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The ‘Singapore scenario’: the uncertain prospects for labour standards in post‐Brexit Britain 下载免费PDF全文
Charles Woolfson 《Industrial Relations Journal》2017,48(5-6):384-402
The Conservative government of Theresa May asserted that labour standards would be preserved post‐Brexit. The Labour Party also privileged labour standards in its anti‐austerity programme. The threat remains however that Brexit will provide an incentive to erode labour standards in a global ‘race to the bottom’ in a ‘Singapore scenario’. 相似文献
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Carolyn Carroll John M. Griffith Patricia M. Rudolph 《Managerial and Decision Economics》1999,20(3):163-171
We examine the hypothesis that white knights enter control contests to spend free cash flow instead of paying it out to shareholders. Tobin's q is used to measure management's inclination to invest in negative NPV investments. We find that historically, white knights have over‐invested and their acquisition of the target is one more negative NPV investment. Alternatively, hostile bidders’ past investment decisions have increased shareholder wealth. Furthermore, white knights’ returns upon the announcement of their bid have a significant negative relationship with free cash flow, implying that their bid reveals information about white knights management's investment decisions. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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《American journal of economics and sociology》2016,75(2):263-263
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《American journal of economics and sociology》2016,75(3):567-567
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《American journal of economics and sociology》2016,75(5):1047-1048
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《American journal of economics and sociology》2016,75(4):841-841
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The turn of the millennium is associated with increased corporate fraud, largely attributed to the failure of corporate governance. The compensation committee is expected to minimize fraud by rewarding only appropriate CEO behavior. A causal modeling approach, the Directed Acyclic Graph, was used to estimate the structure of corporate fraud. Corporate fraud was measured as illegal earnings statement(s), not all restatements but only those found illegal. A major finding is that the CEO's stock‐option compensation motivates the CEO to commit corporate earnings fraud, while cash salaries and bonuses are only indirectly related to earnings fraud through those stock options. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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