FIRST IN VILLAGE OR SECOND IN ROME?*

Though individuals prefer high‐quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group. In this environment, sorting of agents yields an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. With transfers, this equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium where agents bid for relative positions and entails less segregation than the efficient allocation. More egalitarianism within organizations induces greater segregation across organizations, but can improve the allocation efficiency. Since competition is most intense for intermediate talent, effective personnel policies differ systematically between high‐quality and low‐quality organizations.     

WHEN DOES IT PAY TO GET INFORMED?*

A repeated principal–agent problem where both sides start out symmetrically uninformed about a productivity‐related parameter and where the principal has the option to costlessly learn this parameter is analyzed. Typically, the principal delays the acquisition of information to avoid costly signaling. If the learning decision of the principal is observable by the agent, the expected delay is longer than if it is unobservable. The discrepancy is due to the ability of the principal to avoid costly signaling when he is known to be uninformed.     

DOES INPUT QUALITY DRIVE MEASURED DIFFERENCES IN FIRM PRODUCTIVITY?*

One explanation for productivity dispersion is that the quality of inputs differs across firms. We add labor market history variables such as experience and firm and industry tenure, as well as general human capital measures such as schooling and sex. Adding these variables decreases the ratio of the 90th to 10th productivity quantiles from 3.27 to 2.68 across eight Danish manufacturing and service industries. We also use the wage bill and worker fixed effects. We find that the wage bill explains as much dispersion as human capital measures.     

GLOBAL BUSINESS CYCLES: CONVERGENCE OR DECOUPLING?*

We analyze the evolution of the degree of global cyclical interdependence over the period 1960–2008. Using a dynamic factor model, we decompose macroeconomic fluctuations in output, consumption, and investment into a global factor, factors specific to country groups, and country‐specific factors. We find that during 1985–2008, there is some convergence of business cycle fluctuations among industrial economies and among emerging market economies. Surprisingly, there is a concomitant decline in the relative importance of the global factor. We conclude that there is evidence of business cycle convergence within each of these two groups of countries but divergence (or decoupling) between them.     

CORRUPTION AND MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES: DOES REGULATION HELP?

Misunderstandings about the structure of microcredit interest rates continue to generate rich criticism of the industry's high interest rates. Research has focused attention on the cost structure of interest rates and, more recently, on macroeconomic and macro‐institutional factors. While the cost structure is probably the most important determinant of interest rates, other factors also matter. In addition to other important results that usually validate the empirical literature, this paper finds that microcredit interest rates respond positively to corruption. The analysis shows that there is asymmetry between the effects of corruption, depending on whether or not the MFIs are regulated. While corruption has a positive and significant impact on interest rates of unregulated MFIs, it has a negligible impact on interest rates of regulated MFIs.     

IS IT IS OR IS IT AIN'T MY OBLIGATION? REGIONAL DEBT IN A FISCAL FEDERATION*

This article studies the repayment of regional debt in a multiregion economy with a central authority: Who pays the obligation issued by a region? With commitment, the central government will use its economy‐wide taxation power in support of its objective to smooth distortionary taxes and consumption across regions. Absent commitment, this tool of the central government may be exploited to induce it to bail out regional government deficits. We characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications. In particular, we show when the gains from a federation may outweigh the welfare costs of a bailout. We use these insights to comment on actual fiscal relations in three quite different federations: the United States, the European Union, and Argentina.     

POLLUTION PERMIT SYSTEMS AND FIRM DYNAMICS: HOW DOES THE ALLOCATION SCHEME MATTER?*

I use a firm dynamics model to compare two permit allocation schemes commonly used in pollution permit systems. In the first, closing plants keep their permits, and new entrants do not get them, whereas in the second, closing plants lose their permits, and new entrants get free allowances. Calibrating the model with data from power plants participating in the U.S. program, I find that, compared to the first scheme, in the second arrangement, (i) plants stay, on average, 3.6 years longer and (ii) although the aggregate emission rate is lower, the plant distribution displays more dirty and low‐productivity plants.     

SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: A SOURCE OR SALVE FOR THE RACIAL ACHIEVEMENT GAP?*

Racial disparities in school discipline are believed to contribute to the persistent achievement gap between black and white students. In this article, I estimate the relationship between school discipline and achievement within a structural model, taking into account the spillover effects of disruptive behavior. I find that discipline has an overall positive influence on student performance and that the racial gap in discipline stemming from cross‐school variation in discipline policies is consistent with achievement maximization. Integrating schools can close both the discipline and achievement gaps; however, overall achievement is reduced since schools are less able to target their discipline policies.     

BAILOUTS IN FEDERATIONS: IS A HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINT ALWAYS BEST?*

This article analyses hard and soft budget constraints in a federation, where there is a moral hazard problem between the central and the regional governments. Regional governments can avoid a bailout from the center by exerting costly effort. In this setting, a hard budget constraint is not always optimal because it can provide excessive incentives for high effort, and thus discourage investment that is socially efficient. Thus, a hard budget constraint can imply the opposite kind of inefficiency that emerges under a soft budget constraint, where the common pool problem can give rise to inefficiently low effort and overinvestment.     

REMITTANCES AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT: SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH?

Recent studies indicate that the effect of migrants’ remittances on the economic growth of receiving countries depends negatively on the level of development of the domestic financial sector. In this paper, we introduce a new indicator of financial development to measure the efficiency of the domestic banking system, and find the existence of complementarity between remittances and bank efficiency in economic growth, such that remittances promote growth only in countries whose banks function well. This result is robust to controls for other traditional measures of financial depth and institutional quality indicators.     

SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA IN A PRODUCTION ECONOMY: DO RATIONAL ANIMAL SPIRITS CAUSE OVERPRODUCTION?*

We study a standard two‐period economy with one nominal bond and one firm. The firm finances the input with the nominal bond in the first period and its profits are distributed to the shareholders in the second period. We show that in the neighbourhood of each efficient equilibrium, a sunspot equilibrium also exists. It is shown that the equilibrium interest rate is lower than the efficient level and that there is overproduction in the sunspot equilibrium, under some conditions. However, there is no sunspot equilibrium if the profit share of the firm can be traded as well as the bond.     

EXPLOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE 1990s NASDAQ: WHEN DID EXUBERANCE ESCALATE ASSET VALUES?*

A recursive test procedure is suggested that provides a mechanism for testing explosive behavior, date stamping the origination and collapse of economic exuberance, and providing valid confidence intervals for explosive growth rates. The method involves the recursive implementation of a right‐side unit root test and a sup test, both of which are easy to use in practical applications, and some new limit theory for mildly explosive processes. The test procedure is shown to have discriminatory power in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles, thereby overcoming a weakness in earlier applications of unit root tests for economic bubbles. An empirical application to the Nasdaq stock price index in the 1990s provides confirmation of explosiveness and date stamps the origination of financial exuberance to mid‐1995, prior to the famous remark in December 1996 by Alan Greenspan about irrational exuberance in the financial market, thereby giving the remark empirical content.

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FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION: DOES TRUST MATTER?

Ecosystem service provision in agriculture may require cooperation between farmers. Trust fosters cooperation in many economic and social interactions and is important to the success of traditional agricultural cooperatives. Little is known about how trust affects farmers’ willingness to cooperate to provide an ecosystem service, what types of trust are most important, and under what conditions trust may matter. In this study, we present results of a survey of Missouri crop farmers exploring the role trust plays in farmers’ stated willingness to cooperate to control pests. We find that most farmers say they are willing to cooperate, and most farmers are willing to trust others. However, we find little evidence that trust positively influences farmers’ willingness to cooperate to control pests. Instead, we find that trust may only matter under certain conditions, such as when participants’ farms are dissimilar, and that other determinants, such as the perceived benefit of cooperation and environmental concern, are more important than trust to farmers who are contemplating cooperation to control pests.     

EFFICIENT POLICY IN A PREDATORY ECONOMY: TO HIM WHO HATH SHALL BE GIVEN?*

Trade subject to predation generates externalities within and between markets. Efficient tax, infrastructure, and enforcement policies internalize the net externality—more trade implies fewer predators but drawn to trade at rising cost. The balance is positive (negative) as enforcement is weak (strong). Dual economies pair weak Periphery and strong Core enforcement markets. Efficient taxation and infrastructure promote the Core at the expense of the Periphery. Efficient enforcement promotes both. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is efficient when Core enforcement is weak (strong). Tolerance of informal market Mafias that provide enforcement and infrastructure is efficient when Core enforcement is strong.     

TARGETS IN THE TAYLOR RULE: INFLATION,SPEED LIMIT,OR PRICE LEVEL?

This paper explores the link between alternative targets in the Taylor rule and their empirical fit using real‐time U.S. macroeconomic data. We first study the stabilizing properties of the classical Taylor rule (inflation targeting, IT) and add either a price‐level target (PLT) or output gap quasigrowth target (speed‐limit targeting, SLT) in the context of the standard New Keynesian model. We demonstrate that, although only SLT has the same functional form as the optimal interest‐rate reaction function, both PLT and SLT stabilize the model macroeconomy against a cost‐push shock for a wide range of parameter values better than IT. We then estimate all three specifications using the Greenbook data. We find much stronger support for SLT than PLT and discuss pitfalls in estimating the latter that are present in existing literature. (JEL E52, E58)     

RENAISSANCE OR REQUIEM: IS NUCLEAR ENERGY COST EFFECTIVE IN A POST‐FUKUSHIMA WORLD?

In the aftermath of Fukushima, decisions to slow or stop the future use of nuclear power have not been based on rational economic analysis. We find that there are cost‐effective technologies that would greatly mitigate future natural disasters. Even if the U.S. nuclear industry adopted new safety technologies and paid the full cost of insurance and borrowing, it is more efficient to continue to use existing nuclear plants than to replace them with new fossil fuel plants. However, new nuclear plant costs can exceed fossil fuel alternatives if the price of carbon emissions is below $118/ton. (JEL Q40, Q48, Q54)     

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR FIRMS IN OPPRESSIVE AND CORRUPT STATES: INFORMALITY OR FORMALITY VIA BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS?

Firms operating in oppressive conditions such as those in the transition countries often take advantage of informality, making unofficial payments to officials and underreporting their sales for tax purposes. This paper argues that business associations may constitute a more transparent, efficient, and formal alternative. Empirical support for the argument is provided based on firm level data on several thousand firms from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys in 25 transitions countries for 2002 and 2005. We show that, despite their often rather bad reputation, business associations tend to play a rather positive role, helping firms to reduce both having to make unofficial payments and underreporting of sales for tax purposes. ( JEL D2, D7, L2, P2, P3)     

ISLAMISTIC TERROR AND THE LABOUR MARKET PROSPECTS OF ARAB MEN IN ENGLAND: DOES A COUNTRY'S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT MATTER?

This paper considers two questions on the labour market discrimination against Arab or Muslim men after the recent terrorist attacks. First, I consider for the first time the impact of the September 11 attacks on the wages and working hours of Arabs in Europe. Second, I test whether the fact that a country was the direct target of terrorist attacks influences discrimination using the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004 and the London bombings on 7 July 2005 as quasi‐experimental events. The results indicate that the wages, hours worked and employment probabilities of Arab men were unchanged by the attacks.