DOMESTIC COMPETITION POLICY AND TARIFF POLICY COMPARED*

M. Yano and F. Dei have demonstrated that, by controlling the degree of competition in a non‐tradables market (competition policy), a country can influence the terms of trade so as to increase its welfare, relative to free trade. Using their model, this study compares the extent of this effect with that of a tariff policy. It demonstrates that a competition policy can achieve a higher utility than a tariff policy if tariff rates are at levels currently tolerated in the real world. This demonstrates that domestic competition policy may play an important role as a substitute for tariff policy.     

INTERTEMPORAL COURNOT AND WALRAS EQUILIBRIA: AN ILLUSTRATION*

In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount). "S'il y avait 3, 4, ...n producteurs en concurrence [...] la valeur de p, qui en résulte, diminuerait indéfiniment par l'accroissement indéfini du nombre n,”A. A. Cournot (1838, p. 63)."     

WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION

This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.     

THE DECISION TO HIRE MANAGERS IN MIXED MARKETS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION*

This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING AND STRATEGIC CHOICE: THE COURNOT‐BERTRAND MODEL

Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.     

QUANTITY PRECOMMITMENT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION YIELD COURNOT OUTCOMES: A CASE WITH PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION*

Using a simple model of two-stage duopoly game, this paper shows that Bertrand-like price competition on a differentiated goods market, following a simultaneous endogenous choice of production capacity, yields the Cournot-like outcomes.     

R&D INCENTIVES UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME*

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost‐reducing activities. We focus on the correlation between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment at equilibrium monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We also prove that, if competition is sufficiently tough, any increase in product substitutability reduces R&D efforts.     

CLUSTER‐BASED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM EAST ASIA*

In this paper I attempt to formulate an endogenous model of cluster‐based industrial development, based on case studies in Japan, Taiwan, and China, where the initiation phase is followed by the quantity expansion phase through imitation and subsequently by the quality improvement phase through innovation. I argue that such a process of industrial development is supported by the development of market transactions among assemblers, parts‐suppliers, and merchants, and the stimulation of innovation made possible by the benefits of industrial clusters arising from the geographical concentration of a large number of enterprises and a variety of human resources in a small geographical area.     

DUOPOLY IN THE JAPANESE AIRLINE MARKET: BAYESIAN ESTIMATION FOR THE ENTRY GAME*

This paper provides an econometric analysis of a duopoly game in the Japanese domestic airline market. We establish a novel Bayesian estimation approach for the entry game, which allows the incorporation of flexible inference techniques. We find asymmetric strategic interactions between Japanese firms. This result implies that competition is still influenced by the former regulation regime. Furthermore, our prediction analysis indicates that the new Shizuoka airport will suffer from a lack of demand in the future.     

A NONCOOPERATIVE SHIPPING COURNOT DUOPOLY WITH LINEAR‐QUADRATIC TRANSPORT COSTS AND CIRCULAR SPACE*

The mixed strategy equilibria in a location quantity duopoly model with circular markets are investigated. We find that a continuum of equilibria exists when the transport cost function is linear. However, if costs are strictly concave or convex, most strategies fail to qualify as equilibria. For any integer n, there are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria in which each firm locates at n possible locations with equal probability. This result explains possible outcomes in which firms’ on‐path locations are not minimally or maximally differentiated.     

INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND THE OPTIMAL POLICY INTERVENTION: THE CASE OF COURNOT‐TYPE COMPETITION UNDER NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

We derive the optimal subsidy policy for an interconnection agreement between two symmetric Internet service providers (ISPs) competing á la Cournot in a network service market. The interconnection quality agreed upon is lower than the socially optimal level, as suggested by Crémer et al. (2000 ). In the basic model where both ISPs compete in the domestic market, the optimal investment subsidy rate depends positively on the strength of network externalities. In the extended model where home and foreign ISPs compete in the home market, the optimal subsidy rate for the home government is higher than in the basic model.     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT*

In this paper we study the mix of anti‐copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.     

STABILITY OF THE COURNOT SOLUTION AND FREE ENTRY: A NOTE*

Taking a traditional approach, I show that by using the discrete adjustment system, the Cournot solution in a free entry oligopoly with increasing returns to scale is stable only when the number of firms is very small. We must pay attention to stability when using the free entry Cournot oligopoly model.     

REALIZED COST‐BASED SUBSIDIES FOR STRATEGIC R&D INVESTMENTS WITH EX ANTE AND EX POST ASYMMETRIES*

We discuss stochastic cost‐reducing R&D investments and examine efficient subsidies. We discuss a two‐stage duopoly model in which each firm chooses R&D levels (innovation size and probability of success) in the first stage and competes à la Cournot in the second stage. We find that simple subsidies depending on the realized cost differences induce the efficient levels of R&D with respect to the innovation size and probability of success by two firms regardless of ex ante and ex post asymmetries between the two firms.     

PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY GAIN IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS*

This paper examines two policy instruments, privatization of the domestic public firm and imposition of a tariff on foreign private firms in an international mixed oligopolistic model with asymmetric costs. It first demonstrates that different orders of moves of firms will imply different government decisions on optimal tariff and on privatization policy. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990 ), this paper then uses an extended game to discuss endogenous roles. It indicates that the efficiency gain that highlights the importance of foreign competition is crucial in determining the welfare improving privatization policy. Moreover, the endogenous equilibria are associated with different government decisions on privatization.     

"中国之谜"-文献综述和一个假说

本文首先就"中国之谜"产生的背景及其争论进行了总结分析。然后通过引入以资本市场为代表的虚拟经济部门将传统的局限于实体经济部门的货币数量论拓展为包括资本市场、商品市场和货币市场的广义货币数量论模型,在新模型框架下分析了"中国之谜"的生成机理;我们发现大量货币在资本市场的积聚是货币供应量与物价关系反常的直接原因。"中国之谜"是货币虚拟化过程中虚拟经济和实体经济关系失调的结果。     

QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION,WELFARE, AND THE MODE OF COMPETITION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKET: A NOTE*

We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.     

"中国之谜"-文献综述和一个假说

该文首先就中国之谜产生的背景及其争论进行了总结分析.然后通过引入以资本市场为代表的虚拟经济部门将传统的局限于实体经济部门的货币数量论拓展为包括资本市场、商品市场和货币市场的广义货币数量论模型,在新模型框架下分析了中国之谜的生成机理;我们发现大量货币在资本市场的积聚是货币供应量与物价关系反常的直接原因.中国之谜是货币虚拟化过程中虚拟经济和实体经济关系失调的结果.     

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE STATE‐OWNED FIRM AND SOCIAL WELFARE: A NOTE

We consider a mixed market where a state‐owned firm competes with private firms. If the number of firms is exogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm might improve social welfare. This situation occurs when the state‐owned firm is inefficient and private firms are efficient. However, if the number of firms is endogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm must reduce social welfare.     

MEASURING OUTPUT FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ATKINSON REVIEW

In 1993 a new page was turned in national accounting. The United Nations Standards of National Accounting recommended a new standard for the measurement of output from the public sector. Implementation has recently begun in many countries, in Europe based on a European Union directive. In the U.K. the Atkinson Review in 2005 came up with a series of recommendations. This article examines its recommendations concerning the definition and valuation of government outputs. For the non‐market sector a market analog is recommended by the Review. However, several of its recommendations are inconsistent with that, championing social value as a basis for definitions and measurement. If taken seriously it will lead to arbitrary and politically controversial factors inserted into national accounts. The article highlights the norm that GDP is a measure of production, and advocates adhering to the market analog and following well recognized practices of national accounting.