MEASURING POVERTY USING BOTH INCOME AND WEALTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SPAIN

We study the correspondence between a household's income and its vulnerability to income shocks in two developed countries: the U.S. and Spain. Vulnerability is measured by the availability of wealth to smooth consumption in a multidimensional approach to poverty, which allows us to identify three groups of households: the twice‐poor group, which includes income‐poor households who lack an adequate stock of wealth; the group of protected‐poor households, which are all those income‐poor families with a buffer stock of wealth they can rely on; and the vulnerable‐non‐poor group, including households above the income‐poverty line that do not hold any stock of wealth. Interestingly, the risk of belonging to these groups changes over the life‐cycle in both countries while the size of the groups differs significantly between Spain and the U.S., although this result is quite sensitive to whether the housing wealth component is included in the wealth measure or not.     

Viewpoint: Measuring the well‐being of the poor with income or consumption: a Canadian perspective

Abstract There is a long tradition of using consumption measures derived from Statistics Canada's household expenditures surveys to study material well‐being, inequality, and poverty. We offer an introduction to this research. Income and consumption measures give different pictures of the patterns of material well‐being in Canada, but the differences are not as large as in the US. We also provide a comparison to Meyer and Sullivan's results on data quality. Canadian expenditure surveys are of high quality. Unique aspects of these surveys (variation in quality control measures over time and the possibility of comparing to income tax data) provide important insights into the quality of survey data on income and consumption.     

SHARECROPPING,LAND EXPLOITATION AND LAND‐IMPROVING INVESTMENTS*

This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long‐standing issues: inefficiency and lack of investment. It considers the problems that the tenant, with a shorter‐term interest in the farm than the landlord, might overexploit the land to maximize immediate returns even at the cost of future damages, and under‐supply long‐run productivity improving investments in land. I show that the efficient (first‐best) levels of input use and investment can be achieved (both in the steady state and in transition) by a suitable share contract which, by dampening incentives to maximize current returns, addresses the land exploitation problem, and by an appropriate cost allocation rule which can address the investment problem.     

Self‐regulation through Goal Setting*

Goals are an important motivator. But little is known about why and how people set them. We address this issue in a model based on two stylized facts. First, goals serve as reference points for performance. Second, present‐biased preferences create self‐control problems. We show the power and limits of self‐regulation through goals. Goals increase an individual's motivation—but only up to a certain point. Furthermore, they are painful self‐disciplining devices. Thus, greater self‐control problems may result in tougher goals; but for a severe present bias goals either lack a motivating force, or are too painful to be accepted.     

THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK ON SELF‐ASSESSMENT

It is a well‐known phenomenon that people have difficulties in assessing their ability correctly. Often they overestimate their (relative) abilities. We conduct an experiment to test whether the self‐assessment of individuals improves when they receive feedback and there are incentives to make a correct self‐assessment. We investigate the subjects' reactions to feedback in several subsequent rounds to see not only if, but also when and how they react. Our main finding is that feedback influences subjects' decisions and can improve their overall self‐assessment. The effects, however, depend on the kind of feedback. Furthermore, we observe differences in the reactions of subjects (e.g., to what extent they follow feedback), the robustness of their belief about their relative ability, and how they process feedback.     

INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL MARKETS,IRREVERSIBILITY OF INVESTMENTS AND FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

In this paper, we analyse the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to improve long‐run welfare when productive investment is irreversible and uncollateralizable and there is no insurance. Only fiat money or government issued bonds provide self‐insurance. We demonstrate that an increase in precautionary savings reduces irreversible productive investment. Hence, subsidies to promote productive but irreversible investment should be financed in such a way that they do not reduce insurance capability. When lump‐sum subsidies are high, a consumption tax is likely to be more redistributive and thus more consumption smoothing than are the other sets of instruments analysed in our model.     

HETEROGENEOUS RISK ATTITUDES IN A CONTINUOUS‐TIME MODEL*

We prove that every continuous‐time model in which all consumers have time‐homogeneous and time‐additive utility functions and share a common probabilistic belief and a common discount rate can be reduced to a static model. This result allows us to extend some of the existing results of the representative consumer and risk‐sharing rules in static models to continuous‐time models. We show that the equilibrium interest rate is lower and more volatile than in the standard representative consumer economy, and that the individual consumption growth rates are more dispersed than in the absence of uncertainty.     

Monetary policy and efficiency in over‐the‐counter financial trade

We develop a monetary model that incorporates over‐the‐counter (OTC) asset trade. After agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely money. Subsequently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets and thus boost their liquidity or to buy assets and thus provide liquidity to other agents. In our model, inflation affects not only the money holding decisions of agents, as is standard in monetary theory, but also the entry decision of these agents in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which predict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Also, an increase in the holding cost of money will lead to a decrease in asset prices, a regularity that is well documented in the data and often considered anomalous.     

COMPARATIVE STATICS OF A MONOPOLISTIC FIRM FACING RATE‐OF‐RETURN AND COMMAND‐AND‐CONTROL POLLUTION CONSTRAINTS

The intrinsic comparative statics properties of a general rate‐of‐return regulated, profit‐maximizing model of a monopolist facing a command‐and‐control pollution constraint are derived. Recent advances in the theory of comparative statics are used to derive the basic comparative statics of the model, which are contained in an observable negative semi‐definite matrix and possess the form of Slutsky‐like expressions. We consider several command‐and‐control pollution constraints that are commonly implemented in practice, and conclude that the intrinsic comparative statics properties of the model are qualitatively invariant to the type of command‐and‐control pollution constraint imposed. We compare our results with those extant, and find that several basic results from the standard A–J model no longer hold in our model.     

R&D AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY

R&D investment has well‐known liquidity problems, with potentially important consequences. In this study, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare in a Schumpeterian growth model with cash‐in‐advance (CIA) constraints on R&D investment, consumption, and manufacturing. Our main results can be summarized as follows. Under the CIA constraints on R&D and consumption (the CIA constraint on manufacturing), an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases (increases) R&D and economic growth. We also analyze the optimality of Friedman rule and find that Friedman rule can be suboptimal due to a unique feature of the Schumpeterian model.     

Accounting for Sustainable Development over the Long‐Run: Lessons from Germany

We construct long‐run sustainability indicators based on changes in Comprehensive Wealth – which we refer to as Genuine Savings (GS) – for Germany over the period 1850–2000. We find that German sustainability indicators are positive for the most part, although they are negative during and after the two World Wars and also the Great Depression. We also test the relationship between these wealth changes and a number of measures of well‐being over the long‐run: changes in consumption as well as changes in average height and infant mortality rates. We find a positive relationship between GS and our well‐being indicators over different time horizons, however, the relationship breaks down during WWII. We also test if the GS/Comprehensive Wealth framework is able to cope with massive disinvestment at the end of the Second World War due to war‐related destructions and dismantlement. We find that negative rates of GS were by and large avoided due to the accumulation of technology and growth‐friendly institutions. We demonstrate the importance of broader measures of capital, including measures of technological progress, and its role in the process of economic development; and the limits of conventional measures of investment to understand why future German consumption did not collapse.     

Consumption adaptation,anticipation‐bias,and optimal income taxation

Adaptation is omnipresent but people systematically fail to correctly anticipate the degree to which they adapt, leading them to make irrational intertemporal decisions. This paper concerns optimal income taxation to correct for such anticipation‐biases in a framework where consumers adapt to earlier consumption levels. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium OLG model with endogenous labor supply and savings where each consumer lives for three periods. The results show how a paternalistic government may correct for the effects of anticipation‐bias through a combination of time‐variant marginal labor income taxes and savings subsidies/taxes. The optimal policy mix remains the same, irrespective of whether consumers commit to their original life time plan for work hours and consumption or reoptimize later on when realizing that they have already adapted more than expected.     

INEQUALITY AND AGGREGATE DEMAND IN THE IS‐LM AND IS‐MP MODELS

This paper presents an extension to the textbook IS‐LM and IS‐MP models that allows the short run effects of an increase in household income inequality to be studied in a simple manner. The income distribution is assumed to be log‐normal, and the coefficient of variation of income is assumed to be exogenous. The latter is used as the measure of income inequality, and enters otherwise standard IS and LM curves in a straightforward manner. While the models are highly stylised, they can easily be extended to more complicated variants.     

WHAT DRIVES THE TIME‐SERIES AND CROSS‐SECTIONAL VARIATIONS IN BANK CAPITAL RATIOS? EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

This paper documents the time‐series and cross‐sectional variations in bank capital ratios and investigates their underlying driving forces using listed Japanese bank data from 1977 to 2009. We derive an overall framework in the form of a present‐value model to decompose the variation in bank capital ratios into changes in expected future stock returns, profitability and leverage ratios. Moreover, we use the variance decomposition approach to examine the relative importance of these factors. We find that the expected future stock returns dominate the time‐series variation in bank capital ratios, and that the expected future profitability also plays an important role as the expected stock returns in the cross‐sectional variation.     

STRATEGIC CANDIDACY AND SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS*

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001 ) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules.     

Commitment and self-control

The literature on self-control problems has typically concentrated on immediate temptations. This paper studies a Gul and Pesendorfer [Temptation and self-control, Econometrica 69 (2001) 1403-1435; Self-control and the theory of consumption, Econometrica 72 (2004) 119-158] style model in which decision-makers are affected by temptations that lie in the future. While temptation is commonly understood to give rise to a demand for commitment, it is shown that ‘temptation by future consumption’ can induce its absence. The model also exhibits procrastination, provides an alternative to projection bias as an explanation for some experimental results, and can simultaneously account for myopic and hyperopic behavior. The evidence on preference reversals supports temptation by future consumption, and suggests that it may not be restricted to short time horizons.     

INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF ABILITIES AND SELF‐SELECTION OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS*

This article presents an intergenerational self‐selection model of migration and education that is capable of explaining the evolution of earnings and education across three generations of immigrants. By structurally estimating the model, it is possible to quantify the sacrifices made by the first generation of Mexican immigrants for the benefits of future generations. In particular, the estimation results suggest that there is a significant one time loss of human capital of immigrants upon migration, that migrants are positively selected from the ability distribution, and that they transmit substantial human capital to their children. Finally, the model is used to evaluate the effects of social policies designed to reduce the “brain drain” from Mexico to the United States.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

RATE‐CUTTING TAX REFORMS AND CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE

While there is a large and growing number of studies on the determinants of corporate tax rates, the literature has so far ignored the fact that the behavior of governments in setting tax rates is often best described as a discrete choice decision problem. We set up an empirical model that relates a government's decision whether to cut its corporate tax rate to the country's own inherited tax and taxes in neighboring countries. Using comprehensive data on corporate tax reforms in Europe since 1980, we find evidence suggesting that the position in terms of the tax burden imposed on corporate income relative to geographical neighbors strongly affects the probability of rate‐cutting tax reforms. Countries are particularly likely to cut their statutory tax rate if the inherited tax is high and if they are exposed to low‐tax neighbors.     

Estimating Consumption Responses to Income Shocks of Different Persistence Using Self‐Reported Income Measures

Models of intertemporal consumption choice posit that consumption reacts more strongly to income shocks with persistent effects than to shocks with temporary effects. This prediction is tested using data from the Estonian Household Budget Surveys for 2002–07. Questions in the survey make it possible to distinguish between two income components of different persistence, using the individual households’ subjective income classification. Estimations confirm that households distinguish income components of different persistence and react to these differently; the consumption response to income shocks with persistent effects is significantly higher than the response to shocks with only temporary effects. Further analysis reveals, however, that consumption also reacts to lagged shocks to temporary income even when the households are not liquidity constrained, suggesting that their behavior is not fully consistent with the standard forward‐looking unconstrained consumption models.