Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

We analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition. In the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition, since the poaching activities can be targeted towards (more) creditworthy borrowers. We find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits, and, therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares. Information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market, whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power. Thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets.     

Consolidation and commercial bank net interest margins: Evidence from the old and new European Union members and candidate countries

This paper examines the effects of financial reforms on the determinants of commercial bank net interest margin in the banking systems of the new EU member countries and candidate countries by dividing the sample period (1995–2006) into two sub-periods: consolidation period (1995–2000) and post-consolidation period (2001–2006). The paper also compares the new and old EU members to check whether differences with respect to the determinants of net interest margins between these two groups of countries exist within the same time period. The results indicate that size and managerial efficiency are negatively and significantly related to net interest margins in the two sub-periods. Regulators should promote merger and acquisition and market entry in order to increase the scale and efficiency of banks operating in the sector. Exploitation of the scale economies seems to be important in decreasing the interest rate spread in the sampled banking sectors. The results further indicate that all macroeconomic variables are statistically insignificant in the second sub-period, suggesting that differences in macroeconomic fundamentals have decreased among the sampled countries due to the increased convergence process in recent years. As for the comparison of the new and old EU members, the results suggest that the financial and economic convergence between the new and old members has not been completed. Macroeconomic differences within the group and between the groups still exist.     

金融中介及关系银行——基于广东外资企业银行融资数据的研究

本文根据外资银行和国有商业银行向在中国境内的外资企业提供的外币贷款和人民币贷款的数据 ,对金融中介及关系银行进行了实证研究。我们的主要结论有两点 :第一 ,企业与银行建立起来的金融业务关系越长久 ,那么其所获得的外币贷款利率就越低。这是对金融中介理论的支持。另外 ,外资控股、第三方担保等因素 ,也具有降低外币贷款利率的效应。第二 ,人民币贷款的利率随着外资企业与更多的银行建立和保持合作关系而降低。人民币贷款主要是由我国商业银行提供。如果商业银行间的竞争仅仅是用来作为信贷定价的主要决定因素 ,而不是用来推进金融创新 ,提供高质量的金融产品和服务 ,那么这将会损害我国商业银行的获利能力并进而影响金融系统的健康发展。     

BANKING UNION IN EUROPE: HOW MUCH CENTRALISATION IS NEEDED?

We examine the efficiency of banking regulation in a federation with two tiers of government and highly integrated banking systems. We assume that policy makers have incomplete information about banks’ true health, and banking sector turmoil can generate cross‐border spill‐over effects. We show that, in such an environment, the decentralisation of policy responsibilities for the regulation of banks can achieve the first‐best allocation and ensure financial stability. While national governments design banking regulations, the federal policy maker authorises inter‐regional income redistribution payments throughout the federation. Our results suggest that strengthening national responsibilities in banking regulation and supervision in the course of the further development of the European banking union may be advisable.     

Competition Tests with a Non-Structural Model: the Panzar–Rosse Method Applied to Germany's Savings Banks

Abstract. In this paper we adopt the Panzar–Rosse approach to assess the competitive conditions in the German banking market for the period from 1993 to 2002. We suggest several improvements to the empirical application of the approach and show that frequently used empirical models that apply price rather than revenue functions lead to biased results. Using disaggregated annual data from more than 400 savings banks (Sparkassen) the empirical findings indicate monopolistic competition, the cases of monopoly and perfect competition are strongly rejected. Furthermore, small banks seem to enjoy even more market power than larger institutions.     

Modelling price competition across many markets (An application to the Spanish loans market)

The purpose of this work is the structural modelling of price competition in a product-differentiated industry in which many firms of varying size compete across many independent small markets, with the target of identifying price behaviour. We apply it to model competition among the more than 79 banks that were active in the Spanish loans market during the period 1983-1991, using micropanel data. A model in which national banks (as opposed to regional and local banks) fully internalize their cross-rate effects in pricing is selected as the model that best fits the data. Our framework allows us to estimate the dead-weight loss due to market power, and to decompose it assessing the part attributable to price coordination.     

MIXED OWNERSHIP,MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND BANK COMPETITION

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit‐linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit‐linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.     

Financial openness,market structure and private credit: An empirical investigation

Consistent with recent theoretical models, this paper finds that financial openness has a positive effect on private credit in economies characterized by a competitive banking sector, but that this effect vanishes and even becomes negative in economies with imperfect banking competition.     

Differentiated interchange fees

Payment networks typically differentiate interchange fees across different merchant sectors. This paper shows that it is generally efficient for a regulator to leave the decision on the structure of interchange fees to payment networks.     

Foreign direct investment and governance quality in Russia

This paper studies the effect of poor governance quality on foreign direct investment in Russia. Using a survey of businesses across forty administrative districts, we find that higher frequency of using illegal payments and higher pressure from regulatory agencies, enforcement authorities, and criminals, negatively affect foreign direct investment. Our identification strategy builds on the exogenous cross-regional variation in worker strikes during 1895–1914, the period before the October Revolution. We find that moving from the average to the top governance quality across Russian regions more than doubles the FDI stock.