The impact of joint participation on liquidity in equity and syndicated bank loan markets

Market liquidity is impacted by the presence of financial intermediaries that are informed and active participants in both the equity and the syndicated bank loan markets, specifically informationally advantaged lead arrangers of syndicated bank loans that simultaneously act as equity market makers (dual market makers). Employing a two-stage procedure with instrumental variables, we identify the simultaneous equations model of liquidity and dual market maker decisions. We find that the presence of dual market makers improves the liquidity of the more competitive and transparent equity markets, but widens the spread in the less competitive over-the-counter loan market, particularly for small, informationally opaque firms.     

Foreign banks in syndicated loan markets

Foreign banks play a prominent role in syndicated loan markets. In this paper we examine foreign banks’ motives in participating in cross-border deals in 25 European countries. We find that usual explanations of foreign banking activities can only account partly for the high rate of foreign involvement in syndicated loan markets. The usual argument is that foreign banks are at a disadvantage because they lack soft information and thus they tend to lend to more transparent firms compared to their domestic counterparts. We find that this relationship only holds in relatively small financial systems. We illustrate different motivations for the large amount of cross border lending in large developed markets. In these markets foreign banks tend to lend to especially risky borrowers and projects.     

Hedging and choice of currency denomination in international syndicated loan markets

We examine the determinants of the currency denomination of debt decision of Australian and New Zealand firms and compare it with that of Asian firms around the 1997 Asian crisis. We control for location choice, and include firm and country specific determinants. We find hedging is the primary determinant of foreign currency borrowing by Australian and New Zealand firms. In Asian firms, however, firm leverage, the exchange rate regime, country political risk, and interest rate differentials determine the currency denomination of debt. With the exception of Hong Kong based firms, there is no support for the hedging hypothesis in Asian firms.     

Impact of ethical behavior on syndicated loan rates

This paper shows that borrowers’ ethical behavior leads lending banks to loosen financing conditions when setting loan rates. We advance the banking literature by stressing that the previous financing loosening is enhanced when there is similarity of lenders and borrowers along their ethical domain given that such similarity brings about familiarity and trust in non-opportunistic behavior between them, thereby contributing to lower information frictions. Unique data composed of 12,545 syndicated loan facilities from 19 countries for the period 2003–2007 indicate a 24.8% reduction in the mean spread associated with an increase of one standard deviation in the degree of borrowers’ ethical behavior from its mean value. Such reduction is enhanced to 37.6% when lenders also behave in an ethical way. Results withstand a battery of robustness tests including the use of alternative databases that capture the effect of the 2008 financial crisis, financing alternatives such as equity financing as well as nonparametric estimations.     

International financial integration in Asian bond markets

With the development of international financial market, the degree of international financial integration increased significantly during the late 1980s and 1990s. A key factor underlying this process was the increased globalization of investments seeking a higher rate of return and the opportunity to diversify risk internationally. In this paper, we investigate the degree of international financial integration in Asia by examining the relationships amongst Asian bond markets by employing the advanced econometric technique of cointegration of error correction vectors. In other words, we propose the answers to the following questions. Firstly, what is the degree of international financial integration in Asian bond markets? Secondly, does this degree of integration significantly change after the 1997 Asian financial crisis?This study has a strong implication for investors, in particular, from the perspective of Australian or US investors, whether they do benefit from investing in Asian bond markets. In addition, understanding the extent of financial integration and monitoring its progress in the region is important for Asian central banks. In addition, increased international financial integration promotes financial development and hence enhances economic performance in the region.     

The design of bank loan contracts

The unique characteristics of bank loans emerge endogenouslyto enhance efficiency in a model of renegotiation between aborrower and a lender in which there is the potential for moralhazard on each side of the relationship. Firm risk is endogenousand renegotiated interest rates on the debt need not be monotonein firm risk. The initial terms of the debt are not set to pricedefault risk but rather are set to efficiently balance bargainingpower in later renegotiation. Loan pricing may be nonlinear,involving initial transfers either from the borrower to thebank or from the bank to the borrower.     

A factor analysis approach to measuring European loan and bond market integration

By using an existing and a new convergence measure, this paper assesses whether bank loan and bond interest rates are converging for the non-financial corporate sector across the euro area. Whilst we find evidence for complete bond market integration, the market for bank loans remains segmented, albeit to various degrees depending on the type and size of the loan. Factor analysis reveals that rates on large loans and small loans with long rate fixation periods have weakly converged in the sense that, up to a fixed effect, their evolution is driven by common factors only. In contrast, the price evolution of small loans with short rate fixation periods is still affected by country-specific dynamic factors. There are few signs that bank loan rates are becoming more uniform with time.     

The role of bankers in the U.S. syndicated loan market

I construct a novel dataset of individual bankers in the U.S. syndicated loan market to analyze the impact of bankers for the largest, most transparent borrowers. Bankers exhibit time-invariant preferences for specific loan characteristics, or styles. In addition, exploiting within-borrower variation in personal relationship strength from banker turnover, I find that stronger relationships lead to significantly lower interest rates. This effect is stronger if borrowers lack a credit rating or issue less frequent and shorter horizon management reports. Relationship loans are associated with fewer bankruptcies and fewer favorable modifications in renegotiations.     

Competition,transmission and bank pricing policies: Evidence from Belgian loan and deposit markets

This paper addresses the pass-through from market interest rates to retail bank interest rates. The paper advocates a heterogeneous approach and applies it to the Belgian banking market. A substantial proportion of the heterogeneity in bank pricing policies can be explained by the bank lending channel and the relative market power hypothesis. The results also suggest that the long-term pass-through is typically less than one-for-one, rejecting the completeness hypothesis. While there is no convincing evidence for asymmetry in retail rates, large deviations from equilibrium mark-ups are faster reduced than small deviations. Overall, conditions for corporate loans are more competitive compared to consumer loans. Demand and savings deposits have, by far, the most rigid prices.     

The determinants of bank loan recovery rates

Using Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database, we estimate a model for bank loan recoveries using variables reflecting loan and borrower characteristics, industry and macroeconomic conditions, and several recovery process variables. We find that loan characteristics are more significant determinants of recovery rates than are borrower characteristics prior to default. Industry and macroeconomic conditions are relevant, as are prepackaged bankruptcy arrangements. We examine whether a commonly used proxy for recovery rates, the 30-day post-default trading price of the loan, represents an efficient estimate of actual recoveries and find that such a proxy is biased and inefficient.     

Monitoring and bank loan pricing

In this paper, we examine the influence of contract costs on the pricing of bank loans. We find that the loan spread depends on a bank's screening and monitoring incentives, which varies across differentially regulated classes of banks. This leads to significant price disparities in the loan market. In particular, the US branches of Japanese banks participate in syndicated lending to US firms that charge significantly higher spreads compared to syndicated loans to US firms without Japanese participation. This pricing disparity is primarily due to regulatory differences. We also find that as specialized intermediaries, banks price loans based primarily on their own monitoring.     

Deposit competition and loan markets

Less-intense competition for deposits, by mitigating banks’ incentive to take excessive risks, is traditionally believed to lead to lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios and more-stable banks. This paper revisits this proposition in a model with borrower moral hazard in which banks’ NPL ratios depend endogenously on their loan pricing. In relatively uncompetitive loan markets, less-fierce competition for deposits (i.e., lower deposit rates) leads to lower loan rates and, thus, safer loans. In more-competitive markets, the opposite can occur: As banks’ deposit-repayment burdens decline, they become less eager to risk-shift; this softens competition for risky loans, leading to higher loan rates and, ultimately, riskier loans. Overall, the model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between banks’ pricing power in deposit markets and their NPL ratios.     

Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.     

Cost stickiness and bank loan contracting

This study examines whether and, if so, how borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., cost stickiness) is factored into the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. We provide strong and reliable evidence that ex-ante, the loan spread increases with cost stickiness after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Moreover, we find that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers with higher default risk and higher information risk. This is consistent with borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior increasing lenders' uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, and hence, lenders need to be compensated ex-ante. Additionally, we conjecture that higher cost stickiness may increase the need for ex-post monitoring. Consistent with this conjecture, we find some evidence that lenders impose tighter non-price terms on firms with stickier costs. This study integrates cost stickiness research with the banking literature by showing that banks incorporate borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior into loan contracting terms.     

The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises

This paper shows that the collapse of the global market for syndicated loans during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect whereby lenders rebalance their loan portfolios in favor of domestic borrowers. The home bias of lenders' loan origination increases by approximately 20% if the bank's home country experiences a banking crisis. This flight home effect is distinct from flight to quality because borrowers of different quality are equally affected. The results indicate that the home bias in capital allocation tends to increase when adverse economic shocks reduce the wealth of international investors.     

Prosocial CEOs and the cost of debt: Evidence from syndicated loan contracts

This paper investigates whether banks value the presence of prosocial CEOs when designing loan contracts. Using personal charitable donation behavior to identify prosocial CEOs, we find robust evidence that the presence of prosocial CEOs is negatively related to firms' cost of debt. We address endogeneity concerns by employing a difference-in-differences setting that exploits exogenous CEO turnover events. Moreover, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs mitigates the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, thereby reduces the agency cost of debt. In addition, we find that the effect of prosocial CEOs also extends to non-price loan contract terms. Finally, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs has positive implications for firm value and is associated with lower default risk.     

Time-varying market integration and stock and bond return concordance in emerging markets

We investigate the extent to which emerging stock market integration affects the joint behavior of stock and bond returns using a two-stage semi-parametric approach. Using a sample of 18 emerging markets, we find an unambiguous and robust link between emerging stock market integration and stock–bond return decoupling. We explain this with a decline in the segmentation risk premia in equities modeled by De Jong and De Roon [De Jong, F., De Roon, F.A., 2005. Time-varying market integration and expected returns in emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics 78, 583–613] that leads to increased demand for stocks and reduced or unchanged demand for bonds. Our findings deliver new insights into the financial liberalization and stock–bond comovement literatures.     

CEO overconfidence and bank loan contracting

In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate.     

The determinants of multiple bank loan renegotiations in Europe

This article provides empirical evidence on the determinants of multiple bank loan renegotiations in Europe over the last decade. It finds that renegotiations differ from those in the US in terms of frequency, amended terms, and first occurrence. Multiple renegotiations concern very large loans, which are funded by large pools of lenders with fewer lead banks. Borrower transparency and amendment characteristics halt the number of renegotiation rounds, while the credit crisis of 2008 has had the opposite effect. Financial development, banking structure, and creditor rights also influence the renegotiation process. Overall, the renegotiation process adapts to informational frictions in the borrower–lender relationship.     

Corporate legal structure and bank loan spread

This study examines how a firm's corporate legal structure may affect its borrowing costs. Corporate legal structure refers to the legal fragmentation of a firm into multiple, separately incorporated entities. This fragmentation is bound to be a factor when lenders determine the pricing of debt and design of contract terms because they can enter into legally enforceable agreements only with specific legal entities. Using a sample of private loans to parent companies in the United States, I find that a more complex corporate legal structure is associated with higher loan spread. The findings are robust to several firm and loan characteristics and are incremental to the effects of other forms of organizational structure, namely business and geographic diversification. Subsequent evidence suggests that the effect of a corporate legal structure on borrowing costs is, at least partly, explained by recovery risk.