Board of Director Quality and Firm Performance

This paper aims to shed light on the relationship between the quality of the individuals on a firm's board of directors and performance. It reports the results of an empirical study of a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. The findings suggest that quality boards, as measured by the average number of board seats held by each director, are associated with quality firms, as measured by both accounting and market performance.     

Corporate boards and ownership structure: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

This study examines the relationship between board structure and ownership structure for firms listed on the stock exchanges of twelve Sub-Saharan African countries, using data for the period 2006–2009. We find that ownership concentration, foreign ownership and managerial ownership are negatively associated with board size. We also find that government ownership is positively associated with the proportion of outside directors while ownership concentration is negatively associated with the proportion of outside directors. These results emphasize that board and ownership structure are both corporate governance mechanisms that are used as substitutes to one another in reducing agency problems.     

The Influence Of Board Diversity On Company Performance Of South African Companies

A board of directors forms one of the pillars of a robust corporate governance framework. Board diversity can offer both challenges and opportunities for a company. In this article we investigate whether diversity of a board influences company performance as well as the change in company performance for the Top 100 South African companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange in 2013–2015. Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets are used as performance measures. Our findings show that the proportion of women on a board, the number of directors with a business qualification and board size are significantly positively related with the performance of South African companies, whereas the ethnic diversity of a board is significantly negatively related with the performance of South African companies.     

Board diversity and firm performance: The role of business group affiliation

There is little consensus globally on the relationship between board diversity and firm performance. Using the resource dependence and agency views, this paper examines how business group affiliation influences the relationship between board diversity and firm performance as a contextual/confounding factor. Based on data for listed firms in India, we find that board demographic diversity is positively associated with the firm performance (Tobin’s Q) of standalone firms, but this association is negative for group-affiliated firms. This negative effect of group affiliation is confirmed in a test based on a novel measure of firm performance using the stock market reaction to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions. For both measures of performance, we show that business group affiliation impairs the positive firm value effects of board demographic diversity. These findings imply that the relationship between board diversity and firm performance requires re-examination in the many countries where group affiliation is common. Our results also provide evidence of a new cost of group affiliation and show in a fresh context that cross-country studies should account for international variations in ownership and institutional structures.     

Dollars and sense: The implications of CEO compensation for organizational performance

Crafting a compensation package for an organization's chief executive officer (CEO) that will help the firm maximize its performance is a vexing challenge for a board of directors. Management theory offers boards several practical hints. A board can put its CEO and the firm in the best position to be successful by (1) creating strong incentives for the CEO to act in the firm's best interest at all times; (2) benchmarking a CEO's performance and compensation relative to that of very high performing CEOs in the industry; (3) diagnosing and responding to CEOs’ feelings about equity relative to their peers; (4) paying a CEO with uniquely valuable knowledge, skills, and ability at the top of the market; (5) offering retention incentives if a proven performer with unique skills is leading a company; (6) resisting the temptation to simply mimic the compensation packages that work for leading firms; and (7) considering candidates’ social ties when recruiting a new CEO.     

Corporate governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical study

Using the agency and institutional perspectives, this study advances several hypotheses about the board structure–firm performance relationship within Russia. We tested these hypotheses using survey data. Despite a relatively small sample size, predictions from both theoretical perspectives were supported. Specifically, we found a negative relationship between “informal” CEO duality and firm performance. This finding is noteworthy given the 1996 Russian Federal law which prohibits the CEO from also serving as board chair. Also, we found that the more vigorously the firm pursues a retrenchment strategy, the more negative the relationship between proportion of inside directors and firm performance. Overall, these findings suggest that effective corporate governance may be essential to firm performance in Russia.     

Gender and ethnic diversity on boards and corporate information environment

Prior studies argue that demographic diversity on a firm's board impacts its information environment, yet there is limited empirical evidence regarding the relation between board diversity and corporate opacity. We extend this line of research by examining whether gender and ethnic diversity of directors impacts corporate opacity. Using a Herfindahl Index based on directors' gender and ethnicities to measure board diversity, and an opacity index based on analyst following, analyst forecast error, bid–ask spread, and share turnover to measure corporate opacity, we find that board diversity is negatively associated with corporate opacity. Our results are robust to alternative measures of board diversity and the various tests we employ to address potential endogeneity concerns.     

Business groups and profit redistribution: A boon or bane for firms?

This article examines the phenomenon of profit redistribution in Indian business groups and relates redistribution with the underperformance of group-affiliated firms relative to unaffiliated firms. The study also documents that profit redistribution is more pronounced in groups of large sizes and high levels of corporate control. The relative underperformance of affiliated firms persists even after controlling for other explanations such as corporate diversification and resource transfers to unlisted firms. The empirical results of the study lend support for the inefficient profit redistribution explanation of the “business group discount”.     

Board experience and value creation in cross-border acquisitions: The role of acquirer and target country institutions

Our study investigates the effects of board acquisition experience on value creation in cross-border acquisitions and the dependence of this relationship on acquirer and target country institutions. We draw on cross-border acquisition research and institution-based corporate governance research to argue that the effect of board acquisition experience depends on the institutional characteristics of the acquirer and target countries and on cultural differences between these two countries. Based on 1775 cross-border acquisitions of U.S. and European acquirers, we show a positive effect of board acquisition experience on the announcement returns of cross-border acquisitions, which is even stronger when the target country’s takeover regulations are less friendly and when the target and acquirer countries are culturally more distant.     

Corporate governance in publicly traded small firms: A study of Canadian venture exchange companies

Most evidence regarding the determinants and effects of corporate governance practices is based on large firms. Herein, we explore these issues in the context of small publicly traded Canadian companies. We exploit the fact that such firms were not subject to corporate governance guidelines prior to 2005 and thus analyze the determinants of voluntary governance practice choices, as well as the effects of those practices on firm performance. Using a unique data set, we construct a corporate governance index for each firm. We measure performance by two variables: quality of accounting earnings and financial performance. The results indicate that corporate governance does matter for smaller traded Canadian firms. We find that both accounting and financial performance are positively related to corporate governance; however, their underlying mechanisms may differ somewhat. Given this result, it would be natural to expect all firms to choose higher levels of governance. However, our results also suggest small firms face resource constraints that limit their choices. We conclude that good governance is an important driver of small firm performance that cannot be neglected by the owners and managers of these firms.     

Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Turkey

This is a study of the relationship between context, internal corporate governance and firm performance, looking at the case of Turkey, an exemplar of family capitalism. We found more concentrated ownership, often in the hands of families, led to firms performing better; concentrated ownership means that controlling families bear more of the risks of poor performance. Less predictably, given that the institutional environment is so well attuned to family ownership, we found that mechanisms that accord room for a greater range of voices and interests within and beyond families – larger boards and foreign ownership stakes – seem to also make for positive performance effects. We also noted that increase in cross ownership did not influence market performance, but was negatively associated with accounting performance. Conversely, we found that a higher proportion of family members on boards had no discernable effect on performance. Our findings provide further insights on the relationship between the type of institutions encountered in many emerging markets, internal corporate governance configurations and firm performance.     

The Effect of Board Size and Composition on the Efficiency of UK Banks

We examine a sample of 17 banking institutions operating in the UK between 2001 and 2006 to provide empirical evidence on the association between the efficiency of UK banks and board structure, namely board size and composition. Our approach is to use data envelopment analysis to estimate several measures of the efficiency of banks, and then to use panel data regressions for investigating the impact of board structure on efficiency. After controlling for bank size and capital strength, we find some evidence of a positive association between board size and efficiency, although this is not robust across all our specifications. Board composition, by contrast, has a robustly significant and positive impact on all measures of efficiency.     

Women in top management and agency costs

This study investigates gender diversity among the top managers of Fortune 500 firms and its effect on agency costs. The study finds that firms with a greater percentage of female officers present lower agency costs but that the negative relation is not robust when considering the endogeneity of diversity. The study also finds that external governance influences the relationship. Although increasing diversity does not reduce agency costs for all firms, the evidence shows that diversity is significantly negatively related to agency costs in firms in less competitive markets. The results suggest that increasing diversity in management can have beneficial effects for firms where strong external governance is absent.     

Board member age,stock seasoning and the evolution of capital structure in Chinese firms

This study examines the evolution of capital structure for Chinese stock issuers over an eleven-year period, stretching three years pre- to eight years post-listing. The paper scrutinizes the role of a key demographic in this seasoning process: The age of board officers. The present study’s key postulate is that board age proxies for a firm’s growth options. While issuer indebtedness exhibits little to no connection with other board properties, a strong inverse association exists with officer age. Moreover, entities with older boards experience notably smaller contractions in leverage on listing, as well as more subdued upswings post-IPO. Results are congruent with older board firms possessing fewer growth options and raising less capital at IPO. Additionally, study findings suggest that the Global Financial Crisis delayed Chinese firms’ re-leveraging adjustments post-IPO. Finally, changes to leverage at IPO, and in the years thereafter, appear similar for both hot- and cold-market issuers.     

The relationship between ethics and firm practices in Russia and the United States

One of the fundamental objectives of corporate governance is to promote a climate that fosters ethical decision-making. As transitioning economies move toward more transparent and democratic systems the existence of policies, such as codes of ethics, that attempt to monitor and control moral behavior will become increasingly important. The establishment of ethical standards not only encourages trust with potential trade partners but also is likely to cultivate foreign direct investment. In this study, data collected from 112 U.S. and 74 Russian respondents reveal some intriguing patterns across these two diverse economies. Managerial implications and future research directions are also discussed.     

Corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance in China: panel data evidence on listed non financial companies

The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the influence of corporate governance characteristics and corporate ownership concentrations on the financial performance of Chinese companies. This is based on analysis of a panel data set covering the years 2001 to 2005. The characteristics considered are the ratios of independent directors and professional supervisors on the companies' two boards, and the level of concentration in and type of ownership of the companies. Our chosen performance metric is Tobin's Q. We find that ownership concentration in general is a significant factor in determining firm performance. The degree of board independence is significant, but it only appears to have a positive impact on performance in larger companies. The expertise of the supervisory board is not a significant determinant of corporate financial performance in China. Our findings support a continued focus on making improvements to the operation and effectiveness of China's institutions of corporate governance.     

Board Characteristics,Compliance, and Firm Performance: Empirical Findings from Colombia

Using data from a single database of Colombian firms, we confirmed an endogenous relationship between specific board characteristics, compliance with corporate governance guidelines, and firm performance. A board comprising experts without conflicts of interest is more likely to control ethical behavior, implement audit committees, review compliance with accepted accounting standards, and approve and control the firm’s strategic planning, all of which will lead to an improvement in firm results, and engagement and retention of higher quality board members. Conclusions have strong implications for public policy and managerial practice.     

Heterogeneity in business groups and the corporate diversification-firm performance relationship

This article examines how heterogeneous features among business groups influence the corporate diversification-firm performance relationship. The study classifies heterogeneity along three dimensions: group size, group diversity, and share ownership. Using a sample of firms from India, the study finds some evidence that for firms affiliated to larger business groups, corporate diversification enhances firm performance. However, business group diversity does not influence the diversification-performance relationship. The impact of diversification on firm performance differs substantially owing to the heterogeneity in share ownership. The paper documents an interesting interplay between business group and ownership structure.     

The impact of firm strategy and foreign ownership on executive bonus compensation in Japanese firms

Building on information-processing perspectives and the Japanese contextual factors, this study investigates the relationships between firm strategy and executive bonus pay as well as the moderating role of foreign ownership on the strategy-compensation relationship in Japanese firms. We focus on R&D investment and product diversification as strategy variables and investigate their direct effects on executive bonus pay. Further, we examine the moderating effects of foreign ownership on the strategy-pay sensitivity. The results, based on a sample of the 148 largest industrial firms in Japan for the 1990-1997 period, show that both R&D investment and product diversification are positively related to executive bonus pay. Our findings also indicate that foreign ownership negatively moderates the relationships between the strategy variables and executive compensation, suggesting that foreign investors play an active monitoring role, reducing cash bonus payments when their invested firms choose to increase R&D or pursue diversification strategy.     

Corporate governance,ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism

This study analyses the role of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. We study cross-national differences between companies with different level of investor protection. In addition, we account for the type of owner (young family vs. non-young family businesses) and the owner’s relationship with a second significant shareholder (monitoring vs. collusion). When the main owner has effective control over the firm (i.e., absolute control or less than absolute control but without the control of a second significant shareholder), the relation between ownership concentration and firm value is U-shaped. Our findings also suggest that the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for companies with higher investor protection and young family-owned businesses.