Tax Costs and Signalling Benefits: The Impact of Surplus ACT

Companies with surplus ACT are faced with additional tax costs if they use dividends to signal information to investors, hence there is a trade-off between tax costs and signalling benefits. This paper provides evidence that investors' reactions to dividend surprises are influenced by the signal generated by earnings and tax planning considerations. The results indicate that in the presence of a positive earnings signal and a binding tax constraint, decreases in dividends are value enhancing.     

现金股利、控制权结构与股价崩溃风险

本文研究了上市公司在具有不同实际控股股东控制权结构下,现金股利与股价崩溃风险的关系。结果表明,过度支付现金股利会显著增加上市公司的股价崩溃风险;实际控制股东控制权与现金流权的分离程度会加剧现金股利与股价崩溃风险之间的正向关系。我们认为这一现象是现金股利中所蕴含的股东治理效应在资本市场上的体现。其现实意义在于,政策监管要着力于治“本”,通过提升公司治理水平以使股利分配真正立足于保护全体股东的利益。     

Long-Term Performance Following Rights Issues and Open Offers in the UK

Abstract:  This study finds evidence of significant long-term underperformance following rights issues made during 1986-95 in the UK. The findings are resilient to a number of methodological controls. In contrast, our results for a smaller sample of open offers made during 1991-95 show strong positive performance over a 5-year post-issue period, implying that firms making open offers had better growth prospects than firms making rights issues. During 1986-90, a period when open offers were rarely used, firms appeared to be making rights issues to exploit overvaluation. However, this was not evident for rights issues made during 1991-95, a period when open offers were more commonly used.     

The direct costs of UK rights issues and open offers

The paper describes selling and underwriting procedures in rights issues and open offers, and analyses the costs of issue reported in prospectuses, including the substantial costs which are not for underwriting. The impression is often given that costs are fixed at 2 % of gross proceeds, but they vary and average 5.78 %(median 4.28 %). Controlling for economies of scale and fees not related to the issue, costs increase with the proportion of the issue underwritten and with the depth of discount, and decrease with the proportion of the company owned by large shareholders.     

Dilution,Dividend Commitments and Liquidity: Do Dividend Changes Reflect Information Signaling?

We develop new tests of the dividend signaling hypothesis by focusing on the role of liquidity. We allow for two different types of signaling models: one where current dividends signal firm value and the objective is to prevent current dilution, and the other where commitments to future dividends constitute the signal. We find that the results differ by the sign of the dividend surprise. Signaling models of the commitment type explain the market reaction to negative dividend surprises. Interestingly, this result is significant only for the earlier sub-period in our sample due, perhaps, to the well-documented increase in institutional investors with longer horizons. The market reaction to positive dividend surprises, on the other hand, is shown to be consistent with the over-investment and wealth transfer hypotheses. We show that the failure of the signaling model for these firms could be due to lower costs of dividend increases.     

Do Underwriters Certify Value? Evidence from UK Rights Issues and Open Offers

Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) have proposed that underwriters of seasoned equity offers certify issuer value. The study tests predictions resulting from these papers and finds little evidence from UK rights issues and open offers that underwriting banks certify. The main purpose of underwriting appears to be simply to guarantee the proceeds. There is a positive reaction to open offers (a type of private placing) but this is unlikely to be due to underwriter certification. There is a large loss of value for companies announcing deeply discounted offers, which is attributed to release of bad news on announcement     

Equity ownership segregation, shareholder preferences, and dividend policy in China

We investigate how listed Chinese firms pay different types of dividend to satisfy shareholders, different dividend preferences shaped by institutional factors such as share tradability and asymmetrical taxation. We find that the cash dividend level is significantly and positively related to the proportion of non-publicly tradable shares and this relation is mainly driven by legal person shareholders' preferences for cash dividends. In contrast, the stock dividend level is significantly and positively associated with the proportion of publicly tradable shares. These findings provide an empirical rationale for the current reform on the segregation of equity ownership rights in China.     

Property Investment and Property Development Firm Performance Around Initial Public Offerings and Rights Offerings: U.K. Evidence

In contrast to the well-documented underperformance of equity issuers, property investment firms undertaking initial public offerings and rights issues have performed indistinguishably from similar nonissuing firms. Property development companies that issued equity over the same period performed significantly worse than nonissuing firms. The major difference between property development and property investment firms is that property investment firms hold portfolios of real estate assets and thus have more certain prices. The lower pricing uncertainty of property investment firms results in normal long-run performance. Tests of the cognitive bias hypothesis provide only weak support of this explanation, while size and book-market effects are unable to account for the performance of property investment and development companies. The findings of underperformance for rights issues suggest that timing equity issues to take advantage of new shareholders may not be linked to the existence of cognitive bias. An important finding for the international growth in securitized real estate markets is that no evidence is found suggesting equity issues of securitized real estate firms should be avoided.     

The Importance of the Sequence in UK Rights Issues

Abstract:  This study examines the market reaction to UK rights issues announcements and also investigates the position of these issues in the sequence in which the firms make multiple rights issues. The sample consists of 569 rights issues made by 243 industrial and financial firms over the period 1988–1998. The results suggest that the UK market responds negatively to earlier issues in the sequence made by multiple rights issuers. This negative reaction diminishes and becomes insignificant at or after the third issue. In addition, the study shows that the favourable response to later rights issues in the sequence is due to the diminishment in the level of information asymmetry around such issues.     

The Differences Between Stock Splits and Stock Dividends: Evidence on the Retained Earnings Hypothesis

Abstract:  This paper investigates stock dividends and stock splits on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE), which is of interest because several of the more recent explanations for a stock market reaction can be ruled out. The main findings are that the announcement effect of stock dividends as well as stock splits is closely related to changes in a firm's payout policy, but that the relationship differs for the two types of events. A stock dividend implies an increase in nominal share capital and hence a decrease in retained earnings. Firms announcing stock dividends finance growth entirely by debt (explaining the need for an increase in nominal share capital) and retained earnings. Basically all firms announcing a stock dividend with a split factor of less than two can also afford to increase their total cash dividends permanently, at least proportionally to the increase in share capital, leading to a significant announcement effect of 4.23%. Firms announcing a stock dividend with a split factor of two or more also increase total cash dividends permanently, but less than proportionally to the increase in share capital. This leads to an insignificant announcement effect of 0.08%. These findings support a retained earnings/signaling hypothesis. For stock splits, no separate announcement effect was found when a firm's payout policy was controlled for. This lends support to the idea that a stock split per se is a cosmetic event on the CSE and is also consistent with the fact that making a stock split on the CSE is virtually cost free.     

The explanatory power of trading volume and insider activity in a pari-mutuel betting market

In this paper, we examine the role played by the holders of privileged information (insiders) in stimulating trading volume which adds explanatory power to a price-based model of returns in a market where the actions of insiders can be isolated – a pari-mutuel betting market. We conduct conditional logit analyses based on data relating to 19,164 horses running in 2078 races (49 racetracks) staged across the UK between 1 June and 31 August 1996. These analyses indicate that prices generally fail to incorporate fully information contained in trading volumes. However, the betting public fully discounts volume information in markets most commonly viewed as attracting bets from insiders. Isolation of the actual degree of insider activity sheds light on the variation in volume effects.     

What do equity issuances signal? A study of equity issuances in the UK before and during the financial crisis

The financial crisis provides an ideal setting to study how quality signalling by firms, and information asymmetries, might explain the stock price reactions around seasoned equity offerings. The heightened information asymmetry levels during the GFC should have increased the importance of issuance quality and information asymmetries in explaining announcement returns. However, we document new and, in some cases, surprising findings, using a sample of 700 UK seasoned equity offerings between 2003 and 2012: (1) Contrary to expectations, announcement returns during the crisis were driven less by signalling and asymmetric information effects and more by macroeconomic conditions and general uncertainty. (2) In constrained capital markets, firms that were able to move more quickly to raise significant amounts of capital, made the capital-raising environment more challenging for firms that followed, such that the latter had to incur additional costs. (3) Contrary to the traditional view that the low book-to-market ratios may proxy for overvaluation and thus lower announcement returns, we found a negative relationship during the crisis period. The latter is consistent with the view that book-to-market ratios may also proxy for a distressed firm effect which may have dominated the conventional ‘market timing’ effect during the GFC. (4) Announcement returns were strongly positive for many firms at the peak of the crisis, possibly because the market was relieved to see that equity issues might potentially save firms from insolvency; an equity issuance could, in such circumstances, be a positive signal, even though equity issues are conventionally seen as negative signals. Overall, our paper documents fresh and surprising results about equity capital-raising during the GFC, and also offers insights for corporate finance that are of interest beyond the current crisis.     

Equity Rights Issues in Spain: Flotation Costs and Wealth Effects

This paper analyses the flotation costs and the share price reaction of equity offerings in Spain. The results report a positive relationship between relative flotation costs and the underwriting of an issue, and a negative relationship between such costs and ownership concentration. Fixed flotation costs and a negative relationship with the gross offer proceeds are also observed. On average, there is a negative share price reaction on the date of the 'previous communication' to the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores . The different sub-samples analysed according to the underwriting of the issue and the discount offered reveal no statistical differences.