Training and worker effort: a signalling perspective

Abstract This paper analyzes the interaction between firms’ investment in general skills training and workers’ incentives. It shows that when a firm has an informational advantage over its workers, its provision of free general skills training can serve as a signal that there will be a long‐term relationship between the firm and its workers. This signal induces the workers to exert more effort in learning firm‐specific skills, which enhances the firm's profits. In contrast with most of the existing literature, the model implies that firms may provide free general skills training even if there is no labour market friction.     

Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

Export revenue and quality: Firm‐level evidence from developing countries

I combine firm‐level export data from eight low‐income and middle‐income countries to test the relation between export price and export revenue. Across‐firm estimations show a strong positive association between export price and export revenue. Within‐firm estimations show that firms generate larger export revenue from their high‐price products. The positive correlation between export price and export revenue is strong for manufactures, weak for primary commodities, and nonexistent for extractables. Results are robust to using an alternative quality measure and controlling for exporters’ market power.     

INTERNATIONAL WELFARE AND EMPLOYMENT LINKAGES ARISING FROM MINIMUM WAGES*

We formulate a two‐country model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms to reconsider labor market linkages in open economies. Labor market imperfections arise by virtue of country‐specific real minimum wages. Abstracting from selection of just the best firms into export status, standard effects on marginal and average firm productivity are reversed in our model, yet there are significant gains from trade arising from employment expansion. In addition, we show that with firm heterogeneity an increase in one country’s minimum wage triggers firm exit in both countries and thus harms workers at home and abroad.     

Market structure in congestible markets

This paper analyses market structure of industries that are subject to both positive and negative network effects. The size of a firm determines the quality of its product: when network effects are positive, a larger firm is of higher quality; when the effects are negative, a larger firm's product is of lower quality. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences towards quality (firm size), and firms compete in prices. Equilibria are characterised: for example, in any asymmetric equilibrium, it must be that congestion is not too severe. One consequence of this feature is that an increase in the number of firms in the industry can raise individual firms’ profits. Two factors can bound the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium without fixed costs: expectations, and the ‘finiteness’ property (Shaked and Sutton, Review of Economic Studies 49 (1982) 3–13, Econometrica 51(5) (1983) 1469–1483) of price competition.     

TRADE POLICY AND MARKET POWER: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE

This article identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. We identify market power by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets following variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing‐to‐market is prevalent in all countries in our sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size. More importantly, we find that the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) is not isomorphic to that of tariffs. Whereas tariffs reduce the market power of foreign firms through rent‐shifting effects, NTMs reinforce the market power of nonexiting firms, domestic and foreign alike.     

Who Exports Better Quality Products to Smaller or More Distant Markets?

The role of across‐firm differences in product quality and firms' competitiveness in determining the spatial patterns of within‐product export unit values across destinations is examined in this paper. Using product level export data, it is shown that the average export unit value of a product shipped from the USA or Korea increases with distance and decreases with destination market's size. However, within‐product average unit values for products exported from China and India decrease with distance and increase with market size. To interpret these different spatial patterns of unit values across exporting countries, model of quality heterogeneity is developed in which firms differ in their workers' skill level and higher‐skilled workers show greater productivity in performing tasks that improve product quality. The model predicts that in relatively skill‐abundant countries, exporting firms specialize in high‐quality products using relatively cheap skilled labor, whereas, in relatively skill‐scarce countries, firms that produce lower‐quality products are more competitive.     

Export Destination,Product Quality and Wages in a Middle‐Income Country. The Case of South Africa

A robust finding in the firm‐level literature is that exporting firms pay higher wages. Using South African data this paper investigates the relationship between export destination and wages at a worker level. South Africa, a middle‐income country, has two distinct main export markets—a regional market where per capita incomes are lower than at home, and an international market with higher per capita incomes. Our estimates show that workers in firms that export to the region earn less than those that produce for the domestic market. Those in firms that export outside the region earn more than either domestic producers or region‐only exporters. Much of this difference in wages can be explained by the premium the different types of exporters pay for skills. These results support previous studies which suggest that export destination is related to product quality which in turn is related to worker quality and therefore wages.     

Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labour market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. To investigate the impact of these changes, we use unique longitudinal matched employer‐employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and enables links of the workers to the firms in which they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign‐owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and are also able to improve the match quality of their workers. JEL Classifications: J23, J31, J41, J61, P23, P31.     

Pricing to Firm: an Analysis of Firm‐ and Product‐level Import Prices*

We use Hungarian Customs data on product‐level imports of manufacturing firms to document that the import price of a particular product varies substantially across buying firms. We relate the level of import prices to firm characteristics such as size, foreign ownership, and market power. We develop a theory of “pricing to firm” (PTF), where markups depend on the technology and competitive environment of the buyer. The predictions of the model are confirmed by the data: import prices are higher for firms with greater market power, and for more essential intermediate inputs (with a high share in material costs). We take account of the endogeneity of the buyer’s market power with respect to higher import prices and unobserved cost heterogeneity within product categories. The magnitude of PTF is big: the standard deviation of price predicted by PTF is 21.5%.     

The Robustness of Cartels Facilitated by Anti-Dumping Regulations

This study formulates Prusa's (1992 ) theory that anti-dumping regulations facilitate the formation of cartels between an exporter and import-competing firms. It demonstrates that interest rates and product differentiation are two key factors that may determine the robustness of the cartels. It builds a Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products that explains how anti-dumping regulations might encourage the creation of cartels. To highlight the circumstances under which an import-competing firm is seriously hurt by dumped exports, this study adopts the following setting. First, both the exporter and the import-competing firms sell only in the home market. Second, if the exporter's product is sold at a cheaper price than the product of an import-competing firm in the home market, this is a sufficient condition to initiate an anti-dumping petition. Although the setting might also provide the circumstances under which the anti-dumping authority could be over-protecting the import-competing firm, it makes it possible to view the exporter as a predator. Since the setting enables the exporter to be free from the need to make profits in its own market, it sets a lower price for its product only if it decides to undertake predatory activities against an import-competing firm.     

Growth, Competition and Welfare

The impact of competition on growth and welfare is analysed by developing a model in which the number of firms, profit margins and innovation rates are endogenous. Different regimes of oligopolistic competition are distinguished. The tougher the price competition, the lower the profit margins for a given rate of concentration. This reduces the number of firms and product variety in a free entry equilibrium. Consequently, tougher competition implies larger firm size and higher rates of innovation since new technologies can be applied in a larger market. Oligopolistic pricing leads to underinvestment in firm-specific knowledge, even if inter-firm knowledge spillovers are neglected.     

Market Size and the Survival of Foreign‐owned Firms*

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and foreign direct investment cost uncertainty and investigate the survival of foreign‐owned firms. The survival probabilities of foreign‐owned firms depend on firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity, and host country characteristics, such as market size. We show that a foreign‐owned firm will be less likely to be shut down when its parent firm's productivity is higher and its indigenous competitors are less productive. Although a larger market size will always reduce the survival probability of indigenous firms, it can lead to a higher survival probability for foreign‐owned firms if their parent firms are sufficiently productive.     

PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

Trade and industrial structure with large firms and heterogeneity

We develop a model of trade and firm heterogeneity in an oligopolistic setting. This setting generates key differences in terms of modelling setup, modelling predictions and welfare implications with respect to the existing literature on trade and firm heterogeneity. In terms of modelling setup our approach allows us to explore interaction between potentially large heterogeneous firms, in contrast to recent trade literature with heterogeneity and atomistic firms. As a result variables like market price and total sales vary endogenously as different firms enter the market. We offer a solution for the integer problem inherent in small group models, based on stochastic dominance. The model generates testable predictions deviating from the benchmark firm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) in terms of the effect of trade liberalisation on markups, market shares, the market price. We also derive predictions on the effect of distance and market size on the probability of zero trade flows and export prices. Our model features the possibility that welfare declines as a result of trade liberalisation. The result in Brander and Krugman (1983), the benchmark model for trade under oligopoly, that welfare unambiguously rises with free entry and might decline without free entry due to increased cross-hauling is reversed. In a setting with heterogeneous instead of homogeneous firms, welfare might decline with free entry. A negative welfare effect without free entry can be ruled out if the firm size distribution is sufficiently dispersed.     

Optimal Pricing and Entry Rules When a Regulated Dominant Firm Faces a Competitive Fringe

In this paper, we study optimal regulation of a dominant firm facing an unregulated competitive fringe. First, assuming the size of the fringe is fixed, we demonstrate that the usual Ramsey Rule for second-best efficient pricing remains applicable in this context. We also examine the suitability of the Laspeyres price cap and show that it retains its desirable properties. This implies that regulators should continue to apply Laspeyres price cap regulation to the dominant firm after competition has materialized. Then, assuming that price and entry control are regulatory instruments, we characterize the efficient pricing and entry rules. We demonstrate that the free entry equilibrium number of firms will be excessive relative to the efficient number of firms, thereby providing a new Excess Entry Theorem. Finally, we suggest a modification of the Laspeyres price cap that can incentivize the regulated dominant firm to support efficient entry into the fringe.     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion,Firm Size,and Growth

This paper analyzes a model of equilibrium wage dynamics and wage dispersion across firms. It considers a labor market where firms set wages and workers use on-the-job search to look for better paid work. It analyzes a perfect equilibrium where each firm can change its wage paid at any time, and workers use optimal quit strategies. Firms trade off higher wages against a lower quit rate, and large firms (those with more employees) always pay higher wages than small firms. Non-steady-state dispersed price equilibria are also analyzed, which describe how wages vary as each firm and the industry as a whole grow over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, J41.     

Foreign Acquisitions in China and Multinationals’ Global Market Strategy

Using firm‐level data from 2000 to 2006, we find that foreign acquisitions in China change the target firms’ export extensive margins. We develop a three‐country model with cross‐border acquisitions to show that the acquirers can alter the targets’ export decision through three possible channels: fixed‐cost jumping, technology transfer and global market reorganization. We find evidence that foreign acquisitions change the Chinese target firms’ probability of exporting to a third market. Technology transfer is not observed. Evidence implies that fixed‐cost jumping is used to enable the targets to export, while global market reorganization is a key motive for the acquirers to withdraw the targets from the export market.     

Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms

Recent writers have asserted that firms controlled by workers are rare because workers have diverse preferences over firm policies, while investors all support wealth maximization. However, the source of the asymmetry between capital and labor remains unclear. We resolve this puzzle by arguing that because financial capital is exceptionally mobile, capital markets induce unanimity. The lower mobility of human capital implies that labor markets are monopolistically competitive and hence that unanimity cannot be expected in labor‐managed firms. Moreover, such firms are vulnerable to takeover by investors, while capital‐managed firms are substantially less vulnerable to takeover by workers.     

Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogenous labor and perfect history screening

We study effects of mobility costs in a model of (Nash) wage bargaining between workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, heterogeneous workers, identical firms and free firm entry, and where firms can screen workers perfectly according to their previous work history but not their actual productivity. We derive the employment level and the minimum worker quality standard, in the market solution, and in the efficient solution established by a social planner. When workers have positive bargaining power, there is always some inefficient unemployment among desired workers in the market solution. The lowest hiring standard chosen by firms is higher than the planner's standard when firing costs are high relative to hiring costs, but may be lower in the opposite case. We show that any higher established hiring standard corresponds to a market equilibrium. The model explains a tendency for a high initial unemployment rate to remain high, particularly for low-skilled workers.