Price or Quantity? A New Irrelevance Result for Mixed Markets

Earlier studies for mixed markets have established a series of so‐called irrelevance results. While previous results relate to the attainment of the first‐best allocation for welfare, we provide a new irrelevance result in terms of the choice of strategic variable in the product market. We show that regardless of whether a public or private firm is the market leader, the leader always chooses the price contract whereas the follower is indifferent between the price contract and the quantity contract. The identity of the leader and the follower firm is therefore irrelevant for the equilibrium mode of competition. Implications for economic models in mixed market settings emerge, which are also discussed.     

转轨经济中的所有权与竞争:来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以国内制造业上市公司为研究对象 ,分析市场竞争和所有权结构对其产出增长率的影响。研究结果表明 ,所有权集中度与公司产出增长率之间存在U形关系 ;激烈的产品市场竞争对公司产出增长率具有正向影响 ,而且这种正向影响只有在股权分散和股权高度集中的企业中才较为显著。因此 ,可以认为市场竞争和所有权结构在强化公司治理方面存在互补关系     

Outsourcing of peripheral services: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing plant-level data

In this paper we empirically explore outsourcing decisions of peripheral services using information from a data set of 926 Spanish manufacturing plants. We find that increases in outsourcing of peripheral services are positively correlated with increases in the plant׳s market share as well as increases in product market competition and product prices. These findings are robust to controlling for whether plants belong to single-plant or multi-plant firms. These patterns are consistent with a strategic shift in the allocation of attention to core manufacturing activities, and are at odds with traditional TCE and PRT theories of vertical integration.     

The effects of resale price maintenance laws on petrol prices and station attrition: empirical evidence from Wisconsin

The state of Wisconsin's Unfair Sales Act prevents the sale of any item below cost in order to attract business, and specifically requires petrol (gasoline) stations to mark up their prices by at least 6% over the wholesale price. While the ostensible reason for this law is to protect small, independent retailers and thus enhance competition, the evidence suggests that the primary result of this law has been to inflate the price of petrol for Wisconsin consumers and facilitate tacit collusion in retail petrol markets. Petrol prices in two major markets in the state are examined, as well as in one market outside of the state where no minimum markup is required. The data show that when the penalties for violating the Unfair Sales Act were strengthened, the average markup of retail petrol over the wholesale price increased significantly in Wisconsin without a commensurate change in the average markup in the market outside of Wisconsin. It is also found that price dispersion is significantly lower over a two-year period in the protected Wisconsin market than in the unprotected markets.     

Market maker competition and price efficiency: Evidence from China

We test the relationship between market maker competition and stock price efficiency. Using the number of market makers as a proxy for competition, the results show a strong positive correlation between competition and stock price efficiency. Moreover, price efficiency is higher when competing market makers have higher research ability. We suggest that market maker competition increases price efficiency through two channels: 1) Competition decreases transaction costs, and 2) Uninformed market makers learn from orders submitted by informed market makers through competition. The latter happens only in the group of market makers with higher experiences. The results imply that the price efficiency can be improved by enhancing the competition of market makers with high research ability and experiences.     

Multi‐product exporters,variable markups and exchange rate fluctuations

In this paper we investigate how firms adjust markups across products in response to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. We estimate markups at the market–product–plant level using detailed panel production and cost data from Mexican manufacturing between 1994 and 2007. Exploiting variation in the real exchange rate in the aftermath of the peso crisis in December 1994, we provide robust empirical evidence that plants increase their markups and producer prices in response to a real depreciation and that this increase is greater for products with higher productivity. Thus, we provide direct evidence for the theoretical mechanism of variable markup response behind incomplete and heterogeneous exchange rate pass‐through on producer prices. Our empirical methodology allows us to decompose the producer price response to exchange rate shocks into a markup and a marginal cost component using our markup estimates. Using these estimates, we establish that marginal cost at the product–plant level increases more in response to real exchange rate depreciation if the plant has higher share of imported inputs.     

竞合行为对装备制造业市场拓展的影响

以我国装备制造业20家上市公司的市场经营数据为样本,从市场效率、市场份额、产品差异等角度考察竞合对市场拓展产生的影响。研究发现,竞合行为的模式不同对装备制造业市场拓展产生的影响也不同,竞合行为并不会必然使双方都获得收益。从分析数据看,以关联联盟形式进行的竞合更能导致企业相对市场效率的改变,以规模联盟形式进行的竞合更有利于产品差异化,而在市场进入方面两种形式的竞合没有显著差异。显然,装备制造业如何理性选择竞合行为和实施策略以参与国际竞争成为亟待解决的问题。     

Biased managers as strategic commitment: The relative profit approach

This paper analyzes a duopolistic model wherein each firm׳s owner can hire a biased manager for strategic reasons. We focus on the situation wherein each firm׳s owner evaluates the performance of her/his manager on the basis of her/his relative profit, which is equal to the weighted sum of her/his absolute profit and the absolute profit of her/his opponent firm. We show that in both price-setting and quantity-setting competitions, the owners of the two private firms employ aggressive managers rather than absolute profit maximizing managers regardless of the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance. Furthermore, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, as the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance increases, we show that the firms׳ owners tend to hire more aggressive managers when the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance is sufficiently low, whereas in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the firms׳ owners tend to hire less aggressive managers otherwise. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the type of each firm׳s manager is not monotone with respect to the degree of each firm׳s relative performance. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, we find that the change in the optimal type of manager hired by each firm is non-monotone against the change of competitiveness in the market with the increase in the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance.     

Perfect versus imperfect direct advertising,and market performance

We present a model of economic growth driven by horizontal innovation in which, unlike the existing literature, the final output sector employs a non-specified, non-CES, additive production function. Our motivation in conducting such analysis is based on the recognition that the use of a CES aggregate production function in the final output sector leads to the unrealistic conclusion that the gross markup of price over marginal costs set in the monopolistically-competitive intermediate sector is constant. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium with perfect competition in the final output market to exist even in the presence of a non-CES technology. These conditions generalize the usual properties of the CES case. We also analyze the long-run relation between economic growth and variable markups.     

Dissertation abstract: Essays on pricing in experimental duopoly markets

This dissertation comprises three independent essays that analyze pricing behavior in experimental duopoly markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre- and post-search), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to simple intuition, presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. The data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted. The second essay uses experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price-matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. When costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees increase the posted prices to the collusive level. With asymmetric costs, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device depends on the relative cost difference. Fewer guarantees, combined with lower average prices, suggest that cost asymmetries may discourage collusion. The third essay investigates the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a homogeneous good duopoly. With discounting, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts that the large firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the laboratory data indicates that price leadership by the large firm is one of the most frequently observed timings of price announcement. In most cases, however, it comes second to simultaneous price-setting. This tendency to wait for the other firm to announce its price is especially strong when the level of size asymmetry between firms is low. We attribute the lower than expected frequency of price leadership to coordination failure, which is further compounded by elements of inequity aversion. JEL Classification C91, D43, D83, L11 Dissertation Committee: Timothy Cason (Chair), Department of Economics, Purdue University Dan Kovenock, Department of Economics, Purdue University Stephen Martin, Department of Economics, Purdue University Marco Casari, Department of Economics, Purdue University     

Small Leading Firms*

We formally analyze the question of whether a price leader must control a large share of the market. Our main result is that if other producers have rising marginal costs and behave as price takers, even the smallest firm in a competitive industry with a rising supply curve can enhance its profits by cutting output and raising price, becoming a price leader. Therefore, we would expect pure competition to be destroyed under these technological conditions.     

Profits and competition under alternative technologies in a unionized duopoly with product differentiation

This paper aims at investigating if the conventional wisdom (i.e. an increase of competition linked to a decrease in the degree of product differentiation always reduces firms׳ profits) can be reversed in a unionized duopoly model. We show that a decrease in the degree of product differentiation may affect wages, hence profits, differently, depending on both the firms׳ production technology and the mode of competition in the product market. Specifically, under constant returns to labour, the “reversal result” can apply under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, but it is more likely when firms compete in quantities. By contrast, under decreasing returns, profits can increase with competition but only if firms compete in prices.     

Analysis of threshold cointegration with asymmetric adjustments in the Hong Kong grocery industry

High market concentration in the Hong Kong grocery industry has been prevalent over many years with the domination of a few large supermarket chains. However, no research has been conducted on the price dynamics between the supermarket and non-supermarket sectors to investigate whether the non-supermarket sector can impose competitive discipline on the dominating supermarket chains. We argue that standard cointegration tests cannot allow for transaction costs and distinguish whether the price co-movement is attributable to price competition or collusion. Our study therefore fills this research gap by adopting the threshold cointegration tests in a three-regime threshold vector error-correction model to account for the asymmetric price adjustment dynamics between supermarket and non-supermarket sectors of Hong Kong and evaluate the market power of the supermarket sectors in the presence of transaction costs. Our results favour the presence of cointegration between the supermarket and non-supermarket price indices with asymmetric adjustment dynamics. We interpret the results of statistically significant downward price adjustments in the outer-band regimes as the evidence of mutual price competition. Nevertheless, the supermarket sector has stronger market power than the non-supermarket sector, and therefore can sustain higher price level without inducing substantial competition pressures inside the neutral band.     

An econometric analysis of the effects of market liberalization on price dynamics and price volatility

The paper investigates price dynamics under market liberalization, with a focus on the effects of lowering price floors. We analyze price dynamics by specifying and estimating a dynamic Tobit model under time-varying volatility, where the market price is censored by a government-set support price. The model is applied to the U.S. butter market over the last three decades. The econometric results show how the price support program affects both expected prices and the volatility of prices. It is found that the censoring effects of a price support program can be significant and large even if the price support is set relatively low.

Price or Quantity Competition? Oligopolistic Structures in International Commodity Markets

International commodity markets may be characterized by price or quantity competition and by product differentiation. As an illustration, this paper presents a set of models of the Japanese market for imported beef. The models are evaluated using a non-nested econometric test. The one which best fits the data is a Stackelberg model with price leadership by Australia. This result provides evidence on the explicit nature of the game being played by exporters, unlike the applied conjectural variations approach which provides only an index of how competitive the market is.     

The equity price channel in a New-Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions and banking

This paper studies the role of the equity price channel in business cycle fluctuations, and highlights the equity price channel as a different aspect to general equilibrium models with financial frictions and, as a result, emphasizes the systemic influence of financial markets on the real economy. We develop a canonical dynamic general equilibrium model with a tractable role for the equity market in banking, entrepreneur and household economic activities. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data over the sample period 1982Q01–2015Q01. We show that a dynamic general equilibrium model with an equity price channel well mimics the U.S. business cycle. The model reproduces the strong procyclicality of the equity price. The equity price channel significantly exacerbates business cycle fluctuations through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels. Our results support the increasing emphasis on common equity capital in Basel III regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial stability, but amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.     

The impact of product innovation on firm-level markup and productivity: evidence from China

This article empirically evaluates the impact of product innovation on firms’ markup and productivity. Based on a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, we estimate firm-level markup using the wedge between output elasticities of intermediate input and its cost share in total revenue. Firm productivity is measured as revenue productivity and adjusted with the estimated markup. The results suggest that product innovation increases firm-level markup and revenue productivity. However, the effect of product innovation on the adjusted productivity is mostly negative or insignificant. The observed relationships also vary in response to market structures. Our results indicate that the positive impact of product innovation on revenue productivity is mainly driven by price-cost markup changes rather than physical productivity improvements. Our study suggests the widely observed positive relationship between product innovation and revenue productivity should be interpreted with caution.     

A reconsideration of the impact of recalls on the market valuation of a product

This paper looks at the problem of determining the effect on the market valuation of a product of recalls due to safety defects when the analytical framework is misspecified. Using the car market, the results show that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the effect on the price of recalls from the impact of quality differentials among makes and models.     

The empirical content of Cournot competition

We consider the testable implications of the Cournot model of market competition. Our approach is nonparametric in the sense that we abstain from imposing any functional specification on market demand and firm cost functions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for (reduced form) equilibrium market price and quantity functions to be consistent with the Cournot model. In addition, we present identification results for the corresponding inverse market demand function and the firm cost functions. Finally, we use our approach to derive testable restrictions for the models of perfect competition, collusion and conjectural variations. This identifies the conditions under which these different models are empirically distinguishable from the Cournot model. We also investigate empirical issues (measurement error and omitted variables) related to bringing our testable restrictions to data.     

Avoiding commercial piracy

In this paper we analyse the roles of the government and an incumbent in preventing the entry of a pirate, who tries to avoid being caught. The framework of analysis used is a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition. We find that both the government and the incumbent have key roles in preventing the entry of pirates. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a pure monopolist, even if it installs an antipiracy system. It will let the pirate enter either as a follower or a leader, or encourage the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the pirate from entering the market, depending on its technology for monitoring commercial piracy. Finally, we find that the pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being caught by the incumbent and the government.