Government‐spending multipliers and the zero lower bound in an open economy

This paper assesses the size of the government‐spending multiplier in an open economy when the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate is binding. In a theoretical framework, in a closed economy, other authors have shown that when the nominal interest rate is binding the government‐spending multiplier can be very large (close to four). Their theory helps illuminate the government‐spending multiplier in the ZLB, but it is difficult to match that theory with the data. We argue that, in an open economy, another channel exists for the crowding‐out effect via the real exchange rate. For an open economy, the government‐spending multiplier is not large owing to the appreciation of the real exchange rate, induced by the appreciation of aggregate demand that follows the increases in government spending. To test the robustness of our open economic model, we conduct the same analysis in a corresponding closed economy model. The result from our closed economy model confirms the result obtained in the other work. Our theoretical results are consistent with the results obtained in the empirical literature, which uses the vector autoregressive method and the structural vector autoregressive approach to measure the impact of government‐spending shock on the real gross domestic product and revealed that the government‐spending multiplier tends to be lower in open economy.     

ON DECREASING MARGINAL IMPATIENCE*

One of the most controversial assumptions in endogenous time preference theory is that the degree of impatience is marginally increasing in wealth. We examine the implications of an empirically more relevant specification whereby time preference exhibits decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). With DMI, there are multiple steady‐state non‐satiated and satiated equilibria. In a constant interest rate economy, the non‐satiated steady‐state point is necessarily unstable. In a capital economy with decreasing returns technology, both the non‐satiated and satiated steady‐state points can be saddlepoint stable. The model is used to examine policy implications for the effects of capital taxation and government spending.     

MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

In a two‐sector model of monopolistic competition, this paper explores what impacts an expansion of government spending on public services has on national income. In the short run where entry and exit of firms are restricted, a rise in government spending on services like health care (which has only a role of substituting for market services) increases national income, but that on services like elderly care (which has not only this role but also another role of contributing to home production of services) decreases it. These results are reversed in the long run. Welfare effects of public services are also examined.     

SOCIAL STATUS,EDUCATION AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS GROWTH*

This paper extends the relative wealth specification of status preference to the two‐sector Uzawa (1965 )– Lucas (1988 ) model and examines the effectiveness of government spending on economic growth. It is found that the desire for relative wealth‐induced social status and/or the education component of relative wealth‐induced social status are important ingredients in determining the growth rate effects of government spending. Provided that the agent is concerned with his or her relative social position, the education‐induced social status plays a more important role than the physical‐asset‐induced social status in determining the validity of public spending on growth. If individuals do not care about their education‐driven social rewards, then an increase in government spending has no effect on the balanced growth rate regardless of the presence of the physical‐asset‐induced social status. A rise in government spending reduces the long‐run growth rate if the education‐induced social status is present.     

THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

Endogenous business cycles and systematic stabilization policy*

We study the effects of fiscal policy rules on the determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium in a perfectly competitive monetary model with constant returns. Government spending implies a distortion of the monetary steady state due to the implied taxation. We show that policy rules that let the GNP share of government spending depend sufficiently negatively on increases in GNP stabilize the economy with respect to endogenous fluctuations for arbitrarily little distortion of the steady state at which stabilization occurs. The rules do not involve lump‐sum taxation, negative income taxation, or exact knowledge of the economy's laissez‐faire steady state.     

MONETARY EXPANSION AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY*

Using a dynamic optimization model that incorporates a cash‐in‐advance constraint on both consumption and investment and productive public capital financed by a lump‐sum tax and seigniorage, this paper analyses the steady‐state effects of an increase in the inflation rate (the money growth rate) on output, private capital and welfare. The effects are negative at high inflation rates. However, at low inflation rates, the effects depend on the amount of lump‐sum tax revenue collected and therefore are either positive or negative.     

Financial markets’ behavior around episodes of large changes in the fiscal stance

Using a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002, this paper shows that interest rates, particularly those of long-term government bonds, decrease when countries’ fiscal position improves and increase around periods of budget deteriorations. Stock market prices surge around times of substantial fiscal tightening and plunge in periods of very loose fiscal policy. In addition, the paper shows that results depend on countries’ initial fiscal conditions and on the type of fiscal consolidations: Fiscal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of government deficit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates and increases in stock market prices.     

Accounting for China's Saving‐Investment Imbalance from 2002–2008

This paper decomposes and analyzes China's saving‐investment imbalance (equivalent to current account imbalance) from 2002–2008. We first use the Flow of Funds Accounts to calculate the saving and investment rates (propensity) of the household, corporate and government sectors and to evaluate their relative contribution to the aggregate saving‐investment surplus. The results indicate that the increase of saving‐investment surplus can be attributed to the steady increase of saving by the household and government sectors and the short‐term downsizing of investment by the corporate and government sectors. We then use more disaggregate supplementary datasets to explore the factors behind the evolution of the saving and investment rates for the three sectors. The rise of the household saving rate mainly sources from the urban sector. The corporate saving rate experienced a steady increase because of the rise of profitability. Government macroeconomic policies have had a strong influence on the saving and investment patterns of the corporate and government sectors.     

Identifying fiscal policy (in)effectiveness from the differential counter‐cyclicality of government spending in the interwar period

Differences across decades in the counter‐cyclical stance of fiscal policy can identify whether the growth in government spending affects output growth and so speeds recovery from a recession. We study government‐spending reaction functions from the 1920s and 1930s for twenty countries. There are two main findings. First, surprisingly, government spending was less counter‐cyclical in the 1930s than in the 1920s. Second, the growth of government spending did not have a significant effect on output growth, so that there is little evidence that this feature of fiscal policy played a stabilizing role in the interwar period.     

FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND BUSINESS CYCLE VOLATILITY IN A MONETARY UNION

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium two‐country sticky‐price model to analyze the implications of financial market integration for the propagation of asymmetric productivity and government spending shocks in a monetary union. Financial market integration has a small effect on the propagation of these shocks if households can only trade in risk‐free bonds. However, financial market integration has a more substantial effect on the propagation of these shocks in a monetary union with a complete market for state‐contingent claims. This result indicates that it may be important to account for threshold effects in empirical analyses of the impact of financial market integration on business cycle volatility in a monetary union.     

A note on the societal benefits of illiquid bonds

Abstract Kocherlakota (2003) provides an example of a monetary economy where efficiency is enhanced with the introduction of a nominally risk‐free bond that is specifically designed to be illiquid. The societal benefit of an illiquid bond in his example, however, is transitory, and he does not characterize an optimal policy. I use an analytically tractable framework to characterize an optimal intervention and to show that the purported benefits of an illiquid bond market persist in a steady state.     

THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: TESTING THE NON‐LINEAR HYPOTHESIS

Theoretical models suggest a non‐linear relationship between government size and long‐run economic growth. However, testing this hypothesis empirically in cross‐country studies is complicated by the endogeneity of government spending and the accurate identification of inflexion points. This paper examines the non‐linear hypothesis by incorporating threshold analysis in a cross‐country growth regression. The methodology utilizes a sample‐splitting framework and follows an objective strategy for identifying and testing changes in the slope. The results provide evidence in support of the non‐linear hypothesis for a broad panel of countries.     

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.     

Starving the beast? Intra-generational conflict and balanced budget rules

A balanced budget requirement does not only prevent fiscal policy makers from smoothing tax distortions but also affects their preferred choice of government spending. The paper analyzes the conditions under which groups opposed to government spending might want to implement a balanced budget requirement in order to induce the government to spend less. It shows that relaxing a balanced budget requirement need not be associated with higher government spending.     

Two‐level CES Production Technology in the Solow and Diamond Growth Models*

The two‐level CES aggregate production function—that nests a CES into another CES function—has recently been used extensively in theoretical and empirical applications of macroeconomics. We examine the theoretical properties of this production technology and establish existence and stability conditions of steady states under the Solow and Diamond growth models. It is shown that in the Solow model the sufficient condition for a steady state is fulfilled for a wide range of substitution parameter values. This is in sharp contrast with the two‐factor Solow model, where only an elasticity of substitution equal to one is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a steady state. In the Diamond model, multiple equilibria can occur when the aggregate elasticity of substitution is lower than the capital share. Moreover, it is shown that for high initial levels of capital and factor substitutability, the effect of a further increase in a substitution parameter on the steady state depends on capital–skill complementarity.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

Warm glow and the transmission of pro‐socialness across generations

The transmission of pro‐socialness across generations is modeled using the warm‐glow approach. The parent generation seeks to cultivate pro‐social values in their children as this would improve their material well‐being when they grow up as cooperative adults. I show that communities endowed with more productive resources have a stronger incentive to teach their children social cooperation. Thus, there is a correlation between a village's level of material well‐being and villagers’ steady‐state level of pro‐socialness. When the cost of moral education is directly dependent on the parent generation's level of pro‐socialness, the multiplicity of steady states may emerge. If a community's initial level of pro‐socialness is high, the system will reach an interior steady state; in contrast, if this initial level is low, eventually the level of pro‐socialness will approach zero in the long run. Thus communities that start with similar initial levels of pro‐socialness may end up at drastically different steady states.     

The technological determinants of long‐run inequality

I explore the effect of skill‐biased technological change and unbiased technological progress on long‐run inequality using a theoretical model in which the supply of skilled and unskilled workers is endogenous. The main assumption of the model is that young agents can finance their education and become skilled workers by borrowing against their future income on an imperfect credit market. I show that whenever the rate of unbiased technological progress is sufficiently high there is no steady‐state inequality, independent of the degree of skill bias. If instead the rate of unbiased technological progress is low, then the long‐run skill premium increases with the technological skill bias. Therefore, similarly to the short run, in the long run higher technological skill bias may cause higher inequality. However, contrary to the short run, in the long run unbiased technological progress is more important than technological skill bias in determining inequality. I also discuss how the efficiency of the educational technology and the degree of financial development affect long‐run inequality.