The Information Content Of Calls Of Debt: Evidence From Long-Run Stock Returns

We examine the long‐run performance of the common stock of firms following calls of both straight and convertible debt from 1945 to 1995. Using a sample of 718 calls of straight debt, we find an average abnormal return in the five years following the call of between 0.16% and 0.34% per month, which compounds to an economically and statistically significant 11% to 22% over the five‐year period. This evidence of overperformance following calls shows a distinct symmetry between the straight debt and equity markets. Issues of debt and equity are both followed by long‐term underperformance, whereas stock repurchases and debt calls are both followed by long‐run overperformance. For our sample of 713 calls of convertible debt, we find little systematic evidence of abnormal performance following the call. Some researchers suggest that calls of convertible debt provide negative signals to the market. Our results provide no support for this claim. In contrast, our evidence of marginal positive long‐run returns provides weak support for the model that calls of convertible debt signal the realization of profitable investment options, and for the price pressure hypothesis.     

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

The Wealth Effect of Demutualization: Evidence From the U.S. Property-Liability and Life Insurance Industries

This study examines the wealth effect of demutualization initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating underpricing and postconversion long‐run stock performance. Our results suggest that there is more “money left on the table” for demutualized insurers than for non‐demutualized insurers. We show that higher underpricing for demutualized firms can be explained by greater market demand, market sentiment, and the size of the offering. Further, contrary to previous research reporting an average underperformance of industrial IPOs, we show that demutualization IPOs outperform non‐IPO firms with comparable size and book‐to‐market ratios and non‐demutualized insurers. We present evidence that the outperformance in stock returns is mainly attributable to improvement in post‐demutualization operating performance and demand at the time of the IPOs. The combined results of underpricing and long‐term performance suggest that the wealth of policyholders who choose stock rather than cash or policy credits is not harmed by demutualization. Stockholders who purchase demutualized company shares either during or after the IPO have earned superior returns. Our findings are consistent with the efficiency improvement hypothesis.     

Do Privatization IPOs Outperform in the Long Run?

This paper investigates the long-run stock returns of privatization initial public offering (IPO) firms using a sample of 241 privatization IPOs from 42 countries during the period 1981-2003. We compare one-, three-, and five-year holding period returns of privatization IPOs to those of the domestic stock market indices and to size and size- and book-to-market equity ratio (BM)-matched firms from the same countries. Consistent with previous studies, we find that privatization IPOs significantly outperform their domestic stock markets in the long run. However, they show less consistent abnormal long-term stock performance relative to their size or size- and BM-matched benchmark firms.     

IPO Failure Risk

We explore the factors associated with historical IPO failures by developing an IPO failure prediction model that includes accounting information as well as proxies for the role of information intermediaries and other IPO deal–related characteristics. We document statistically significant differences in failure models applicable to nontech versus high tech IPOs, and these structural differences are largely driven by accounting‐based proxies for firms' investments in intangible assets, operating performance, and financial leverage. We also develop parsimonious, predominantly accounting‐based, strictly out‐of‐sample (i.e., no hindsight) IPO failure forecasting models for each of the two sectors. We find that our forecasts are negatively associated with one‐year post‐IPO abnormal returns. A pseudo‐hedge strategy of going short (long) in high (low) failure risk portfolios yields returns of economically significant magnitudes over the one‐year horizon, and is robust to alternative returns methodologies. Further results suggest that IPO long‐run returns anomalies may persist, but they take different forms for high‐tech and nontech IPOs.     

Market Underreaction to Free Cash Flows from IPOs

I examine the relation between initial public offering (IPO) long‐run stock performance and the amount of cash raised by the firm in the offering. I find that IPOs raising more cash have poorer long‐run performance. The result is robust to different measurement methods. The evidence suggests that the market underreacts to free cash flow related agency problems in IPOs. Consistent with this interpretation, I find that IPO long‐run performance is more sensitive to the new cash raised in the offering if an IPO firm has lower capital expenditure or higher opening bid‐ask spread.     

Three Decades of IPO Markets in Canada: Evolution,Risk and Return

This article explores the extent that the long‐run returns following initial public offerings (IPOs) can explain the asserted decrease in IPOs in Canada. The causes of such a decrease remain controversial, in part because of our limited knowledge of this market. We first describe in detail the evolution of Canadian IPOs on the senior and the venture stock exchanges over three decades (1986–2016). This evolution differs considerably between natural resource and non‐natural resource firms. Second, using other junior markets as a benchmark, we show that the Canadian IPO market is very particular, mainly because it lists very small firms at an early development stage. Third, using 2,145 Canadian IPOs, we provide evidence that these IPOs generate three‐year negative average abnormal returns, and more than 70 percent report negative abnormal returns. Large issuers reporting profits constitute the only subsample that provides fair returns, but they account for less than 5 percent of IPOs. Such a market probably survived for many decades because of investors' preference for skewness and the characteristics of the returns' distribution. We observe a high level of skewness of abnormal returns, consistent with the behavioral finance proposition that investors are often unduly optimistic when valuing lottery stocks.     

Non-linear dynamics of hot and cold cycles in Indian IPO markets: evidence from Markov regime-switching vector autoregressive model

The study aims to examine non-linear relationship between initial public offering (IPO) volume and average monthly initial returns for ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ issuing cycles in the Indian IPO markets using a two-state Markov regime-switching vector autoregressive model. The sample considers 557 IPOs during the period 2004–2014. The study establishes the presence of hot and cold states in Indian IPO markets. It finds bidirectional causality between IPO volume and initial returns for ‘hot’ issuing periods. The empirical findings suggest that the market possesses valuable information content in terms of the past issuing activity which has the potential to increase the predictability of future market behaviour.     

The Long Run Share Price Performance of Malaysian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)

Abstract:  This paper investigates the long run share price performance of 454 Malaysian IPOs during the period 1990 to 2000. In contrast with developed markets, significant over performance is found for equally-weighted event time CARs and buy-and-hold returns using two market benchmarks, though not for value-weighted returns or using a matched company benchmark. The significant abnormal performance also disappears under the calendar-time approach using the Fama-French (1993) three factor model. While the long run performance of Main and Second Board IPOs does not differ, the year of listing, issue proceeds and initial returns are found to be performance-related.     

Exits,Performance, and Late Stage Private Equity: the Case of UK Management Buy‐outs

Using a hand‐collected dataset of 1,225 buy‐outs, we examine post buy‐out and post exit long term abnormal operating performance of UK management buy‐outs, during the period 1980–2009. Our univariate and panel data analysis of post buy‐out performance conclusively show positive changes in output. We also find strong evidence for improvements in employment and output and a lack of significant changes in efficiency and profitability following initial public offerings (IPO) exits. IPOs from the main London Stock Exchange (LSE) market outperform their counterparts from the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) only in terms of changes in output. For secondary management buy outs (SMBOs), performance declines during the first buy‐out but in the second buy‐out performance stabilises until year three, after which profitability and efficiency fall while employment increases. Although private equity (PE) backed buy‐outs do not exhibit either post buy‐out or post exit underperformance, they fail to over‐perform their non‐PE backed counterparts. In the subsample of buy‐outs exiting via IPOs on the AIM, PE firms do not outperform non‐PE buy‐outs. Our findings highlight the importance of tracing the overall performance of buy‐outs over a longer period and controlling for sample selection bias related to the provision of PE backing.     

Information content of IPO grading

In the year 2007, Indian capital market regulator-SEBI, introduced a unique certification mechanism for IPOs whereby all IPOs have to undergo mandatory quality grading by independent rating agencies. In this paper we argue that such objective, independent and exogenous certifying mechanism provides a better opportunity to test the well established certification hypothesis, especially in the context of emerging markets with institutional voids. Using a sample of 163 Indian IPOs we test the efficacy of IPO grading mechanism. We find, grading decreases IPO underpricing and positively influences demand of retail investors. Grading reduces secondary market risk and improves liquidity. However, grading does not affect long run performance of the IPOs. IPO grading successfully capture firm size, business group affiliation and firm’s quality of corporate governance. Our findings imply that, in emerging markets, regulator’s role to signal the quality of an IPO contributes towards the market welfare.     

HIGH-TECH IPOS: A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS

The typical price behavior of an initial public offering (IPO), consisting of a price upsurge on the first trading day followed by subpar performance in the (longer-run) after-market, is one of the most intriguing puzzles in corporate finance. This study focuses on high-tech IPOs in Europe and the U.S. over the period 1998–2001, both to compare the European and U.S. IPO markets and to determine how the price behavior of high-tech IPOs compares to that of IPOs in general. Average initial-day returns were 39% and 64% for the European and U.S. samples, respectively. The median returns were significantly lower, however, indicating that the sample averages are affected by a small group of exceptionally strong performers. But, for the first full year of trading, the median market-adjusted returns were negative for both samples. Not surprisingly, this substandard aftermarket performance was most apparent in companies that failed to generate operating profits.
As with IPOs in general, high-tech IPOs showed higher initial-day returns in "hot" markets than in "cold." Strong first-day performance was a good predictor of IPO volume in the high-tech market, with strong first-day returns triggering a flood of IPOs in subsequent months. Overall, then, the authors' study concludes that the price behavior of high-tech IPOs provides an exaggerated version of the general tendency of IPOs to be underpriced initially but underperform over the longer term.     

Re‐assessing the long‐term underperformance of UK Initial Public Offerings

Previous work has identified that IPOs underperform a market index, and the purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of this finding. We re‐examine the evidence on the long‐term returns of IPOs in the UK using a new data set of firms over the period 1985–92, in which we compare abnormal performance based on a number of alternative methods including a calendar‐time approach. We find that, using an event‐time framework, there are substantial negative abnormal returns to an IPO after the first 3 years irrespective of the benchmark used. However, over the 5 years after an IPO, abnormal returns exhibit less dramatic underperformance, and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns depends on the benchmark applied. Further if these returns are measured in calendar time, we find that the (statistical) significance of underperformance is even less marked.     

An empirical analysis of Mexican and US closed-end mutual fund IPOs

We examine 135 Mexican closed-end fund IPOs and 370 Mexican non-fund IPOs that issued between 1994 and 2003 along with 217 contemporaneous US fund IPOs and document three primary results. First, we find that Mexican IPOs in the aggregate experience no significant underpricing, unlike their US IPO counterparts. Both Mexican and US IPOs experience significantly negative long-run performance. Second, Mexican closed-end fund IPOs experience positive long-run performance, significantly better than Mexican non-fund IPOs which experience negative long-run performance. Unlike Mexican fund IPOs, US fund IPOs experience negative long-run performance. Third, we find that both Mexican and US debt-backed closed-end fund IPOs significantly outperform equity-backed closed-end IPOs. In Mexico, debt-backed funds experience positive abnormal returns, compared to negative abnormal returns for Mexican equity-backed funds, US debt-backed funds, and US equity-backed funds.     

Underwriter Compensation Structure: Can It Really Bond Underwriters?

Underwriter compensation can be structured as all cash or a combination of cash and warrants. Using a sample of small initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that underwriter compensation contracts that include warrants in exchange for cash can serve as certification for IPO firms by substituting for reputation capital. When underwriters accept warrants when they could have received more cash compensation, the IPOs avoid the well documented long‐run underperformance. However, when underwriters receive warrants after maximizing cash compensation, the IPO experiences higher underpricing and poorer long‐run performance. The findings are consistent with a motivation by the underwriters to circumvent regulatory constraints.     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.     

The under-pricing of IPOs in the Gulf cooperation council countries

We document the phenomenon of under-pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) for 47 Gulf firms that went public between 2001 and 2006. The IPOs had, on average, initial abnormal returns of 290 percent, far exceeding those documented for both developed and emerging markets. In aftermarket performance, we find that these IPOs provide investors with negative abnormal returns over a one-year period, which seems to be consistent with findings in other industrial and emerging markets. The empirical models fail, however, to provide us with a satisfactory explanation using the common independent variables employed in the literature. Nevertheless, it appears that country- and industry-specific characteristics, in addition to the timing of the offers, play a key role in explaining IPO behavior in the region. This paper's empirical findings support the hypothesis that investors are initially over-optimistic about an IPO's performance, but grow more pessimistic over time.     

IPO Pricing in “Hot” Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the Table?

This paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing. Using a model in which the aftermarket price of IPO shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment, I show that IPOs can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return. A sample of recent French offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model. Individual investors' demand is positively related to market conditions. Moreover, large individual investors' demand leads to high IPO prices, large initial returns, and poor long‐run performance.     

Europe's Second Markets for Small Companies

European stock exchanges have repeatedly opened second markets to list small companies. We explain the motivation for the creation of these second markets, and the reasons why many of them have failed. We find that the average long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) on second markets is dramatically worse than for main market IPOs. However, the second markets have provided firms with the opportunity to raise funds at the IPO and in follow‐on offerings. The relative success of London's AIM, which is an exchange‐regulated market with minimal regulations, has led other European stock exchanges to establish similar non‐EU regulated second markets. Most of the IPOs on these exchange‐regulated markets are offered exclusively to institutional investors, and are equivalent to private placements. These IPOs, which frequently raise only a few million euros, rarely develop liquid trading.