The not so dark side of trust: Does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?

This paper reports a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust, in a sample of countries, both developed and developing. That relationship is robust to controlling for a large set of economic, policy, and institutional variables, to changing the estimate of the shadow economy and the estimation period, and to controlling for endogeneity. It is independent from trust in institutions and from income inequality, and is mainly present in the sample of developing countries. Those findings suggest that the tax compliance effect of trust dominates its role as a substitute for the formal legal system.     

A century of economic growth in Latin America

This paper makes a contribution to the study of economic growth in developing countries by analyzing the six largest Latin American economies over 105 years within a two-equation framework. Confirming previous findings, physical and human capital prove to be key determinants of GDP per head growth. However, a more controversial result is an overall negative conditional correlation between trade openness and GDP per head growth — though openness has a positive link via investment. The evidence also shows that macroeconomic instability has been a drag on long-term growth in the region.     

Trade, technology transfer and national efficiency in developing countries

This paper simultaneously explores the determinants of the developing countries’ production frontier and these countries’ ‘efficiency’ in using the available resources and technology. In doing so it allows for the transfer of (industrial country) technology in determining the frontier and for international trade's influence on absorptive capacity and national efficiency levels. Stochastic frontier analysis is used to model the production frontier for 57 developing countries for the period 1970-1998, to measure cross-country and temporal differences in efficiency levels and to explain the differences in efficiency levels. The results indicate significant differences in efficiency levels across countries and regions and movement over time, and an important influence of trade and trade policy in raising output both through technology improvements embodied in imported capital goods and by inducing efficiency improvements.     

Distribution and development in a model of misgovernance

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development.     

Capability and opportunism: Evidence from city officials in China

Opportunism is prevalent in political competition and public policy making. This paper investigates how opportunism is mitigated by capabilities among city leaders in China. Taking advantage of China’s institutional setup with ample bureaucratic transfers, the paper estimates leaders’ capabilities as their personal contributions to local economic growth. The paper finds strong evidence of political business cycles – a typical form of political opportunism – as manifested by a significant boost in the growth rate preceding the Communist Party’s national congress. However, more capable leaders are found to generate more modest political business cycles than less capable ones do. The findings suggest that, to the extent that political selections are associated with the long term reputation of officials, career-concerned opportunism is at least partially moderated by the selection of capable officials in China. The paper provides supportive evidence for the reputation model of political business cycles as well as enriches the study of government officials in weak institutional environments.     

Democratization is the driving force for technological and economic change

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between democratization and technological innovation. In primis, the paper shows, through economic history, that democratization is an antecedent process (cause) to technological and economic change (effect). In particular, the primary finding is that democratization is a driving force for technological change: most free countries, measured with liberal, participatory, and constitutional democracy indices, have a higher level of technology than less free and more autocratic countries. In fact, “democracy richness” generates a higher rate of technological innovation with fruitful effects for the wellbeing and wealth of nations. These findings and predictions lead to the conclusion that policy makers need to be cognizant of positive associations between democratization and technological innovation paths in order to support the modern economic growth and future technological progress of countries.     

Former Communist party membership and bribery in the post-socialist countries

We study the effect of former Communist party membership on paying bribes to public officials and motivations for bribery, 25 years after the fall of communist rule. Data come from a large representative survey, conducted in post-socialist countries in 2015/16. To deal with endogeneity, we instrument party membership with information on whether family members were affected by the Second World War. Instrumental variable results suggest that links to the former Communist party increase the likelihood of paying bribes today; this result applies to the former party members as well as their children and relatives. Among bribe payers, people with the party links are more likely to offer bribes as well as think that bribe payments are expected. Overall, our findings suggest that the proclivity to corruption of the former Communist party members has been transmitted through family and thus sustained over time, contributing to corruption decades after the demise of the Socialist bloc.     

The role of the government in financial sector development

This study examines the impact of two dimensions of the government, namely, size and quality, on two dimensions of the financial sector, size and efficiency, in a cross section of 71 economies. The study finds that increased quality of the government as measured by governance and legal origin positively influences both financial sector size and efficiency. The size of the government proxied by government expenditure and the government ownership of banks has a negative effect on financial sector efficiency, and a positive impact on financial sector size, particularly in the low income economies.     

Globalization and growth in the low income African countries with the extreme bounds analysis

The relationship between globalization and economic growth, especially in the poorer developing countries, is controversial. Previous studies have used single globalization indicators such as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. This paper uses a comprehensive measure of a globalization of Dreher (2006), which is based on measures of globalization of the economic, social and political sectors. Panel data estimates with data of 21 low income African countries show a small but significant positive permanent growth effects. The sensitivity of this growth effect is examined with the extreme bounds analysis (EBA). Contrary to the findings by Levine and Renelt (1992) that cross-country growth relationships are fragile, the effects of globalization and some other determinants of the long run growth rate are found to be robust by EBA.     

Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated group, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats want to create such parties, and we predict that private investment and governance will be stronger in their presence. We illustrate the model by examining the institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party.     

Public sector motivation and development failures

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the relationship between public sector motivation and development. In the model the public sector produces a public good and workers are heterogeneous in terms of public sector motivation (PSM). Wages in the private sector increase with the quality of the public good. In this context, public sector wage premia (PSWP) have two opposite effects: low PSWP helps screen workers with PSM into the public sector, while high PSWP helps motivate workers to be honest. Raising PSWP may not improve the quality of governance and multiple equilibria might arise. The model highlights that the relative importance of workers selection and provision of ”on the job” incentives in the public sector varies in systematic ways with wages in the private sector. We provide anecdotal and original empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions and discuss some policy implications for public sector reforms in developing countries.     

Viewpoint: From cities to productivity and growth in developing countries

Abstract.  This paper reviews the evidence about the effects of urbanization and cities on productivity and economic growth in developing countries using a consistent theoretical framework. As in developed economies, there is strong evidence that cities in developing countries bolster productive efficiency. Regarding whether cities promote self-sustained growth, the evidence is suggestive but ultimately inconclusive. These findings imply that the traditional agenda of aiming to raise within-city efficiency should be continued. Furthermore, reducing the obstacles to the reallocation of factors across cities is also desirable.     

The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in Africa

In this paper we propose estimates of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) in 38 African countries. We develop a simple general equilibrium model that can handle taxes on five major tax classes, and can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data. A key feature of our model is the explicit recognition of the informal economy. Our base case estimate of the average MCF from marginal increases in all five tax instruments is 1.2. Focusing on the lowest cost tax instruments in each country, commonly the VAT but not always, the average MCF is 1.1. Finally extending the tax base to include sections of the informal economy by removing some tax exemptions offers the potential for a low MCF source of public funds, and a lowering of MCFs on other tax instruments.     

Social security and economic integration

This letter analyzes the impact of economic integration on capital accumulation and capital flows when countries differ in their social security systems. Funding and early retirement both foster capital accumulation relative to pay-as-you-go pensions with flexible retirement. When economies integrate, both imply capital outflow possibly resulting in utility losses.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.     

Tax evasion in transition: Outcome of an institutional clash? Testing Feige's conjecture in Albania

A field survey of households was conducted in Tirana, Albania in 2000. A response rate of 89.3% yielded 1.340 valid questionnaires, allowing me to test Feige's (In: Nelson, J.M., Tilley, C., Walker, L. (Eds.), Transforming Post-communist Political Economics. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, p. 21) conjecture that more tax evasion will be observed, when formal and informal institutions clash. Respondents’ attitudes towards formal and informal institutions were obtained by applying factor analysis to their responses to a series of attitudinal questions. The theoretical importance of the interaction between formal and informal institutions in determining tax evasion finds empirical support in the data.     

How foreign direct investment promote institutional quality: Evidence from Vietnam

Using a unique dataset from a provincial competitiveness survey and the rising foreign direct investment (FDI) from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), I find that variations in economic institutions across the provinces of Vietnam are associated with the flow of foreign investment. To overcome endogeneity problems, I use the minimum distance from each province to a main economic centre as an instrument for foreign investment inflows. The instrumental variable approach shows that the direction of influence is from greater foreign investment to better institutions. These results hold after controlling for various additional covariates, and are also robust to various alternative measures of institutions. I also find that foreign direct investment has greater short-term impacts on institutional quality in the northern provinces.     

Inflation and economic growth in Latin America: Some panel time-series evidence

In this paper we investigate the role of macroeconomic performance, mainly in terms of rates of inflation, in determining economic growth in four Latin American countries which suffered hyperinflationary bursts in the 1980s and early 1990s, but that also differ in terms of development levels. The data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and the empirical results, based on panel time-series data and analysis, confirm the anecdotal evidence which suggests that inflation has had a detrimental effect to growth in the region. All in all, we highlight the fact that excessive inflation has clearly offset the Mundell–Tobin effect and consequently the high costs that inflation has had on economic activity in the region.