Tanzanian formal sector workers' participation in informal production

A theoretical model is developed explaining formal sector workers participation in the informal sector. A reduced-form informal sector participation function is derived from a specific utility function, a specific informal sector production function, and a specific informal sector earnings function. The participation function can be estimated consistently, and provides a solution to the problem that informal sector ‘wages’ in developing countries are hard to observe. A sample of Tanzanian formal sector workers is used to estimate the participation function. A majority of Tanzanian formal sector workers participate in informal production. Participation in informal production is inversely related to household income, to living in Dar es Salaam, and to being a mother with small children. Participation is positively related to age, and multiple-job-holding seems to play a very different role in the transition from work to retirement in Tanzania compared to industrialized countries.     

Cross‐Subsidies,and the Elasticity of Informality to Social Expenditures: The Case of Mexico's Seguro Popular

How is the size of the informal sector affected when the distribution of social expenditures across formal and informal workers changes? How is it affected when the tax rate changes along with the generosity of these transfers? In our search model, taxes are levied on formal‐sector workers as a proportion of their wage. Transfers, in contrast, are lump‐sum and are received by both formal and informal workers. This implies that high‐wage formal workers subsidize low‐wage formal workers as well as informal workers. We calibrate the model to Mexico and perform counterfactuals. We find that the size of the informal sector is quite inelastic to changes in taxes and transfers. This is due to the presence of search frictions and to the cross‐subsidy in our model: for low‐wage formal jobs, a tax increase is roughly offset by an increase in benefits, leaving the unemployed approximately indifferent. Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence on the recent introduction of the “Seguro Popular” healthcare program.     

Informal employment in developing countries : Opportunity or last resort?

There is an ongoing debate among researchers and policy makers, whether informal sector employment is a result of competitive market forces or labor market segmentation. More recently it has been argued that none of the two theories sufficiently explains informal employment, but that the informal sector shows a heterogenous structure. For some workers the informal sector is an attractive employment opportunity, whereas for others - rationed out of the formal sector - the informal sector is a strategy of last resort. To test the empirical relevance of this hypothesis we formulate an econometric model which allows for several unobserved segments within the informal sector and apply it to the urban labor market in Côte d'Ivoire.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

Informal Employment and the Role of Regional Governance

The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation to why the degree of informal employment may vary substantially between different regions within a country. In Brazil, 45% of workers in the urban labor force are employed informally. The degree of informal employment, however, varies substantially across regions, with some cities having 20% and others having 80% or more of their labor force in the informal sector. The hypothesis assessed here is that the quality of local governance—or government effectiveness—affects the decisions of workers and businesses as to whether to participate in the formal or the informal sector. The empirical analysis, based on data from 5500 Brazilian municipalities, shows that informal employment is lower in regions with better governance, higher average education, and with a relatively large manufacturing sector. Endogeneity concerns are addressed as part of a series of robustness checks of the results.     

Rural-urban migration,informal sector and development policies: a theoretical analysis

"A theoretical model of rural-urban migration has been developed with special reference to the informal sector. The wage rate and employment in the informal sector are determined endogenously. The paper shows the simultaneous existence of open unemployment and informal sector in the urban area in migration equilibrium. The effects of alternative subsidy policies on unemployment and welfare of the workers are studied." The model is intended primarily for use in analyzing trends and policies in developing countries.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

Oil price shock and informal workers in dual labor markets

This paper examines the impact of a rise in oil prices on the wages of workers in the unorganized sector of a developing economy. The model economy is comprised of two non-traded transport sectors, formal and informal, along with other sectors. The main results that we obtain are as follows. The informal transport sector contracts when fuel price rises and lowers the real income of the informal workers. The per-unit return to land rises, and the factor readjustments even raise the output of other sectors in the economy. We also show why inclusion of non-passenger transport services does not alter the main outcomes of the model.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Labor markets and productivity in developing countries

In middle-income countries, the informal sector often accounts for a substantial fraction of the urban labor force. We develop a general equilibrium model with matching frictions in the urban labor market, the possibility of self-employment in the informal sector, and scope for rural–urban migration. We investigate the effects of labor market institutions, different types of growth, and company taxes on labor market outcomes and aggregate productivity. We quantify these effects by calibrating the model to data for Mexico, and show that matching frictions can lead to a large informal sector when formal sector workers have substantial bargaining power.     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Education and earnings in urban West Africa

Using a series of comparable labor force surveys in urban West Africa, we estimate the private returns to education among representative samples of workers in seven economic capitals (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou). The data allow us to provide a unique cross-country comparison using rigorously the same variables and methodology for each country. We tackle the issues of endogenous sector allocation (public, formal private and informal sectors) and endogeneity of the education variable in the earnings functions. We find that the returns to schooling are most often enhanced once an endogenous education variable is accounted for. This effect holds particularly true in the informal sector. In most West African cities of our sample, the public sector gives more value to education, followed by the formal private sector and then the informal sector. We also shed light on convex returns to education in all the cities and sectors, including in informal activity. More generally, a major contribution of this paper is to provide evidence of significant effects of education on individual earnings in the informal sectors of the West African cities, even at high levels of schooling.     

Political‐Economic Regime and the Wage Curve: Evidence from Chile, 1957–96

This paper tests whether a wage curve—a negative relationship between the level of unemployment and the level of pay—existed in Chile during 1957–96. The analysis is divided into two periods. For 1957–73, during inward‐led development, we reject the existence of a wage curve. For 1974–96, when the economy opened, state‐run industries were privatised and labour rights weakened, we find a wage curve of ?0.08. Based on this finding we conclude that the unemployment–pay elasticity in the post‐reform period is similar to the ?0.07 to ?0.10 wage curve found in other western, capitalist countries. Disaggregating the analysis by group, we find that women, non‐university educated workers and public sector workers have suffered more from unemployment. Yet informal sector workers have not experienced pay drops as a result of unemployment, contradicting the hypothesis that the informal sector acts as a buffer during economic downturns.     

Allocation of Labor in Urban West Africa: Insights from the Pattern of Labor Supply and Skill Premiums

Using comparable data from five West African capitals, we assess the rationale behind development policies targeting high rates of school enrollment through the prism of allocation of labor and earnings effects of skills across the formal and informal sectors, and not working. We find that people with high levels of education allocate to the small formal sector, while less educated workers allocate to the informal sector. While high levels of education are given more value in the relatively smaller sectors of salaried employment, observed skills like education appear to be fairly unprofitable in the larger self-employment sector. The fact that only the small formal sector in urban West Africa both seems to absorb highly educated workers and provide high skill premiums may be an important reason for the observed low demand for education and high dropout rates.     

Occupational choices of working children in Bangladesh

The article looks into the determinants of occupational choices of working children in Bangladesh. Using data from 6668 Bangladeshi working children aged 5 through 14, the article estimates several binary and multinomial logit regressions, separately for boys and girls. The article confirms that most children work in the informal sector where formal sector’s jurisdiction and regulations are absent. Specifically, the article finds that children are least likely to work in the service occupation and are more likely to work in the textile sector. The findings highlight the diversity in the occupational distribution of child workers by gender and show how their individual and family characteristics influence occupational choices. The service sector, which comprises of mostly maids, is a hidden sector. This sector makes children vulnerable to abuse. Thus, it is suggested that policy makers need to come up with effective legislations that would protect the children who work in the ‘hidden informal’ sector.     

Economic reform and informal wage—a general equilibrium analysis

We attempt to trace the consequences of liberal economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with formal informal labor markets, wage-differential, vertical linkage and restricted capital movement. In particular, we show that the informal wage, representing income for a vast segment of unskilled labor may actually increase even if more people are employed in the informal segment. This also confirms that a contraction in the formal sector employment and the consequent expansion in the informal segment do not necessarily imply impoverishment of the existing set of informal workers.     

Are labor markets segmented in developing countries? A semiparametric approach

We test the hypothesis that observably similar workers earn higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector in developing nations. Using data from Argentina's household survey and various definitions of informal employment, we find that on average, formal wages are higher than informal wages. Parametric tests suggest that a formal premium remains after controlling for individual and establishment characteristics. However, this approach suffers from several econometric problems, which we address with semiparametric methods. The resulting formal premium estimates prove either small and insignificant, or negative. Neither do we find significant differences in measures of job satisfaction between the two sectors. We invoke these results to question the mainstream view that labor markets are segmented along formal/informal lines in developing nations such as Argentina.     

Tax Reform,Structural Unemployment and the Environment

The effects of environmental tax reform, i.e., using the proceeds of a higher energy tax rate to lower the labour tax rate, on wage formation, employment and environmental quality are analysed in the context of a small open economy with structural unemployment caused by hiring costs. We find that such a reform may boost employment if it shifts the tax burden away from workers towards those without employment in the formal sector. Environmental tax reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers in the formal sector if higher energy taxes reduce earnings in the informal sector by reducing labour productivity.     

Globalisation and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Labour Market in India

This paper examines quantitative and qualitative dimensions of employment issues in India from gender lens. Inequality in quantitative aspects have been analysed gender gap in work participation, composition and structure of employment. The study finds that female work participation in India has declined sharply despite faster economic growth and improvement in female literacy outcomes. The magnitude of decline is sharper in case of illiterate, women from less privileged class and rural backgrounds. Similarly, even after two decades of economic reform, female workers are highly concentrated in low productive, less remunerative and unpaid family labour category of self employment activities. Considering the qualitative dimension of jobs, the paper finds that the condition of female workers are more vulnerable as they are highly concentrated in informal sector and informal jobs with no employment security, no social security, and are being paid relatively lower wages compared to male workers in most of the sub-sector. The paper argues for an urgent policy intervention to ensure access to decent jobs and to provide protection to these vulnerably placed women workers.

     

Increasing wage dispersion and the changes in relative employment and wages in Mexico's urban informal sector: 1987-1993

This study analyses the role of changes in informal/formal relative employment, wage levels and wage inequality in explaining increasing wage dispersion in Mexico during the 1987–1993 period. From 1987 to 1993, the variance of the log of hourly wages for Mexican workers increased by more than 50 per cent. Using data from the Encuesta nacional de empleo urbano we find that this increase in the overall wage dispersion was mainly driven by increasing wage dispersion in the formal sector coupled with a faster growth in formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment. However, compression in the distribution of wages within the informal sector contributed to substantially slowdown the increasing overall wage inequality. About 60 per cent of the 1987–1993 4.65 percentage point reduction in the informal sector share of total employment is explained by changes in the structure that determines sectoral employment; the rest is explained by changes in the composition of the labour force, particularly increases in the sectoral education gap and a change in the regional relative share of sectoral employment. Also, from 1987 to 1993 the sectoral wage ratio increased from 0.59 to 0.63. It seems that a relative improvement in unobserved skills in the informal sector helped to close the wage differential but this effect was partially offset by an increase in the relative prices of both observed and unobserved skills, as well as increases in relative observed skills in the formal sector, particularly education.