Accessibility of optima in pure exchange economies

Assuming differentiable monotonicity and differentiable convexity of utility functions, we show that if y and z are allocations of a pure exchange economy with z optimal and preferred to y by every agent, then there is a trade curve of finite length from y to z. We make no assumption on utility functions designed to ‘keep away from the boundary’. The conclusion need not hold if z is not optimal, unless a special boundary condition is assumed and (l, m) ≠ (2, 2).     

Restricted houseswapping games

Restricted houseswapping games (RHGs) are a generalization of ‘one-sided matching games’, in which we specify a class II* of ‘allowable’ simple trading cycles. The cores of such games may be empty. Given II*, all possible closed RHGs have non-empty cores of II* is ‘strongly balanced’. Examples include the one-sided matching markets (^{Shapley and Scarf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974. 1. 23–37}. ^{Tijs et al., OR Spektrum 1984, 6, 119–123}; ^{Quinzii, International Journal of Game Theory 1984, 13, 41–60}) and the two-sided matching markets (^{Gale and Shapley. American Mathematical Monthly 1962. 69, 9–16}; ^{Shapley and Shubik, International Journal of Game Theory 1972, 1, 111–130}: and ^{Demange and Gale Econometrica 1985, 53, 873–888}).We then consider the subclass of RHGs in which there is no transferable resource. In this case, a weaker condition on II*, called ‘weak balancedness’, is sufficient to guarantee core non-emptiness. In addition, if II* is not weakly balanced, then there exists a preference profile such that the strict core of the resultant game is empty.Several other examples are given of II* that are (a) strongly balanced: (b) weakly balanced but not strongly balanced: and (c) not even weakly balanced.Finally, we discuss the issues of equilibrium definition, existence, and core-equilibrium allocation equivalence in RHGs.     

Continua of stochastic dominance relations for unbounded probability distributions

Let P = {F,G,…} be the set of all probability distribution functions with support (0, ∞). An unrestricted stochastic dominance relation>_∞ is defined on P for each real ∞ 1, where F >_∞ G means that ^x_y = 0 (x - y)^{∞ - 1} dG(y) ^x_{n = 0}(x − y)^∞−1 dG(y) for all ∞ 0, with < for some x. These relations are partial orders that increase as ∞ increases with limit relation>_∞. A class U_∞ of utility functions u on (0, ∞) is defined in such a way that F >_∞ G iff udF > udG for all u ε U_∞. The U_∞ decrease as ∞ increases and have a non-empty intersection U_∞. Each u ε U_∞ is an increasing function that has derivatives of all orders that alternate in sign. Criteria which tell when F eventually dominates G in the sense of F >_∞ G are noted. Comparisons with bounded stochastic dominance results are made in several places.     

Benchmark priors for Bayesian model averaging

In contrast to a posterior analysis given a particular sampling model, posterior model probabilities in the context of model uncertainty are typically rather sensitive to the specification of the prior. In particular, ‘diffuse’ priors on model-specific parameters can lead to quite unexpected consequences. Here we focus on the practically relevant situation where we need to entertain a (large) number of sampling models and we have (or wish to use) little or no subjective prior information. We aim at providing an ‘automatic’ or ‘benchmark’ prior structure that can be used in such cases. We focus on the normal linear regression model with uncertainty in the choice of regressors. We propose a partly non-informative prior structure related to a natural conjugate g-prior specification, where the amount of subjective information requested from the user is limited to the choice of a single scalar hyperparameter g_0j. The consequences of different choices for g_0j are examined. We investigate theoretical properties, such as consistency of the implied Bayesian procedure. Links with classical information criteria are provided. More importantly, we examine the finite sample implications of several choices of g_0j in a simulation study. The use of the MC³ algorithm of Madigan and York (Int. Stat. Rev. 63 (1995) 215), combined with efficient coding in Fortran, makes it feasible to conduct large simulations. In addition to posterior criteria, we shall also compare the predictive performance of different priors. A classic example concerning the economics of crime will also be provided and contrasted with results in the literature. The main findings of the paper will lead us to propose a ‘benchmark’ prior specification in a linear regression context with model uncertainty.     

Structural instability of the core

Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let w(n,q)= 2q-n+1 and let W be a smooth ‘policy space’ of dimension w. Let U(W)^N be the space of all smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is shown that there exists an ‘instability dimension’ w^*(σ) with 2w^*(σ)w(n,q) such that:

1. (i) if ww^*(σ), and W has no boundary, then the core of σ is empty for a dense set of profiles in U(W)^N (i.e., almost always),

2. (ii) if ww^*(σ)+1, and W has a boundary, then the core of σ is empty, almost always,

3. (iii) if ww^*(σ)+1 then the cycle set is dense in W, almost always,

4. (iv) if ww^*(σ)+2 then the cycle set is also path connected, almost always.

The method of proof is first of all to show that if a point belongs to the core, then certain generalized symmetry conditions in terms of ‘pivotal’ coalitions of size 2q−n must be satisfied. Secondly, it is shown that these symmetry conditions can almost never be satisfied when either W has empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q) or when W has non-empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q)+1.     

Theoretical tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic dynamical models

This paper examines different theoretical stability tests of infinite-horizon rational expectations equilibria. These ‘tests’ have different status: two of them express that the considered equilibrium is ‘isolated’ [neither (non-sunspot) equilibria (test 1) nor (well-behaved) sunspot equilibria exist in a neighbourhood (test 2)] and two of them are learning criteria [either standard ‘evolutive learning’ (test 3) or game-theoretical ‘eductive’ learning (test 4)]. Surprisingly, these four tests select the same steady state equilibria in the class of one-dimensional one-step-forward looking economic models. The extension of this equivalence theorem to n-dimensional and then more complex systems is discussed.     

Continua of stochastic dominance relations for bounded probability distributions

Let P={F,G,…} be the set of probability distribution functions on [0,b]. For each αε[1, ∞), F_αG means that ∫^x_o(x−y^α−1dF(y)∫^x_o(x−y)^α−1dG(y) for all xε[0, b], and F>_αG means that F_αG and F≠G. Each _α is reflexive and transitive and each>_α is asymmetric and transitive. Both _α and>_α increase as α increases but their limits are not complete. A class U_α of utility functions is defined to give F>_αG iff ∫udF>∫udG for all uεU_α. These classes decrease as α increases, and their limit is empty. Similar decreasing classes are defined for each _α, and their limit is essentially the constant functions on (0, b].     

The non-existence of smooth demand in general banach spaces

We study the questions of existence and smoothness of demand functions with an infinite number of commodities. The main result obtained, under some hypothesis, is: if a C¹ demand exists in a commodity space B, then B can be given an inner product structure. For example, if B is L_p, 1p∞, and if there exists a C¹ demand function defined on B then p must be 2. Another result is: if a demand function exists, defined for all prices p and income, then the commodity space must be reflexive. For example, if B is L_p and a demand function exists on B, defined for all prices and incomes then 1<p<∞. We also study the cases L_∞ and L₁ with weaker assumptions. We finish the paper proving that the demand function is always defined for a dense set of prices and convenient incomes.     

The optimal consumption function in a Brownian model of accumulation Part A: The consumption function as solution of a boundary value problem

We consider a neo-classical model of optimal economic growth with c.r.r.a. utility in which the traditional deterministic trends representing population growth, technological progress, depreciation and impatience are replaced by Brownian motions with drift. When transformed to ‘intensive’ units, this is equivalent to a stochastic model of optimal saving with diminishing returns to capital. For the intensive model, we give sufficient conditions for optimality of a consumption plan (open-loop control) comprising a finite welfare condition, a martingale condition for shadow prices and a transversality condition as t→∞. We then replace these by conditions for optimality of a plan generated by a consumption function (closed-loop control), i.e. a function expressing log-consumption as a time-invariant, deterministic function of log-capital . Making use of the exponential martingale formula we replace the martingale condition by a non-linear, non-autonomous second-order o.d.e. which an optimal consumption function must satisfy; this has the form , where . Economic considerations suggest certain limiting values which and should satisfy as , thus defining a two-point boundary value problem (b.v.p.) — or rather, a family of problems, depending on the values of parameters. We prove two theorems showing that a consumption function which solves the appropriate b.v.p. generates an optimal plan. Proofs that a unique solution of each b.v.p. exists are given in a separate paper (Part B).     

Stochastic processes of temporary equilibria

It is the aim of the paper to study within the framework of an ‘overlapping generation model’ the evolution of temporary equilibria. At date t, there are ‘newborn’ agents and ‘old’ agents who were born in previous periods; the old agents hold cash balances (fiat money) that they carried over from the previous period. At the beginning of period t, all agents receive a random endowment of consumption goods. Then the agents exchange these endowments and money on spot markets at date t (trading in future markets is not considered). Once a temporary equilibrium is reached, the economy move to the next date. Agents who were born at date t then become old and meet agents born at period t+1.It is shown that the evolution of temporary equilibria in this model leads to analyse the ergodic properties of a certain class of Markov processes with stationary transition probability.     

Approximation of convex preferences

It is shown geometrically that a monotone concave preference order can be approximated by orders representable by a concave utility function. This is applied to proving that preferences with ‘desirable’ properties (such as inducing smooth excess demand functions, analyticity, strict convexity) are dense.     

The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and analysis

This paper systematically reviews empirical studies looking at the effectiveness of the Delphi technique, and provides a critique of this research. Findings suggest that Delphi groups outperform statistical groups (by 12 studies to two with two ‘ties’) and standard interacting groups (by five studies to one with two ‘ties’), although there is no consistent evidence that the technique outperforms other structured group procedures. However, important differences exist between the typical laboratory version of the technique and the original concept of Delphi, which make generalisations about ‘Delphi’ per se difficult. These differences derive from a lack of control of important group, task, and technique characteristics (such as the relative level of panellist expertise and the nature of feedback used). Indeed, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that a Delphi conducted according to ‘ideal’ specifications might perform better than the standard laboratory interpretations. It is concluded that a different focus of research is required to answer questions on Delphi effectiveness, focusing on an analysis of the process of judgment change within nominal groups.     

A theory of formal conceptual definitions: developing theory-building measurement instruments

This study develops the need for formal conceptual definitions (sometimes called nominal definitions) and how to develop better measurement instruments for theory-building. It develops the underlying theory for ‘good’ formal conceptual definitions by defining terms, demonstrating that formal conceptual definitions are needed for all theory-building empirical research, explains how and why ‘good’ formal conceptual definitions are used to develop properties and their measures, and last, it logically explains that good formal conceptual definitions are necessary conditions for construct validity (content validity, criterion validity, convergent validity, and discriminant validity) while statistical tests are sufficient conditions for validity. This theory development explains why formal conceptual definitions are necessary before any traditional statistical empirical validity tests are performed. This study suggests that any statistical validity tests are not meaningful if the concept is not formally defined.In short, the theory of formal conceptual definitions provides a structure to develop ‘good’ measures of the formal theory that leads to ‘good’ empirical theory-building.     

Dynamic programming for non-additive stochastic objectives

We derive the existence of an optimum and the techniques of dynamic programming for non-additive stochastic objectives. Our key assumption for non-negative objectives is that asymptotic impatience exceeds asymptotic ‘mean’ growth, where ‘mean’ growth is derived not only from intertemporal inelasticity and the random return on investment but also from the curvature of the non-additive stochastic aggregator (i.e. the ‘certainty equivalent’). We provide broad families of new, interesting, and tractable examples. They illustrate that ‘mean’ growth can exist even when the distribution of returns has unbounded support, that power discounting often implies infinite asymptotic impatience, and that non-positive objectives are easily handled with few restrictions on growth.     

Representing preferences with nontransitive indifference by a single real-valued function

Let be an interval order on a topological space (X, τ), and let x _˜^* y if and only if [y z x z], and x _˜^** y if and only if [z x z y]. Then _˜^* and _˜^** are complete preorders. In the particular case when is a semiorder, let x _˜⁰ y if and only if x _˜^* y and x _˜^** y. Then _˜⁰ is a complete preorder, too. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of continuous utility functions representing _˜^*, _˜^** and _˜⁰, by using the notion of strong separability of a preference relation, which was introduced by Chateauneuf (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1987, 16, 139–146). Finally, we discuss the existence of a pair of continuous functions u, υ representing a strongly separable interval order on a measurable topological space (X, τ, μ, ).     

Self-organized criticality in evolutionary systems with local interaction

This paper studies a stylized model of local interaction where agents choose from an ever increasing set of vertically ranked actions, e.g. technologies. The driving forces of the model are infrequent upward shifts (‘updates’), followed by a rapid process of local imitation (‘diffusion’). Our main focus is on the regularities displayed by the long-run distribution of diffusion waves and their implication on the performance of the system. By integrating analytical techniques and numerical simulations, we come to the following two main conclusions. (1) If non-coordination costs are sufficiently high, the system behaves critically, in the sense customarily used in physics. (2) The performance of the system is optimal at the frontier of the critical region. Heuristically, this may be interpreted as an indication that (performance-sensitive) evolutionary forces induce the system to be placed ‘at the edge of order and chaos’.     

A continuity property for local price adjustment mechanisms

This paper makes a case that a (local) continuity property is a reasonable one for any local price adjustment mechanism. This property means that if the starting points (i.e., initial prices) of the adjustment process are ‘close' to one another, and if the characteristics of the economies are ‘close' to one another, then, given any price adjustment mechanism, agents should compute equilibria that are ‘close' to one another. Under preferences which satisfy a ‘surjectivity hypothesis', it is shown that the tâtonnement process satisfies this continuity property on a nice subset of the space of all economies. A characterization of these economies for which the tâtonnement process is locally stable is given. Chart logic is a useful way to think about the path dependent property of implied volatility and about the relationship between implied volatility and historical volatility.     

Innovativeness and involvement as determinants of website loyalty: II. Determinants of consumer loyalty in B2C e-commerce

This paper is the second of the series of studies entitled “Innovativeness and Involvement as Determinants of Website Loyalty”, which was designed to test Foxall's [(1995). Cognitive styles of consumer initiators. Technovation 15(5), 269–288] style/involvement model in the context of Internet buyer behaviours. In this paper, a consumer Website loyalty model was proposed to describe how consumer transfer their existing brand loyalty in the traditional retail market to the same brand's Website in the B2C e-commerce market and how their perceived risk at the brand's Website mediates this loyalty transformation. Data were collected via an email invitation and Web-based questionnaire. One thousand and fourty four Taiwan Internet buyers randomly selected from the database of a well-known brand's Website have completed the survey. The multiple regression technique indicated the robustness of this loyalty transformation model (adjusted R²=0.50). Findings further indicated the impact that consumers’ cognitive style/involvement have on their loyalty transformation model. After segmenting consumers via their DSI and PDI scores, the distinct loyalty transformation models are revealed: the adjusted R² of more-involved innovators’ loyalty transformation model was the highest (0.60), followed by more involved adaptors’ model (0.45), less involved innovators’ model (0.45), and finally, less involved adaptors’ model (0.42). Discussions of how consumers’ cognitive style and involvement level interact with each other and impact on the predictors of the Website loyalty are discussed. Proposals are made of how Website managers can use this knowledge to build marketing strategies.     

When does coordination pay?

In a continuous-time model of two symmetric open economies, with a floating exchange rate, we find that the pay-off to macroeconomic policy coordination depends systematically on how heterogeneous is their inflation experience. While monetary policy coordination improves welfare in handling a common rate of underlying inflation, it exacerbates the ‘time consistency’ problem arising when there are differences (as is illustrated diagrammatically). Since the principle of ‘certainty equivalence’ applies to time-consistent policy in linear quadratic models, we are also able to give a stochastic interpretation of the deterministic results.     

On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets

The class of games without side payments obtainable from finite trader markets having possibly infinite dimensional commodity spaces, individual compact, convex consumption and production sets, and concave upper-semicontinuous utility functions is considered. It is shown that these market games are precisely the totally balanced games. In fact, each totally balanced game is shown to have both a finite commodity representation and an infinite commodity ‘simple’ representation.