FIRST‐BEST FISCAL POLICY WITH SOCIAL STATUS*

This paper examines the first‐best fiscal policy in a stochastic, infinite‐horizon representative agent model that exhibits consumption‐enhanced as well as wealth‐enhanced social status in the household utility. We show that the first‐best labour tax rate is a positive constant that is used to correct negative consumption externalities. The first‐best tax rate on capital income is also positive in order to overturn agents' status‐seeking capital over‐accumulation. Moreover, we find that in sharp contrast to a conventional automatic stabilizer, the first‐best capital tax rate moves in the opposite direction with shocks to firms' production technology, thus exacerbating the business cycle.     

Property taxes and dynamic efficiency: A correction

According to Kim and Lee (1997), property taxes as opposed to capital gain taxes and taxes on rent endanger dynamic efficiency. The present paper shows that the choice of the tax base is immaterial. What counts is whether the taxes eliminate the after-tax rent. Empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case.     

Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets

Empirical analyses of labor tax and public debt processes provide prima facie evidence for imperfect government insurance. This paper considers a model in which the government's inability to commit to future policies or to report truthfully its spending needs renders government debt markets endogenously incomplete. A method for solving for optimal fiscal policy under these constraints is developed. Such policy is found to be intermediate between that implied by the complete insurance (Ramsey) model and a model with exogenously incomplete debt markets. In contrast to optimal Ramsey policy, optimal policy in this model is consistent with a variety of stylized fiscal policy facts such as the high persistence of labor tax rates and debt levels and the positive covariance between government spending and the value of government debt sales.     

SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES AND STATUS PREFERENCES IN THE UZAWA‐LUCAS MODEL*

This paper shows that introducing preferences for social status based on human capital holdings modifies the finding of Gómez (2004 ) that sector‐specific externalities associated with human capital in the goods sector do not violate the optimality of the competitive economy in the Uzawa–Lucas model. The effect of an increase in the degree of sector‐specific externalities is qualitatively the same as that of an increase in the strength of the desire for status. Hence, paradoxically, a greater degree of sector‐specific externalities makes human capital accumulation more excessive from the social point of view.     

Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of consumption can be strictly negative. We also show that preference nonseparabilities imply that optimal differentiable asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature. We show that under weak conditions, it is possible to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth are linear, and taxes/transfers are history-dependent only at retirement. The average asset income tax in this system is zero.     

Tax competition in federations revisited

We extend Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004) by considering all-purpose public goods that are beneficial to both producers and consumers. Horizontal externality (resp. vertical externality) exerted by tax competition will not necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes.     

Effects of Aspirations and Habits on the Distribution of Wealth

We analyze how the introduction of habits and aspirations affects the distribution of wealth when the labor productivity of individuals is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and when bequests arise from a joy‐of‐giving motive. In the presence of either bequests or aspirations, labor income shocks are transmitted intergenerationally, and this transmission, together with contemporaneous shocks, determines the distribution of wealth. We show that the introduction of aspirations (habits) decreases (increases) the average wealth, and increases (decreases) both its intragenerational variability and the degree of intergenerational mobility. Therefore, a distinction between aspirations and habits is relevant because they involve different implications for the distribution of wealth.     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation

We study the structure of optimal wedges and capital taxes in a dynamic Mirrlees economy with endogenous distribution of skills. Human capital is a private, stochastic state variable that drives the skill process of each individual. Building on the findings of the labor literature, we construct a tractable life-cycle model of human capital evolution with risky investment and stochastic depreciation. In this setting, we demonstrate the optimality of (a) a human capital premium, i.e., an excess return on human capital relative to physical capital, (b) a large intertemporal wedge early in the life-cycle, and (c) a non-zero intratemporal wedge even at the top of the skill distribution at all dates except the last date in the life-cycle. The main implication for the structure of optimal linear capital taxes is the necessity of deferred taxation of physical capital. The average marginal tax rate on physical capital held in every period is zero in present value. However, expected capital tax payments do not equal zero in every period. Necessarily, agents face negative expected capital tax payments early in the life-cycle and positive expected capital tax payments late in the life-cycle.     

The dual nature of public goods and congestion: the role of fiscal policy revisited

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.     

Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment

Benhabib and Rustichini [Optimal taxes without commitment, J. Econ. Theory 77 (1997) 231-259] study the properties of optimal capital taxes in economies without commitment and no government debt. They find that capital taxes may be different from zero at steady state. This note shows that, once governments have the possibility of issuing debt and smoothing taxes over time, optimal steady state capital taxes turn out to be zero.     

Casino regulations and economic welfare

Abstract This paper studies the entry and tax regulation of oligopolistically competitive privately run casinos and government‐run casinos in a jurisdiction. We highlight three important external effects from casino‐style gambling: non‐casino income creation, social disorder costs, and cross‐border gambling. The laissez‐faire equilibrium need not be overcrowding compared with regulated or government‐run regimes. Entry regulation may lead to higher jurisdiction welfare than tax regulation. Government‐run casinos always operate on a larger scale and achieve higher welfare than other regimes, given the same number of casinos. With an endogenous fraction of external gamblers, a dispersed casino configuration yields higher welfare than a centralized one.     

Democratic public good provision

This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under repeated voting. Expenditures are financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations. We focus on politico-economic Markov equilibria and contrast these with the Ramsey allocation under commitment. The model features indeterminate equilibria, with a key role of forward-looking strategic voting. Due to the lack of commitment to future policies, the tax burden may be on the wrong side of the dynamic Laffer curve. Moreover, restrictions on government policies can in some cases be welfare improving.     

Costly Tax Enforcement and Financial Repression

Using an overlapping generations production‐economy model characterized by financial repression, purposeful government expenditures and cost of tax collection, we analyse whether financial repression can be explained by the cost of raising taxes. We show that with public expenditures affecting utility of the agents, modest costs of tax collection tend to result in financial repression being pursued as an optimal policy by the consolidated government. However, when public expenditures are purposeless, the above result only holds for relatively higher costs of tax collection. But, more importantly, costs of tax collection cannot produce a monotonic increase in the reserve requirements. What are critical, in this regard, are the weights the consumer assigns to the public good in the utility function and the size of the government.     

Fiscal implications of AIDS in South Africa

The number of people living with HIV is alarmingly large. In addition to the incomprehensible human suffering of those directly affected, AIDS also has large, negative economic effects. In this paper, I study the fiscal implications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa in a standard neo-classical growth model. I find that an antiretroviral program is to a large extent self financing. Improvement in dependency ratios and health care cost savings would pay for Rand 144 billion of a full epidemiological intervention. The indirect effect through the changing demographic structure will be more important than the direct health care cost saving effect. I also explore different taxation policies. The households would be willing to sacrifice an amount equal to 12% of GDP in the first period to be subject to an optimal (Ramsey) fiscal policy rather than an alternative fixed debt to GDP policy. The optimal policy implies an increase in government debt during the peak of the epidemic.     

MACROECONOMIC AND REDISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES IN THE USA*

This paper studies the effect of an increase in consumption taxes using a dynamic general equilibrium model of overlapping generations calibrated to the US economy. When the proceeds are used to reduce income taxes, the reform raises the aggregate capital and labour supply in the long run. Workers increase labour supply immediately in response to the reform, while consumption rises only gradually. The tax reform also transfers wealth from old consumers to young consumers. As a result, while future generations experience significant welfare gains, current generations, particularly old consumers, tend to experience sizable welfare losses. When the proceeds are used for a lump‐sum transfer, the aggregate capital and labour both decrease in the long run. This reform is welfare‐improving for the current low‐income households.     

Environmental policy and lobbying in small open economies

This paper analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. International environmental policies are here characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. The optimal pollution taxes are characterized and comparative statics are carried out to increase the understanding of mechanisms underlying pollution taxes in the specified setup. It is found, among other things, that the presence of local lobbying may decrease, as well as increase pollution taxes - depending on, e.g. an assumption of symmetry.     

TAX PROJECTIONS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS BY GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS: HIDDEN MANOEUVERINGS BEHIND FISCAL RECONSTRUCTION IN JAPAN*

This paper investigates how the hidden manoeuvrings of governments' fiscal department bureaucrats affect tax projections and economic growth forecasts. The empirical results suggest that they underestimate their tax projections when these are based on their forecasts of government debt. We also analyze the manoeuvrings of fiscal bureaucrats on economic forecasts and find that their forecasts of economic growth rates depend on their own projections of government debt and fiscal deficits.     

AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL WITH PUBLIC CAPITAL AND SUSTAINABLE GOVERNMENT DEBT*

This paper presents and analyses an endogenous growth model with public capital and public debt. It is assumed that the ratio of the primary surplus to gross domestic income is a positive linear function of the debt income ratio which assures that public debt is sustainable. The paper then derives necessary conditions for the existence of a sustainable balanced growth path for the analytical model. Further, simulations are undertaken in order to gain insight into stability properties of the model and in order to analyse growth effects of deficit financed increases in public investment. The latter is done for the model on the sustainable balanced growth path as well as for the model along the transition path.     

Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy

We study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when (i) the regulator does not know the firms’ abatement costs, (ii) penalties for tax evasion are limited, and (iii) monitoring of pollution is costly. We show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms’ incentives to over-estimate their abatement costs. In particular, depending on the firms’ abatement costs, the optimal policy may involve over or under-deterrence compared to the full information outcome. We then investigate the properties of a pollution standard. We show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered.