Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

Abstract. This paper starts by describing the composition of monetary policy committees (MPCs) in inflation‐targeting and non‐targeting countries. The experience of MPC members on their inflation performance is then compared, opposing inflation targeters with non‐targeters. Our sample covers the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, in the period 1999–2008. Our results first show that MPCs are different in inflation‐targeting (versus non‐targeting) countries. They also reveal that policy‐makers' backgrounds influence inflation, and that the influence of MPCs' experience is much greater in inflation‐targeting countries, while size effects are more important for committees that do not target inflation.     

The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy

The discursive dilemma implies that the decision of a board depends on whether the board votes directly on the decision (conclusion‐based procedure) or votes on the premises for the decision (premise‐based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma might occur. Under majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur either (i) if the relationship between the premise and the decision is non‐monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise‐based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.     

Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice

Transparency has become one of the main features of monetarypolicymaking during the last decade. This article establishesstylized facts and provides a systematic overview of the practiceof monetary policy transparency around the world. It shows muchdiversity in information disclosure, even for central bankswith the same monetary policy framework, including inflationtargeting. Nevertheless, the study finds significant differencesin transparency across monetary policy frameworks. The empiricalfindings are explained using key insights distilled from thetheoretical literature. Thus, this article aims to bridge thegap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency.(JEL codes: E58, D82)     

货币政策透明度指数:理论方法与实证检验

文章通过建立货币政策透明度指数,并利用我国金融市场的利率数据进行检验,认为我国中央银行在基准利率调整和准备金率改变等重大政策决策上,货币当局更倾向于采用模糊的政策操作方式,由此可能会导致市场预期的混乱,并最终对政策实施效果产生负面影响。因此,我国有必要借鉴西方国家的政策操作经验,进一步有选择地增加货币政策操作的透明度,并借以最终建立一个简单透明、效率更高的政策调控框架。     

Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy under Abenomics

In this paper, I investigate the causes of the recent sharp response of the yen and Japanese stock prices to the discussion of, and the subsequent implementation of bold monetary easing by the Bank of Japan as demanded by Prime Minister Abe. I present statistical evidence that the response of the two asset prices have indeed been unusually large relative to the past experience with nonconventional monetary policy (NCM) even after allowance is given for the rise in global economic activity and asset prices. I also point out that the rally has been led by speculative trading by foreign investors, while domestic investors have largely stayed on the sidelines. I discuss possible reasons for such foreign investor behavior. Simply put, the unprecedented political pressure raised hopes of the adoption of bold measures by the Bank of Japan. I discuss, however, the possibility that the room for further action by the Bank is quite limited apart from what might be called a targeted helicopter drop of money. I also point out the possibility that investor behavior may have not been based on economic fundamentals. The asset price volatility since April 2013 is interpreted in the light of such discussions.     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union

Abstract. The paper analyzes the relation between monetary uncertainty and government incentives to implement economic reforms in order to reduce structural distortions and make economies more flexible. It is shown that uncertainty about the central bank's behavior leads to more reforms. I relate this result to the debate about central bank structure in a larger European monetary union.     

Indian Monetary Policy in the Time of Inflation Targeting and Demonetization

This paper provides a narrative of Indian monetary policy since the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (NAFC) in the mid‐2008 till the current period. The period 2009–2013 was dominated by the joint monetary and fiscal stimuli of the Indian authorities prompted by the NAFC. These, along with some structural shocks and a hands‐off attitude in forex market intervention, could have had their role in rising inflation and external account instability (leading up to the taper tantrum episode). In such a backdrop, after considerable discussion during 2013–2014, a Monetary Policy Framework Agreement was signed between the Government of India and the Reserve Bank of India on February 20, 2015 that formally adopted flexible inflation targeting (IT) in India. While the IT regime so far has coincided with significant reduction in inflation in India, the atmosphere has been benign. Now that fuel prices have started moving in the north‐east direction, the government has proposed a revised framework for the minimum support price in the Union Budget for 2018–2019 and fiscal slippages have started happening, it remains to be seen whether IT can wither more rough weather in the days to come. Finally, in recent years, Indian monetary policy has been dominated by two significant events: the emergence of significant deterioration of Indian public sector balance sheets, and the demonetization episode in November 2016. Monetary policy in both of these periods wrestled with fashioning an appropriate strategy for managing the impossible trinity.     

Monetary policy under a multiple-tool environment

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, central banks have been using a new set of policy tools in addition to conventional tools (such as short-term interest rates) to conduct monetary policy. This paper employs a methodology that captures 25 of these tools with a limited number of factors for Turkey. Due to a set of factors such as the high volatility of inflation, market-friendly financial architecture and its size, Turkey provides a unique environment to capture these factors and their effects on economic performance. The three factors identified here can be categorized as interest rate, central bank foreign exchange position and liquidity. The empirical evidence reveals that these three factors affect all the economic-state variables considered in the paper in different directions and magnitudes.     

Transparency in monetary policy: A general equilibrium approach

We study a general equilibrium model with a central bank (CB) and two groups of agents, producers and workers. The CB maximizes a weighted average of utilities of the two groups. The CB has two possible types, one favoring workers and the other favoring producers. The CB's type is private information. We compare two possible monetary policy regimes, transparent and opaque. For realistic values of parameters, it is shown that workers are better off under the opaque regime, whereas producers are better off under the transparent regime. This result is shown to hold in two cases, when the range of possible monetary transfers is small and when the range of possible monetary transfers is large.     

货币政策透明度的结构与体系的非完整性

本文通过分析货币政策透明度基本结构的合理性,以及三类透明度所发挥的不同作用,提出透明度建设不仅仅是透明程度的提高,更要注重透明度体系的完善.并且,针对我国目前不存在目标透明度,也不能建立目标透明度的事实,建议注重知识透明度的建设及其作用的发挥,使市场主体可以深入学习和理解央行的经济模型和货币政策决策规则,从而发挥货币政策透明度应有的作用.     

Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheets

Abstract. This paper studies how the exposure of a country's corporate sector to interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency crisis. To analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency crises as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the costs of abandonment. The results show that a higher exposure to interest rate changes increases the probability of crisis through an increased need for output loss compensation and an increased efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output. A higher exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the need for output loss compensation. However, it lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, its effect on the probability of crisis is ambiguous.     

Openness and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: A Cross-country Analysis

Abstract

This paper evaluates the relationship between a country's openness to trade and the effectiveness of monetary policy in changing output growth and inflation in 29 different countries. Using quarterly data from the 1957–2003 period, empirical estimates based on individual country specifications show that the direction, significance and nature of the relationship between openness and the effectiveness of monetary policy on output growth as well as inflation vary considerably across countries.     

欧洲中央银行货币政策透明度研究

大多数国家的央行开始摈弃隐秘性传统,其货币政策逐渐走向开放和透明。如何最充分、准确、及时地向公众披露与解释货币政策目标、策略和决策已成为多数国家货币政策操作所面临的首要问题,本文首先对欧洲中央银行在实践中所采用的主要沟通策略和工具进行归纳和介绍,然后将欧洲中央银行与世界其他主要中央银行的信息公开程度进行横向比较,最后就关于提高欧洲中央银行货币政策透明度的相关建议和争议进行评述。     

The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts*

Central banks have become remarkably more transparent over the last few decades. In this paper, we study the effects of this evolution, focusing on whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables. We use a large set of proxies for central‐bank transparency in 12 advanced economies. We find evidence for a sizeable effect (e.g., by announcing a quantified inflation objective, or by publishing inflation and output forecasts). However, there are decreasing marginal effects to increases in transparency, and the disagreement among the expectations of the general public is not affected. This suggests that there are possible limits to transparency.     

Monetary policy,heterogeneous population and inflation

Adding heterogeneity to an otherwise simple model results in a deviation from the Friedman rule. We show that a central bank concerned with inequality delivers an outcome below the Pareto frontier. Our results may shed light as to why central banks around the world do not follow the Friedman rule and instead deliver positive inflation rates. On the other hand, the calibrated model indicates that the implied optimal inflation rates are much higher than those observed in the data. One possible interpretation of our results is to question the recent wisdom of thinking of inequality as part of central banks’ concerns.     

影子银行、信用创造与货币政策传导机制

中国的影子银行规模已经达到GDP的一半,因此研究与之相关的问题有重要的现实意义。影子银行具有特殊的信用创造功能,能影响中国货币政策的有效性。选取2008～2013年的月度数据,通过建立VAR模型、Johansen协整检验、脉冲响应分析、方差分解等方法,实证研究影子银行在计量角度上对货币政策各层次的影响效果。结果显示：影子银行规模与通货膨胀率、广义货币供应量存在长期稳定的关系;影子银行规模对物价有较强烈冲击,同时对货币供应量有时滞性的长期影响,在一定时间内对经济增长有负面影响,这说明需要出台相应的措施加强对影子银行的监管。     

Market‐Based Measures of Monetary Policy Expectations and Their Evolution Since the Introduction of the Euro

The paper considers the relation between monetary policy expectations and financial markets in the case of Europe. A number of money market instruments are compared, with the result that the 1‐month forward interest rates extracted from the Libor yield curve has the best prediction power of the future monetary policy path. These forward rates have been used to study the evolution of market expectations regarding the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). The sharp increases and the following decreases in interest rates during 2000–2001 have reduced the predictive power of money market instruments, but smoother management of interest rates and better communication from the ECB has helped to improve the forecasting power of money market instruments.     

Federal Monetary Policy: A Comment

We comment on an article published in this journal by Hefeker (2003) and reveal an inconsistency in his analysis of monetary policy in federal monetary unions. We clarify an implicit assumption in his model and show that even when this further assumption is met, Hefeker's (2003) claim that a pure majority vote by the regions and the central government results in a monetary authority consisting solely of regionally appointed governors is not generally valid in the context of his model.     

析货币政策的科学性与艺术性

货币政策的制定和实施离不开科学原则作指导,但货币政策的实时决策又是极其复杂的,需要中央银行家的审时度势和敏锐判断,也即货币政策的艺术性。详细分析了货币政策科学性和艺术性的具体表现,认为货币政策的科学性与艺术性在实践中是难以分割和同等重要的,好的货币政策总是需要好的政策实施者,需要将科学性原则与中央银行家们的决策艺术完美地结合起来。