Strategic alliances by venture capital backed firms: an empirical examination

A growing body of literature examines the formation of strategic alliances as an important value-added role provided by venture capital firms. This paper contributes to this literature by examining two related questions: whether venture capital firms use strategic alliances as a substitute or compliment to capital infusion, and how venture capital firms use alliances to mitigate different types of risk. Results from 2505 venture-backed startups reveal that venture capital firms treat alliance formation as a substitute for capital infusion and that the breadth of the network of syndication partners investing in the startup increases the number of its strategic alliances. We also find intentionality in alliance formation. Specifically, firms operating in industry environments characterized by technical risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating technical risks, and firms operating in environments characterized by market risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating market risk. Our findings lend additional support to the perspective that alliances represent an important mechanism through which venture capital firms add value to their portfolio companies.     

Social progress,business formation,and access to investment capital

The rate of business formation is higher in countries that rank better on dimensions of social progress. This creates a need for investment capital and helps drive a positive relation between social progress and IPO activity. For example, my results suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in a country's Social Progress Index is associated with an additional 0.372 IPOs and a $69.416 increase in cumulative IPO proceeds raised per million people. The relation is stronger for emerging markets than for developed markets. Social progress is also positively correlated with the proportion of IPO firms that receive venture capital funding.     

风险投资对风险企业IPO功效研究——以我国深市中小板为例

风险投资是专业化投资过程,IPO是参与各方首选退出方式。我国风险投资起步晚、发展缓慢,基于发达国家资本市场得出的有关风险投资的结论未必适用于我国。本文使用深交所中小板相关数据检验风险投资在我国风险企业IPO过程中的具体作用,并对检验结果进行分析。通过对风险投资与风险企业IPO关系研究,为我国风险投资的发展提出合理化建议。     

Signaling and initial public offerings: The use and impact of the lockup period

To reduce information asymmetries for potential investors considering investment in an IPO venture, owners can signal the firm's longer-term viability and quality in several ways. The lockup period, is one signal that can be offered. We investigated the lockup period of a sample of 640 ventures going through the IPO and find that a longer lockup period acts as a substitute signal to venture capital (VC) and prestigious underwriter backing. Furthermore, we find that ventures which have a going concern issue can reduce the amount of underpricing at the time of the IPO by accepting a longer lockup period.     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.     

Emerging strategies in the venture capital industry

This article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms. There are three main sets of results:First, the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different “strategic groups.” Members of these “groups” are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms: 1. Financial Resources—Equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources (five major sources) resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm. 2. Staff Resources—The way venture capital firms use staff resources, particularly regarding investee management assistance, is becoming increasingly varied across different groups. Some firms provide fewer than 2-days per year, while others provide up to 450 man-days per year per client. 3. Venture Stages—While the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1,2, and 3 investment, specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages. 4. Use of Financial Resources-Firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make ($100 M to $1000 M) and in their role as a direct investor versus a “broker” for institutional funds. Practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways. First, they may find it useful to compare their firm's orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm's that comprised this study. Second, they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine, clarify, and/or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm.A second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups. Annualized, after-tax return on investments of between 25% and 40% remain the most common objective across all firms. A 5-to-6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms.A third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater “certainty” about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm. The most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline.Practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry. Second, they should consider the finding that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry.It is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger, older funds. Some of these funds would be characterized as “industry leaders, pace-setters, and innovators.” The sample provides a solid representation of the “broad middle” of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry. While larger, older funds are under represented, their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about “future direction of the venture capital industry.“Finally, the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital. For investors, the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied. Basically, this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry/geographic considerations.For users of venture capital, the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs. Users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities, staff utilization orientations, sources and uses of financial resources. This should make for more informed “shopping” among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to “shop” for the most compatible firm.     

The impact of firmspecific capabilities on the amount of capital raised in an initial public offering: Evidence from the biotechnology industry

Going “public” has a magical sound to most entrepreneurial managers. By going public the firm increases its legitimacy in the business community, improves access to debt financing, and creates a means of exit for major shareholders. However, by far the most important reason for going public is to infuse a significant amount of investment capital into the firm. It is well documented that small businesses frequently fail because of insufficient funding and heavy debt loads. Issuing an initial public offering (IPO) allows entrepreneurial firms to overcome these pitfalls. Clearly, if access to capital is the major goal of going public, then the success of an offering is measured by the amount of capital raised by the firm. This study presents a model of the total amount of capital raised by a firm through an IPO. The explanatory variables include several indicators of the scientific capabilities of the firm including the location of the firm, the quality of the research staff, the number of products under development, the number of patents held by the firm, and the firm's prior spending on research and development (R&D). The model is empirically tested on a sample of 92 biotechnology IPOs. The results provide strong support for the hypothesized positive relationship between the total amount of capital raised by a firm's IPO and the scientific capabilities of the firm.Our results have important implications for entrepreneurs. First, an entrepreneur needs to develop and send credible signals indicating the value of the firm's intangible assets to the market. Second, the market values as deep a product pipeline as possible given a firm's resource constraints. Third, choice of location is a key strategic decision that should not be overlooked. Fourth, the market values firm-specific capabilities and will increase the capital it is willing to invest in a firm accordingly. Finally, the amount of capital a firm raises in its IPO can be influenced by entrepreneurial managers' strategic decisions.     

Is venture capital worth it? Effects on firm performance and founder returns

This paper extends research on venture capital (VC) finance by studying its effects on a venture's performance and on its founders' returns beyond an initial public offering (IPO). A “founder performance” construct, defined as a founder's financial and nonfinancial returns, is proposed and used to measure and compare returns to founders with returns to investors and firm performance. In general, venture characteristics pre-IPO and venture performance post-IPO were not significantly different when comparing ventures with and without VC backing. Only when VC backing is very high, do pre-IPO resources and funding improve significantly. However, higher levels of resource endowments did not seem to affect post-IPO performance for the venture or its investors. On the other hand, founders resorting to VC funding before taking their company public generated significantly less wealth for themselves and were less likely to remain as CEOs of their ventures after the IPO. Results suggest that founders motivated primarily by wealth creation and those motivated by remaining in control of their ventures should, in both instances, minimize VC backing when taking their ventures public. The finding that founder performance differs from venture and investor performance calls for future research to explore potential conflicts of interest that may arise from the double role of founders as principals and agents.     

New insights into venture capitalists' activity: IPO and time-to-exit forecast as antecedents of their post-investment involvement

We examine how VCFs' forecast of an IPO exit affects their breadth of advising and the likelihood of founder–CEO replacement shortly after they invest in a new venture. Moreover, we examine how the expected time-to-exit moderates these relationships. Our findings show that the likelihood of founder–CEO replacement upon receiving venture capital funding is significantly greater if a VCF perceives this company as a potential IPO as opposed to a trade sale, and this likelihood increases if the forecasted time-to-exit is short. We also illustrate how the breadth of advice varies as a function of the forecasted IPO and time-to-exit.     

Technology strategy and software new ventures' performance: Exploring the moderating effect of the competitive environment

Technology strategy (TS) is one of the most important aspects of any firm's strategic posture especially in dynamic environments such as the computer software industry. Not only do new ventures face the pressures that accompany all young companies (e.g., shortages of capital), but they also have to keep up with a rapid rate of technological change. Consequently TS, the sum of a firm's choices on how to develop and exploit its technological resources, can profoundly affect a venture's performance and survival.This empirical study examines the relationships between TS and new venture performance (NVP). By focusing on TS variables and analyzing their performance outcomes, the study offers insights into the factors that can influence the success of new ventures in a fast-paced environment. This study also examines key environmental moderators, those external environmental forces, which can significantly impact the strength or direction of the relationship between a firm's TS and NVP.The study examines five TSs that can enhance NPV. The first is radicality, which means developing and introducing new products ahead of competitors. The second is the intensity of product upgrades, which refers to a venture's commitment to introducing more refinements and extensions of its products than its competition. The third is the level of R&D spending, which indicates a venture's strong investment in internal research and development activities. The fourth is the use of external technology sources (e.g., strategic alliances and licenses) to augment a firm's own R&D efforts. The final dimension is the use of     

Venture capital investing for corporate development objectives

There is a significant new player emerging in the venture capital world whose participation is changing the way that the venture business is done. Domestic and foreign corporations have discovered that investing in venture capital adds a new dimension to their corporate development strategies and can also make an outstanding return on investment.Armed with serious amounts of cash, aware of the value of an association with their name and frequently possessing marketing power that a small company covets, corporations are competing with venture capitalists for the best deals. Obtaining a “corporate partner” is now an accepted part of a small company's financing strategy.For the corporate development executive, this activity provides a useful tool to widen the spectrum of participation in new technologies while retaining the entrepreneurial drive and reducing the cost and exposure of new ventures. However, it is not a panacea for growth and caution should be exercised to avoid creating unrealistic expectations.Both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists welcome this source of later-stage capital, providing it minimizes equity dilution and assists in product development, marketing and liquidity for their investment. However, it is a competitor for the venture capitalists in sourcing deals and a potential adversary for the entrepreneur when objectives clash. Additionally, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists often are suspicious of the corporation in the small company's boardroom.The objective of most corporations is the strategic benefits that can result from venture capital investing, such as acquisitions, technology licenses, product marketing rights, international opportunities and a window on technology. However, this objective is frequently mixed with a financial return objective and can lead to a confused strategy.Participation by corporations can take many different forms but usually begins with investments in several venture capital funds as a limited partner and evolves into direct investments in venture companies. Formation of a venture development subsidiary by the corporation is a demonstrated way to maximize the strategic rewards. If financial return is the only objective, then a stand-alone venture fund is the best vehicle.The most important factors for the strategic success of a corporate program are the creation of a high-quality deal stream and the use of outstanding people to interface between the corporation and the venture capital world. In addition, there has to be a long-term commitment, active involvement and a carefully devised internal communications strategy to promote and protect the program.Creation of a formal venture development subsidiary is probably the best way to maximize the strategic objectives. Lubrizol Enterprises operates as such a subsidiary of The Lubrizol Corporation and utilizes venture capital investing, acquisitions, partnerships, and contract research to develop strategic business units based on leading-edge technologies.     

Organizational Virtue and Stakeholder Interdependence: An Empirical Examination of Financial Intermediaries and IPO Firms

Organizational virtue orientation (OVO), an organizational-level construct, refers to the integrated set of beliefs and values that support ethical character traits and virtuous behaviors. To advance the study of organizational virtue, we examine OVO in firms making their initial public offerings (IPOs), with respect to key external stakeholders that serve as financial intermediaries (i.e., venture capital firms and underwriting banks). Drawing on stakeholder and resource dependence theories, we argue that mutual interdependencies occur between financial intermediaries and IPO firms such that venture capital firms’ ownership levels and underwriter reputation are positively associated with the selection of more virtuous IPO firms. We also argue for the moderating relationship of IPO firm age on these main relationships; since IPO firms have more history and information availability, less importance will be placed on OVO in the selection process. In support of our hypotheses, the results of this study suggest the organizational virtue of IPO firms influences the selection decisions of financial intermediaries by reflecting positively on these key stakeholders to improve legitimacy and reputation.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Early teams: The impact of team demography on VC financing and going public

This study investigates how top management team (TMT) demographic characteristics affect firm outcomes for young high technology firms in Silicon Valley. We study how team composition and turnover shape an entrepreneurial firm's ability to attract venture capital and its ability to successfully complete an initial public offering. We find that broad access to information by virtue of having top management team members that have worked for many different employers (diverse prior company affiliations) and have diverse prior experiences (functional diversity) tend to be associated with positive outcomes. In addition, entrants to and founder exits from the TMT increase the likelihood that a firm achieves an IPO. TMT exits, in turn, reduce the likelihood of achieving an IPO. Results also suggest that prior human capital experience is consistently associated with positive firm outcomes. These findings suggest that team experiences, composition and turnover are all important for bringing new insights to the firm and are associated with the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will succeed.     

制度学习、网络中心性和市场进入——跨国风险资本在华投资的实证研究

在我国风险投资市场不断繁荣而且跨国风险投资大量涌进的背景下,本文主要运用清科数据库2001年1月1日到201 0年1 2月31日的数据进行分析,研究发现跨国风险投资机构的网络中心性对"制度学习一市场进入"的关系具有中介作用。跨国风险投资机构不同的联合投资网络中心性对制度学习正向影响市场进入的影响作用不同,其中中介中心性的影响作用最大,表明跨国风险资本充当其他风险投资机构网络联结的中介具有重要的作用。在此基础上,本研究对跨国风险投资机构和本土风险投资机构的实践及联合投资网络的运作提出相应的建议,以期推动我国风险投资产业的有序发展。     

Exploring the innovation strategies of young firms: Corporate venture capital and venture capital impact on alliance innovation strategy

We investigate how governance structure and power influence alliance exploration strategy. Adopting a real options perspective and the agency view, we suggest that innovation strategies differ based on the firm's governance authority. We find that the motivations of corporate venture capitalist firms, venture capitalists, and firm founders may have an impact on the formation of exploratory alliances among adolescent firms. Using a sample of 122 adolescent firms, we examine the influence that governance structure has on the firm's alliance portfolio and innovation potential. While the influence of corporate venture capitalist firms alone do affect alliance formation strategy, corporate venture-backed firms with founders having high influence (knowledge or ownership in the firm) are more likely to form innovation-focused alliances. In contrast, venture capitalist-backed firms tend to avoid innovation-focused alliances, preferring more exploitive ones, even when founders have high influence within the firm.     

When do domestic alliances help ventures abroad? Direct and moderating effects from a learning perspective

While the importance of strategic alliances for new venture internationalization is well acknowledged, the effect of domestic partners remains less understood. Building on organizational learning theory's vicarious learning arguments, we suggest that internationally experienced domestic partners positively influence new ventures' international intensity. Moreover, acknowledging that ventures may have multiple learning sources, we argue that the effect is more pronounced when substituting for the lack of new ventures' top management teams' international experience, or when complementing the insights about foreign markets received from foreign alliance partners. The analysis of 194 publicly held new ventures largely supports our hypotheses.     

论美国、德国风险投资的退出机制

风险投资退出机制在风险投资中占有十分重要的地位。美国风险投资退出渠道主要以IPO和并购为主 ,而德国风险投资主要以股票回购退出为主。造成这种差异的原因主要有二板市场的发达度不同、投资主体的不同、投入创业阶段的不同和激励机制的差异等。     

风险投资的内涵辨析及其实践意义

风险投资的内在运行机制是“合理预期高收益和合理控制高风险”。由此 ,风险投资的投资对象不是人们一般意义上所理解的“高成长的中小企业”、“高科技企业”或“风险企业” ;国内争论颇多的“创业投资”与“风险投资”并没有本质不同 ,此种译名之争 ,其实强调的是各自不同的侧面 ;为解决风险投资的退出机制 ,以过低的上市标准来设计、推出创业板是一个错误的选择。     

An examination of the influence of industry structure on eight alternative measures of new venture performance for high potential independent new ventures

This study examined the influence of the structure of new ventures’ entered industries on eight alternative measures of new venture performance for 199 high potential independent new ventures. Each of the 199 entrepreneurial ventures had undertaken an initial public offering (IPO) within the first 6 years of the venture’s founding date and were free of corporate sponsorship or prior corporate parentage.Specifically, this research examined the influence of: (1) stage of the life cycle; (2) industry concentration; (3) entry barriers; and (4) product differentiation on eight alternative measures of new venture performance. The eight measures of new venture performance examined in this research consisted of: (1) change in sales; (2) sales level; (3) net profit; (4) earnings before interest and taxes; (5) return on sales; (6) return on assets; (7) return on invested capital; and (8) return on equity.Most prior research examining the influence of industry structure on new venture performance has: (1) utilized only one or two measures of new venture performance as indicators of the venture’s overall effectiveness and efficiency; (2) often failed to provide theoretical justification for the measure(s) of new venture performance or industry structure examined; and (3) utilized data derived from questionnaires and/or the PIMS data base of corporate-sponsored new ventures. In addition, prior industry structure studies examining independent new ventures have often utilized relatively small sample sizes.This study sought to advance the progress in the field of entrepreneurship with regard to understanding the influence of the structure of new ventures’ entered industries on new venture performance by: (1) examining eight alternative measures of new venture performance; (2) providing theoretical justification for the measures of new venture performance and industry structure examined; and (3) utilizing the largest nonquestionnaire data base of independent new ventures developed to date.This research found that the stage of the life cycle of the venture’s entered industry was the most important determinant of new venture performance among the four industry structural elements examined. Stage of the life cycle had a statistically significant relationship, at a 0.05 level, with the majority of the new venture performance measures examined in this research. In addition, ventures entering industries in the introductory stage of the life cycle achieved the highest levels of venture performance, particularly when compared with those ventures that entered industries in the mature stage of the life cycle.However, this study did not find a statistically significant relationship between stage of the life cycle and change in sales. This suggests that there is a trade-off between profitability and sales growth, and that new ventures that undertake an IPO have a stronger focus on achieving profitable operations rather than sales growth during the initial years after their IPO. This may be due to pressures placed on the new ventures to achieve profitability by the external credit market.Conversely, this research found that: (1) industry concentration; (2) entry barriers; and (3) product differentiation did not have statistically significant relationships, at a 0.10 level, with any of the eight alternative measures of new venture performance examined in this research. However, this research did find that over 90% of the new ventures entered industries characterized by: (1) a low degree of industry concentration and (2) a high degree of product differentiation.The relative absence of new venture entry into industries characterized by: (1) high degrees of concentration and (2) low degrees of product differentiation provides support for prior theory, which suggests that successful entry into such industry environments may be substantially more difficult.In sum, the results of this research suggest that high potential independent new ventures that undertake an IPO should enter industries in the introductory stage of the life cycle. In addition, the results of this research suggest that industries characterized by: (1) relatively low degrees of industry concentration and (2) highly heterogenous products may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful entry by high potential independent new ventures seeking to raise equity capital through an IPO.