How costly are debt crises?

The aim of this paper is to assess the short and medium-term impact of debt crises on GDP. Using an unbalanced panel of 154 countries from 1970 to 2008, the paper shows that debt crises produce significant and long-lasting output losses, reducing output by about 10 percent after 8 years. The results also suggest that debt crises tend to be more detrimental than banking and currency crises. The significance of the results is robust to different specifications, identification and endogeneity checks, and datasets.     

Does financial connectedness predict crises?

The global financial crisis has reignited interest in models of crisis prediction. It has also raised the question whether financial interconnectedness—a possible source of systemic risk—can serve as an early warning indicator of crises. In this paper, we examine the ability of connectedness in the global network of financial linkages to predict systemic banking crises during the 1978–2010 period. Our results indicate that increases in a country’s own connectedness and decreases in its neighbours’ connectedness are associated with a higher probability of banking crises after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. Our findings suggest that financial interconnectedness has early warning potential, especially for the 2007–2010 wave of systemic banking crises.     

Are stock market crises contagious? The role of crisis definitions

Financial contagion studies generally examine whether co-movement between markets increases during a crisis. We use a flexible co-movement measure to examine how conclusions of such analyses depend on the sample chosen as the ‘crisis’. To this end, we analyse stock market co-movement during the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007 global financial crisis for all possible source countries and for all possible time periods or extreme return quantiles. This way we account for the main crisis dating approaches adopted in the literature. Our results suggest there is no clear relationship between excess co-movement and commonly used crisis samples.     

Why do closed-end country funds trade at enormous premiums during currency crises?

We investigate the response of US traded country fund premiums to currency crises in related foreign (local) markets. Our analysis includes 25 currency crises over the past decade involving 18 funds investing in 12 emerging markets, and 7 funds investing in 6 developed markets. We find that fund premiums and the volatility of the premiums increase dramatically in response to a currency crisis, both for emerging and developed markets funds, and that these effects dissipate slowly over time. Our results show that country fund shares and net asset values (NAVs) have differential risk exposures and that these differences are exacerbated during a crisis. While the NAV returns show sensitivity to changes in the local market index, share returns are sensitive to changes in both local and world market indices. Therefore, in response to a currency crisis, when local stock markets decrease in value, fund NAVs react more strongly than their share prices which have a strong global component. We also show that the high premiums observed during currency crises are not due to the reluctance of investors to trade and realize losses.     

Contagion from the crises in the Euro-zone: where,when and why?

The prevalence of contagion between the Euro-zone countries and other European countries since the Greek crisis of 2009 is now well – known, but the factors that influence the pattern of this contagion are not well understood. We investigate this question both within Europe and beyond to the USA and Japan, using an asymmetric M-GARCH model that focuses on extreme values of the risk premia on government bonds. We compare these extreme values with news of major events and find that they are highly correlated. We find a different pattern of contagion emanating from Ireland compared to the other crisis countries of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. We also examine the factors that have made countries vulnerable to contagion and find that financial factors are more important than trade ones. However, intra-Euro-zone trade has also been a significant factor between the major Euro-zone economies. There is little evidence that global factors affect contagion between EU member states, but some evidence that nominal exchange rate movements offer a degree of insulation from contagion for the non-Euro zone states.     

How do IMF announcements affect financial markets in crises?: Evidence from forward exchange markets

We employ a theoretical model to interpret the liquidity and moral hazard effects of IMF support during a financial crisis. We then estimate the response of forward exchange markets to IMF-related announcements, using data on the 3-, 9-, and 12-month forward exchange rates. Our results indicate that the announcement of IMF negotiations is associated with a premium on the baht and the rupiah, where the premium is much larger on the latter. This result is largely consistent with the responses of stock and bond markets, especially when country-specific data are employed.     

The real effect of banking crises: Finance or asset allocation effects? Some international evidence

This paper analyzes whether the decline in economic growth that follows a banking crisis occurs because of a reduction in the amount of credit available (finance effect) or a worsening in the allocation of investable resources (asset allocation effect). We use a sample of more than 2500 industrial firms in 18 developed and developing countries that experienced 19 systemic banking crises between 1989 and 2007. The results indicate that banking crises negatively affect firms’ intangible investments, which intensifies the economic downturn. The negative growth effect produced by the worsening of the investment allocation is stronger in countries with highly developed financial systems and institutions.     

Latin American stock markets’ volatility spillovers during the financial crises: a multivariate FIAPARCH-DCC framework

The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the volatility spillovers in Latin American emerging stock markets. A multivariate Fractionally Integrated Asymmetric Power ARCH model with dynamic conditional correlations of Engle (1982 Engle, R. F. 1982. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance of United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica, 50: 987–1007. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) with a Student-t distribution is employed. We examine whether considering for long memory and asymmetry in emerging stock markets behaviour may provide more insights into the volatility spillovers phenomenon. In this paper we select daily frequency stock indexes covering four emerging countries in Latin America for the period (January 1995–September 2009). Our results point out the importance of volatility spillovers in these countries. Moreover, long memory and asymmetry in emerging stock market dynamics seem to provide more insights into the transmission of volatility shocks. More interestingly, the analysis of the DCCEs behaviour over time via multivariate cointegration, vector error correction model and the Cholesky variance decomposition shows shifts behaviour around major Latin American financial crisis and recent subprime crisis. On the practical side, these results may be useful for international portfolio managers and Latin American stock market authorities.     

Exchange rate regimes,capital controls,and currency crises: Does the bipolar view hold?

This paper empirically examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find no evidence that, as the bipolar view argues, intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find that hard pegs with capital account liberalization have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than intermediate regimes with capital controls and free floats with capital controls. Hence, the bipolar view does not strictly hold in the sense that intermediate regimes are significantly more prone to currency crises than the two extreme regimes. However, the fact that hard pegs with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to currency crises is worthy of note.     

Why do people save in cash? Distrust,memories of banking crises,weak institutions and dollarization

The paper analyzes why households hold sizeable shares of their assets in cash at home rather than at banks – a phenomenon that is widespread in many economies but for which information is scarce. Using survey data from ten Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries, I document the relevance of this behavior and show that cash preferences cannot be fully explained by whether people are banked or unbanked. The analysis reveals that a lack of trust in banks, memories of past banking crises and weak tax enforcement are important factors. Moreover, cash preferences are stronger in dollarized economies where a “safe” foreign currency serves as a store of value.     

The effects of firm actions on customers’ responses to product recall crises: analyzing an automobile recall in China

In times of product-harm crises, the involved firms always employ some countermeasures, such as releasing messages relevant to their response actions. To evaluate the influence of these messages on the perceptions and behavioral responses of corporate customers relative to the recalls, we conducted a case study of the Volkswagen automobile recall in China in 2013. Guided by the protective action decision model, we developed a conceptual model to first study customers’ responses to the recall crisis. Based on this model, we further examined the influence of two types of firm actions, namely technical and ceremonial, on the customer crisis-coping process. Results show that product experience, risk perception, and information seeking significantly influence customers’ behavioral intentions during the product recall crisis. Customers in the technical action group exhibit a higher level of risk perception based on their product experience and have a higher likelihood of seeking information. However, information seeking fails to influence their behavioral intentions. Ceremonial actions overcome the disadvantages of technical actions, but customers’ lack of solution information should be met. In this sense, crisis-involved firms are encouraged to employ a combination strategy including the implementation of the two types of firm actions and then promptly release the messages containing both actions.     

Does environmental investment pay off?—portfolio analyses of the E in ESG during political conflicts and public health crises

This paper examines the contribution of environmental investment on firm value during the Russia-Ukraine War and Global Public Health Crisis. Using media-based environmental scores, we investigate the performance of the emission-reduction-based and green-innovation-based portfolios. The results indicate that while engaging in environmental activities decreases firm value during the noncrisis time, it creates value when companies face market-wide crises. Our findings suggest that environmental investment serves as a risk-hedging vehicle for political and health crises. In addition, compared to corporate ESG disclosures, firm-level media-based environmental scores mitigate the endogeneity between a company's ESG disclosure policies and its firm characteristics.     

De facto exchange rate regimes and currency crises: Are pegged regimes with capital account liberalization really more prone to speculative attacks?

This paper empirically examines whether de facto exchange rate regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises in 84 countries over the 1980–2001 period by using the probit model. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find that pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with floating regimes. By using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find interesting evidence that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization significantly lower the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes. These results are robust to a wide variety of samples and models. From the standpoint of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, we can conjecture that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to speculative attacks because they can enhance greater credibility in their currencies by abandoning monetary policy autonomy.