Creditor passivity: The effects of bank competition and institutions on the strategic use of bankruptcy filings

In transition countries, banks often fail to take action against loan defaulters. Using a model of the bank–firm relationship, we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Therefore, asymmetric information between banks is reduced, and bank competition intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the greater the bank’s incentive to bankrupt defaulting firms. This makes information between banks less asymmetric and thus leads to lower interest rates and increases the probability that all banks offer loans.     

Creditor concentration: An empirical investigation

Most of the literature on multiple banking assumes equal financing shares. However, unequal, asymmetric or concentrated bank borrowing is widespread, and creditor concentration is only weakly correlated with the number of bank relationships. This paper therefore investigates the determinants of creditor concentration for German firms using a comprehensive firm-bank level dataset for the time period between 1993 and 2003. We document that corporate borrowing from banks is very often concentrated, even for the largest firms in our sample. Leveraged firms and firms with more redeployable assets concentrate their borrowing from banks, as are firms dealing with a relationship lender that is profitable, that has lower monitoring costs, or that operates in a concentrated regional lending market.     

Market entry,privatization and bank performance in transition1

This paper examines how market entry and privatization have affected the margins and marginal costs of banks in the post‐communist transition. We estimate bank revenue and cost functions, allowing the estimated parameters to change over time. In the first sub‐period (1995–98), we find that privatized banks earned higher margins than other banks, while foreign start‐ups had lower marginal costs. In the third sub‐period (2002–2004), foreign banks remained low marginal cost service providers, while privatized domestic banks had the widest margins. Subtracting marginal costs from margins to calculate mark‐ups, an indication of demand for services, shows that initially privatized banks had the largest mark‐ups. However, by the third sub‐period, differences among private banks diminished. In comparison to private banks, state banks persistently under‐performed in controlling costs and attracting demand. Our evidence therefore indicates that foreign bank entry promoted lower costs and that privatization and market entry encouraged more demand for services.     

Effects of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in transition economies

In transition countries, the real impact of banking crises has so far been rather moderate. We study the effect of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in a model where incumbent banks possess an informational advantage. We find that bank insolvency reduces the incentive to restructure for firms whose incumbent bank becomes insolvent. However, bank insolvency provides an additional incentive for firms that enter the credit market to develop new projects because it reduces asymmetric information between banks. Firms’ credit costs are thereby lowered. We also explain a path‐dependent development by demonstrating that the firms’ decision to develop new projects depends on the banks’ share of non‐performing loans.     

Environmental liability and the capital structure of firms

This paper analyses the impact of environmental liability regimes on the capital structure of firms. We show that imposing environmental liability only on polluting firms, with limited liability, increases use of bank debt. Extending environmental liability to banks lowers bank borrowing relative to liability only on firms, with an ambiguous effect relative to no liability. Using US industry-level data we estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing by firms and show that the introduction of environmental liability only on firms increased bank borrowing by 15–20%, but when liability was extended to banks, borrowing returned to a level slightly higher than with no liability.     

Cash policy and the bank-firm relationship

Bank health affects a firm's cash holding - a healthy bank can result in either more (because of the influential bank power) or less (because of precautionary motive) firm-level cash holding. Motivated by the contrasting views in the existing literature, this paper investigates whether bank policy determines firm-level cash policy. Using Japanese firm-level data over 2000–2014, we find that the difference in bank health effects stems from the firm's investment status. We find that healthy banks induce growing firms to hold more cash while declining firms hold more cash when borrowing from unhealthy banks. Furthermore, we find that banks with more liquidity also induce their growing borrowers to have more cash. Our results are robust to the endogeneity of bank selection. Our study indicates that bank-firm relationship can serve as an advance-signalling device for a firm's shareholder-wealth-maximizing investments and contributes to the literature that explains the cash holding puzzle.     

NATURAL DISASTERS,DAMAGE TO BANKS,AND FIRM INVESTMENT

This article investigates the effect of banks’ lending capacity on firms’ investment. To identify exogenous shocks to loan supply, we utilize the natural experiment provided by Japan's Great Hanshin‐Awaji earthquake in 1995. Using a unique data set that allows us to identify firms and banks in the earthquake‐affected areas, we find that the investment ratio of firms located outside the earthquake‐affected areas but having a main bank inside the areas was significantly smaller than that of firms located outside the areas and having a main bank outside the areas. Our findings suggest that loan supply shocks affect firm investment.     

Service Deregulation,Competition, and the Performance of French and Italian Firms

This article reports estimates of the impact of service regulation reform on the productivity of French and Italian firms in retail, transports and professional services over the period 1998–2007. We implement a two‐stage least squares estimation: the first‐stage instruments mark‐ups, a financial measure of rents, with barriers to entry and the second stage estimates the impact of instrumented mark‐ups on total factor productivity (TFP), a real measure of firm efficiency. We find that entry barriers lower firm productivity by raising mark‐ups and rents. These estimates imply that, if French and Italian regulators had adopted the OECD best practices in terms of entry barriers, firms in these sectors would have increased their TFP level by five percentage points. We do not find any robust evidence of a non‐linear relation between mark‐up and productivity.     

Bank loan supply shocks and leverage adjustment

We investigate the effect of bank loan supply shocks on firms’ leverage adjustment. We show that the impact of bank shocks is larger for firms with greater dependence on financially troubled banks. We measure firms’ pre-crisis loan dependence on troubled banks by using matched firm–bank loan data. Using the boom-bust cycle from 1987 to 2014 in Japan as a quasi-experiment, we find that financially constrained firms adjust their leverage slower during credit-crunch periods than during other periods. During credit-crunch periods following banking crisis, firms associated with failing banks or with banks that have a limited capacity to supply loans show a slower adjustment than other firms. Bank shocks have significant effects on small firms’ adjustment but not on that of large firms. These results are robust when we consider demand-side effects and perform other robustness tests. Our results imply that bank shocks have a persistent effect on borrowers’ leverage.     

FAMILY FIRMS,BANK RELATIONSHIPS,AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: A COMPREHENSIVE SCORE CARD

We examine the effect of financial constraints on firm investment and cash flow. We combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry to classify firms according to whether they are family‐owned, not family‐owned, or belong to a family‐linked network of firms and according to their number of banking relations (with none, one, or several banks). Our empirical strategy is structural, based on a dynamic model solved numerically to generate the joint distribution of firm capital (size), investment, and cash flow, both in cross sections and in panel data. We consider three alternative financial settings: saving only, borrowing and lending, and moral hazard constrained state‐contingent credit. We estimate each setting via maximum likelihood and compare across these financial regimes. Based on the estimated financial regime, we show that family firms, especially those belonging to networks based on ownership, are associated with a more flexible market or contract environment and are less financially constrained than nonfamily firms. This result survives stratifications of family and nonfamily firms by bank status, region, industry, and time period. Family firms are better able to allocate funds and smooth investment across states of the world and over time, arguably done informally or using the cash flow generated at the level of the network. We also validate our structural approach by demonstrating that it performs well in traditional categories, by stratifying firms by size and age, and find that smaller and younger firms are more constrained than larger and older firms.     

Do interest rate controls work? Evidence from Kenya

This paper reviews the impact of interest rate controls in Kenya, introduced in September 2016. The intent of the controls was to reduce the cost of borrowing, expand access to credit, and increase the return on savings. However, we find that the law on interest rate controls has had the opposite effect of what was intended. Specifically, it has led to a collapse of credit to micro‐, small‐, and medium‐sized enterprises; shrinking of the loan book of the small banks; and reduced financial intermediation. Because of their adverse effects on bank lending, we estimate that the interest rate controls have reduced economic growth by ¼–¾ percentage points on an annual basis. We also show that interest rate caps reduced the signaling effects of monetary policy. These suggest that (1) the adverse effects could largely be avoided if the ceiling was high enough to facilitate lending to higher‐risk borrowers and (2) alternative policies could be preferable to address concerns about the high cost of credit.     

Credit card cash‐out as informal financing: Evidence from China

Using a proprietary account‐level database from a commercial bank in China, we document that credit card holders can ease their credit constraints through the practice of cash‐out based on bogus transactions using credit cards. We find that such behaviour might be beneficial to both cardholders and banks. First, we find that a 1% increase in the cumulative number of credit card cash‐out transactions lowers the probability of default by 9.59%. Second, for private businesses, a 1% increase in the number of abnormal cash‐out transactions lowers overdue risk by 13.45%. Third, by lowering the overdue risk, the card‐issuing bank earns a larger profit. Our results are consistent with the notion that unconventional credit card cash‐out can mitigate the extent of capital misallocation in emerging markets.     

Product Differentiation,Competitive Toughness,and Intertemporal Substitution

Standard measures of competitive toughness fail to capture the fact that, as consumers optimize intertemporally, firms operating today compete with (as yet non‐existent) businesses, which will be started tomorrow. We develop a two‐tier constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model of dynamic monopolistic competition in which the impact of product differentiation on the market outcome depends crucially on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The degree of product differentiation per se fails to serve as a meaningful indicator of competitive toughness: what matters is its cross‐effect with EIS. We also extend the model to the case of non‐CES preferences in order to capture variable mark‐ups.     

Relationship lending and innovation: empirical evidence on a sample of European firms

This paper investigates the impact of relationship lending on innovation (the probability to innovate and the intensity of innovation). Using a unique dataset providing detailed information on bank–firm relationships across European firms, we relate different proxies of relationship lending (soft information, long-lasting relationships, number of banks and share of the main bank) to innovation. We find a very strong and robust positive effect of ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships, a less robust positive effect of long-lasting relationships and a negative effect of credit concentration as measured by the number of banking relationships. We also find that ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships reduce credit rationing for innovative firms, while long-lasting relationships seem to favour innovation via other relational channels. These results raise some concern on the impact of screening processes based on automatic procedures, as those suggested by the Basel rules, on firms' capability to finance innovative activities in Europe.     

Bank efficiency in South‐Eastern Europe

This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in six transition countries of South‐Eastern Europe over the period 1998–2008. Using a stochastic frontier approach, our analysis reveals that the average cost efficiency of South‐Eastern European banks is 68.59 percent, and the average profit efficiency is 53.87 percent. Regressions on the determinants of bank efficiency show that foreign banks are characterized by higher profit efficiency but lower cost efficiency, and government‐owned banks are associated with lower profit efficiency than domestic private banks. However, the efficiency gap between foreign‐, domestic private‐ and government‐owned banks narrows over time. We also find that the market power of a bank has a positive association with both cost and profit efficiency. Institutional development, proxied by progress in banking regulatory reforms, privatization and enterprise corporate governance restructuring, also has a positive impact on bank efficiency.     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

Export rivalry and exchange rate pass‐through

In this paper, we investigate the influence of market rivalry on firm‐level exchange rate pass‐through. Similar to Bloom et al. Econometrica, 80 , 1347–1393 (2013), we define market rivalry as product market proximity, and expect the cross market spillovers, that is, through leaked information or reputation, to affect firm‐level export price. Using a comprehensive dataset from Chinese exporters for the 2000–2007 period, we find that in response to a higher degree of market rivalry firms are less responsive to exchange fluctuations. This unresponsiveness suggests a higher degree of exchange rate pass‐through. The influence of market rivalry is stronger among firms that export consumption and heterogeneous products, and to developed countries. Our results are robust to different measures of market rivalry and specifications.     

The impact of production offshoring on the skill composition of manufacturing firms: evidence from Italy

In this work we explore how the international outsourcing of production impacts the skill composition of employment within Italian manufacturing firms. In particular, our aim is to assess whether the choice to offshore production activities to cheap‐labour countries implies a bias in the employment of skilled workers relative to unskilled ones.

Using a balanced panel of firms covering the period 1995–2003, we set up a counterfactual analysis in which, by using a difference‐in‐differences propensity score matching estimator, we compare the dynamics of skill demand for treated and control firms while addressing the possible problem of selection bias.

Our results identify a ‘potential’ skill bias effect of production offshoring. In particular, we find that treated firms tend to show an upward shift in the skill ratio with respect to the counterfactual sample, but coefficients are not significantly different from zero. When we look at the elements of the skill ratio separately, we find that the skill bias is driven by a fall in the employment of production workers (blue collars), rather than by the increase in the employment of non‐production workers (white collars), thus providing further evidence on the unskilled labour‐saving nature of international outsourcing.     

Interest rate assumptions and predictive accuracy of central bank forecasts

The interest rate assumptions for macroeconomic forecasts differ among central banks. Common approaches are given by the assumptions that interest rates remain constant over the forecast horizon, follow a path as expected by market participants or follow a path as expected by the central bank itself. Theoretical papers such as Svensson (The instrument-rate projection under inflation targeting: the Norwegian example. Centre for European Policy Studies Working Paper (127), 2006) and Galí (J Monet Econ 58:537–550, 2011) suggest an accuracy ranking for these forecasts, from employing central bank expectations yielding the highest forecast accuracy to conditioning on constant interest rates yielding the lowest. Yet, when investigating the predictive accuracy of the Bank of England’s and the Banco Central do Brasil’s forecasts for interest rates, inflation and output growth, we hardly find any significant differences between forecasts based on the different interest rate paths. Our results suggest that the choice of the interest rate assumption appears to be of minor relevance empirically.     

Activity strategies,information asymmetry,and bank opacity

Using a large panel of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, we investigate the association between functional diversification and bank earnings management. We document a positive relationship between bank earnings management and bank diversification. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that diversification increases the asymmetric information of banks, leading to greater discretionary power by bank managers. This effect is most prevalent in smaller banks and non-dividend paying banks. The impact of diversification on earnings management is less pronounced during the crisis. Our study is of interest to regulators and other stakeholders who examine factors which affect behavior of bank managers.