标准专利许可中可变价格的社会福利效应:基于产品差异化的视角

技术标准在产品生产过程中的使用越来越广泛,标准专利许可定价形式问题关系到技术标准所有者和产品生产者的收益,有待拓展研究。通过构建古诺竞争模型,从产品差异化角度对标准专利许可中可变价格形式的社会福利效应进行分析,得到的主要结论为:当产品市场达到均衡,且标准专利许可采用的价格形式是可变价格时,社会总福利随着产品差异化程度的提高而增加,随着差异化产品市场中标准专利使用者数量的增加而增加,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡产量随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡价格与产品差异化程度呈现出倒“U”型关系,临界点为特定的市场规模;标准专利使用者的均衡利润随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大。由此可见,标准专利许可的可变费用比率下降有利于激励技术标准使用者生产更多的差异化产品,提升社会总福利。     

The “Dark Side” of Deregulation: How Competition Affects the Size of the Shadow Economy

This paper builds a theory that explains the dramatic expansion of the underground economy in the late 1990s by the sharp increase in market competition worldwide. I model an oligopoly game where firms first decide on entry and sector, and then compete in price. Operating in the underground sector reduces variable costs, but comes at the risk of being detected and fined. As competition intensifies (i.e., as consumers become more and more price‐sensitive), underground firms attract more demand, thus stealing business and profits from official firms. As a consequence, more firms enter the underground economy. A lenient policy toward the underground economy may increase welfare when markups are high, but will be welfare‐detrimental when markups are low.     

Location choices and third‐degree spatial price discrimination

This paper studies how firms choose their product differentiation levels when they engage in third‐degree price discrimination in the following product market competition in a location‐price model. We show that firms will not choose to locate at the two endpoints if different consumer groups have similar sizes. Hence, the principle of maximum differentiation does not hold, resulting in a more intense product market price competition. Only if the size of one group of consumers is sufficiently larger than that of the other group, would firms make their products as differentiated as possible by choosing the two endpoints as their locations.     

PRICE FLOORS AND QUALITY CHOICE

This paper studies effects of price floors in a simple model of vertical product differentiation. We find that even non‐binding price floor (i.e., minimum price set below the lowest Nash equilibrium price in the baseline model) can increase quality on the market, if the cost of quality is sufficiently low. Where a binding price floor does not increase the equilibrium quality, it makes consumers worse off. There is also a possibility of over‐investment into quality as a result of the binding minimum price.     

Import sensitive products and perverse tariff‐rate quota liberalization

Abstract This paper shows that a Tariff‐Rate‐Quota's (TRQ) minimum access expansion can perversely trigger domestic price increases. Often, TRQs have prohibitive over‐quota tariffs to mimic import quotas in providing minimum market access. In the WTO's Doha Round, it is likely that countries using TRQs will avoid aggressive tariff reductions if they increase the quota portion of TRQs. We show that when the import price lies between the unit cost of production and the price received by domestic upstream firms, an increase in import quota as a share of domestic production may cause an increase in the domestic retail price.     

Dynamic Model for Market Competition and Price Rigidity

This article presents a price floor model in which durability, unit costs and production period are factors in explaining price rigidity. This article elaborates that cost structure plays an essential role in resolving the inconclusive relationship between market concentration and price rigidity. When the industry is characterized by decreasing returns of scale, the degree of price flexibility decreases as market competition intensifies. The reverse is true when the industry exhibits increasing returns of scale. The factors that cause price rigidity also foster price adjustment asymmetry and price adjustment lag. During times of recession, the model exhibits upward price flexibility as costs increase, but downward price rigidity as costs decrease. Even under forward-looking expectations, the way in which firms adjust prices could look as though they have adaptive expectations. If price stickiness is a characteristic of market competition, then public policies determined by price level could be too drastic for firms in competitive markets.     

Incentive regulation in local telecommunications: The effects on price markups

The governing bodies of the telecommunications industry instituted a major shift from rate of return to price cap regulation in an effort to foster competition and improve efficiency. This paper focuses on the local exchange market and examines the price markup before and after the implementation of price cap regulation to measure the effects of the change on consumer welfare. The average price markup increased slightly after price cap regulation; however, the average price decreased, indicating that consumers benefited without firms losing from the regulatory shift.      

Comparing Horizontal Mergers Under Cournot with Bertrand Competitions

Taking the product substitutability into account, this paper considers the horizontal mergers under Cournot with Bertrand competition. Firstly, the big market size indicates non‐intention to merge. Secondly, independent goods indicate indifferences between the quantity competition and price competition. Finally, firms under quantity competition are more willing to merge than under price competition. The antitrust authority is more inclined to approve the merger under quantity competition than that under price competition.     

A DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE AUSTRALIAN RAW WOOL MARKET*

This paper develops a quarterly disequilibrium model of the Australian wool market. It is postulated that because of inherent market imperfections the market does not clear. The model consists of demand and supply equations for both private and government traders, a minimum condition to determine quantity transacted and a price adjustment equation based on excess demand/supply. Effective demand/supply concepts which recognise the expectation of rationing are employed to model private demand/supply. Supplier price expectations explicitly account for the lower bound imposed by the minimum reserve price scheme (RPS). The estimates suggest that the disequilibrium hypothesis cannot be rejected, as a consequence measures of market imbalance are provided. The model is also used to simulate the effects of the removal of the RPS.     

Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams

We conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market. The market was operationalized as a repeated game between two “teams” with one, two, or three players in each team. We found that asking (and winning) prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two- or three-person teams. There were no general effects of team size, but prices increased with time when each team member was paid his or her own asking price and decreased when the team's profits were divided equally. This result is consistent with a simple model of individual learning.     

Supply Disruptions and Regional Price Effects in a Spatial Oligopoly—An Application to the Global Gas Market

Supply shocks in the global gas market may affect countries differently, as the market is regionally interlinked but not perfectly integrated. Additionally, high supply‐side concentration may expose countries to market power in different ways. To evaluate the strategic position of importing countries with regard to gas supplies, we disentangle the import price into different components and characterize each component as price increasing or price decreasing. Because of the complexity of the interrelations in the global gas market, we use an equilibrium model programmed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and simulate the blockage of liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows through the Strait of Hormuz. This enables us to account for the oligopolistic nature and the asymmetry of the gas supply. We find that Japan faces the most severe price increases, as the Japanese gas demand completely relies on LNG supply. In contrast, European countries such as the UK benefit from good interconnection to the continental pipeline system and domestic price taking production, both of which help to mitigate an increase in physical costs of supply as well as in the exercise of market power.     

Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfectly Competitive Eco‐Industries

Permit markets lead polluting firms to purchase abatement goods from an eco‐industry which is often concentrated. This paper studies the consequences of this sort of imperfectly competitive eco‐industry on the equilibrium choices of the competitive polluting firms. It then characterizes the second‐best pollution cap. By comparing this situation to one of perfect competition, we show that Cournot competition on the abatement good market contributes not only to a nonoptimal level of emission reduction but also to a higher permit price, which reduces the production level. These distortions increase with market power, measured by the margin taken by the noncompetitive firms, and suggest a second‐best larger pollution cap.     

Price effects of the euro cash changeover: the role of product market competition

The euro cash changeover that took place in 2002 in 12 countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union was associated with abnormal price increases in most member countries. This paper investigates the influence of product market competition on the size of the changeover-related prices hikes, showing that the price hikes were less prevalent in countries with a higher level of competition. For the countries that are to join the euro area in coming years, this means that fostering competition can help contain changeover-related price increases. This aspect is of particular importance for the most recent and next wave of euro adopters, because of their rather heavy product market regulation as measured by the OECD, which are likely to restrain competition. The results indicate that comprehensive reform efforts can be more beneficial in containing changeover-related price hikes than a selective easing of product market regulation in a subset of areas.     

利用期货市场转移南水北调中水价波动的风险

南水北调是缓解北方水资源危机而采取的大规模调水工程，适应社会主义市场经济的要求，该工程中水资源配置将采用市场机制运作，由供求关系形成水的价格，水价波动决定了价格风险的存在，而水价过高将给企业带来成本的提高或利润的下降。为此，本文针对南水北调中的城市工业用水，提出利用期货市场的风险转移功能来规避水价波动给企业带来的风险，有利于增强企业的国际竞争力。     

Price or Quantity? A New Irrelevance Result for Mixed Markets

Earlier studies for mixed markets have established a series of so‐called irrelevance results. While previous results relate to the attainment of the first‐best allocation for welfare, we provide a new irrelevance result in terms of the choice of strategic variable in the product market. We show that regardless of whether a public or private firm is the market leader, the leader always chooses the price contract whereas the follower is indifferent between the price contract and the quantity contract. The identity of the leader and the follower firm is therefore irrelevant for the equilibrium mode of competition. Implications for economic models in mixed market settings emerge, which are also discussed.     

Wage inequality in Turkey, 2002–10

This paper studies the evolution of wage inequality in Turkey using household labour force survey data from 2002 to 2010. Between 2002 and 2004, the relative supply of more‐educated workers to less‐educated workers remained constant while their relative wages decreased in favour of less‐educated workers. However, between 2004 and 2010, the relative supply of more‐educated workers to less‐educated workers rose, while their relative wages remained constant or kept increasing in favour of more‐educated workers. This suggests factors other than those implied by a simple supply‐demand model are involved, such as skill‐biased technical change or minimum wage variations. The decomposition of wage inequality reveals that the price (wage) effect dominates the composition effect particularly in the first period. Our results show that the real minimum wage hike in 2004 corresponds to a major institutional change, which proved to be welfare‐increasing in terms of wage inequality. The upper‐tail (90/50) wage inequality decreased between 2002 and 2004 and stayed constant thereafter, whereas the lower‐tail (50/10) wage inequality decreased throughout the period. Our findings thus provide evidence supporting the institutional argument for explaining wage inequality.     

The asymmetric impacts of monetary policy on housing prices: A viewpoint of housing price rigidity

Previous studies have discovered the defensive characteristics of housing prices, which is also known as downward price rigidity. This paper discusses whether this feature would result in an asymmetric relationship between housing prices and monetary policy. This paper first uses the loss aversion behavior of traders to assess the viability of housing price rigidity in the housing market and to deduce further that if downward housing price rigidity actually existed, then the impact of monetary policy on housing prices should be asymmetric. For empirical tests, this paper uses data from the UK housing market and then uses the money supply as the proxy variable of monetary policy. The relationships between these two variables are observed. This paper performs estimation using both traditional and threshold error correction models by comparing the coefficients of both models. The results indicate that housing price is indeed asymmetrically adjusted to money supply. When housing prices increase to reflect a loose monetary policy, a modification behavior is evident. Conversely, housing prices cannot easily reflect a tight monetary policy. This result indicates that housing prices tend to overreact in upturn and underreact in downturn. The results imply that when implementing relevant policies for the housing market, the government should consider the asymmetry of housing price changes. Otherwise, the situation can easily result in the creation of a bubble or the collapse of the housing market because of incorrect policies.     

Housing Prices in Urban China as Determined by Demand and Supply

This paper studies the demand for and supply of residential housing in urban China since the late 1980s when the urban housing market became commercialized. Using aggregated annual data from 1987 to 2012 in a simultaneous equations framework we show that the rapid increase in the urban residential housing price can be well explained by the forces of demand and supply, with income determining demand and cost of construction affecting supply. We find the income elasticity of demand for urban housing to be approximately 1, the price elasticity of demand to be approximately ?1.1 and the price elasticity of supply of the total housing stock to be approximately 0.5. The resulting long‐run effect of income on urban housing prices in elasticity terms is approximately 0.7, because the increase in income has shifted the demand curve outward more rapidly than the supply curve.     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

The impact of brand selection on price competition - a double-edged sword

Brand selection - the number of alternative brands of a particular product - is a double-edged sword in that on the one hand it increases rivalry and so stimulates price competition but on the other hand it causes consumers to be poorly informed and thus vulnerable to exploitation and so dampens price competition. This phenomenon is demonstrated analytically and empirically, with analytical work based on Hotelling's unit market line. Using price dispersion as a measure of the state of price competition, it is shown that a widening in price dispersion, that is, a lessening of price competition, arises from an increase in brand selection. Any increase in the number of alternative brands on offer (brand selection) causes an increase in ‘DIF-ness’ (Distortion in Information Function) which in turn causes an increase in price dispersion (a lessening of price competition). The phenomenon is demonstrated empirically through a small survey of household beverages.