Institutional Quality and International Trade

Institutions—quality of contract enforcement, property rights, shareholder protection, and the like—have received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences, beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modelled within the framework of incomplete contracts. We show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity. Institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply, among other things, that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade. Second, we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade, using data on U.S. imports disaggregated by country and industry. The empirical results provide evidence of "institutional content of trade": institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows.     

Endogenous business networks

Business networks are a feature of the organizational landscapeof many countries, though they vary in magnitude. This articledevelops a theory of business networks where they are endogenousto the reliability of the legal system. Networks are a substitutefor reliable institutional support that guarantees written contracts.The existence of networks exerts a negative effect on the functioningof the anonymous market. This is because the network absorbshonest individuals, raising the density of dishonest individualsengaged in anonymous market exchange. Since this lowers thepayoff from market exchange, larger networks may be easier toenforce. We find that networks are economically inefficientunless they are relatively large. This is consistent with theview that informal contract enforcement institutions may beinefficient in general equilibrium even though they enhanceefficiency in partial equilibrium.     

Risky business: Institutions vs. social networks in FDI

Political economy scholarship on foreign direct investment (FDI) emphasizes variation in host country political risk but overlooks variation in investors' sensitivity to political risk. We show that relational contracting, relationship‐based contract enforcement, is more efficient for high‐risk, human capital‐intensive activities for which the costs of writing legally enforceable contracts are prohibitive. We disaggregate FDI into two distinct varieties: mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and venture capital (VC). We propose that VC flows are less sensitive to host institutions but correlate strongly with skilled migrant networks that monitor compliance and impose reputational costs. Our empirical analysis of dyadic VC and M&A flows covers over 100 countries during 1980–2009. We address other mechanisms through which migrant networks facilitate FDI and verify our results hold at the country‐industry level. These findings suggest that relational contracting facilitates global integration of dynamic, knowledge‐intensive industries even when formal institutions are weak.     

Payment choice in international trade: Theory and evidence from cross‐country firm‐level data

When trading across borders, firms choose between different payment contracts. Theoretically, this should allow firms to trade‐off differences in financing costs and enforcement across countries. This paper provides evidence for this hypothesis employing firm‐level data from a large number of developing countries. As predicted, international transactions are more likely paid after delivery when financing costs in the source country are high and when contract enforcement is low. We extend the theory and also show empirically that the more complex an industry is, the more important is contract enforcement and the less important are financing costs for the contract choice.     

On Mergers and Agglomeration

We formulate a model of mergers and acquisitions assuming a monopolistic competitive industry that exhibits agglomeration economies. We provide the conditions for the existence of a non‐trivial Nash equilibrium in the acquisition market at which the most productive firm acquires a range of less‐productive firms. Most importantly, we show that domestic merger and acquisition activities are international trade promotionary. We also show that such types of mergers and acquisition will improve the competitive position of foreign firms leading to an increase in their market share. In addition, domestic mergers and acquisitions will increase the number of imported varieties.     

论制度是博弈的结果——对诺思制度变迁理论的修正

制度是博弈的纳什均衡。一般而言,博弈主体响应获利机会,产生了对新制度的诱致性需求,开始制度创新活动。但在随后的逐利博弈中,由于利益分割的对抗性,却可能使博弈陷入囚徒困境,表现为无序竞争下的激烈的利益冲突。随着冲突的加深,各个博弈主体产生了更强烈的对新制度——合作规则的渴望,表现为制定规则的讨价还价行为,并附以实施惩罚战略的承诺,但规则往往一再被破坏,因为此时新制度尚未达到纳什均衡,因而难以被遵守。于是,人们试图寻求某种强制性措施——可置信的承诺行动,以求改变收益支付,从而改变博弈均衡,使博弈在集体理性下达到纳什均衡——即新制度最终形成。     

Oil shocks and fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola: Assessing the role of asymmetries and institutions

The aim of this article is to examine procyclicality in Angola, assess whether it behaves asymmetrically over the oil cycle, and test the hypothesis that institutions and fiscal rules can moderate procyclicality. Received wisdom suggests that in resource‐rich economies, fiscal policy tends to be procyclical albeit improvements in the past decades due to institutional reforms. Similar evidence is available for oil‐rich economies; however, we know little about how procyclicality behaves over the oil cycle; that is, whether spending (and revenue) grows faster during oil‐market booms, than during downturns. Further, evidence on institutions and fiscal rules in oil‐exporting economies is still ambiguous. We bridge both gaps by examining fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola, one of the largest oil‐producers in Africa, and a country that has experienced an intense process of institutional reforms since 2002. Therefore, it is an ideal candidate for our study. We use data for the 2004–2014 period to estimate a threshold vector error correction model that extends vector autoregressive and vector correction methods used up to date. Our results indicate that revenue and spending are generally procyclical to oil shocks, that revenue is more procyclical during booms, and that institutional quality, net inflows, financial openness, and fiscal rules affect procyclicality.     

Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts

In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto-dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto-dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF HOLD‐UP PROBLEM AND NON‐EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE CONTRACT

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model that examines the emergence of non‐exclusive franchise contracts in the presence of the franchisor hold‐up problem. Our model of an endogenous franchising network underscores the trade‐off between the cost associated with specifying and enforcing the contractual terms and the cost associated with broadening the relationships with multiple franchisors. We show that when the contracting cost relative to the relational cost is high and when the economies of specialization is low, a non‐exclusive franchise contract is an optimal contractual arrangement to mitigate franchisor opportunism.     

Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy

This paper examines how much of the difference in the size of the informal sector and in per capita income across countries can be accounted by regulation costs and enforcement of financial contracts. It constructs and solves numerically a general equilibrium model with credit constrained heterogenous agents, occupational choices over formal and informal businesses, financial frictions and a government sector which imposes taxes and regulations on formal firms. The benefit from formalization is better access to outside finance. The quantitative exercises suggest that: (i) regulation costs and not the level of enforcement account for differences in the size of the informal sector between United States and Mediterranean Europe; (ii) for a developing country like Peru, however, contract enforcement and regulation costs are equally important in accounting for the size of the informal sector; and (iii) regulation costs and contract enforcement do not account for most of the income differences observed among countries.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Performance Pay and Adverse Selection*

It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyze an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the firms’ gain from worker self‐selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive contracts are excessively high‐powered, thereby inducing the more productive workers to exert too much effort and increasing agency costs stemming from the misallocation of effort.     

Is Tinkering with Institutional Quality a Panacea for Firm Performance? Insights from a Semiparametric Approach to Modeling Firm Performance

There is a large and growing literature on the impact of institutional quality on economic performance and the broad consensus is that “good” institutions facilitate better economic performance. The literature that provides micro‐level support for the policy discourse about institutional quality does not, however, account for significant intra‐country variation in reactions of firms to changes in business environments, even within the same industry, and it generally ignores the possibility that the impact of institutional quality on firm performance may not be neutral. In this paper, we analyze the impact of institutions on firm performance using an approach that enables us to overcome these problems with the stylized approach. Using cross‐country firm‐level data, we demonstrate that not only does the marginal impact of institutional quality vary significantly within countries, but also that the impact is economically significant only at the two extremes of the distribution. We view this as prima facie evidence that policies that tinker with institutional quality on the basis of the popular wisdom about the impact of these institutions on the average firm may not have the desired or expected impact, at least at the micro level.     

A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

We construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. It allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross‐subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists. In fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs. We show that the Miyazaki–Wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome.     

Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent‐seeking

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent‐seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between the size of government and economic growth. We find that with very high (low) discounting, there is a unique low (high) growth equilibrium, regardless of the size of government. For the intermediate range of discounting, there are multiple equilibria and the growth outcome depends on the size of government. With endogenous time discounting, the growth outcome is path dependent and depends on the level of inherited human capital. However, there is only one stable growth regime and the economy endogenously switches to it. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are not extremely high, the stable regime is the one in which there is a high‐growth equilibrium for a smaller size of the government and for larger size, both the high‐growth and the low‐growth equilibrium coexist. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are extremely high, there exists only a unique high‐growth equilibrium irrespective of the size of government. Furthermore, economies with bigger size of the government and/or with poor quality institutions will take longer to endogenously switch to this stable growth regime.     

Stable Tariffs and Retaliations*

A two‐country, two‐commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash‐equilibrium, a non‐free‐trade outcome. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the “contingent threat situation” to reformulate tariff retaliations. In this context, we show that the free trade is a stable outcome. More surprisingly, this interesting result is also valid for the “Johnson case,” where one country is better off under the tariff‐ridden Nash equilibrium compared to free trade.     

How to allocate forward contracts: The case of electricity markets

Several regulatory authorities worldwide have imposed forward contract commitments on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In this paper we analyze the impact of such commitments on equilibrium outcomes in a model that reflects important institutional and structural features of electricity markets. We show that, when firms are asymmetric, the distribution of contracts among firms matters. In the case of a single dominant firm, the regulator can be confident that allocating contracts to that firm will be pro-competitive. However, when asymmetries are less extreme, certain contract allocations might yield anti-competitive outcomes by eliminating more competitive equilibria. Our analysis thus suggests that forward contracts should be allocated so as to (virtually) reduce asymmetries across firms.     

Contract length heterogeneity and the persistence of monetary shocks in a dynamic generalized Taylor economy

We develop the generalized Taylor economy (GTE) in which there are many sectors with overlapping contracts of different lengths. In economies with the same average contract length, monetary shocks will be more persistent when longer contracts are present. Using the Bils–Klenow distribution of contract lengths, we find that the corresponding GTE tracks the U.S. data well. When we choose a GTE with the same distribution of completed contract lengths as the Calvo, the economies behave in a similar manner.     

Firm Investment decisions in the post‐conflict context

Economic and political transition can occur through peaceful or violent means. Violent transition disrupts the incentive for firms to make productive investments. This paper studies the determinants of profit reinvestment for firms in post‐conflict transition economies. Results indicate that while access to finance is an important determinant of reinvestment during transition, it is not as important in the post‐conflict context. However, property rights protections, in particular institutions of contract enforcement, are a more important determinant of profit reinvestment for firms operating in the post‐conflict environment than for firms in general. This indicates that obstacles to investment are context specific.     

A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy

Summary This paper examines an economy in which agents with private information about their own productive capabilities seek to raise capital to fund their investment projects. We employ an equilibrium concept which is closely related to Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. In equilibrium, all agents who succeed in raising capital (entrepreneurs) are pooled; they all receive the same contract or consumption schedule. Entrepreneurs, however, are separated from those who fail to raise capital. This separation results in productive efficiency for the economy. If the economy has no viable alternative investment opportunity (other than agents' projects) then equilibrium allocations can be supported by a (non-intermediated) securities market. If there is a viable alternative, the equilibrium allocations cannot be supported by a securities market equilibrium. We interpret this case as suggesting the emergence of financial intermedary coalitions.