Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

We analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition. In the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition, since the poaching activities can be targeted towards (more) creditworthy borrowers. We find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits, and, therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares. Information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market, whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power. Thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets.     

The effects of irreversibility on the timing and intensity of lumpy investment

This paper examines how changes in irreversibility of investment affect the timing and intensity of lumpy investment. We develop a continuous-time model wherein a firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring a partially reversible investment cost at that instant. The amount of the investment cost is directly related to the intensity of investment that is endogenously chosen by the firm at the instant when the investment option is exercised. We show that higher irreversibility of investment induces the firm to raise its optimal investment trigger, thereby deferring the undertaking of the project. Furthermore, we show that changes in irreversibility of investment have no impact on the firm's optimal investment intensity due to two opposing effects that exactly offset each other. Finally, we show that higher irreversibility of investment reduces the value of the investment option and, therefore, makes the firm less valuable.     

Small business lending and credit risk: Granger causality evidence

Because of their opaque nature, SMEs are overly reliant on bank lending. Therefore, we examine whether banks' credit supply to SMEs are affected by their financial conditions. To this end, we employ a Granger causality analysis to examine whether there is an indication of a significant direction of determination between SME lending and non-performing SME loans. The results reveal no bidirectional relationship between SME lending and NPL for the entire banking sector. For Islamic banks, however, we find two-way linkages between these two parameters: a negative causation is running both from SME lending to NPL growth and from NPL to SME lending. Given Islamic banks' deposit-oriented funding practices and their adherence to profit-and-loss sharing principles, this finding suggests the presence of heightened market discipline within the Islamic banking system.     

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. For a special case, we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities. We also find that the uniqueness result in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] is robust to our form of agency, but that the non-uniqueness result in Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123] is not.     

Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico

International migration is costly and initially only the middle class of the wealth distribution may have both the means and incentives to migrate, which can increase inequality in the sending community. However, the migration networks formed lower the costs for future migrants, which can in turn lower inequality. This paper shows both theoretically and empirically that wealth has a nonlinear effect on migration, and then examines the empirical evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and inequality in rural sending communities in Mexico. After instrumenting, we find that the overall impact of migration is to reduce inequality across communities with relatively high levels of past migration. We also find some suggestive evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship among communities with a wider range of migration experiences.     

A comparison of national saving rates in the UK, US and Italy

We develop the approach of Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Sabelhaus [1996. Understanding the postwar decline in US saving: A cohort analysis. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0, 315-390], based on the life-cycle model of savings, to decompose the differences in the national saving rates between the UK, US and Italy. Our work suggests that the US saving rate is lower principally because Americans on average retire later. In contrast, the Italian saving rate is higher predominantly because Italians are credit constrained, particularly when young. We also found that demography and the different tax and benefit systems are able to explain little of the cross-sectional differences in saving rates. The study accounts for the possible importance of inter-generational private transfers in determining saving rates.     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

Distribution of wealth and incomplete markets: Theory and empirical evidence

This paper analyses the equilibrium distribution of wealth in an economy where firms’ productivities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, returns on factors are determined in competitive markets, households have linear consumption functions and government imposes taxes on capital and labour incomes and equally redistributes the collected resources to households. The equilibrium distribution of wealth is explicitly calculated and its shape crucially depends on market incompleteness. With incomplete markets it follows a Paretian law in the top tail and the Pareto exponent depends on the saving rate, on the net return on capital, on the growth rate of population, and on portfolio diversification. The characteristics of the labour market crucially affects the bottom tail, but not the upper tail of the distribution of wealth in the case of completely decentralized labour market. The analysis also suggests a positive relationship between growth and wealth inequality. The theoretical predictions find a corroboration in the empirical evidence of United States in the period 1989-2004.     

Foreign bank entry,bank efficiency and market power in Central and Eastern European Countries1

This article analyses the implications of the recently observed sharp expansion of foreign banks in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as measured by equity ownership. We show that the mode of foreign entry has a pivotal impact on the post‐entry performance of banks in CEECs. Foreign greenfield banks are characterized by superior cost efficiency, compared with domestic and foreign‐acquired banks. The efficiency of foreign‐acquired banks deteriorates in the initial year of acquisition, but improves thereafter. Banks acquired by foreigners have less market power relative to domestic and foreign greenfield banks. Overall, the CEEC banking sectors have benefited from the increased foreign bank participation, both in terms of higher efficiency and more competition.     

Are Transition Countries Overbanked? The Effect of Institutions on Bank Market Entry

Abstract. The popular notion that transition countries are overbanked is challenged in this paper. We study the decision for market entry and the optimal number of banks in a Salop model. We show that the amount of collateral, which is necessary to solve the moral hazard problem of finance, depends on the distance between bank and firm as well as the quality of the institutional environment. We analyze how the number of banks decreases as the institutional environment improves. Moreover, we find that market entry is insufficient because new entrants do not consider thoroughly the positive effects of their entry decision on social welfare.     

Herding and bank runs

Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. I extend the banking model to allow a depositor to choose his withdrawal time. When he withdraws depends on his consumption type (patient or impatient), his private, noisy signal about the quality of the bank's portfolio, and the withdrawal histories of the other depositors. Some of these runs are efficient in that the bank is liquidated before the portfolio worsens. Others are not efficient; these are cases in which the herd is misled.     

The impact of bank competition and concentration on industrial growth

This paper studies whether bank competition affects growth of non-banking industries. We find that non-cooperative bank competition and stability promote industrial growth robustly. Bank concentration may also affect growth positively; the latter effect increases for higher levels of competition.     

Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities

We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.     

Spatial effects of foreign direct investment in US states

Abstract This paper estimates the aggregate productivity effects of Marshallian externalities generated by foreign direct investment (FDI) in US states, controlling for Marshallian externalities and other spatial spillovers generated by domestic firms. A regional production function framework models externalities and other spatial spillovers explicitly as determinants of total factor productivity. We employ a system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to account for the potential endogeneity of FDI and the presence of spatial lags. Using data for US states from 1977–2003, the results indicate that FDI generates positive externalities, while externalities from domestic firms are negative.     

Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision

We examine the optimal institutional allocation of bank regulation. We find that centralizing the lending of last resort and deposit insurance functions in a regulator leads to excessive forbearance. It also leads the bank to invest suboptimally in loans. Giving this regulator supervision improves on both problems, but it still does not lead to the efficient outcome. In the multi-regulator arrangement, we find that it is beneficial to give supervision to the deposit insurer. The choice between the unified-regulator arrangement and the multi-regulator arrangement involves a trade-off: The multi-regulator arrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquidity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels. These results assume the absence of information frictions. When banks are better informed than regulators, we show that regulators may have an incentive not to share private information, suggesting it is important to consider regulators’ informational advantages when deciding on the allocation of regulation.     

Market entry,privatization and bank performance in transition1

This paper examines how market entry and privatization have affected the margins and marginal costs of banks in the post‐communist transition. We estimate bank revenue and cost functions, allowing the estimated parameters to change over time. In the first sub‐period (1995–98), we find that privatized banks earned higher margins than other banks, while foreign start‐ups had lower marginal costs. In the third sub‐period (2002–2004), foreign banks remained low marginal cost service providers, while privatized domestic banks had the widest margins. Subtracting marginal costs from margins to calculate mark‐ups, an indication of demand for services, shows that initially privatized banks had the largest mark‐ups. However, by the third sub‐period, differences among private banks diminished. In comparison to private banks, state banks persistently under‐performed in controlling costs and attracting demand. Our evidence therefore indicates that foreign bank entry promoted lower costs and that privatization and market entry encouraged more demand for services.     

Patent Protection,Innovation and Technology Licensing

We show that the common wisdom suggesting higher investment in innovation under a stronger patent protection may not be true if the innovator can license its technology ex‐post innovation. If the initial cost of production is high and the slope of the marginal cost of undertaking innovation is moderate, investment in innovation is maximised at a patent protection that is weaker than the strongest patent protection. Otherwise, strongest patent protection maximises investment in innovation. We also show that welfare is maximised neither at the strongest patent protection nor at the weakest patent protection but at an intermediate patent protection. Our results are important for patent policies.     

Competition for exclusive customers: comparing equilibrium and welfare under one-part and two-part pricing

Abstract.  This paper compares one-part and two-part pricing in a discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without 'unit-price commitment,' where the lack of unit-price commitment is consistent with 'after-market monopolization.' We find that two-part pricing with unit-price commitment is firms' dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two-part pricing without unit-price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one-part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits.     

Consumption, Wealth, and Indebtedness in the Context of Uncertainty: The Consumption Function Meets Portfolio Theory

The objective of this paper is to provide a sound theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of consumer indebtedness, by integrating Portfolio theory with the Life-Cycle hypothesis (LCH) model of consumption. Modern versions of this LCH theory almost always assume that utility is additive over time, but in this study, the multiplicative Cobb–Douglas function is used. The new synthesis also explains the stochastic properties of consumption more fully and clearly than previous studies, in particular the uncertainty arising from rates of return on risky assets. The new theory will also help to improve the explanation of the surprise changes in consumption because these sources of risk are incorporated explicitly into the analysis.     

Consolidation and commercial bank net interest margins: Evidence from the old and new European Union members and candidate countries

This paper examines the effects of financial reforms on the determinants of commercial bank net interest margin in the banking systems of the new EU member countries and candidate countries by dividing the sample period (1995–2006) into two sub-periods: consolidation period (1995–2000) and post-consolidation period (2001–2006). The paper also compares the new and old EU members to check whether differences with respect to the determinants of net interest margins between these two groups of countries exist within the same time period. The results indicate that size and managerial efficiency are negatively and significantly related to net interest margins in the two sub-periods. Regulators should promote merger and acquisition and market entry in order to increase the scale and efficiency of banks operating in the sector. Exploitation of the scale economies seems to be important in decreasing the interest rate spread in the sampled banking sectors. The results further indicate that all macroeconomic variables are statistically insignificant in the second sub-period, suggesting that differences in macroeconomic fundamentals have decreased among the sampled countries due to the increased convergence process in recent years. As for the comparison of the new and old EU members, the results suggest that the financial and economic convergence between the new and old members has not been completed. Macroeconomic differences within the group and between the groups still exist.