Microcredit market structure and financing obstacles for micro firms

Using rich survey data of micro firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, I analze the effect of recent changes in microcredit market structure on perceived financing obstacles. Controlling for country, time and firm characteristics, lower microcredit market concentration is associated with firms reporting financing as a more severe obstacle to their operations. This indicates that rising competition between microfinance institutions may have led to reduced financial access. The results are consistent with information‐based theoretical predictions that lenders with less market power have weaker incentives to invest in lending relationships with opaque firms and that greater competition aggravates borrower screening.     

The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model

I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed.     

What have the FTA and the NAFTA done to the Canadian labor market?

A central concern with respect to globalization is its effects on institutions. Institutions are thought to provide protections against the casual damage inflicted by market processes and, in various ways, to contribute toward aggregate economic efficiency. The effects of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement on the Canadian labor market and its institutions provide a useful case study of the effects of globalization because Canadian trade is so heavily concentrated with the United States. In this paper I show that, while the agreements imposed considerable costs on employees in some manufacturing industries, overall, Canadian institutions have not been substantially changed by the agreements. Where those institutions have changed, other factors have been much more important.     

Market forces and competition in university systems: theoretical reflections and empirical evidence from Italy

This paper deals with the reforming processes in higher education (HE) from centralised systems towards more competitive ones. In particular, I discuss these issues referring to the Italian case, and the market‐like mechanisms introduced in it during 1990s and early 2000s. The focus of the paper is in analysing the effects of the increasing competition on teaching performance of universities. For this purpose, I develop a theoretical model, moving from the framework of yardstick competition (YC), to describe the functioning of a competition model based on comparing performance of institutions. Then, I apply this model using data from the Italian university system. The results suggest that an increasingly competitive environment effectively improves the universities’ performance, which is also influenced by other factors, namely the characteristics of the institutions themselves and of their students, and by the resources available. As the exploratory nature of the study, these findings must be validated through future research.     

Do regional trade agreements stimulate FDI? Evidence for the Agadir,MERCOSUR and AFTA regions

The integration of emerging markets into the global economy is heavily promoted by foreign direct investment (FDI ) inflows. Among the factors explaining the location of FDI , regional trade agreements (RTA s) can be relevant for emerging markets, as they can promote economic integration and increase the attractiveness of the region for foreign investors. This paper investigates the impact of South–South trade agreements on the FDI decision of multinationals, where the Agadir, mercado comun del sur (MERCOSUR), and ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) agreements are considered. Three panels of countries are defined, where the members joined a specific agreement or not. Non‐Gulf Arab states are compared to better performing regions in Latin America and Southern and Eastern Asia. The analysis provides evidence that openness to foreign trade and financial markets are among the main catalysts to attract FDI , provided that business‐friendly institutions exist in the host country. Other variables, like the size of the industrial sector, urbanization rates, and external debt appear to be important in some cases. The integration of China into the world economy is a specific trigger for FDI to Asian destinations. Since RTA s influence the market size by reducing barriers to trade, their impact operates via GDP growth and openness. Gains from the agreement are striking for Latin America and Asia, but not for Arab states. To attract more FDI , business‐friendly institutional reforms and mechanisms to support new firm foundation should be implemented in this region.     

GOVERNANCE AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN TEAM SPORTS

Antitrust law distinguishes vertical and horizontal restraints. A horizontal restraint is one which exists between competing firms supplying rival products in a market, and a vertical restraint is one which exists between firms that jointly contribute to supplying a particular product in a market. Horizontal agreements receive much closer antitrust scrutiny because they often enable firms to limit competition at the expense of consumers, while vertical restraints may be legal or illegal depending on whether they tend to enhance or reduce competition or the exploitation of market power. This paper argues that there are important vertical restraints that operate in sports leagues which have been mostly neglected in the literature but have a significant impact. We focus on intraleague restraints, where member clubs of a league agree to control the organization of league competition, and interleague restraints, where horizontal agreement such as the Reserve Clause relies on agreements not to compete for players competing in senior or junior leagues. ( JEL L83, L42, L44)     

Bank competition, financial reform, and institutions: The importance of being developed

In this paper, I estimate the degree of market power at the bank-level for 84 banking systems worldwide. Subsequently, I analyze the sources of bank competition, placing emphasis on the impact of financial reform and the quality of institutions. I find that financial liberalization policies reduce the market power of banks in developed countries with advanced institutions. In contrast, banking competition does not improve at the same pace in countries with weaker institutions and a lower level of institutional development. The results hold across a wide array of identification tests and estimation methods. The main policy implication to be drawn is that a certain level of institutional development is a precondition for the success of reforms aimed at enhancing the competition and efficiency of banking markets.     

Controlling monopoly power in a double-auction market experiment

There is robust evidence in the experimental economics literature showing that monopoly power is affected by trading institutions. In this paper, we study whether trading institutions themselves can shape agents' market behavior through the formation of anchors. We recreate experimentally five different double-auction market structures (perfect competition, perfect competition with quotas, cartel on price, cartel on price with quotas, and monopoly) in a within-subject design, varying the order of markets implementation. We investigate whether monopoly power endures the formation of price anchors emerged in previously implemented market structures. Results from our classroom experiments suggest that double-auction trading institutions succeed in preventing monopolists from exploiting their market power. Furthermore, the formation of price anchors in previously implemented markets negatively impacts on monopolists' power in later market structures.     

Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis

This paper uses laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance of a deposit-refund mechanism used to enforce compliance with voluntary public-good commitments made in the absence of strong regulatory institutions. With this mechanism agents decide whether to join an agreement and pay a deposit prior to making their contribution decisions. If an agreement receives sufficient membership to form, members then make their contribution decisions and compliant members are refunded their deposits. If an agreement does not form, then deposits are immediately refunded and a standard voluntary contribution game is played. We find that the deposit-refund mechanism achieves nearly full efficiency when agreements require full participation, but is far less effective, and in some cases disruptive, when agreements require only partial participation. As the mechanism does not require the existence of strong sanctioning institutions, it is particularly suited for enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements.     

Market collusion and the politics of protection

This paper investigates the relationship between trade and competition policy within a model where market collusion and protectionist lobbying are themselves related. Collusion and lobbying are modeled as joint products of the same collective effort of firms. In equilibrium, firms cannot achieve greater cooperation in one dimension without reducing it in the other. A trade agreement that limits the effectiveness of lobbying may cause firms to increase market collusion, thereby increasing the domestic price. Thus, international trade agreements may run counter to the goals of competition policy. On the other side, a more restrictive competition policy is shown to either reduce the domestic price or reduce import protection. Thus, competition policy tends to promote trade policy goals. The reason is that restrictive competition policy undermines collusion at the source—it decreases the per-firm benefit to collusion relative to the gains from deviating—reducing firm cooperation in both dimensions.     

Of Carts and Horses: Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms

In the early 1990s, many advocated quick privatization of state‐owned monopolies in developing countries, assuming that market institutions would develop once firms were privately owned. More recent thinking emphasizes establishing institutions conducive to promoting competition before privatization. To date little empirical work has informed the debate. This paper addresses this gap by testing whether establishing a regulatory authority prior to privatizing incumbent telecommunications firms matters. I find that countries that established regulatory authorities prior to privatization saw increased telecom investment and telephone penetration compared to countries that did not. Moreover, investors paid more for telecom firms in countries that established a regulator prior to privatization.     

Code-sharing Agreements and Interconnections in Markets for International Flights

The paper investigates the consequences of code‐sharing agreements among airline firms competing on international routes, where some passengers interconnect to flights originating or terminating at cities not served by foreign airlines. The authors calculate the precise market share captured by flights operated under code sharing. They compare airfares, market shares, profits, and passengers’ welfare before and after the implementation of a code‐sharing agreement and demonstrate that code sharing is Pareto‐improving.     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition Policy

Voluntary environmental agreements are oftensuspected to promote collusive practicesbetween participating firms. The paperaddresses the antitrust implications ofGermany's voluntary Dual Management System forPackaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD). It uses analytical tools of the economictheory of the firm to examine features ofDSD's governance structure that were oftenidentified to impede competition. While thepaper does not argue that DSD performs asefficiently as a hypothetical solution in amore competitive setting, it shows that thesefeatures have an economic rationale from theviewpoint of the theory of the firm. Thegeneral conclusion is that it is necessary tocarefully analyze the institutional fine-tuningof a voluntary agreement in order to derive theoverall impact stemming from a formal lack ofcompetition. A more case-to-case-oriented,institutional research approach could thereforefruitfully supplement model-driven, theoreticalanalyses of voluntary environmental agreementsand their effect on market competition.     

International migration and trade agreements: The new role of PTAs

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and bilateral migration flows. Building on the empirical literature on the determinants of migration flows, I estimate a modified gravity model to assess the role of PTAs and their content on bilateral migration flows. Using a sample of 29 OECD destination countries over the period 1998–2008, I show a strong positive effect of PTAs on bilateral migration flows. I find that the content of PTAs also matters: when visa‐and‐asylum and labour market related provisions are included in PTAs, this further stimulates bilateral migration flows. Different estimation strategies, including instrumental variables, are employed to address the potential endogeneity bias problems related to PTAs and their content.     

The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?

Many have argued that financial markets are crucial in ensuring that governments maintain sustainable fiscal balances - the so called ‘market discipline hypothesis’. A recent version of this theory holds that both fiscal rules and fiscal transparency are necessary to enable markets to discipline overspending governments. I argue, however, that while these fiscal institutions are effective at improving governments fiscal balances, financial markets are likely not the causal mechanism which discipline governments’ fiscal policies. Instead, I propose that fiscal rules and transparency promote better budget balances because domestic political actors use fiscal institutions to constrain executive policymaking. I test these competing hypotheses of why these fiscal institutions are effective – financial markets vs political competition – and find that country budget balances are increased not as a consequence of financial markets, but when the level of political competition and civil society engagement is sufficiently high. These results are robust to accounting for the possible selection bias of who adopts fiscal institutions.     

Mega‐Regional Agreements and Their Impact on Australia

This paper estimates the effects of emerging mega‐regional agreements on the economy of Australia using a Computable General Equilibrium model. Scenarios considered include the 11‐member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‐Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement, its possible enlargement to include five additional members (‘TPP16’) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) currently under negotiation. The study finds that Australia stands to enjoy real income and trade gains along both the CPTPP and RCEP paths. However, since Australia is already benefiting from its own liberal trade policies and many prior trade agreements, benefits are relatively modest, typically below one per cent of real income.     

Endorse or Not to Endorse: Understanding the Determinants of Newspapers’ Likelihood of Making Political Recommendations

This article investigates the determinants of newspapers’ provision for political opinion. I empirically examine the role of newspapers’ political preferences and market competition on newspapers’ decision to make endorsements. Regression results suggest that market competition turns newspapers more likely to make endorsements. Results from a simple model show that newspapers’ ideology determine their endorsements, making partisan papers more likely to make political recommendations and endorse challengers than non‐partisan newspapers.     

Social Preferences,Sorting, and Competition*

In this paper, I investigate how an increase in competition for workers influences the impact of social preferences on labor‐market outcomes. By sorting themselves into firms with homogeneous work forces, workers can ensure that they suffer less from social comparisons. Competition promotes choice and thus facilitates sorting. However, competition also boosts rent differences in the labor market, because firms cannot curb internal inequity among its employees without losing workers to competitors. To reduce their exposure to social comparisons, workers might engage in inefficient sorting into unemployment. Consequently, social preferences can have strong effects (i.e., unemployment) in a competitive labor market, whereas they only have a slight impact on labor‐market outcomes in a monopsony.     

Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.     

Determinants of foreign direct investment

Empirical studies of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity show substantial differences in specifications with little agreement on the set of included covariates. We use Bayesian statistical techniques that allow one to select from a large set of candidates those variables most likely to be determinants of FDI activity. The variables with consistently high inclusion probabilities include traditional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labour endowments and trade agreements. There is little support for multilateral trade openness, most host‐country business costs, host‐country infrastructure and host‐country institutions. Our results suggest that many covariates found significant by previous studies are not robust.