Slow but stable(ish) house price growth lies ahead

• ? UK house price growth is running out of steam. And with household incomes squeezed and the affordability of housing stretched, we think a prolonged period of very modest growth lies ahead. But the prospect of a crash is remote.
• ? At 2.6% in Q2 2017, annual house price growth is presently running at a four‐year low. This is a step change down from the recent peak of nearly 10% in mid‐2014 and average growth of 4% over the current economic expansion.
• ? Three developments are likely to lie behind this slowdown. The first is weak growth in households' real income, cutting the ability to save for a deposit or finance a move up the housing ladder. That said, past periods of sluggish income growth have not always been associated with low house price inflation.
• ? The second is the consequence of recent tax hikes imposed on buy‐to‐let investors and second‐home owners, which theory suggests should be capitalised in lower property prices.
• ? The third and perhaps most important reason is the increasing unaffordability of housing to an ever‐widening sub‐set of the population. The ratio of house prices to earnings is almost back at its pre‐crisis record. And the income of the average mortgage borrower is close to £60,000, more than double the average annual wage.
• ? This third factor has implications beyond price growth, suggesting both a permanently lower level of transactions and a further decline in the number of households with mortgages, continuing a trend which began at the beginning of the century.
• ? But set against these headwinds is the cushion provided by record lows for both mortgage rates and mortgage affordability. Overall, house prices are caught between a lack of traditional drivers of accelerating growth, but equally an absence of forces which have typically caused prices to fall. Hence, our expectation of a period of sluggish, but relatively stable, growth.

     

Thrifty firms and thriftless households are risks to growth

• ? Structural changes in savings behaviour by households and especially firms in advanced economies in recent years pose threats to global growth. Household savings may have been compressed by high wealth levels, pointing to the risk of a sharp rise in saving and fall in spending if asset prices correct. One positive compared to a decade ago, however, is that US personal saving is less depressed than then.
• ? The bigger risk is arguably on the corporate side, where firms' net savings have risen on average by 2–3 percentage points of GDP since the early 1990s. This has been accompanied by weakening investment, especially in net terms. The reasons behind this are varied – post‐crisis caution, demographic factors and a shift to R&D intensive industry may all have played a role. But a key factor is likely to have been changes in incentives facing executives, leading them to prioritise stock buybacks over investment. This risks creating a long‐term low‐growth feedback loop.

     

Why the UK saving ratio is unlikely to flip anytime soon

• ? With inflation down and wages rising, the outlook for consumer spending in the UK is brightening. But should households opt to boost savings, the mood could darken.
• ? We think a meaningful rise in the saving ratio from its recent record lows is unlikely, though. Austerity may be easing, but the drag from fiscal policy is still set to limit households’ savings resources, while the durability of the current expansion may reduce the motivation for precautionary saving.
• ? What's more, any rise in interest rates on savings accounts will probably be even slower than the modest pace we expect for Bank Rate. And with the demographic shift toward an older, less thrifty, population, the appetite of households to save looks set to remain subdued.

     

Housing slump could cut world growth to decade‐low

• ? A combined slump in house prices and housing investment in the major economies could cut world growth to a 10‐year low of 2.2% by 2020 – and to below 2% if it also triggered a tightening in global credit conditions.
• ? In such a scenario, inflation would remain well below target in the main economies, and US Fed rates would be up to 100 basis points lower than in our baseline by 2021.
• ? Signs of a global house price downturn are already visible, with around a third of our sample of economies seeing falling prices and world residential investment starting to decline. High house price valuations add to the risk that this downturn will deepen in the coming quarters, hitting consumer spending.
• ? Using the Oxford Global Economic Model, we find that a 10% fall in house prices and an 8% fall in housing investment both cut growth by around 0.3%‐0.4% across regions. Adding a sharp Chinese downturn, such as that seen in 2015, has a large additional impact on growth in Asia .

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: World growth cut as financial woes persist

• This month sees our world GDP forecast for 2016 cut to 2.3%, from 2.6% previously. Our new forecast implies this year will be the weakest for the world economy since 2009.
• Our 2016 growth forecast was over 3% in mid‐2015. But the economic backdrop has worsened markedly since, with steep drops in stock markets, slumping commodities and widening credit spreads.
• We flagged the risks from the financial market sell‐off last month and conditions have improved little since. Worse, there are some signs that weakness in the real economy may be broadening.
• This month's global downgrade partly reflects familiar factors such as worsening emerging markets: we now expect even deeper recessions in Brazil and Russia.
• The US forecast has also been downgraded again, to 2% from 2.4% last month. This in part reflects a soft Q4 GDP reading, one worrying detail of which was a weaker performance by consumer spending.
• Signs of a slowdown in services were also visible in the PMI surveys for January in the US and Eurozone. Partly as a result, our Eurozone growth forecast has been cut this month to 1.6% from 1.8%.
• With world industry already stagnant, signs of weakness spreading to services are unwelcome. We are particularly concerned that the financial market slump will create a negative global credit and confidence shock.
• Another concern is that the collapse in world stock prices is starting to have ‘negative wealth effects’. For most consumers, wealth effects are more likely to be generated by house price moves. In this respect, there is some room for optimism – house prices are still growing in most of the main economies.
• But housing is weakening in some emerging countries and world house and stock prices have tended to move together since 2007.
• Pressures on policymakers to act remain strong and are increasingly focused on using negative interest rates – as in Japan and Sweden in the last month.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Market falls overstate loss of momentum

• ? Financial market moves in recent months suggest that there is increasing concern about a substantial global growth slowdown or even a recession. But we continue to see this as an over‐reaction to the weakening economic data; while the downside risks to the global GDP growth outlook have clearly risen, our baseline forecast for 2019 is little changed at 2.7%, down from 3% in 2018.
• ? Recent economic news confirms that the Q3 economic soft patch appears to have spilled over into Q4, particularly in the industrial sector which has seen a broad‐based loss of momentum in many economies coinciding with a further slowdown in global trade growth. But while surveys of service sector activity have also moderated, the falls have been rather less abrupt, suggesting that overall global GDP growth is slowing albeit not alarmingly so.
• ? On balance, we think that the weaker data do not provide compelling evidence that global growth is slowing more sharply than our December forecast. Although the financial market sell‐off and associated tightening in financial conditions will impinge on growth, this may at least be partly offset by weaker inflation in response to lower oil prices, now seen at US$61pb in 2019. This, combined with the continued strength of labour markets and the likelihood of further moderate wage growth, points to a further period of solid household spending growth.
• ? Nonetheless, the risk of a sharper slowdown has risen. Cyclical risks have increased over the past couple of years as spare capacity has diminished. And uncertainty over the economic and financial market impact of the unwinding of central balance sheets have added to the risk of policy mistakes.
• ? Although our central view is that the recent financial market correction will not morph into something rather nastier, further sustained weakness (particularly if accompanied by dollar strength) would have more significant implications for activity and could see world growth falling below the 2016 post‐crisis low of 2.4%.

     

G7 consumption: after the wealth rush

• ? In only one of 12 large advanced economies do we expect consumption to outstrip GDP growth in 2018. As key drivers rotate, the impact of a recovery in real incomes will be dampened by higher oil prices and waning wealth effects .
• ? Policy‐fuelled asset booms sustained the post‐crisis recovery in G7 consumption, though by historical standards the recovery was nothing special. Historically, the G7's average 5‐year recovery from troughs entailed consumption matching GDP growth, but in the five years from 2010 consumption was 0.2 ppt weaker. Its relative strength only picked up from 2015, when boosted by weak oil prices.
• ? Relatively weak G7 consumption growth is likely to continue as key drivers rotate. Strong employment growth and a modest pick‐up in wage inflation will offset waning equity and housing wealth effects.
• ? Near‐term risks are two‐way. An oil‐fuelled inflation surprise could hit consumers, wreck central bank gradualism and reveal balance sheet weaknesses. Currently, however, we see only limited pockets of credit risk and vulnerability to higher rates.
• ? Conversely, there is scope for a credit‐fuelled boost to consumption. G7 household borrowing relative to its trend is arguably close to 40‐year lows, so unless financial deepening has reached a limit, there is scope for increases in borrowing. Furthermore, G7 bank deleveraging could be over, boosting credit supply conditions.
• ? We see two positive longer‐term drivers of the global consumption share: (i) Asian economies will become more consumption‐driven; (ii) Household re‐leveraging offers scope for some debt‐fuelled consumption growth. Offsetting negatives are that demographics, interest rates and asset prices will provide little support

     

Brexit fears mask underlying pressures on investment

• ? Brexit uncertainty is seen as a likely culprit behind weakness in UK business investment. But structural shifts in the economy alongside issues relating to how investment is measured suggest that even without the uncertainty factor, a significant revival in measured investment spending may not materialise.
• ? Movements in relative prices continue to favour expansion by relatively labour‐intensive rather than capital‐intensive sectors. Relatedly, a shift towards investment‐light services activity is persisting, while recent changes in the make‐up of employment are reducing the extent of likely automation.
• ? Moreover, the ongoing pace of technological change and corresponding fears of rapid obsolescence could deter investment. And an increasingly fuzzy division between investment and consumer spending suggests that official data may be increasingly understating investment's true level.

     

Higher interest rates should not unduly faze consumers

• ? Though the MPC has signalled a more aggressive pace of interest hikes than previously anticipated, we still expect the impact on the consumer sector in aggregate to be modest. We estimate that household debt servicing costs will rise from the current level of 4.1% of household income to 5.0% by the end of 2019. This would still be only a little over half the pre‐crisis peak.
• ? We expect the MPC to hike interest rates twice in both 2018 and 2019, taking Bank Rate to 1.5% by the end of next year. Higher interest rates will impact on consumer spending by increasing debt servicing costs and reducing the attractiveness of credit (including mortgages), but savers will benefit from higher returns on their deposits.
• ? Mortgages account for 77% of loans to UK households and full pass through of a 100bp rise in Bank Rate to variable rate loans, implying an increase from 2.78% to 3.78%, would add £100 a month to the cost of servicing an average mortgage. But only two‐fifths of borrowers have a variable rate deal, so for many homeowners the adjustment to higher interest rates will not be immediate. And the proportion of houses which are owned via a mortgage has fallen over the past decade, suggesting that the household sector as a whole will be less sensitive to higher mortgage interest rates.
• ? Historically the relationship between Bank Rate and interest rates on unsecured lending has been weak and rates on credit cards and personal loans have not yet risen following November's rate hike. The link to deposit rates has been stronger and higher returns on savings will mitigate some of the damage to household income from higher debt servicing costs, although uneven distribution of debt and savings means that there will be winners and losers at a more disaggregated level.
• ? We have used the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model to run a counterfactual scenario where Bank Rate is kept at 0.5% throughout 2018 and 2019. The results suggest that the pace of rate hikes assumed in our baseline forecast would reduce the level of consumer spending by 0.2 percentage points by the end of 2019.

     

Fixed versus floating: vulnerability to rising interest rates

• ? Looking at different economies' exposure to fixed‐ and floating‐rate private‐sector debt reveals how vulnerable they could be to rising interest rates. Our analysis finds that Hong Kong, Sweden, China and Australia are potentially most exposed via floating rates to rising debt service costs. A 150bp rise in rates would also push several other countries' debt service ratios above the peaks of 2008. Less vulnerable economies include the US and Germany.
• ? High levels of floating‐rate debt imply a large and rapid pass‐through of rising interest rates to firms and households, with negative consequences. Exposure to floating‐rate debt as a share of GDP varies greatly: the highest levels are in Hong Kong, China, Sweden, Australia and Spain, with the lowest levels in the US, France and Germany.
• ? Growing shares of fixed‐rate housing debt in the US, Eurozone and UK mean the impact of higher interest rates may be less severe than a decade ago. Private deleveraging in countries such as the US, UK and Spain could also soften the impact.
• ? A rise of 100bp in short‐term interest rates would raise the debt service ratio after one year by around 2.5% of GDP in Hong Kong, with increases of 1.5–1.7% of GDP in Sweden, China and Australia. The smallest effects would be in the US and Germany.
• ? A 100–150bp rate rise would push debt service ratios in China, Hong Kong, Canada, France and the Netherlands well above their peaks of a decade ago. A similar rate rise would take debt service ratios in Sweden, South Korea and Australia close to, or above, previous peaks.
• ? The distribution of debt within economies, which our analysis does not cover, is also important. For example, there is some evidence that the US corporate sector has a high concentration of debt among borrowers with weak finances. Countries that are highly vulnerable to interest rate rises may see their central banks normalise policy rates more slowly than they otherwise would.

     

A ‘lost decade’ for pay may be a taste of things to come

• ? The failure of pay growth to respond to falling unemployment is less of a puzzle when allowance is made for structural changes in the jobs market. But the same developments make it hard to see where a pay revival will come from.
• ? In real terms, the average weekly wage in the UK is below the level of 10 years ago, an unprecedentedly poor performance. This is despite joblessness dropping to a 42‐year low and employment at a record high.
• ? The responsiveness of pay to falling unemployment has dwindled. A shift towards less secure forms of employment, the tightening up of eligibility for benefits and the consequences of globalisation have all made workers more compliant and less willing and able to push for higher wages.
• ? The result has been a decline in the ‘equilibrium’ rate of unemployment. The Bank of England currently judges this rate to be around 4.5%. But that earnings growth is so subdued despite unemployment being in line the Bank's estimate suggests that the sustainable rate of joblessness may well be much lower.
• ? With unemployment forecast to plateau at current levels, the odds of a revival in pay growth look slim, despite possible upsides from strong corporate profitability and rises in the National Living Wage. This would not be a new development – a secular decline in earnings growth has been apparent over the last 30 years in both nominal and real terms, with pay growth in successive periods of economic expansion failing to return to pre‐recession norms.
• ? This suggests that a serious revival in pay growth is unlikely to happen without the economy operating at significantly higher pressure and with a substantially lower unemployment rate. But this would require a recognition of, and a more accommodative policy response to, the historically weak economic expansion since the financial crisis. Neither seems likely.

     

房屋拆迁会刺激家庭的金融市场参与吗？——一个心理账户的分析视角

在心理账户的作用下,拆迁补偿款的发放使得家庭更加倾向于参与金融市场投资,因此房屋拆迁将会显著提高家庭的金融市场参与度。对此,基于中国家庭金融调查（CHIP2013）和中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS2018）数据,运用工具变量法,实证检验了房屋拆迁对家庭金融市场参与的影响,结果表明,房屋拆迁会在一定程度上促进家庭的金融市场参与,且这一效果在消费支出少和金融资产余额多的家庭中更加显著。同时,中介效应检验结果发现,在房屋拆迁促进家庭金融市场参与的过程中,家庭可支配收入发挥了部分中介作用。这意味着,在房屋拆迁补偿中,不仅拆迁户应该警惕过度参与金融市场的非理性行为,而且政府和金融机构也应该组织和提供不同形式的金融教育,提高拆迁户的金融素养,从而预防拆迁返贫的悲剧。     

UK inflation set to tumble below target by autumn

• ? We expect CPI inflation to slow markedly this year, dropping below the 2% target by the autumn. The inflationary impulse from the 2016 depreciation is fading and should partially reverse, while global food and energy prices are expected to stabilise. Base effects will become increasingly important.
• ? CPI inflation reached a five‐and‐a‐half‐year high of 3.1% in November, up from a little over 1% a year earlier. The 2017 pick‐up in inflation was the result of a perfect storm of a weaker pound, higher oil prices and sharp rises in domestic electricity bills. But inflation has subsequently slowed, reaching 2.5% in March. And, after a brief hiatus, we expect the downward trend to continue as we move through the year.
• ? The key driver of lower inflation will be weaker core pressures. In line with the literature, there is already evidence that the impact of sterling's depreciation is fading, and we think that the pressures could partially reverse if sterling continues to strengthen. We see little prospect of an offsetting escalation in domestic cost pressures. The recent pick‐up in wage growth has been muted and a further acceleration above 3% looks unlikely while there remains slack in the labour market.
• ? The food, petrol and energy categories contributed 0.8 ppt to CPI inflation last year, compared with a drag of 0.5 ppt in 2016, as stronger global pressures combined with the weaker pound. But as global prices have been more subdued of late, by the end of 2018, we expect these categories to be contributing 0.5 ppt to CPI inflation.
• ? The final element behind the expected slowdown in inflation is base effects. The comparison with last year's strong price pressures will depress the 2018 inflation rate, and we see the base effects being at their strongest mid‐year.
• ? We think it unlikely that such a slowdown in inflation would derail the MPC from hiking interest rates twice this year. But it could temper its hawkishness in 2019.

     

ECB tapering: beware of global consequences

• ? The ECB's scaling back of its QE programme in 2018 could be more disruptive to global financial markets than the Federal Reserve's ongoing balance sheet unwinding. ECB bond purchases led Eurozone private investors to inject a massive amount of funds into global debt markets over the last few years. As the ECB reduces its stimulus, Eurozone investors will gradually pare back the build‐up of their foreign debt exposures. The full unwinding of ECB QE will see investors rebalance toward domestic debt securities .
• ? We expect Eurozone investors to continue injecting funds into global debt markets as the ECB proceeds to wind down its QE, but they will do so at a much slower pace. Based on our projections, European purchases of foreign debt securities this year will total €200 billion – down by half from the average €400 billion over the last three years. Such a large reduction raises the risk of disruption in some markets.
• ? How did we get here? Spillovers from the ECB's QE were much more pronounced than during Fed's. European private investors that sold bonds to the ECB during its QE programme faced a commensurate shortage of domestic debt assets. In contrast to the US experience, ECB buying far exceeded new domestic issuance, inducing private investors to sharply increase purchases of overseas debt securities.
• ? Ultimately, we expect European investors to seek to restore the share of domestic debt securities in their portfolios to a level in line with the historical norm, after the proportion of their domestic debt holdings fell by 7pp since the programme began. The rebalancing is likely to start in earnest once the ECB stops buying (and eventually starts selling) securities. As a result, the global debt issuance boom is likely to lose steam, given the extent to which it has relied on the support of European investors.

     

Coronavirus fallout threatens financial stability

• ▪ The coronavirus is set to sharply cut global growth and also risks sparking substantial levels of financial distress among both businesses and households, potentially cascading into the banking sector. The challenges this poses for policymakers is formidable.
• ▪ Financial vulnerabilities were evident in the corporate sector in many economies even before the virus struck, with rising debt, declining credit quality and worsening liquidity positions. Consumer-facing sectors especially at risk from the impact of the virus tend to have weaker financial positions.
• ▪ There are also household fragilities. A large fraction of households - often 40%–50% - have limited liquid assets to tide them over if they cannot work. Access to sickness and unemployment benefits varies widely across economies.
• ▪ High levels of bad loans in some banking systems, most notably in Italy, could be exacerbated by the virus impact, threatening financial stability. High dollar debts in many economies outside the US are another risk factor.
• ▪ As well as containing the virus, policymakers need to consider imaginative approaches to prevent financial distress worsening the economic downturn, potentially including a need to rapidly backstop banks, firms, and households.

     

Trump versus Reagan – the global dimension

• ? Could the Trump era resemble the 1980s? ‘Reaganomics’ boosted world growth – but not necessarily in the ways people think – and not for emerging markets (EMs), a larger part of today's world economy. Growth then was also aided by factors such as declining interest rates, which are missing today, and we doubt that deregulation will lead to a productivity surge. US asset prices, meanwhile, were depressed in 1981, unlike now, so the big gains of the 1980s are unlikely to be repeated. EM assets should do better than back then, though.
• ? Optimistic observers – and to some extent, markets – have been drawing parallels between the policy mixes of the Trump and Reagan administrations, and talking up the prospects of stronger global growth. But while the US did support world growth in the 1980s, this was arguably more due to Keynesian' demand‐side policies than supply‐side ones: Reagan's record on supply‐side policies was mixed.
• ? The US is still an important driver of global activity, but markets may be too optimistic about the effect of Trump's policies on world growth. Any Trump fiscal stimulus will occur against a much less favourable background than that of the 1980s, when US growth also benefitted from a variety of factors missing now.
• ? It is also unclear whether Trump's administration will tolerate large expansions of the current account and fiscal deficits as the ‘price’ for more growth. And we are sceptical about the prospects of big gains from deregulation: US economic dynamism has waned, but the policies so far proposed in this area look potentially misdirected.
• ? Over the coming years asset market performance is unlikely to mirror that of the 1980s: valuations suggest less room for dollar appreciation and stock market gains this time around. But emerging market (EM) assets may do better – the soaring dollar and high US rates that hit EMs in the 1980s are unlikely to be repeated. And our analysis suggests even modestly better US growth will support commodity prices and EM growth.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again

• ? In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside.
• ? The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016.
• ? One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year.
• ? We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support.
• ? But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: A weaker dollar and slightly faster growth

• ? We have raised our world GDP growth forecasts this month, to 2.7% for 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 (from 2.6% and 2.9% previously). Similarly, we have lifted our inflation forecast for this year to 3.1%.
• ? Surveys continue to suggest buoyant global activity, driven by manufacturing in several countries. This, in turn, is helping pull world trade from its 2016 lows. However, this partially reflects factors such as stimulus measures in China, which is boosting construction and manufacturing and bolstering trade in the region, and also benefitting major capital goods exporters such as Germany and Japan.
• ? But there are reasons for caution given there are still underlying factors holding back demand and the likelihood that the fiscal stimulus promised by President Trump will not be as big as expected.
• ? The most important forecast change this month is that we see a weaker US dollar ahead as monetary policy tightening in the US has already been largely priced in. This means our EURUSD and GBPUSD forecasts are now $1.10 and $1.32 by year‐end, while the short‐term outlook for many EM currencies against the US$ has also firmed.
• ? We still expect the Fed to raise rates on another two occasions this year, followed by three hikes in 2018. However, we have brought forward by one quarter to Q4 2017 our forecast of when the Fed will begin to taper reinvestment of its portfolio holdings.
• ? Meanwhile, we think the ECB is still a long way from policy normalisation. We expect QE to be tapered from January until June 2018. Then, the ECB will consider lifting the deposit rate from its negative levels in the final part of 2018, and only in 2020 will it start raising the main refinancing rate.
• ? Emerging markets' prospects have improved amid a strong batch of high frequency indicators and a pick‐up in trade. Given low valuations, we see positive momentum for EM currencies and think that they may have entered a long cycle of strength.

     

Looser financial conditions carry a sting in the tail

• ? Against a long list of headwinds facing the economy, one apparent saving grace has been a relaxation in financial conditions since the start of 2019. Our UK Financial Conditions Index presently sits at its loosest in 18 months.
• ? Some of the lowest real interest rates in the world and a currency trading close to the weakest on record represent, all else equal, are powerful reflationary forces for the UK. But the fundamental cause of loose conditions ‐ the rising no‐deal Brexit odds ‐ mean they carry a sting in the tail.
• ? Conversely, the likely rise in market interest rates and sterling that would follow our expectation of a Brexit deal implies an overall positive for the economy could be dampened by tighter financial conditions.

     

Why we aren't predicting a global recession

• ? Fears that the global economy is heading into a recession are rising. But while we cannot ignore the risks that a recession could be brewing, our baseline assumption is still for a modest growth slowdown from here.
• ? The global economy is in a similar position to 2012 and 2015, as mounting uncertainties dampen growth. This time, trade tensions are a high‐profile culprit rather than the possible collapse of the eurozone or a China hard landing.
• ? In the previous two cases global growth fell to around 2.5% ‐ around the rates seen in Q2 this year ‐ only to then rebound. Our baseline forecasts assume a similar mini cycle, albeit with only a modest growth rebound.
• ? We also assume that further major adverse shocks won't materialise, and that insurance policy moves by central banks will stop a plunge in investment and households from panicking.
• ? Still, recession fears should be taken seriously ‐ slowdowns can become self‐perpetuating. Once annual GDP growth has fallen by over 1ppt from its peak, the eventual decline typically ends up being much larger ‐ of the seven growth slowdowns since the late 1970s where annual growth slowed by over 1ppt ‐ four resulted in either a global recession or only a narrow escape from one.
• ? With US‐China tensions unlikely to recede and factors like the US yield curve inversion adding to the air of gloom, the latest downturn could gain momentum.
• ? Although reduced macro volatility and anchored inflation have made it easier for policymakers to deliver soft landings, the effectiveness of monetary policy has waned. And with China no longer acting as spender of last resort, it's vital that governments in advanced economies stand ready to pick up the slack