Organizational structure,risk-based capital requirements,and the sales of downgraded bonds

Using bond downgrades as external shocks to life insurers’ asset risk, we document several findings of the impact of organizational structure and risk factors on investment risk taking. First, we find that mutual insurers and widely-held stock insurers are more likely to sell downgraded bonds than are closely-held stock insurers. Second, we find evidence that insurers are less likely to sell downgraded bonds that remain in the same rating class than bonds downgraded to a lower rating class. The result implies that insurers sell downgraded bonds mainly because of additional capital charge is imposed, not because of downgrade itself. In other words, risk factors in risk-based capital regulation do matter on life insurers’ investment risk taking. Finally, we find that life insurers might be reluctant to sell downgraded bonds at fire-sale prices during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

How rating agencies achieve rating stability

Surveys on the use of agency credit ratings reveal that some investors believe that rating agencies are relatively slow in adjusting their ratings. A well-accepted explanation for this perception on the timeliness of ratings is the through-the-cycle methodology that agencies use. According to Moody’s, through-the-cycle ratings are stable because they are intended to measure default risk over long investment horizons, and because they are changed only when agencies are confident that observed changes in a company’s risk profile are likely to be permanent. To verify this explanation, we quantify the impact of the long-term default horizon and the prudent migration policy on rating stability from the perspective of an investor – with no desire for rating stability. This is done by benchmarking agency ratings with a financial ratio-based (credit-scoring) agency-rating prediction model and (credit-scoring) default-prediction models of various time horizons. We also examine rating-migration practices. The final result is a better quantitative understanding of the through-the-cycle methodology.By varying the time horizon in the estimation of default-prediction models, we search for a best match with the agency-rating prediction model. Consistent with the agencies’ stated objectives, we conclude that agency ratings are focused on the long term. In contrast to one-year default prediction models, agency ratings place less weight on short-term indicators of credit quality.We also demonstrate that the focus of agencies on long investment horizons explains only part of the relative stability of agency ratings. The other aspect of through-the-cycle methodology – agency-rating migration policy – is an even more important factor underlying the stability of agency ratings. We find that rating migrations are triggered when the difference between the actual agency rating and the model predicted rating exceeds a certain threshold level. When rating migrations are triggered, agencies adjust their ratings only partially, consistent with the known serial dependency of agency-rating migrations.     

Banks' home bias in government bond holdings: Will banks in low‐rated countries invest in European safe bonds (ESBies)?

This paper offers two new explanations for banks' home bias in government bond holdings: a sovereign‐based rating cap on corporates and the existence of a ‘bank tax.’ These are complementary to the four explanations offered in the literature: risk‐shifting, gambling for resurrection, moral suasion, and a means to store liquidity for financing future investment. Collectively, they cast doubt on the European Union's demand‐led approach to investment in European safe bonds (ESBies) by banks in low‐rated countries. Bank regulations such as constraints on large exposure or risk‐based capital on credit risk concentration will be needed if the objective is to break the so‐called ‘deadly embrace.’     

The real impact of ratings-based capital rules on the finance-growth nexus

We investigate whether ratings-based capital regulation has affected the finance-growth nexus via a foreign credit channel. Using quarterly data on short to medium term real GDP growth and cross-border bank lending flows from G-10 countries to 67 recipient countries, we find that since the implementation of Basel 2 capital rules, risk weight reductions mapped to sovereign credit rating upgrades have stimulated short-term economic growth in investment grade recipients but hampered growth in non-investment grade recipients. The impact of these rating upgrades is strongest in the first year and then reverses from the third year and onwards. On the other hand, there is a consistent and lasting negative impact of risk weight increases due to rating downgrades across all recipient countries. The adverse effects of ratings-based capital regulation on foreign bank credit supply and economic growth are compounded in countries with more corruption and less competitive banking sectors and are attenuated with greater political stability.     

Financial statement comparability and credit risk

Prior research shows that firms’ financial statement comparability improves the accuracy of market participants’ valuation judgments and thus may reduce firms’ costs of capital. Distinct from prior research focusing on the equity market, we develop measures of comparability relevant to debt market participants based on the within-industry variability of Moody’s adjustments to reported accounting numbers for the purposes of credit rating. We examine two sets of adjustments: (1) to the interest coverage ratio and (2) to non-recurring income items. We validate these comparability measures by providing evidence that greater comparability is associated with lower frequency and magnitude of split ratings by credit rating agencies. We predict and find that greater comparability is associated with (1) lower estimated bid-ask spreads for traded bonds, (2) lower credit spreads for both bonds and five-year credit default swaps, and (3) a steeper one- to five-year credit default swap term structure. Our results are consistent with financial statement comparability reducing debt market participants’ uncertainty about and pricing of firms’ credit risk.     

Internal ratings systems,implied credit risk and the consistency of banks’ risk classification policies

This paper aims at improving our understanding of internal risk rating systems (IRS) at large banks, of the way in which they are implemented, and at verifying if IRS produce consistent estimates of banks’ loan portfolio credit risk. An important property of our work is that the size of our data set allows us to derive measures of credit risk without making any assumptions about correlations between loans, by applying Carey’s [Carey, Mark, 1998. Credit risk in private debt portfolios. Journal of Finance LIII (4), 1363–1387] non-parametric Monte Carlo re-sampling method.We find substantial differences between the implied loss distributions of two banks with equal “regulatory” risk profiles; both expected losses and the credit loss rates at a wide range of loss distribution percentiles vary considerably. Such variation will translate into different levels of required economic capital. Our results also confirm the quantitative importance of size for portfolio credit risk: for common parameter values, we find that tail risk can be reduced by up to 40% by doubling portfolio size.Our analysis makes clear that not only the formal design of a rating system, but also the way in which it is implemented (e.g. a rating grade composition; the degree of homogeneity within rating classes) can be quantitatively important for the shape of credit loss distributions and thus for banks’ required capital structure. The evidence of differences between lenders also hints at the presence of differentiated market equilibria, that are more complex than might otherwise be supposed: different lending or risk management “styles” may emerge and banks strike their own balance between risk-taking and (the cost of) monitoring (that risk).     

The optimal trade-off between interest rate risk and annual return of bond ladders

Bond laddering is a popular fixed-income investment strategy. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a methodology for determining private investors’ most interest rate risk (IRR)-return-efficient investment horizon for bond ladders (BLs), which are virtually free of credit risk. Two IRR measures of a continuously rolling and homogenous BL (CRHBL) are analytically derived under the assumption that interest rates are martingales. The first measure is the modified duration, which assumes a flat term structure of interest rates. However, this assumption is not fully supported by the empirical data and, thus, an additional IRR measure is proposed. Under each of these two measures, the ratios between the annual return in excess of the demand deposit rate and IRR of CRHBLs with different investment horizons are calculated. As expected, CRHBLs with rather low IRR are most risk-return-efficient. The results for the theoretical CRHBLs also apply to “real-world” discrete BLs. Thus, the proposed methodology can help private investors construct IRR-return-efficient discrete BLs.     

Perceptions of postretirement benefit obligations by bond rating analysts

This research examines the measurement and impounding of alternative measures of a corporation's other postretirement benefits obligation (OPEBs) by an important segment of the capital markets. The Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) model is used as a benchmark from which to assess the importance of an added OPEB variable in the bond rating process. Using the corporate bond rating as the dependent variable, multiple measures of the OPEB obligation are inserted individually as an added independent variable into an N-chotomous probit model. The results for 1987 and 1988 indicate that measures calculated from publicly available information produce highly significant results. The developed postretirement liability measures are found to provide relevant and material information regarding the risk level of a firm's bonds as represented by its bond rating. This insight concerning the additional risk represented by a firm's postretirement benefits is beyond that supplied by the firm's pension information. This suggests that the additional investor default risk attributed to a firm's OPEB can be reasonably proxied by data found in the company's annual report footnote disclosures.     

Measuring the deadly embrace: Systemic and sovereign risks

This study contributes to the literature by making a first step toward implementing a comprehensive internally coherent measurement of systemic risk in a country. It measures systemic risk and the ensuing conditional contingent liabilities of the sovereign stemming from Luxembourg’s Other Systemically Important Institutions (OSIIs), the Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) to which they belong, the investment funds sponsored by the OSIIs, the household and the non-financial corporate sectors. The ensuing estimated systemic contingent claims are included in a stochastic version of the general government’s balance sheet to gauge their impact on the country’s sovereign risk. Results indicate that time-varying conditional implicit guarantees from OSSIs are larger than those from G-SIBs and investment funds, while systemic risk stemming from the household and non-financial corporate sectors is moderate. The robustness of the sovereign is not drastically affected by systemic risk stemming from the rest of the economy. However, illustrating the so-called “deadly embrace”, sovereign risk would significantly rise as a result of a historically plausible increase in sovereign assets’ value volatility combined with an economy-wide shock. The main policy implication is that financial stability stands on two columns, a resilient financial sector and a sustainable fiscal position.     

Information Transfer Effects of Bond Rating Downgrades

This paper investigates information transfer effects of bond rating downgrades measured by equity abnormal returns for industry portfolios. Industry rivals can be subject to two opposing effects, the contagion effect and the competition effect. We find that the net effect is strongly dependent on the original bond rating of the downgraded firm. For investment‐grade (speculative‐grade) firms, industry abnormal equity returns are negative (positive), which implies a predominant contagion (competition) effect. The analysis reveals a rich pattern of positive and negative correlations across negative credit events, which can be used to improve our understanding of portfolio credit risk models.     

Timeliness of Spread Implied Ratings

Rating agencies are known to be prudent in their approach to rating revisions, which results in delayed rating adjustments. For a large set of eurobonds we derive credit spread implied ratings and compare them with agency ratings. Our results indicate that spread implied ratings often anticipate the future movement of agency ratings and hence can help track credit risk in a more timely manner. This finding has important implications for risk managers in banks who, under the new Basel 2 regulations, have to rely more on credit ratings for capital allocation purposes, and for portfolio managers who face rating‐related investment restrictions.     

Market-implied ratings and their divergence from credit ratings

In this article, we investigate the divergence between credit ratings (CRs) and Moody's market-implied ratings (MIRs). Our evidence shows that rating gaps provide incremental information to the market regarding issuers' default risk over CRs alone in the short horizon and outperform CRs over extended horizons. The predictive ability of rating gaps is greater for more opaque and volatile issuers. Such predictability was more pronounced during the 2008 financial crisis but weakened in the post–Dodd–Frank Act period. This finding is consistent with credit rating agencies’ efforts to improve their performance when facing regulatory pressure. Moreover, our analysis identifies rating-gap signals that do (do not) lead to subsequent Moody's actions to place issuers on negative outlook and watchlists. We find that negative signals from MIR gaps have a real economic impact on issuers’ fundamentals such as profitability, leverage, investment, and default risk, thus supporting the recovery-efforts hypothesis.     

The United Shareholders Association Shareholder 1000 and firm performance

From 1989 through 1993, the United Shareholders Association (USA) published its Shareholder 1000 report, which ranked 1000 firms on several dimensions of corporate performance, including shareholder rights and management compensation. We examine two measures reported by the USA of the alignment between managers' and shareholders' interests: a shareholder rights score and a management compensation rating. The associations between these measures and measures of operating performance and investment levels are analyzed. We find evidence that the USA shareholder rights and management compensation scores are significantly and positively associated with measures of operating performance and investment spending. Further tests indicate that USA management compensation scores proxy for aspects of corporate behavior that have significant valuation implications not reflected in financial statements.     

What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

Real Estate Risk,Corporate Investment and Financing Choice

This paper empirically examines how real estate risk impacts corporate investment and financing decisions. Using a panel of United States firms from 1985 to 2013, we document that real estate risk is negatively associated with firms’ long-term investments and long-term external financing in equity and debt. The results are robust to different risk measurements and in particular salient during the financial crisis period when the endogeneity between risk and investment is less of a concern. The effect on firm leverage, however, depends on risk measures. Overall, in contrast to previously documented positive effects of the real estate value, real estate risk exposure exhibits mostly the opposite effects on investment, financing and capital structure. This difference is consistent with option value determinants. Findings in this paper shed new lights on the impact of real estate holding on corporate decisions, offer a new explanation for the underperformance of hedge funds’ real estate strategies, and confirm the theoretical predictions in Deng et al. (2015).     

Learning to profit with discrete investment rules

The learning of optimal discrete investment rules is analysed and related to the problem of forecasting financial returns. The aim is twofold: to characterize some 'good' learning methods for agents using investment rules of this form and to explain why many observed investment rules such as technical trading rules are discrete. A consistent estimator for discrete investment rules is used and it is shown, using simulations, that direct estimation of investment rules is preferable to the estimation of forecasting models to be used in such rules. This model and the associated results indicate there are a number of reasons why it may be easier to learn a good discrete investment rule than to learn a continuous rule; this provides a partial explanation of why discrete investment rules are used so widely.     

Corporate investment and changes in GAAP

This paper investigates whether changes in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) affect corporate investment decisions. Using a sample containing forty nine changes in GAAP, I find that changes in accounting rules affect investment decisions. I then examine two mechanisms through which changes in GAAP affect investment. First, I find that changes in GAAP affect investment, particularly R&D expenditures, when firms have financial covenants that are affected by changes in GAAP. Second, I find evidence suggesting that the process of complying with some changes in GAAP alters managers’ information sets and consequently changes their investment decisions, particularly their capital and R&D expenditures and, to a weaker extent, their acquistion expenditures. This paper contributes to the literature on the real effects of accounting by providing evidence that accounting rules affect investment decisions even when the rule change does not concern the measurement and reporting of investment, and by documenting specific mechanisms through which the relation manifests.     

The Influence of a Credit Rating Change on Dividend and Investment Policy Interactions

We examine firms’ alterations in dividend and investment activities following credit rating changes. We find that downgraded firms reduce both dividends and investments more than no‐rating‐change firms. However, a silver lining of this doubly negative impact for shareholders is an increase in investment efficiency in firms that are most likely to overinvest. For upgraded firms, investments increase, but dividend outlays do not, compared to firms without rating changes. Our findings of asymmetric dividend stickiness and symmetric investment changes on a credit shock suggest that dividends and investments should not always be considered competing uses of funds.     

国家主权信用评级质量检验方法研究

国家主权信用评级对当今国际经济和金融运行有着极为重要的影响力。但是,与其地位不相符的是,评级机构的评级结果事后多次被证明准确性和前瞻性较差。事先缺乏预警而事后大幅降级,甚至对加剧危机起到了推波助澜的作用。本文从国家主权信用评级质量的检验方法入手,系统分析了违约率和迁移率等传统方法在检验评级结果起到的作用及其不足,给出了检验评级质量的一般方法,并验证了该评级检验方法的科学性和准确性。     

Bank systemic risk and corporate investment: Evidence from the US

In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model in which a bank’s investment (e.g., loans) is influenced by short-term financing and a probability of a financial crisis. When banks ex ante expect to be bailed out during financial crises, they do not necessarily internalize the cost of financial crises and invest more. We argue that the level of systemic risk in the banking sector is largely driven by (1) the way in which banks finance their investment (e.g., loans) using more short-term debt and/or (2) the increase in asset commonality amongst banks. We use three measures that arguably capture two dimensions of “bank systemic risk”, namely, (1) bank funding maturity and (2) bank asset commonality, to empirically test whether bank systemic risk has a positive effect on corporate investment. We document that in a sample of publicly listed firms in the United States over the period 1991–2013, bank systemic risk is positively associated with the firm-level investment ratio after controlling for a large set of country- and firm-level variables. In addition, we show that a firm's leverage strengthens the positive effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment, suggesting that more financially constrained firms experience a larger effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment than less financially constrained firms.