基于成本差异的最佳贸易与产业政策选择

本文讨论了存在成本差异的第三国市场模型的最佳贸易与产业政策选择问题，讨论了社会成本和私人成本、本国和外国成本差异情况下的Cournot竞争和Bertrand竞争的情况。本文发现，在Cournot竞争下，政府首先行动时，当政府基金影子价格低于4／3时，政府对出口进行补贴，并且本国越有成本优势，补贴越高，补贴的利润转移效应越大；当政府基金影子价格高于4／3时，政府对出口征收出口税，且本国越有成本优势，征税越多。在Bertrand竞争下，当政府先行动时，对出口征收出口税；当政府后行动时，对出口进行补贴。当本国企业具有劣势时，事后补贴是最佳政蓑。     

Look before you leap: Why politicians may have a point to be hesitant about the gains from trade

Economists emphasize the welfare gains of unrestricted trade, but politicians worry about the income distribution effects of increased competition. We show that the welfare gains of a trade shock become ambiguous if inaccurate information hinders optimal income redistribution with distortionary policy instruments. To be sure about the net welfare outcome of a compensated trade shock, the government must know the size of the trade shock and the corresponding size of the policy instrument that is needed to generate a balanced budget. If this is not the case, politicians may have a point when being hesitant about the gains from trade.     

Trip Chaining: Who Wins Who Loses?

This paper studies how trip chaining (combining commuting and shopping or commuting and child care) affects market competition: in particular, pricing and the equilibrium number of firms as well as welfare. We use a monopolistic competition framework, where firms sell differentiated products as well as offering differentiated jobs to households, who are all located at some distance from the firms. The symmetric equilibriums with and without the option of trip chaining are compared. We show analytically that introducing the trip chaining option reduces the profit margin of the firms in the short run, but increases welfare. The welfare gains are, however, smaller than the transport cost savings. In the free-entry long-run equilibrium, the number of firms decreases but welfare is higher. A numerical illustration gives orders of magnitude of the different effects.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper discusses public abatement financed by pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue and investigates the welfare consequences of a tariff. The main result of this paper is that under certain conditions a tariff reduction results in an improvement in welfare through an increase in public abatement and a decrease in pollution. This result may guide policy for countries that wish to harmonize trade liberalization and the environmental protection demonstrated by both the private and the public sectors.     

Welfare improving licensing with endogenous choice of prices versus quantities

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities by taking into account patent licensing where the patent holder, which is itself a producer within the industry, licenses its cost-reducing innovation to the rival firm through a two-part tariff contract. For substitute products we find that both Cournot and mixed price-quantity competition may constitute the equilibrium outcomes, depending on the innovation size. Contrary to the results in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), we show that the optimal licensing contract definitely leads to an increase in social welfare. Our result reinforces the positive welfare effect of patent licensing.     

贸易自由化与中国企业进口中间品质量升级

进口高质量中间品是发展中国家实现技术追赶的重要途径;贸易自由化会降低进口高质量中间产品的贸易成本和相对价格,促进企业进口中间品质量升级。基于此,本文利用细分关税数据、海关数据和工业企业数据,将加工贸易作为控制组、一般贸易作为处理组,采用倍差法经验分析贸易自由化对中国企业进口中间品质量的影响。结论发现：伴随关税下降,中国企业进口中间品质量整体增长,且一般贸易组增长速度远快于加工贸易组。同加工贸易相比,关税下降1%一般贸易进口中间品质量增长高出0.06%~3.74%。这一作用在持续进口企业中,在基础设施完善、市场化水平高、经济集聚程度高的地区更明显。上述结论通过了同趋势假设、内生性等一系列稳健性检验。     

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.     

Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s agro-food sectors under liberalized agricultural trade: a case for national product differentiation

Russia is a major importer of agro-food products in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), whereas Kazakhstan’s agro-food sector is more export-oriented. Based on a multi-market-model with bilateral trade, the paper investigates how a Common Agricultural Market (CAM) and World Trade Organization (WTO) accession would affect prices, quantities, and welfare on agro-food markets in both countries. Trade diversion effects are expected because of a changed tariff structure. Kazakhstan’s agro-food sector will loose price competitiveness on Russia’s markets if liberalization is too narrowly focused on import tariffs. Simulations also suggest that national product differentiation can be part of a strategy for Russian agro-food industries to cope with stronger international competition.     

Endogenous vertical structure and trade policy in an import-competing market

We examine the endogenous determination of a vertical market in an import-competing market with import tariff. We show that if firms commit to vertical organization before the government's commitment to trade policy, the home and foreign firms choose vertical separation and vertical integration, respectively, at equilibrium under Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium entails both firms separating their retailers. Comparing profits between Bertrand competition to Cournot competition, we find that upstream manufacturer's profit can be higher under Bertrand competition with integration than under Cournot competition with separation when comparing foreign upstream manufacturer's profit.     

Spatial discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournot with asymmetric demands

This paper develops a barbell model a la Hwang and Mai [Hwang, H., and C.C. Mai, 1990, Effects of spatial price discrimination on output, welfare, and location, American Economic Review 80, 567–575.] with homogeneous product and asymmetric demands to compare prices, aggregate profits and social welfare between Cournot and Bertrand competition, and to analyze the firms' equilibrium locations. It focuses on the impacts of the spatial barrier generated from transport costs, and the market size effect resulting from asymmetric demands. It shows that the market-size effect is crucial in determining firms' locations under Cournot competition, but insignificant under Bertrand competition. Moreover, the equilibrium price of the large market and the aggregate profits are lower but the social welfare is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition if one of the markets is sufficiently large and the transport cost is high.     

Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects

Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms’ incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods.     

EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF TARIFF REDUCTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

This paper analyses the evidence on the impact of tariff reductions on employment in developing countries. We carry out a systematic review of the existing empirical literature, and include both, ex post econometric evidence and ex ante Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulation studies. The synthesis of results suggests that the effects of tariff reductions on employment are country and trade policy specific. When looking across higher quality econometric studies that control for the endogeneity of tariffs, only a couple of studies have statistically significant results, and these suggest that employment is likely to decrease slightly in the short run following trade liberalization. This is consistent with the notion that there are winners and losers from trade policy reform. These results are in contrast with the CGE findings, which by design incorporate projections of the medium‐run economy‐wide knock‐on effects suggested by economic theory. The synthesis of CGE studies suggests non‐negative effects of trade liberalization on aggregate employment and moderate inter‐sectoral labour reallocation effects.     

全球化背景下我国出口退税政策的经济效应

本文通过将出口退税政策变量纳入全球模拟(GSIM)模型,从产业层面和全球视角对出口退税政策通过价格机制影响有关国家的生产、进出口贸易流量、生产者与消费者福利等经济活动进行理论分析。并基于2007年全球纺织品生产与贸易数据,对我国纺织品出口退税政策的主要经济效应进行了模拟分析。结果表明,提高纺织品出口退税率将使我国纺织品的产出、出口以及行业生产者的福利都有所增加,而纺织品内销量有所减少以及消费者的福利受损。     

测度中国与G-7的双边贸易成本——一个改进引力模型方法的应用

传统引力模型方法在测度贸易成本时,由于缺乏微观理论基础,往往事前假定贸易成本的构成并且忽略多边阻力的影响而广受批评。基于一个融入双边冰山型贸易成本的多边一般均衡贸易模型,本文采用的改进引力模型能够弥补上述缺陷。运用该模型我们综合测度了1980~2006年中国与G-7各国关税等价的双边贸易成本。结果表明,中国与这些国家关税等价的贸易成本都已经低于50%,与1980年相比,到2006年平均下降幅度高达30%,并且在入世以后呈现加速下降的趋势。这充分说明近30年来,中国的对外开放程度不断提升,正加速融入全球经济一体化之中。     

Trade Creation and Trade Diversion

SUMMARY

In this paper we raise questions regarding the appropriateness of the traditional gravity model for evaluating the existence of trade creation and trade diversion in the context of regional trade arrangements. We demonstrate that existing methods fail to separate multilateral and allocation effects, and are therefore unable to say anything useful about either. Further, we point out that omitted variables-perennially unobservables-further contribute to the contamination of the results. Bearing these criticisms in mind, we provide a new methodology for assessing the effect of preferential trading arrangements on the trade volumes, and hence, the welfare of member and non-member countries. We offer a test that separates these effects, and employ it in an assessment of the EC. We find that the allocation effects of the EC caused 5 of its 11 members to divert trade toward bloc members, and 2 of its members to divert trade away from the EC. We also find that the EC increased multilateral trade for both members and non-members.     

Disclosure Policy in a Mixed Market

This paper investigates the optimal disclosure strategy for private information in a mixed duopoly market, where a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a joint-stock company compete to supply products. I construct a model where the two firms compete in either quantity or price, and uncertainty is associated with either marginal cost or market demand. The model identifies the optimal disclosure strategies that constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by type of competition and uncertainty. In Cournot competition, both firms disclose information under cost uncertainty, while only the SOE or neither firm discloses information under demand uncertainty. Alternatively, in Bertrand competition, only the joint-stock company discloses information under cost uncertainty or demand uncertainty. Recently, developed countries have required the same level of disclosure standards for SOEs as for ordinary joint-stock companies. The findings described in this paper warn that such mandatory disclosure by SOEs can trigger a reaction by joint-stock companies, putting the economy at risk of a reduction in welfare.     

Do firms choose overcapacity or undercapacity in a vertical structure?

This study investigates capacity choice in a vertical structure in which each downstream firm makes its capacity decision, then a monopolistic upstream firm proposes the input price or two-part tariff contract. Finally, each downstream firm chooses its output (or price). Contrary to the conventional wisdom that both firms hold excess capacity in an Cournot competition, we find that each downstream firm always chooses undercapacity regardless of both the nature of goods and the competition modes. Second, we also show that capacity efficiency is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Third, even though there are double marginalization distortion and rent-extracting effect, we can achieve the monopoly equilibrium of the vertically integrated firm though two-part tariff contract.     

The effects of tariff increases on supply base complexity: A conceptual framework

Recent protectionist trends around the world have raised interest in newly enforced or increased tariffs and their effects on global supply chains. For firms sourcing globally, tariff introductions or increases significantly affect importing costs, which ultimately affect product costs. Such tariff changes may incentivize firms to adjust their supply base to mitigate these cost increases, thus altering the structure and complexity of firms' supply bases. In this paper, we first characterize the U.S. tariff landscape from 1997 to 2017. We then develop a conceptual model to explain how the severity and timing uncertainty of expected tariff increases influence a firm's speed of adapting to the changing tariff environment. Specifically, we explore firms' propensity to form or delete ties to suppliers, which influences supply base complexity. Moreover, we consider factors that moderate the relationship between severity, timing uncertainty, and supply base complexity, including a tariff's geographical scope, a firm's relative purchase spend, and supply risk. Our conceptual model offers both research and managerial implications.     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

Frequency competition and environmental costs: An application to European air transport liberalization

In this paper, we analyze symmetric frequency equilibria in airline markets; these equilibria are derived as multiproduct oligopoly solutions in a spatial competition model. Competitive equilibria are compared with a regulated equilibrium; in order to assess the welfare implications of European air transport liberalization, we compute numerical solutions using data for 21 regulated European interstate routes in 1990. We conclude that, following the introduction of competition in these markets, consumer welfare is significantly higher due to frequency increases and fare decreases. Profits decrease and, as a result of higher departure frequencies, environmental costs increase. However, the gains in consumer welfare more than compensate the decrease in profits and the rise in environmental costs.