基于Copula函数的保险公司经济资本配置研究

经济资本的度量及配置是风险管理的核心内容。本文利用Copula函数构建保险公司总体风险的联合分布函数,结合TCE方法来度量保险公司经济资本,并利用动态规划方法对经济资本最优配置模型求解。最后结合中国人民财产保险股份有限公司的数据进行实证。通过研究发现,我国财险公司内部偿付能力状况较好,但险种结构有待优化。     

Social capital and capital allocation efficiency

Based on the social norms and structural theories of social capital, this study examines the relationship between community social capital and the firms’ capital allocation efficiency. We hypothesize and find that the community social capital of a firm's headquarter area has a negative and statistically significant impact on its capital allocation inefficiency, which is robust to alternative proxies for community social capital and capital allocation inefficiency, propensity score matching and instrumental variable regressions. In addition, we find that the effect of community social capital is more pronounced for firms with poor internal ethical culture and weak network connections to outside executives and directors, implying that community social capital becomes important in these situations. This finding links prior social norms and networks literature to capital allocation studies in that the norms and networks components of community social capital discipline self-interested managers’ behavior and reduce information asymmetry-two channels of capital allocation efficiency. Overall, community social capital works as a compensatory monitoring and information transfer mechanism and improves the firms’ capital allocation efficiency.     

Backtesting for risk-based regulatory capital

In this paper we present a framework for backtesting all currently popular risk measurement methods for quantifying market risk (including value-at-risk and expected shortfall) using the functional delta method. Estimation risk can be taken explicitly into account. Based on a simulation study we provide evidence that tests for expected shortfall with acceptable low levels have a better performance than tests for value-at-risk in realistic financial sample sizes. We propose a way to determine multiplication factors, and find that the resulting regulatory capital scheme using expected shortfall compares favorably to the current Basel Accord backtesting scheme.     

Risk capital allocation for RORAC optimization

This paper considers the financial optimization problem of a firm with several sub-businesses striving for its optimal RORAC. An insightful example shows that the implementation of classical gradient capital allocation can be suboptimal if division managers are allowed to venture into all business whose marginal RORAC exceeds the firm’s RORAC. The marginal RORAC requirements are refined by adding a risk correction term that takes into account the interdependencies of the risks of different lines of business. It is shown that under certain stationarity conditions this approach can guarantee that the optimal RORAC will eventually be achieved.     

Asset tangibility and capital allocation

Firms comprise divisions that often differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. As the strength of borrowing constraints depends on the liquidation value of assets, these firms influence their debt capacity by allocating funds across divisions. We argue that a company whose capital allocation is not verifiable suffers from a dynamic inconsistency problem, as it tends to allocate resources in favor of divisions with fewer tangible assets, leading to a tight borrowing constraint. When capital allocation is verifiable, committing to invest only little there eases this constraint, although it implies a deviation from a return maximizing allocation.     

Private equity and regulatory capital

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.     

Economic capital for nonperforming loans

A portfolio of nonperforming loans requires economic capital. We present two models for forecasting the portfolio loss and its probability distribution. In the first model, the loss for each nonperforming loan entails a change in provision over the risk horizon. The risk determinants are the single-name concentration, measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index, as well as a systematic factor and the idiosyncratic risk. Our second model allows for interportfolio diversification with a portfolio of performing loans because banks typically own both performing and nonperforming loans. In this model, the nonperforming loan is identified with its systematic risk. Both models allow for closed-form expressions of economic capital and for the capital charge of the single loan. We calibrate the macroeconomic model parameters statistically with a loss panel; the microeconomic parameters depend on the portfolio. The portfolio risk for nonperforming loans mainly depends on the volatility of the systematic economic factor. The dependence becomes more pronounced when interportfolio diversification is taken into account. The magnitude of interportfolio diversification is also marked. Finally, we calculate regulatory capital charges according to Basel II for past-due loans. The regulatory charges are on average smaller than our economic charges and, additionally, take the volatility of economic activity into account only implicitly.     

Taxes and the global allocation of capital

Despite enormous growth in international capital flows, capital-output ratios continue to exhibit substantial heterogeneity across countries. We explore the possibility that taxes, particularly corporate taxes, are a significant source of this heterogeneity. The evidence is mixed. Tax rates computed from tax revenue are inversely correlated with capital-output ratios, as we might expect. However, effective tax rates constructed from official tax rates show little relation to capital—or to revenue-based tax measures. The stark difference between these two tax measures remains an open issue.     

Bank capital allocation under multiple constraints

We study how a bank allocates capital across its business units when facing multiple constraints over several periods. If a constraint tightens – be it because of stricter regulation or higher risk – capital flows to the more efficient unit, i.e. the unit offering a higher marginal return on required capital. Relative efficiency helps explain how a policy measure targeting a specific business unit – e.g. imposing requirements for market risk, or ring-fencing lending – spills over to another, seemingly unrelated unit. It also helps explain the bank’s response to the tightening of a constraint that is contemporaneously slack but likely to bind later on.     

Ruin probabilities and optimal capital allocation for heterogeneous life annuity portfolios

A large part of the actuarial literature is devoted to the derivation of ruin probabilities in various non-life insurance risk models. On the contrary, very few papers deal with ruin probabilities for life insurance portfolios. The difficulties arise from the dependence and non-stationarity of the annual payments made by the insurance company. This paper shows that the ruin probability in case of life annuity portfolios can be computed from algorithms derived by De Pril (1989) and Dhaene & Vandebroek (1995). Approximations for ruin probabilities are discussed. The present article complements the works of Frostig et al. (2003) who considered whole life, endowment, and temporary assurances, and of Denuit & Frostig (2008) who considered homogeneous life annuities portfolios. Here, heterogeneous portfolios (with respect to age and/or face amounts) are studied. Particular attention is paid to the capital allocation problem. The total amount of reserve is shared among the risk classes in order to minimize the ruin probability. It is then fair to charge a higher margin to the risk classes requiring more capital.     

Politics,credit allocation and bank capital requirements

I develop a normative theory of political influence on bank lending and capital structure. Legislators want banks to make politically-favored loans that reduce bank profits but generate social or political benefits. The regulator uses asset-choice regulation and capital requirements to induce the lending desired by legislators. There are four main results. First, if regulators dislike bank fragility, then credit-allocation regulation should be accompanied by higher capital requirements. Second, banks will resist higher capital requirements, which will be lower when banks have more bargaining power. Third, when politics matters more in bank regulation, the banking sector is larger and more competitive, with higher capital requirements. Fourth, the optimal reporting mechanism, in which banks report their privately-known profitability and the regulator endogenously determines capital requirements and stringency of credit-allocation regulation in response, shows that political influence is stronger when banks are more profitable.     

Cross-country effects of regulatory capital arbitrage

One reason for the recent asset price bubbles in many developed countries could be regulatory capital arbitrage. Regulatory and legal changes can help traditional banks to move their assets off their balance sheets into the lightly regulated shadows and thus enable regulatory arbitrage through the securitized sector. This paper adopts a global vector autoregression (GVAR) methodology to assess the effects of regulatory capital arbitrage on equity prices, house prices and economic activity across 11 OECD countries/regions. A counterfactual experiment disentangles the effects of regulatory arbitrage following a change in the net capital rule for investment banks in April 2004 and the adoption of the Basel II Accord in June 2004. The results provide evidence for the existence of an international finance multiplier, with about half of the countries overshooting U.S. impulse responses. The counterfactual shows that regulatory arbitrage via the U.S. securitized sector may enhance the cross-country reallocation of capital from housing markets towards equity markets.     

采用信用风险模型计提监管资本:问题和对策

实施基于商业银行内部信用风险模型的资本监管制度对监管当局和商业银行都提出了严峻的挑战。信用风险计量模型不仅在理论上应经得起推敲,其计量结果在实证上需经得起检验,并且在不同银行间应具有可比性。本文为美联储的五位高级监管人员(Beverly J.Hirtle,Mark Levonian,Marc Saidenberg,Stefan Walter,David Wright)发表在《纽约联储经济政策评论》2001年3月号上的研究报告。该报告对采用风险计量模型计提信用风险资本所涉及的许多重大问题进行了深入讨论,揭示了内部评级法的技术原理,业界关于内部评级法的许多争论很大程度上都围绕这些问题展开,部分问题在新资本协议最终稿以及巴塞尔委员会发表的监管文件中可以找到答案,如时间跨度、使用测试、贷款损失准备处理、报告频率等;但有些问题仍未解决,讨论还在继续,如计量模型的具体形式、模型验证技术。本报告对于读者深入理解内部评级技术和监管要求具有很强指导作用。     

Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities

Based on a large sample of publicly listed and non-listed US commercial banks from 1996 to 2011, we find robust evidence consistent with banks using realized available for sale (AFS) securities gains and losses to smooth earnings and increase low regulatory capital. We also find that (i) banks with positive earnings smooth earnings, and banks with negative earnings generally take big baths; (ii) regulatory capital constrains big baths; (iii) banks with more negative earnings and more unrealized beginning-of-quarter losses (gains) take big baths (smooth earnings); and (iv) banks with low regulatory capital and more unrealized gains realize more gains. Also, banks with negative earnings take big baths (avoid or reduce the earnings loss) if their unrealized gains are insufficient (sufficient) to offset the negative earnings. Our inferences apply to listed and non-listed banks, which indicates that the earnings management incentives do not derive solely from public capital markets. Our findings reveal that the accounting for AFS securities gains and losses enables banks to manage regulatory capital and earnings in a variety of ways.     

Optimal capital allocation using RAROC™ and EVA®

Equity capital allocation plays a particularly important role for financial institutions such as banks, who issue equity infrequently but have continuous access to debt capital. In such a context this paper shows that EVA and RAROC based capital budgeting mechanisms have economic foundations. We derive optimal capital allocation under asymmetric information and in the presence of outside managerial opportunities for an institution with a risky and a riskless division. It is shown that the results extend in a consistent manner to the multidivisional case of decentralized investment decisions with a suitable redefinition of economic capital. The decentralization leads to a charge for economic capital based on the division's own realized risk. Outside managerial opportunities increase the usage of capital and lead to overinvestment in risky projects; at the same time more capital is raised but risk limits are binding in more states. An institution with a single risky division should base its hurdle rate for capital allocated on the cost of debt. In contrast, the hurdle rate tends to the cost of equity for a diversified multidivisional firm. The analysis shows that hurdle rates have a common component in contrast to the standard perfect markets result with division-specific hurdle rates.     

Intermediation and the equilibrium allocation of investment capital : Implications for economic development

We investigate several common assertions about intermediation and how it affects the allocation of investment capital. We use a model with adverse selection and costly state verification in which both debt contracts and credit rationing are observed. Intermediaries arise due to a comparative advantage in information acquisition. Relative to the situation absent intermediation, intermediaries reduce credit rationing and (inefficient) interest rate differentials. The model also shows how large interest rate differentials can be observed when financial markets are not integrated and how the volume of intermediation is affected by changes in the environment.     

Dismantling internal capital markets via spinoff: effects on capital allocation efficiency and firm valuation

We investigate the linkage between changes in firm value and changes in capital allocation efficiency resulting from dismantling internal capital markets via spinoffs. We find no evidence of wholesale misallocation of capital pre-spinoff. On the average, excess value increases following spinoffs. Furthermore, changes in excess value are positively linked to changes in capital allocational efficiency following spinoff. We find that spinoff announcement returns are greater (smaller) when the parent allocates capital to the unit to be spun off in a seemingly less (more) efficient manner. Divested division capital expenditures move toward industry levels after spinoff, regardless of their relative investment opportunities.     

A novel equity valuation and capital allocation model for use by long-term value-investors

We present a novel asset pricing model that captures the investment wisdom and stock-selection approach of the long-term value-investors Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett. Taking a longer term view of business prospects and business risks, we explicitly consider the time period in which a business enjoys a competitive advantage over its peers as the central tenet of our model and capture the eventual demise of this competitive advantage in a probabilistic manner. Assuming that our investor has log utility, our model answers the question of capital allocation in a two-asset scenario. The model does not enforce the Efficient Market Hypothesis and is shown to explain some well-known empirical studies on stock returns.     

Internal control and internal capital allocation: evidence from internal capital markets of multi-segment firms

We investigate the impact of internal control over financial reporting on management decisions in directing corporate resources to alternative investment projects in multi-segment firms. Results from cross-sectional and inter-temporal analyses indicate that internal control weaknesses (ICWs) are associated with distortionary internal capital allocations. The adverse impact on internal capital markets is more pronounced for firms with company-level ICWs. Our analyses also show that firms with weak existing governance mechanisms benefit more from maintaining effective internal control. We further document that the negative impact of ICWs on firms’ internal capital transfers manifests in a lower excess value of diversification.     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.