Wage posting without full commitment

Wage posting models of job search typically assume that firms can commit to paying workers exactly the posted wage. We relax this assumption and impose “downward” commitment; firms can commit only to paying at least their advertised wage. As each firm can only commit to pay at least their advertised wage, workers may demand that the firm pay more than the advertised wage. In labor markets with a finite number of workers and firms, the strategic interaction between firms makes it costly for firms to provide applicants the incentive not to demand wages in excess of the advertised wage. In equilibrium, firms may settle for running job auctions at the cost of losing control of the number of applicants that they can attract. When this strategic interaction between firms vanishes, workers never choose to demand more than the advertised wage.     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion,Firm Size,and Growth

This paper analyzes a model of equilibrium wage dynamics and wage dispersion across firms. It considers a labor market where firms set wages and workers use on-the-job search to look for better paid work. It analyzes a perfect equilibrium where each firm can change its wage paid at any time, and workers use optimal quit strategies. Firms trade off higher wages against a lower quit rate, and large firms (those with more employees) always pay higher wages than small firms. Non-steady-state dispersed price equilibria are also analyzed, which describe how wages vary as each firm and the industry as a whole grow over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, J41.     

PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

TRAINING,TURNOVER, AND SEARCH*

This article explores a model of firm‐specific training in a job search environment with labor turnover. The main substantive finding is a positive association between training and wages (when dispersed). The article then precisely characterizes how both wage dispersion and firm profitability depend on the flow value b≥ 0 of workers' unmatched time. It is shown that: (i) for all high values b, no equilibrium exists; (ii) for intermediate values b, multiple equilibria arise, where firms earn zero profits, and choose from a general wage distribution; (iii) for all lower values b, there is a unique equilibrium, with firms earning positive profits, and choosing from an atomless set of wages.     

On-the-job search and strategic bargaining

This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment. I show that if workers and firms are homogeneous, there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages, each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. If firms are heterogeneous, I characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages. I compare the quantitative predictions of this model with Burdett and Mortensen's [1998. Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment. International Economic Review 39, 257-273.] wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

Multinationals,cross‐border acquisitions and wage dispersion

Abstract We examine the impact of cross‐border acquisitions on intra‐firm wage dispersion using a detailed Swedish linked employer‐employee data set including data on all firms and about 50% of the Swedish labour force with information on job‐tasks and education. Foreign acquisitions of domestic multinationals and local firms increase wage dispersion but so do also other types of cross‐border acquisitions. Hence, it is the acquisition itself rather than foreign ownership that increases wage dispersion. The positive wage effect is concentrated to CEOs and other managers, whereas other groups are either negatively affected or not affected at all.     

The formal sector wage premium and firm size

We show theoretically that when larger firms pay higher wages and are more likely to be caught defaulting on labor taxes, then large-high wage firms will be in the formal and small-low wage firms will be in the informal sector. The formal sector wage premium is thus just a firm size wage differential. Using data from Ecuador we illustrate that firm size is indeed the key variable determining whether a formal sector premium exists.     

ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND THE GENDER EARNINGS GAP IN CHINESE INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS

This paper analyzes the gender wage gap in the post‐reform Chinese industry using a unique employer‐employee matched dataset. The analysis shows that the sex‐related wage premiums at the firm level account for almost all the portion of the gender wage gap that is not explained by observed personal characteristics. It is found that firms which have a larger pay gap between men and women are more likely to operate in the market with fierce competition, subject to a hard budget constraint, adopt piece rates, and have a lower degree of employees' influence. (JEL I30, J16, J21, J64, J71, O10, R20)     

Holdup and wage dispersion

This paper provides a search-theoretic model of the labor market, in which large firms hire workers sequentially and wages are bargained with full commitment. The firm's optimal vacancy-posting strategy trades off the fact that a larger size decreases marginal benefits from subsequent jobs, but avoids higher future recruiting costs attributable to the holdup effect. The holdup effect is dominant if the production function is not sufficiently concave, resulting in firm-size wage premium. The equilibrium features wage dispersion both within and between firms. When calibrated to the U.S. data, the extended model accounts for 67%–84% of the observed wage dispersion, among which 13%–27% is attributed to the holdup effect.     

The importance of worker, firm and match effects in the formation of wages

This paper estimates a Mincerian wage equation with worker, firm, and match specific effects and thereby complements the growing empirical literature started by the seminal paper of Abowd (Econometrica 67:251–333, 1999b). The analysis takes advantage of the extensive Danish IDA data which provides wage information on the entire working population in a 27-year period. We find that the major part of wage dispersion in the Danish labor market can be explained by differences in worker characteristics. However, the relative contributions of the three components vary across subgroups of workers. The match effect constitutes a non-negligible part of the overall wage dispersion. An analysis of inter-industry wage differentials shows that firm characteristics are more important at the industry level than at the worker level. Similarly, we find evidence that high-wage workers tend to sort into high-wage industries to a larger extent than they sort into high-wage firms within industries. The mobility pattern of workers is related to the quality of the firm and the match. Finally, we find that firms’ wage policies differ across subgroups.     

Firm heterogeneity and immigrant wage assimilation

This article investigates the role of job mobility in immigrant wage assimilation. I use longitudinal linked employer–employee data for Portugal to estimate the immigrant wage catch-up in log wage regressions with both individual and firm fixed effects. I show that moving to firms with higher wage premiums accounts for approximately 30% of the immigrant wage catch-up in the first years.     

Same Work,Different Pay? Evidence from a US Public University

Abstract

This study examines detailed data for faculty at a typical public research university in the United States between 1995 and 2004 to explore whether gender wage differentials can be explained by productivity differences. The level of detail – including the number of courses taught, enrollment, grant dollars, and number and impact of publications – largely eliminates the problem of unmeasured productivity, and the restriction to one firm eliminates unmeasured work conditions that confound investigations of wider labor markets. The authors find that direct productivity measures reduce the gender wage penalty to about 3 percent, only 1 percentage point lower than estimates from national studies of many institutions and with fewer productivity controls. The wage structure for women faculty differs markedly from the wage structure for men. Interpreted against the institutional features of wage setting for this population, the paper concludes that penalties for women arise at the department level.     

A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill–Biased Technology

In this paper I analyse the directed search/matching problem in an economy with heterogeneous skills and skill–biased technology. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists and is socially efficient. Matching is partially mixed in the equilibrium. A high–tech firm receives both skilled and unskilled applicants with positive probability, and favours skilled workers, while a low–tech firm receives only unskilled applicants. The model generates wage inequality among identical unskilled workers, as well as between–skill inequality, despite the fact that all unskilled workers perform the same task and have the same productivity in the two types of firms. Inequality has interesting responses to skill–biased technological progress, a general productivity slowdown, and an exogenous increase in the skill supply elasticity.     

ON THE USE OF FIRM FIXED EFFECTS AS A PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE FOR ANALYZING LABOR MARKET MATCHING

The present note evaluates the performance of firm fixed effects as a productivity measure when identified from wage regressions with two‐way fixed effects in matched employer‐employee data. This setting is frequently applied to study the matching between workers and firms. Exploiting wage and production data from a large administrative German data set, I find that the correlation between firm fixed effects (FFE) and total factor productivity is close to zero. Once TFP is used, the matching pattern is positive assortative, whereas the two‐way fixed effect technique yields the opposite result.     

PRODUCT MARKET AND THE SIZE–WAGE DIFFERENTIAL*

Using directed search to model the product market and the labor market, I show that large plants can pay higher wages to homogeneous workers and earn higher expected profit per worker than small plants, although plants are identical except size. A large plant charges a higher price for its product and compensates buyers with a higher service probability. To capture this size‐ related benefit, large plants try to become larger by recruiting at high wages. This size–wage differential survives labor market competition because a high wage is harder to get than a low wage. Moreover, the size–wage differential increases with the product demand when demand is initially low and falls when demand is already high.     

Wage inequality and between-firm wage dispersion in the 1990s: A comparison of rural and urban enterprises in China

Using a worker–firm matched sample, this paper compares the changes of wage structures of urban and rural enterprises following public sector restructuring in China's manufacturing sector. While the wage responses of rural firms with respect to firm characteristics are found to have declined steadily, compensation of urban workers has become increasingly linked to their firms' ability to pay. Our analysis reveals that industrial restructuring has weakened the influence of institutional factors, such as market power, soft budget constraints, and insider influence, on the wage determination of rural firms but it has enhanced their impact on urban firms. Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4) (2005) 664–687.     

DOWNWARDS WAGE RIGIDITY,ENDOGENOUS SEPARATIONS AND FIRM TRAINING

This paper analyses the effect of downwards wage rigidity on wage setting, wage compression and firm training. It is shown that downwards wage rigidity in future periods induces a wage penalty and increases wage compression in the present period. However, contrary to previous work this is not sufficient to increase firms’ training investments. The reason lies in the endogeneity of separations, which become more frequent.     

Directed search with multi-vacancy firms

I construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create. Within this framework, the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously, wages play an allocative role in the matching process, and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms. I characterize the (unique) equilibrium. Comparative statics generate testable implications for cross-sectional variation in matching efficiency, as well as the dynamic behavior of vacancies and unemployment. Moreover, allowing for ex-ante heterogeneity across firms, the model can easily and naturally generate the observed relationship between firm size, wages, profitability, and hiring.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.