Lender's risk incentive and debt concession

This paper demonstrates that a lender's risk incentive may render it difficult to conduct efficient debt renegotiation. When a lending bank has a risk incentive, the bank is not likely to make a debt concession, even though such a concession could resolve inefficiencies caused by a borrower's risk incentive. If the lender refrains from renegotiation the debt, then the borrowing firm chooses a value-decreasing risky project. As a result, the cash flow that the lending bank collects becomes risky, and the wealth of the bank's shareholders increases. The lender's risk incentive thus accelerates the borrower's risk incentive.     

NOMINAL SOVEREIGN DEBT

I show that reputation alone can sustain nominal sovereign debt, which is subject to both the risks of default and opportunistic devaluations. Nominal debt combined with a countercyclical exchange rate policy allows more hedging against shocks than real savings if markets are incomplete. Thus, the loss of either repayment or monetary reputation severely affects the government's ability to smooth consumption. The model offers a simple explanation for the Bulow and Rogoff critique, while simultaneously helping explain the issuance of nominal sovereign bonds by emerging economies. The model also helps explain why many governments borrow and save at the same time.     

ON THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC DEBT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: DOES COUNTRY RISK MATTER?

This study examines the nonlinear impacts of four country risk indices on the debt‐growth nexus for 61 countries in a panel data framework. Our results show evidence of the different debt‐growth nexus under the different degrees of country risk. Under a high‐risk environment, a country's economic growth is harmed by raising its public debt. The negative effects public debt has on economic growth become weak under low political and financial‐risk environments, while an increase in public debt could help to stimulate economic growth under low composite and economic risk environments. In addition, the differences of countries' income and debt levels also lead country risks to have different effects on the debt‐growth nexus, suggesting that a country should borrow appropriately based on its current risk environments while improving economic performance. (JEL C33, E02, H63, O43)     

Sovereign default and the sustainability risk premium effect

We analyze the joint determination of interest rate risk and debt sustainability for governments with fiscal imbalances. Because higher interest rates imply increased debt services, they worsen the government's financial situation and increase the probability of sovereign default. Thus, higher interest rates eventually lead to a decrease in the real demand for government bonds, which imposes an additional constraint on government debt sustainability.     

Internal debt and welfare

This paper analyzes how multinational firms' internal debt financing affects high-tax countries. It uses a dynamic small open economy model and takes into account that internal debt impacts both the multinational firms' investment decisions and the government's tax policy. The government has incentives to redistribute income from firm owners to workers. If the government's redistributive motive is not too strong, internal debt reduces welfare in the short term by decreasing tax revenues. However, debt financing stimulates capital accumulation and exerts a positive long-term welfare impact.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

Fiscal policy in the US: Sustainable after all?

The sustainability of US public debt has been widely discussed since the Great Recession. Using annual data since 1940, we estimate and compare different specifications of fiscal rules. Estimates of constant-parameter fiscal rules show no evidence of sustainability. This may be due to the instability of government's behaviour over time. Thus, we estimate a Markov-switching fiscal rule in order to identify periods of unsustainable and sustainable fiscal policies. First, we show that the government stabilizes public debt only periodically. Second, during these periods, the government's reaction is sufficiently tight to stabilize public debt over the entire horizon. We conclude that a relatively short-lived but tight fiscal contraction can be sufficient to ensure long-run US debt sustainability.     

Sovereign default risk premia,fiscal limits,and fiscal policy

We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The fiscal limits, which measure the government's ability to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic Laffer curves. The state-dependent distributions of fiscal limits depend on the growth of lump-sum transfers, the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, and economic diversity. The country-specific fiscal limits imply that the market perceives the riskiness of sovereign debt issued by different countries to be different, which is consistent with the observation that developed countries are downgraded at different levels of debt. A nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt emerges in equilibrium, which is in line with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. Nonlinear simulations show that fiscal austerity measures that aim to balance the government budget in the short run fail to contain the default risk premium, even with sizeable cuts in government purchases; but a long-term plan for fiscal reform, if it credibly changes the market's expectation about future fiscal policies, can alleviate the rising risk premium.     

Commodity Price Instability and Debt-linking by Developing Countries

Most developing countries borrow in world capital markets. Typically this borrowing is denominated in one of the major currencies and requires periodic servicing. The foreign exchange required to meet the service obligation is often dependent on the export of one or a small number of commodities. This demand usually competes with a number of other claims on export earnings, including both consumption and capital goods imports. This paper investigates the use of commodity-linked borrowing by developing countries. If the interest and/or principal payments on external debt are linked to the price of a country's principal exports, the risk of default can be shifted to better-diversified lenders. The social cost of linking is much smaller than that of other compensating arrangements. In addition, commodity-linked debt may reduce the borrower's direct lending costs. This will depend on the quantity of linked debt supplied and the dispersion of expectations about the future price of the commodity. If the supply is small relative to the demand among investors who expect the commodity price to increase, the resulting reduction in the cost of borrowing may be sufficient to offset the premium for bearing the risk associated with the commodity's future price.     

Optimal foreign debt for Egypt: A stochastic control approach

This study assesses the foreign debt policy in Egypt and contrasts it versus the optimal policy during the period 1985–2008. It also presents a forecast of the optimal debt during the period 2009–2014. The optimal debt policy was derived using an open economy model for Egypt. The uncertainties in the model stem from the uncertainties in the interest or debt service payments and the uncertainties in the rate of return on investments. The stochastic control approach was used to find the optimal debt policy. It was found that Egypt could borrow externally as long as the trend in the rate of return on investments exceeds the trend in the real interest rate or the trend in the rate of the debt service payments. The analysis finds that Egypt's foreign debt was higher than the optimal level before 1997. After 1997, foreign debt seems to converge to the optimal level. However, Egypt's foreign debt is still below its optimal level which results in an opportunity cost for the economy to grow, otherwise, GDP could have recorded a favorable increase.     

EASY MONEY OR HARD TIMES? HEALTH AND 401(k) LOANS

Rising health care costs and declining personal savings rates are nearly synonymous with household medical debt. For some, defined contribution (DC) retirement savings plans provide a ready source of funds to meet these medical debts. We examine whether health status and health insurance coverage predict the likelihood of having a DC loan using data from the Federal Reserve's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1989 to 2007. We find that poor health raises the likelihood that a household will borrow from their DC plans, even controlling for other forms of debt, access to credit, and whether households are covered by health insurance. Our estimates of the amount of the DC loan, taking selection effects into account, indicate that DC loan amounts are also influenced by health status; those with poor health borrow more from their DC plans. Apart from health status, once a household decides to borrow from their retirement funds, race and education also influence how much to borrow. We argue that public policy can improve the long‐term financial retirement security of households by offering more opportunities to save for medical emergencies, while cautiously maintaining the opportunity to borrow from DC plans. (JEL D12, D14, D91)     

Balanced budget vs. Tax smoothing in a small open economy: A welfare comparison

The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of lending and borrowing constraints on the dynamics of public debt and optimal taxation policy in the context of a general equilibrium model with tax smoothing. The results from the numerical simulation of the model show significant welfare gains, provided that the policymaker is allowed to borrow and lend in order to smooth taxes across time instead of maintaining a balanced budget at all times. Moreover, for a specific process for asset prices, it is also shown that if the government can issue state-contingent debt then overall welfare can be further improved substantially.     

Federal lending and aggregate economic activity

Attention to federal activity in credit markets is typically focused on the government's role as a borrower. In contrast, scant attention is paid to its equally large and dominant role as a lender. This paper evaluates the aggregate impact of federal lending activity within the framework of a vector autoregressive representation of the US macroeconomy. The empirical regularities uncovered suggest that aggregate federal lending activity does not have a net positive impact on output.     

War finance and the baby boom

In this paper, I extend the Barro–Becker model of endogenous fertility to incorporate specific fiscal policies and use it to study the effects of the fiscal policy changes following WWII on fertility in the United States. The US government went through large changes in fiscal policy after the beginning of WWII. The marginal income tax rate for an average American jumped from 4% on average before 1940 to approximately 25% during the war and stayed around 20% afterwards. The government debt–GDP ratio jumped from approximately 30% on average before WWII to 108% in 1946 and then dropped gradually in the following two decades to about 30% again at the end of 1960s. I find that the dramatic increase in the marginal income tax rate was an important cause of the postwar baby boom in the US because it lowered the after-tax wage and thus the opportunity cost of child-rearing. I also find that the differential change in taxes by income was an important reason why the baby boom was more pronounced among richer households (as documented by Jones and Tertilt, 2008). Furthermore, I argue that the government's debt policy may also matter for understanding fertility choices because government debt implies a tax burden on children in the future and thus affects their utility, which is a key determinant of current fertility choice in the Barro–Becker model. The results of a computational experiment show that the US government's postwar debt policy also contributed to the baby boom, but its quantitative importance is relatively small.     

Evaluating borrower’s default risk in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from a lending platform in China

Recent years have witnessed the popularity of online peer-to-peer lending, which allows individuals to borrow from and lend to each other on an Internet-based platform. Using data from a large P2P platform in China, this article explores the factors that determine the default risk based on the demographic characteristics of borrowers. Moreover, we propose a credit risk evaluation model, which can quantify the default risk of each P2P loan. Empirical results reveal that gender, age, marital status, educational level, working years, company size, monthly payment, loan amount, debt to income ratio and delinquency history play a significant role in loan defaults. Finally, we analyse the relationship between default risk and these contributory variables, and the possible causes are also discussed in this study.     

An intertemporal general equilibrium analysis of financial crowding out: A policy model and an application to Australia

This paper constructs a two-period, perfect foresight general equilibrium model that analyzes crowding out. Private investment is debt financed, while government deficits are financed by money and debt. The existence of equilibrium is demonstrated and the model is applied to Australia for 1981–1982, the last years for which Australia had a fixed exchange rate. A benchmark solution is derived and two counterfactual simulations are carried out. Small increases in real government spending are found not to lead to crowding out, while an increase in the debt financed portion of the government's budget deficit does lead to crowding out.     

Debt and Currency Crises—Complements or Substitutes?*

Debt and currency crises are closely interlinked through the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The default tax and the inflation/devaluation tax can be considered as alternative means of financing. Our empirical analysis finds that high‐debt countries choose default rather than inflation/devaluation for financing, while a high money stock reduces the probability of debt crises. Further, we find strong evidence that debt and currency crises share common fundamental causes. Finally, there is a Granger causality running from debt crises to currency crises, but only weakly in the other direction.     

The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case

A retrenchment in crossborder credit is under way, the product of both market forces and political pressure on international banks to lend at home (Economist, 2009). In addition, banks, particularly the largest, have also dramatically expanded their retail banking operations over the past few years (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007). Our goal, in this article, is to study the effects of default risk on equity returns through bank interest margin management under a renewed focus on domestic retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability of banking activities. Specifically, this article explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on an option-based firm-theoretical model with multiple sources of structural breaks due to political pressure. The model demonstrates how capital regulation and political pressure on foreign lending return and risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We show that a more stringent capital requirement is linked with lower equity return, but higher default risk of the bank in the return to domestic retail banking. An increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending return is linked with higher equity return and default risk of the bank. It is also showed that an increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending risk decreases the bank's equity return and default risk. We conclude that the return to domestic retail banking may be a relatively stable activity when the political pressure decision impacts only the expected risk of the bank's foreign lending and not the return.     

Domestic versus External Borrowing and Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets

This paper presents a model of an emerging market sovereign that can selectively default on its domestic or external creditors. The two classes of creditors have different ways of punishing the government in the event of default, which in turn creates a differential in the sovereign's incentives to default on its domestic versus foreign creditors. We explore the extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of debt. We find that a country characterized by volatile output, sovereign risk, and costly tax collection will want to borrow in domestic as well as in international markets.