A CLASS OF PERFORMANCE‐BASED SUBSIDY RULES*

We consider a benchmark static incentive scheme, i.e. a per unit subsidy, that induces a monopoly to produce a target output level. We show that the same output level can be achieved by a continuum of dynamic subsidy rules based on a performance indicator. The rules require only local information. The present value of the subsidies paid is smaller than the amount paid under the static subsidy. Each of the dynamic subsidy rules results at each moment in a lower per unit subsidy than the static subsidy. The subsidy rate depends on a state variable that reflects the monopolist's performance history.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY*

This paper discusses the issue of competition policy and innovation. First, a short review on the theoretical analysis of competition and innovation is provided, relying on the recent book by Aghion and Griffith (2005 ). Then, we examine how such innovation related issues as collaborative research, patent pool, merger in the technology intensive sector and bundling in the software industry are treated under Japan's Anti‐Monopoly Act. We contend that traditional competition policy framework is capable of dealing with innovation related issues but there are several points that should be kept in mind when competition policy deals with innovation related issues.     

WAGE‐RISE CONTRACT AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING AND LABOUR‐MANAGED FIRMS

This paper examines the behaviours of a profit‐maximizing firm and a labour‐managed profit‐per‐worker‐maximizing firm in a two‐stage quantity‐setting model with a wage‐rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the profit‐maximizing firm is the leader and the labour‐managed firm is the follower.     

AUCTIONS,EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

ABSTRACT ** : Using an original database concerning 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by a ‘competition effect’ between private operators. However, a competition effect between private operators and public management appears to be crucial in explaining prices combined with a ‘termination effect’, reflecting the fact that the contract is close to being renewed, and hence re‐auctioned.     

SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES AND STATUS PREFERENCES IN THE UZAWA‐LUCAS MODEL*

This paper shows that introducing preferences for social status based on human capital holdings modifies the finding of Gómez (2004 ) that sector‐specific externalities associated with human capital in the goods sector do not violate the optimality of the competitive economy in the Uzawa–Lucas model. The effect of an increase in the degree of sector‐specific externalities is qualitatively the same as that of an increase in the strength of the desire for status. Hence, paradoxically, a greater degree of sector‐specific externalities makes human capital accumulation more excessive from the social point of view.     

THE SCOPE FOR COLLUSION AND COMPETITION IN A REGULATED VERTICALLY INTEGRATED INDUSTRY*

This paper investigates the competitive implications of input price controls in a partially regulated industry where a vertically integrated firm has exclusive control over an input with natural monopoly characteristics. Such industry structures are commonly encountered in activities such as telecommunications, railways, electricity and water supply. It is shown that in a Cournot game such input price controls are unambiguously benefical to consumers. However, it is further demonstrated that there exist circumstances in which these controls may make the non-integrated firm worse off. Thus if the objective of input price regulation is to protect the non-integrated firm, such controls may prove to be counterproductive.     

MONETARY EXPANSION AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY*

Using a dynamic optimization model that incorporates a cash‐in‐advance constraint on both consumption and investment and productive public capital financed by a lump‐sum tax and seigniorage, this paper analyses the steady‐state effects of an increase in the inflation rate (the money growth rate) on output, private capital and welfare. The effects are negative at high inflation rates. However, at low inflation rates, the effects depend on the amount of lump‐sum tax revenue collected and therefore are either positive or negative.     

A COMPARISON OF CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL APPROACHES IN VALUE‐AT‐RISK ESTIMATION*

In this paper, we attempt to find the most important factor causing the differences in the performance of Value‐at‐Risk (VaR) estimation by comparing the performances of conditional and unconditional approaches. For each approach, we use various methods and models with different degrees of flexibility in their distributions including S_U‐normal distribution, which is one of the most flexible distribution functions. Our empirical results underscore the importance of the flexibility‐of‐distribution function in VaR estimation models. Even though it seems to be unclear which approach is better between conditional and unconditional approaches, it seems to be clear that the more flexible distribution we use, the better the performance, regardless of which approach we use.     

STRATEGIC CANDIDACY AND SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS*

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001 ) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules.     

UPWARD-SLOPING REACTION FUNCTIONS UNDER QUANTITY COMPETITION IN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES*

It is shown that in a mixed duopoly under quantity competition, the public firm's reaction function may be upward-sloping. This is the case with a concave demand function when the public firm attaches to private profits a smaller weight than to its own profits.     

PUBLIC GOODS,RENT DISSIPATION,AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION*

The early literature on rent seeking presumed that total expenditures in the rent-seeking process would equal the value of a contested prize. Subsequent analysis has shown, however, that a number of circumstances give rise to underdissipation of the contested rent—imperfectly discriminating contests, risk-aversion, or where individuals' valuations of the prize are not identical. This paper shows how underdissipation is associated with the public-good character of contested rents. In particular, total rent dissipation is demonstrated to be less than the average stake of the individual contenders. In addition to assessing rent dissipation in contests for public-good allocations, the paper also endogenizes the value of the prize by placing the rent-seeking contest in a setting of candidate competition.     

COMPETITIVE GROWTH IN A LIFE‐CYCLE MODEL: EXISTENCE AND DYNAMICS*

The dynamic behavior of the capital growth rate is analyzed using an overlapping‐generations model with continuous trading. Assuming a technology satisfying constant social returns to capital, the equilibrium growth rate is piecewise‐defined by functional differential equations with both delayed and advanced terms. The main result concerns the existence of a solution expressed as a series of exponentials, which is shown to crucially depend on the initial wealth distribution among cohorts. Upon existence, the dynamics of the capital growth rate has a saddle‐point trajectory that converges to a unique steady state. Along the transition path, the growth rate exhibits exponentially decreasing oscillations.     

PRIVATISATION,COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE SCOTTISH ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY†

This paper analyses the experience of the privatised electricity industry in Scotland. The retention of vertical integration in Scotland has led to a number of different features in the regulation of the industry in Scotland and England and Wales. It has also led to a different pattern of development of competition. Although regulation and price competition appear to have operated to the benefit of consumers thus far, the Scottish system is as yet untested in its ability to cope with significant new entry.     

COMPETITION CAN HARM CONSUMERS*

Duopolists selling differentiated products can generate less consumer surplus than a monopoly selling one of the products. In a Hotelling‐type model where a monopoly supplies more than half of potential consumers, but not all, entry by a rival leads to a duopoly price that is higher than the monopoly price. Consumers in aggregate will be made worse off by such entry when the effect of the price increase outweighs the benefit of extra variety. When consumers have continuous demand functions and firms use two‐part tariffs, duopoly can also result in lower aggregate consumer surplus than monopoly.     

LABOUR‐MARKET ATTACHMENT AND TRAINING PARTICIPATION*

This paper examines how expected attachment to the labour market and expected tenure at a specific firm affect training participation. The results, based on cross‐sectional data from Japan, indicate that expected attachment to the labour market affects participation in both employer‐ and worker‐initiated training, while expected tenure at a specific firm mainly explains participation in employer‐initiated training. These two attachment indices explain more than two‐thirds of the sex gap in training participation. Employers in less‐competitive labour markets are more likely to offer employer‐initiated training to their workers.     

SELF‐CONTROL PROBLEMS AND CONSUMPTION‐SAVING DECISIONS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*

Time‐discounting is a fundamental preference which affects wealth accumulation. If people are impatient, they may spend their earnings instantaneously, and do not save enough for the future. People are often time‐inconsistent, i.e., they often put exceptionally high value on immediate consumption compared to any time in the future. Whether they are aware or not, these individuals are susceptible to self‐control problems. In this paper, we review theoretical and empirical research on time‐inconsistency and self‐control problems, particularly on consumption and saving, and discuss their policy implications.