Judgment and Decision Making in Project Continuation: A Study of Students as Surrogates for Experienced Managers

This work explores the efficacy of using students as surrogates for experienced managers in escalation studies. Participants were 222 managers with substantial project planning and evaluation experience and 146 undergraduate business students. Our results show that the experienced managers exhibited a strong tendency to continue projects, with this tendency being positively related to the degree of project completion. The managers also tended to invest a greater amount of additional resources in response to favourable rather than to unfavourable information, contingent on the degree of project completion. In contrast, the students' decisions showed little sensitivity to the contextual information, and they exhibited no association between the likelihood they would continue a project and how much funding they would allocate to the project. These results suggest that caution is needed in generalizing student-based escalation findings to real-world business settings.     

The effect of obedience pressure and authoritarianism on managers' project evaluation decisions

This study examines the effects that obedience pressure and the personality trait of authoritarianism have on managers' project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test the various hypotheses formulated in this study. The results suggest that project managers have a higher inclination to escalate their commitment to a failing project in the presence of obedience pressure. The results further reveal that project managers' tendency to escalate is most prominent in a private information situation and in an obedience pressure condition. In addition, the results suggest that low authoritarian project managers exhibited a greater tendency to continue a failing project regardless of the extent of obedience pressure under private information conditions. Furthermore, high authoritarian project managers exhibited a greater tendency to continue a failing project only when obedience pressure was present under private information conditions.     

Ethics education in accounting: An investigation of the importance of ethics as a factor in the recruiting decisions of public accounting firms

In recent years, significant attention has been directed to the role of ethics in the business environment and to the ethical development of business students. This study explores the importance of ethical behavior as a factor in the recruiting decisions of public accounting firms. Factors related to the ethical behavior of entry-level employees were compared with other personal characteristics that are traditionally viewed as important to public accounting firms (e.g., personality, appearance, academic performance, etc.). Recruiters from both Big-Six and non-Big-Six firms indicated strong views on the importance of the students' ethical propensities. In fact, ethics received the highest rating by the public accounting firms regardless of their size. The results of this study provide strong evidence for accounting educators to continue to stress to their students the importance of ethical behavior and to continue their efforts to more fully integrate ethics education into the accounting curriculum.     

The influence of self-interest and ethical considerations on managers’ evaluation judgments

Recent empirical studies support self-interest as the sole basis for economic decisions (as predicted by agency theory). However, cognitive moral development (CMD) theory suggests that decision makers will allow ethical/moral considerations to constrain their economic behaviour. The purpose of this study is to resolve the essential conflict between the tenets of agency theory and CMD theory. The results of a laboratory experiment suggest that both moral reasoning level and adverse-selection conditions (self-interest) can have a significant effect on managers’ project evaluation decisions. Specifically, managers are likely to continue a project that is expected to be unprofitable only when adverse selection conditions are present and moral reasoning level is low. Thus, agency theory may not be generalizable to accounting-based economic performance.     

Corporate social responsibility and the wealth gains from dividend increases

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) influences the stock price response to dividend increase announcements and changes in subsequent operating performance. We find that dividend increasing firms with lower CSR scores elicit higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvements in industry‐adjusted operating performance. These findings support the argument in the literature that socially responsible firms are more transparent and commit to higher ethical standards than other firms, suggesting that they suffer fewer agency and informational problems (Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012). Consequently, larger dividend payouts reduce agency costs in firms with lower CSR commitments, thereby generating higher wealth gains for shareholders.     

Alliances and corporate governance

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.     

Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent’s consumption choice

This paper considers remuneration in terms of a good that helps improve or facilitate production in an agency paradigm. In the presence of this production externality, agency problems arise when the agent has an access to an external market for the good or has private, pre-contract information about the production environment. This paper characterises the optimal compensation packages in a variety of settings. The research findings explain various pay practices, such as payment in terms of reimbursement for a certain good and the selective payment of non-cash compensation.     

Conservatism,SEC investigation,and fraud

We present evidence on the relationship between firms that have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting and accounting conservatism. We empirically investigate the extent to which US firms identified by the SEC in their Enforcement Releases demonstrate higher levels of conditional conservatism in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Specifically, by assessing the timing of changes in the litigation risk environment for fraud firms, we document how differences in heightened legal liability guide changes in conservative accounting behavior. Compared to a matched non-fraud control sample, we document that fraud firms have significantly lower levels of accounting conservatism in the pre-fraud period. Consistent with changes in potential legal liability, we find an increase in accounting conservatism for fraud firms during the SEC investigation period. Subsequently, during the public discovery of fraud, any increases in accounting conservatism are marginal and appear to converge back to lower levels compared to the SEC investigation period. Overall, our findings suggest more temporary changes in conservative reporting in the short-term for fraud firms. We also document that increased levels of accounting conservatism for fraud firms are not due solely to the passage of the SOX Act. Our findings aid in explaining fraud firms’ incentives and opportunities for accounting conservatism and lend support for why standard setters, regulators and auditors should continue to monitor and re-evaluate conservatism’s short-term effects that are conditioned on changes in a firm’s risk environment.     

The contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings around the world

Using corporate payout data from 33 economies, this study investigates the contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings in different country-level investor protection environments. We find that stock repurchases contribute more to firm value in countries with strong investor protection than in countries with weak investor protection. We also report that dividends contribute approximately 60% more to firm value than repurchases in countries with weak investor protection. Furthermore, as the proportion of repurchases in total payouts increases, the marginal value of cash increases in countries with strong investor protection, whereas it declines in countries with weak investor protection. In a poor investor protection environment, the marginal value of cash for a firm that makes 100% of its payouts via repurchases is 12 cents lower than that for a firm that distributes 100% of its payouts via dividends. Overall, our findings highlight that stock repurchases are less effective than dividends in mitigating agency problems associated with free cash flow in countries with poor investor protection.     

On the value of restrictive covenants: Empirical investigation of public bond issues

Are restrictive covenants effective mechanisms in mitigating agency problems? Is the magnitude of the increase in the cost of debt due to agency problems non-trivial? We tackle these questions using a large dataset of public bonds. Contrary to the view that restrictive covenants in public bond contracts are standard boilerplates that serve little purpose, we find significant benefits in terms of reduction in the cost of debt associated with covenants. Restrictions on investment activities or issuance of higher priority claims reduce the cost of debt by about 35–75 basis points. These findings suggest that investors view bond covenants as important instruments in mitigating agency problems, and an increase in the cost of debt due to agency problems could be substantial. Additionally, we find that high growth firms and firms with low probability of default are less likely to include covenants suggesting that the costs of covenants outweigh benefits for these types of firms.     

THE CHOICE BETWEEN CALLABLE AND NONCALLABLE BONDS

We examine the choice and the offer spreads between callable and noncallable bonds. We find significant differences by industry sector and therefore segment our results by financial and nonfinancial industries. For the financial sector, the popularity of callable and noncallable bonds is significantly related to the economic environment. Financial and high‐grade nonfinancial callable bonds are also more likely to be issued via a shelf prospectus. Although firms that issue callable bonds do not consistently display the characteristics associated with severe agency problems, the issue choice for below‐investment‐grade nonfinancial and lower rated financial bonds, where we can expect agency problems to be more severe, is more consistent with agency theory than is the issue choice for higher rated bonds.     

An investigation of the ethical decision-making process across varying cultures

This study examines the influence of dimensions of culture on the ethical decision process. Do various cultures perceive the ethical dilemma differently? Do these cultures prefer different types of actions? Do these cultures perceive the role of the accountant differently in response to the consequences? This study has a broad scope of countries (nine), which allows richer contrasts of cultural dimensions. The three aspects of the ethical decision-making process (perceived dilemma, perceived actions, and perceived consequences) are analyzed rather than asking the respondent to make an ethical judgement. Accounting systems adopted by countries reflect culture, profession, and industry. The responses from countries with different accounting systems is analyzed. The findings of this study will provide practitioners as well as academics insight into the harmonization of accounting standards. Research about ethical problems may help accountants anticipate and predict problems that might occur and identify referent countries for solutions to these problems. These findings will also be useful to auditors and accountants designing training programs for multicountry practices.     

Executive compensation and conflict between shareholders and creditors: Evidence from creditor litigation

Using creditor litigation data from China, we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe. By comparing firms that have experienced creditor lawsuits (litigation firms) with those that have not (non-litigation firms), we find that litigation firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity before lawsuits, suggesting that these firms have weaker corporate governance. This result is consistent with our expectation that creditors participate in corporate governance by introducing external monitoring when internal monitoring, dominated by shareholders, is insufficient. We also find that the association is stronger for firms with more severe shareholder-creditor agency conflict. Moreover, creditor litigation is strongly related to low pay-performance sensitivity when the external legal environment is strong. Our results remain robust to different model specifications and after addressing endogeneity problems.     

Provincial preferences in private equity

This paper identifies a strong tendency for Canadian private equity investors to finance entrepreneurs that reside in the same province. For all types of investors and entrepreneurial firms, in terms of the number of investments (13,729 transactions), 84.42% of investments were intra-provincial. In terms of the total value of these transactions ($20,193,896,909 in 1997 dollars), 61.15% of the investment value was intra-provincial. We provide evidence that both agency costs and information asymmetries systematically give rise to differences in the frequency of inter- versus intra-provincial investments, and compare the importance of agency versus institutional factors leading to home bias.      

Corporate cash and governance: A global look into publicly-traded companies' aggregate cash ratios

I conduct international panel-data regressions to investigate the determinants of cash holdings by publicly-traded firms for 20 countries over the period 2007–2017. The precautionary, transaction-costs, and agency motives explained ratios of the firms' aggregate cash to their total assets. On the last motive, higher cash ratios were associated with managers with worse ethical behavior, lower accountability, weaker investor protection, harsher auditing and reporting standards, and greater potential to face holdup problems by lending banks. The agency motive had a greater marginal impact than the precautionary and transaction-costs motives while having a limited explanatory power over total variation in the cash ratios.     

Decision Processes, Agency Problems, and Information: An Economic Analysis of Capital Budgeting Procedures

Corporations use a variety of processes to allocate capital.This article studies the benefits and costs of several commonbudget procedures from the perspective of a model with agencyand information problems. Processes that delegate aspects ofthe decision to the agent result in too many projects beingapproved, while processes in which the principal retains theright to reject projects cause the agent to strategically distorthis information about project quality. We show how the choiceof a decision process depends on these two costs, and specificallyon severity of the agency problem, quality of information, andproject risk.     

USING PROJECT FINANCE TO FUND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS

For much of the past century, there has been an increased tendency for large infrastructure projects to be funded and operated by governments. Since the early 1980s, however, private-sector financing and management of such projects have experienced a dramatic revival. In some cases, this revival has taken the form of the "privatization" of an entire industry. But another, increasingly common, form has been the use of project finance to fund instrastructure investments. Besides being widely used in infrastructure investments like telecommunications and power generation in developing countries, the use of project finance has recently been extended by the U.K.'s Private Finance Initiative to fund public enterprises as diverse as the construction and operation of prisons, hospitals, subway cars, and the National Insurance computer system.
In a project financing, the project is managed by a separate company that is owned by a project sponsor (or sponsors) who usually takes an active role in the management of the project. The project company enters into a complex series of contracts with multiple parties, including the host government, the project's customers and suppliers, and the banks that typically provide most of the debt financing.
This paper argues that the equity investment by the project's operators works together with high debt ratios and the web of contractual arrangements to reduce "agency" problems in the management of large projects. It also shows how the contracts shift the various project risks to those parties best able to appraise and control them. Finally, it discusses why most project financing takes the form of limited recourse bank loans to the project company rather than, say, public bonds with full recourse to the sponsors.     

Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s?

Contracting theory predicts that greater equity-related compensation will decrease the agency problems of equity but may exacerbate the agency problems of debt. We present evidence that the agency costs of debt may have declined during the 1990s. Specifically, changes in the financial characteristics of our sample firms suggest that underinvestment, asset substitution, and financial distress became less likely. Furthermore, agency costs of equity increased during the 1990s, primarily because firms became more difficult to monitor. Together, the findings provide an explanation for why more firms used option-based compensation in the latter 1990s, and why the proportion of options in compensation structure increased throughout the decade of the 1990s.