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1.
We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries. 相似文献
2.
Lefteris Tsoulfidis 《International Review of Economics》2009,56(1):29-45
The widespread idea among economists is that monopolistic or imperfect competition is a set of realistic models that were invented in the 1930s and their purpose was to fill the gap between the polar and, at the same time, hypothetical models of perfect competition and pure monopoly. The main argument of this paper is that the monopolistic competition revolution set in motion a reaction—partly driven by methodological considerations, partly ideological—that ultimately led to the restoration of perfect competition, as the benchmark for evaluating market outcomes. In the end, monopolistic competition eclipsed, and perfect competition from the fridges of economic analysis that was up until the 1920s was placed to the very core of microeconomic model-building.
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Lefteris TsoulfidisEmail: |
3.
Clinton L. Neill Rodney B. Holcomb Kellie Curry Raper Brian E. Whitacre 《Applied economics》2019,51(14):1532-1540
With increased numbers of veterinarians in the market, it is critical to understand how this increased competition affects income potential at multiple levels. This study presents an empirical approach that incorporates local and nonlocalised spatial competition of firms into one model. By analysing the market for veterinarians using a spatial weight matrix approach, we are able to quantify localized and nonlocalised competition which assists in defining relevant market areas for veterinarians. Specifically, increased density within their county and surrounding counties decreases veterinarian income. Thus, the potential market area for veterinarians is larger than the local/county market in which they practice. This is important for veterinarians when choosing a location to practice, as they must consider the competition and demand in local and non-local areas. 相似文献
4.
Luís F. Costa 《Portuguese Economic Journal》2007,6(3):181-204
New Keynesian general-equilibrium static models showed the fiscal multiplier is an increasing function of the degree of monopoly.
Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model allowing us to study the steady-state role of optimal capital stock (and depreciation)
in the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. The GDP multiplier may be locally decreasing in the degree of monopoly when the
number of firms is fixed, but results depend strongly on the set of parameter values chosen. Using a net-output definition
or allowing for free entry leads to unambiguous dominance of the long-run monopolistic multiplier over the Walrasian one.
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Luís F. CostaEmail: URL: http://www.iseg.utl.pt/~lukosta/ |
5.
This paper quantifies the welfare cost of monopolistic competition in a simple parametric class of endogenous growth models, embedding the neoclassical growth framework as a special case. We put particular emphasis on taking transitional dynamics into account. In doing so, we develop an original two-step numerical procedure to compute the value function. We find for conservative calibrations that the welfare cost of monopolistic competition can be anywhere between 0.4 and 1.2% of consumption, depending on whether labor is elastically or inelastically supplied. 相似文献
6.
This paper builds a model of competition through fundraising between horizontally differentiated NGOs. NGOs allocate their time resource between working on the project and fundraising, which attracts private donations. If the market size is fixed, the fundraising levels increase with the number of NGOs and the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs can be larger or smaller than the socially optimal number, depending on the efficiency of the fundraising technology. If the market size is endogenous and NGOs cooperate in attracting new donors, fundraising levels decrease with the number of NGOs and the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs is smaller than the one that maximizes the welfare of donors and beneficiaries. If NGOs can divert funds for private use, multiple equilibria (with high diversion and no diversion of funds) appear. 相似文献
7.
This paper examines the impact of exogenous capital inflow on prices, production, labour supply, and welfare in the presence of specialisation-based externalities. The paper utilises a simple model of an economy that produces one-final good by means of capital, labour, and a large number of varieties of an intermediate good. The intermediate good is produced by means of capital and labour. The supply of capital is exogenous but the supply of labour is endogenous. The presence of internal economies of scale in the intermediate good industry gives rise to specialisation-based external economies in the production of the final good. Perfect competition prevails in the final good industry whereas the intermediate good industry operates under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. It is shown that exogenous capital inflow decreases labour supply and increases welfare only if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the final good is equal to or less than unity. The paper also shows that, if trade opens up between two otherwise similar economies, a capital rich country would be a net importer of varieties of the intermediate good. 相似文献
8.
Federico Etro 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2015,117(3):918-956
Under constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences and Cournot (or Bertrand) competition, a larger market induces exits of domestic firms, lower prices, and larger production of surviving firms because of competition from more foreign firms, even without resorting to the selection effects of Melitz. The elasticity of the number of firms to population decreases with substitutability between goods, and it reaches 0.5 under Cournot competition with homogeneous goods: empirical evidence supports this structural relation against the unitary elasticity of monopolistic competition. The results hold also in a Heckscher–Ohlin model with imperfect competition generating inter‐ and intra‐industry trade due to comparative advantage or comparative preferences. 相似文献
9.
Takashi Suzuki 《Economic Theory》2000,16(2):259-275
Summary. An existence theorem of monopolistically competitive equilibrium of the economy in which commodities are subject to differentiation
will be proved. We start with the existence theorem of Negishi (1961) and extend it to the commodity space of measures on
a compact metric space. In so doing, we have to handle the price normalization carefully.
Received: December 2, 1996; revised version: May 6, 1999 相似文献
10.
Michael T. Rauh 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):901-906
Summary. We consider static non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend on their own actions and
finitely many summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
without any convexity restrictions on payoffs or the common action space. We show that this result applies to a broad class
of monopolistic competition models.
Received: April 13, 2001; revised version: December 18, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" The result in this paper generalizes a result in my PhD dissertation supervised by M. Ali Khan and Joe Harrington.
I thank them for support and encouragement. I also thank Sung Kim, Bruce Nanney, Ashvin Rajan, Kali Rath, and an anonymous
referee for comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
11.
Yasushi Kawabata 《Bulletin of economic research》2010,62(2):109-131
This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods. 相似文献
12.
Johan WILLNER Sonja GRÖNBLOM Annina KAINU Johan FLINK 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2018,89(2):415-436
We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country. 相似文献
13.
We analyze the interaction between the soft budget constraint (SBC) and international trade by placing Segal’s (1998) SBC model within Melitz’s (2003) framework of international trade with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. As in Segal’s model, SBC may result in moral hazard. The opening to international trade adds another sort of inefficiency. Some firms that would have become exporters in the absence of SBC choose to apply low effort and not export in order to extract a subsidy from the government. This effect takes place when the trade costs are sufficiently low. Overall, however, trade liberalization reduces inefficiencies generated by SBC. The number of firms subject to moral hazard SBC decreases, aggregate effort level increases and aggregate profits lost due to SBC-induced sub-optimal effort decline as trade costs decrease. 相似文献
14.
Abstract. We investigate the spatial distribution and organization of an imperfectly competitive industry when firms may choose to operate more than a single production unit. Focusing on a short-run setting with a fixed mass of firms, we first fully characterize the spatial equilibria analytically. Comparing the equilibrium and the first-best, we secondly show that both organizational and spatial inefficiencies may arise. In particular, when fixed costs are low, when transport costs are high, and when products are close substitutes, the market outcome may well have to too many multinationals operating from a social point of view ('over-investment'). As a by-product, under-agglomeration of exporters in the larger market may arise. 相似文献
15.
Kristian Behrens Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano Jacques-François Thisse 《European Economic Review》2007,51(5):1277-1301
We study the impact of falling international trade costs and falling national transport costs on the economic geography of countries involved in an integration process. Each country is formed by two regions between which labor is mobile, whereas there is no international mobility. Goods can be traded both nationally and internationally at positive, but different, costs. A decrease in trade costs and/or in transport costs has a direct impact on prices and wages, which allows us to account for the impact of changes in these parameters on the economic geography and welfare of each country. We show that, as trade barriers fall, the benefits of integration come after its costs. We also show that national transport policies are of the beggar-thy-neighbor type. On both counts, policy coordination is required in the process of economic integration. 相似文献
16.
Abstract This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competing à la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented. 相似文献
17.
Understanding changes in exchange rate pass-through 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Recent research suggests that there has been a decline in the extent to which firms “pass-through” changes in exchange rates to prices. This paper provides further evidence in support of this claim. Additionally, it proposes an explanation for this phenomenon. The paper then presents empirical evidence of a structural break during the 1990s in the relationship between the real exchange rate and CPI inflation for a set of fourteen OECD countries. It is suggested that the recent reduction in the real exchange rate pass-through can in part be attributed to the low inflationary environment of the 1990s. 相似文献
18.
Abstract . Recent trade models with heterogeneous firms have changed the interpretation of gravity equations. Chaney (2008) shows that the effect of distance on the number of exporters and average exports depends on key parameters characterizing the elements of market structure. We use firm-level export data to estimate the structural parameters of Chaney's model. Controlling for the fixed costs of exporting, our estimated parameters match, for 28 out of 34 industries, the model's theoretical predictions. Our industry parameters allow us to evaluate separately the effect of transport costs and tariffs on trade, without having to resort to detailed data on trade frictions. 相似文献
19.
Stefan Lutz 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(2):163-173
A quota on foreign competition generally leads to quality upgrading (downgrading) of the low-quality (high-quality) firm, an increase in average quality, a reduction of quality differentiation, and a reduction of domestic consumer surplus, irrespective of whether the foreign firm produces higher or lower quality. Effects of a quota on industry profits and domestic welfare depend on the direction of international vertical differentiation. If the foreign firm produces low quality, both firms prices and profits rise but domestic welfare falls. This describes well some major effects of a Japanese Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) in the U.S. auto market and relevant empirical findings. If the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign profits will fall. Since domestic consumer surplus falls only unsubstantially, domestic profit gains lead to an increase of domestic welfare.I am grateful to Jim Gaisford, and Konrad Stahl, seminar participants at the Universität Mannheim and at the ZEW, and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. As Senior Fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), Bonn, I gratefully acknowledge its continued support. 相似文献
20.
Agglomeration and fair wages 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract. This paper implements a fair wage constraint into an analytically tractable core-periphery agglomeration model. This enables us to study the role of imperfect labour markets for the pattern of agglomeration. In the short run, a marginal increase in fair wage preferences leads to an unambiguous compression of the national factor price differential between skilled and unskilled labour, involving an increase in the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. In the long run, this mechanism renders full dispersion of an unstable equilibrium already at higher trade costs than in perfect labour markets. There is a tendency for fair wage preferences to enforce agglomeration. 相似文献