SOCIALLY OPTIMAL CRIMINAL COURT WAITING TIMES: A PARTIAL INVESTIGATION

Criminal courts provide a forum for conducting prosecutions with a guilty plea or a trial. Since queues are used as the basis for rationing scarce court facilities delays are inevitable, however courts are invariably criticised as being inefficient as a consequence. This focus on court delay defined as the time elapsing between the listing of the case in the court list and its final disposition is misleading. Rather, attention should be drawn to the considerably longer period between the initiation of proceedings and the conclusion of the case. In the case of defendants not granted bail, this pre-trial delay confers both costs and benefits on society and this observation can be used to ascertain socially optimal pre-trial waits.     

The British and American Rules: an Experimental Examination of Pre-trial Bargaining in the Shadowof the Law

A commonly held view is that the frequency and value of pre-trial settlements in civil disputes are greatly influenced by the cost allocation regime that is in place if the case goes to trial. There is a large and growing theoretical literature on this subject but almost no empirical evidence. This is due simply to the scarcity of relevant data owing to the confidentiality generally associated with such matters. However, the area is an ideal one to analyse experimentally. In this paper we consider the effect of the British and American rules for cost allocation using such an experimental methodology. We find that the two rules produce no difference in the frequency of pre-trial settlements but that the British rule produces higher settlements (pro-pursuer) if the probability of the pursuer winning is large.     

The impact of the judicial objective function on the enforcement of environmental standards

We investigate the influence of a judge’s objective function on the type of sanctions used for enforcing environmental standards. We focus on the difference between monetary and non-monetary penalties. We examine the extent to which judges take social costs of sanctions into account when making judgments in court in the context of environmental violations. We also conduct an empirical analysis to test the main findings of the theoretical model using court data from several Belgian jurisdictions. We find that besides minimizing environmental damages judges also take social costs of sanctions into account in their decision-making.     

Legal Doctrine and Political Control

We model legal doctrine as an instrument of political controlby higher courts over lower courts and the case outcomes theyproduce. We focus on the choice between determinate and indeterminatedoctrines within a hierarchy of courts where political–ideologicalalignment between lower and higher courts varies. We show thatthe choice over doctrinal determinacy depends on the distributionof cases, the distribution of litigants, judicial types, andthe level of policy alignment between higher and lower courtjudges. The model suggests the optimal doctrinal choice fora high court, given the political–ideological alignmentbetween the high court and the lower court, the control characteristicsof doctrines themselves, and the matching of doctrines to litigantpools. This has implications regarding preference divergencewithin the judicial hierarchy, the interaction of differentdoctrines, and interplay between doctrinal specificity and doctrinalreach.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

制度跃迁视角下知识产权审判专门化与企业创新

企业创新离不开制度支持,但现有关于制度影响企业创新的研究主要基于组织合法性理论,并以静态的制度框架为出发点。从诺思制度变迁理论视角,探讨动态的制度变迁环境如何影响企业创新,以2014年中国知识产权审判专门化改革为背景事件,构建准自然实验,研究发现：改革所建立的知识产权法院是制度变迁过程中一次典型的制度跃迁,对于企业创新绩效具有显著提升作用;在异质性检验中发现,知识产权法院的建立显著增加民营企业和高科技企业的实质性创新成果,北京知识产权法院的建立对于企业创新绩效的提升作用更显著;在机制检验中发现,知识产权法院的建立能够缓解企业融资约束,增强企业创新意愿,从而提升企业创新绩效。从诺思制度变迁理论视角解读中国从法制到法治建设的制度变迁过程及其影响,为推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化提供参考。     

Regulatory chill and the effect of investor state dispute settlements

Legal conflicts between multinational firms and host governments are often decided by international arbitration panels—as opposed to courts in the host country—because of provisions in international investment agreements known as investor state dispute settlements (ISDS). Critics fear that investor protection such as ISDS make governments reluctant to adopt appropriate policies (regulatory chill). In this paper I develop a theoretical model in which the outcome of cases brought to court is uncertain owing to the vagueness of the law protecting investors and a court's inability to correctly identify a state of nature with certainty. I show that from a world welfare perspective there is no underregulation, only an overregulation problem. However, from a national welfare perspective “frivolous” lawsuits may lead to regulatory chill. I also identify conditions under which ISDS can lead to a Pareto improvement that involves simultaneous changes in compensation payments and protection rights relative to a national court.     

Informality in an economy with active labour courts

Job regulations and the justice branch interfere on several aspects of labour contracts. We build a model which explores the role of labour courts on the wage distribution in both formal and informal sectors. We obtain that the presence of active labour courts produces a negative relation between the wage gap and the productivity of the worker, a regularity documented in the empirical literature. Active labour courts also reduce informality of unskilled workers but do not have an impact on informality of skilled workers. Some elements and implications of our model are tested using Brazilian data.     

Delegation in a multi-tier court system: Are remands in the U.S. federal courts driven by moral hazard?

Appellate judges face a trade-off when deciding whether to remand cases: delegating the decision power enables to transfer effort costs to the lower court, but may be costly in terms of ideological preferences and reputation costs. Our empirical analysis of federal cases reveals that this trade-off creates a ‘Subsequent Remand Effect’: cases remanded by the Supreme Court to appellate courts are far more likely to be subsequently remanded to district courts, compared to other cases. This effect varies with judicial ideologies, suggesting that the tendency to (subsequently) remand might be driven by moral hazard problems rather than case-relevant attributes.     

Authoritarian transparency: China's missing cases in court disclosure

The question whether authoritarian regimes use transparency initiatives to improve public governance or only to perform window dressing remains open. To address it, we examine a recently promulgated transparency policy in China that mandates public access to all judicial opinions. We find that local courts fail to disclose more than 60% of their opinions in corporate litigation cases, measured against a baseline of publicly listed firms’ disclosure of their litigation, as required and enforced by the securities regulations. Instead of upholding judicial fairness, local courts disclose cases selectively, displaying favoritism and responding to private incentives. Courts are more likely to suppress the publication of their opinions when the firm involved in the litigation is state-owned or is the defendant in its home court, especially in the year before the promotion of the provincial party secretary. We also find that firms whose cases are disclosed by the courts undergo adverse economic consequences, signaling that they have fallen out of favor with the government.     

How German Labor Courts Decide: An Econometric Case Study

Abstract. Courts are an important element in the institutional framework of labor markets, often determining the degree of employment protection. German labor courts provide a vivid example in this regard. However, we know relatively little about court behavior. A unique dataset on German labor court verdicts reveals that social and other criteria like employee characteristics, the type of job, local labor market conditions and court composition influence court decisions. At least as striking is that workers' chances to win depend on where and when their cases are filed. This generates considerable ex ante uncertainty about outcomes.     

Civil Conflict,Democratization, and Growth: Violent Democratization as Critical Juncture

In this paper, we provide an empirical investigation of the interaction between violent conflicts, democratization, and growth in the “third wave” of democratization. The effect of democratization is weakened when taking into account the incidence of civil conflict. The results show that the growth effect of democratization is heterogeneous and depends on the democratization scenario. Peaceful transitions to democracy have a significant positive effect on growth that is even larger than reported previously in the literature, whereas violent transitions have no, or even negative, growth effects.     

Courts,scheduled damages,and medical malpractice insurance

We study how the functioning of the judicial system affects the availability and affordability of medical liability insurance, as proxied by the number of insurers and the premiums paid. We use two unique datasets collected in Italy from 2000 to 2010. Using the first dataset—insurance contracts for hospitals—we estimate the average treatment effect of schedules on insurers and premiums paid, conditional on judicial efficiency and proxied by different measures. Our identification rests on the partial overlap between healthcare districts and judicial districts, meaning that the caseload of a court and malpractice events at the healthcare provider level are not perfectly correlated. On average, the adoption of schedules does not produce any significant effect on insurers or on premiums paid. However, adopting schedules has a robust and significant effect on the number of insurers, but only in inefficient courts. We further investigate these findings using a second dataset comprising 17,578 malpractice insurance claims. We find evidence of a composition effect among claims that is triggered by higher levels of judicial inefficiency: As a court’s inefficiency increases, the likelihood for a case to not be decided on the merits decreases and the levels of reserve and recovery per claim decrease.     

Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance

Disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court. A simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation, thereby inducing sellers to delay contract delivery. By using a large dataset on Italian public procurement, we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance. Where courts are inefficient, we find the following: public works are delivered with longer delays; delays increase for more valuable contracts; contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers; and a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery. Other interpretations receive less support from the data.     

Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems

This paper aims to understand why common law countries have more developed financial markets than civil law countries. One difference between these two legal origins is the procedure of evidence collection for a trial: It is adversarial in common law and inquisitorial in civil law. The adversarial system delegates the collection of evidence to a larger extent to lawyers than the inquisitorial system does. The paper presents a model of law and finance in which investors use courts to enforce their financial contracts with entrepreneurs. Investors are willing to lend more if courts collect evidence more efficiently. Financial markets are more developed in the adversarial than in the inquisitorial system if investors are richer than entrepreneurs or if lawyers are more productive than judges. Manipulation of evidence by lawyers has an ambiguous impact on finance.     

Bargaining over Interconnection: The Clear-Telecom Dispute

We explore the problem of network interconnection in local telecommunications. We develop a model with a competitive business sector and a regulated residential sector. The model is used to analyze the celebrated New Zealand antitrust case between Clear and Telecom. We discuss implications of the model for the economics of antitrust, including issues of competition versus efficiency and the use of appropriate economic models. We also examine the implications of some proposed rules for interconnection. In particular, we examine reciprocity, 'bill and keep', and the rule that the courts ultimately endorsed, the Baumol-Willig rule.     

Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon

Ipresent a simple model to examine the structure of credible post-conflictpower–sharing agreements. I first show that power–sharingis necessary to induce warring factions to choose democraticrule over the status-quo. When warring factions have commitmentproblems, I show that the agreements require a restructuringof the coercive institutions of the state. The theoretical resultsare supported by a wide ranging empirical study by Hartzell (1999)on the stability of negotiated settlements of civil wars foughtduring the post World War II era. I illustrate the results withcase studies on Lebanon and South Africa.     

Reputation,Social Identity and Social Conflict

We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced‐form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both rational players and behavioral players. Behavioral players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the behavioral player is motivated by the social identity literature. For rational players, group membership has no payoff‐relevant consequences. We show that rational players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Our paper relates to the empirical literature which finds that social heterogeneity tends to be increasing in economic variables which we interpret as indicating inefficiency. We provide an explanation that, as social groups compete for surplus, disagreement and inefficiency can result. Our work also relates to the social conflict literature, which examines the relationship between macro level factors such as unemployment and civil disturbances. This literature finds that the amount of social conflict tends to be increasing in the inequitability of the environment.     

Courts and Firm Investments in Real Property

The legal environment and rule of law are important for business, but existing studies often treat rule of law holistically. This article examines the role of courts, specifically the speed of court decisions, the enforcement of edicts, and the impartiality of decision-making as perceived by firms of various sizes, and the impact this has on firm investments in real property. The article analyzes a panel of 6,300 firms from 27 countries in the period from 2002 to 2009 to find that (i) firm size affects perceptions positively, while (ii) paying bribes affects perceptions negatively. At the same time, (iii) a firm’s connections to the government have no apparent impact. More importantly, while all three components have a positive correlation with the amount firms invest in land and machinery, the speed of courts has the greatest significance and the highest marginal effect. Firms perceiving courts to be quick invest nearly four times as much as the average real property investment. This finding suggests that policymakers should focus on reducing backlogs in the court system, perhaps by encouraging more arbitration or staffing more clerks.     

Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement

We consider the supplier’s strategic choice on delivery time in a public procurement setting as the result of the firm’s opportunistic behavior on the optimal investment timing when production costs are uncertain. We model the supplier’s trade-off between the option value to defer the contract execution and the penalty payment in the event of delays. We also take into account the issue of penalty enforcement, which in turn depends on both the discretion of the court of law in voiding contractual clauses and the “efficiency” of the judicial system (i.e. the average length of civil trials). We test our main results on Italian public procurement data showing that the supplier’s incentive to delay is greater the higher the volatility of production costs and the lower the “efficiency” of the judicial system. We then calibrate the model using parameters that mimic the Italian scenario on public works procurement and calculate the maximum amount that a supplier is “willing to pay” (per day) to postpone the delivery date and infringe the contract provisions. Our calibration results are consistent with the theoretical model’s predictions and the empirical findings.