MANUFACTURER ACCEPTANCE OF RETURNS*

Modelling the retailers' behaviour explicitly, I extend the model of manufacturer returns policy of Flath and Nariu (1989) by introducing general demand conditions under uncertainty. I derive an equivalence theorem between manufacturer acceptance of returns and resale price maintenance (RPM) under conditions of zero marginal cost, risk neutrality and symmetric information. This was first shown by Marvel and Reagan (1986) in a somewhat different context. I also discuss some differences between RPM and return policy under asymmetric information and risk attitudes.     

DUALITY WITH SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES UNDER SOCIAL CONSTANT RETURNS*

We develop dual approaches to quantity and price relationships of production in a general multisectoral model with sector‐specific externalities. The production of each good exhibits socially constant returns to scale but privately decreasing returns. We find that the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the social perspective and that the Rybczynski theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the private perspective. The price‐output dual fails to hold in general. Moreover, we re‐establish the Heckscher‐Ohlin theorem in the two‐sector case, as well as the factor endowment–factor price and price‐output comparative statics in the high‐dimension case under proper conditions.     

RETURNS TO SCALE IN RETAIL TRADE*

This paper attempts to estimate genuine scale effects in retail trade from a cross section of retail stores in Israel. This is done by estimating a simple production function for several retail branches and employing the faithful old direct Cobb-Douglas structure with value added as output and labor and capital inputs. And indeed despite the well-known peculiarities of the retail industry, a cross section estimation produces “normal” production-function estimates with reasonable input elasticities. The estimates also identify marked increasing returns-to-scale parameters, higher in food and lower in branches less affected by consumer participation and geographical dispersion. These increasing returns may explain a good part of the increase in sales per unit of inputs observed in time series.     

THE ECONOMIC RETURNS TO AN MBA*

Because MBA programs require work experience before admittance, prior wages can be exploited to disentangle the return to the degree from unobserved productivity. We find that controlling for individual fixed effects generally reduces the estimated returns to an MBA, particularly for those in top programs. However, for full‐time MBA students attending schools outside of the top‐25 the estimated returns are higher when we control for individual fixed effects. We show that there is some evidence that those who take the GMAT but do not obtain an MBA are stronger in dimensions such as workplace skills that are not easily measured.     

QUANTILE FORECASTS OF FINANCIAL RETURNS USING REALIZED GARCH MODELS*

This article applies the realized generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, which incorporates the GARCH model with realized volatility, to quantile forecasts of financial returns, such as Value‐at‐Risk and expected shortfall. Student's t‐ and skewed Student's t‐distributions as well as normal distribution are used for the return distribution. The main results for the S&P 500 stock index are: (i) the realized GARCH model with the skewed Student's t‐distribution performs better than that with the normal and Student's t‐distributions and the exponential GARCH model using the daily returns only; and (ii) using the realized kernel to take account of microstructure noise does not improve the performance.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

PATTERNS OF TRADE AND GROWTH UNDER INCREASING RETURNS: ESCAPE FROM THE POVERTY TRAP*

We consider a two-sector model of intertemporal resource allocation in which the investment good sector exhibits an initial phase of increasing returns in production. The economy maximizes a discounted sum of one period utilities derived from the consumption good. If it is autarkic, it may face a poverty trap from which it cannot escape even if it follows an optimal policy. If it engages in trade with the outside world as a price taker, it may escape from the trap. The optimal patterns of production and trade are analysed for such an economy.     

FREE TRADE NETWORKS WITH TRANSFERS*

We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, so that the global free trade network, in which every pair of countries signs an FTA, is not in general pairwise‐stable. In this paper we show that, even if the world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is pairwise‐stable when transfers between FTA signatories are allowed. Moreover, it is a unique pairwise‐stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.     

MANAGED TRADE WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION*

This article illustrates the importance of imperfect information in self‐enforcing trade agreements. It shows that expected welfare is higher with current period uncertainty, and a high level of uncertainty may even undermine the need for a safeguard clause. These results were derived by extending the seminal paper by Bagwell and Staiger (The American Economic Review 80 (1990), 779–95) to account for current period uncertainty.     

SHAREHOLDERS' UNANIMITY WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS*

When markets are incomplete, shareholders typically disagree on the firm's optimal investment plan. This article studies the shareholders' preferences with respect to the firm's investment in a model with aggregate risk, incomplete markets and heterogeneous households who trade in firms' shares instead of directly accumulating physical capital. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and borrowing limits are not binding, a firm's shareholders unanimously agree on its optimal level of investment. In contrast, with binding borrowing constraints, constrained shareholders prefer a higher level of investment than unconstrained ones.     

JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES*

This article revisits the no‐recall assumption in job search models with take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.     

DO STOCK RETURNS VARY WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS? BUSH VS. GORE: THE FLORIDA RECOUNT

I examine the relation between campaign contributions and stock returns during the Florida recount period of the 2000 presidential elections. Using the full population of publicly traded firms, I find an economically significant positive (negative) relation between pre‐election campaign contributions to Bush (Gore) and stock returns during the 37‐day election recount period. This relation exists for both the level and partisanship of contributions, and exists incrementally at both the firm and industry levels. These relations are robust to several different specifications, including alternative event windows that exclude the potentially confounding House/Senate races. The firm‐level analysis is consistent with contributions being influence‐motivated.     

MEASURING CONSUMER WELFARE WITH MEAN DEMANDS*

The welfare change from a price increase–for example, the compensating variation (cv)—is often calculated using the expenditure function from an estimated demand. If there is unobserved preference heterogeneity, then the estimated demand is an average over households with different preferences. And the cv from the mean demand does not generally equal the mean cv. We give conditions ensuring that the cv from the mean demand equals the mean cv, is less than the mean cv, and approximates the mean cv better than the change in consumers' surplus. A necessary condition is that demands become more dispersed as income rises.     

NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*

I develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous, and each worker’s ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard. Incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long‐term contracts. Relational contracts, which must be self‐enforcing, must therefore be used. The wage dynamics in the optimal contract, which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, are intimately related to the learning effect.     

SEQUENTIAL MERGERS WITH DIFFERING DIFFERENTIATION LEVELS*

We study sequential merger incentives under presence of product differentiation. Two sets of firms produce closely related goods, whereas each set produces more differentiated goods. Merger incentives under product differentiation are found to be stronger for two firms producing closely related goods than more differentiated goods. Also, after one merger, other firms are willing to follow with their own merger, resulting in sequential mergers. This result is consistent with the recent mergers in the video game software industry in Japan.