Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

A curse or a blessing? Natural resources in a multiple growth regimes analysis

The literature on the impact of an abundance of natural resources on economic performance remains inconclusive. In this article we consider the possibility that countries may follow different growth regimes, and test the hypothesis that whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing depends on the growth regime to which an economy belongs. We follow recent work that has used a mixture-of-regressions method to identify different growth regimes, and find two regimes such that in one regime resources have a positive impact on growth, while in the other they have a negative impact or at best have no impact on growth. Our analysis of the determinants of whether a country belongs or not to the blessed resources regime indicates that the level of democracy plays an important role while education and economic institutions have no effect.     

THE MECHANICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS*

This study develops a model wherein capital is used in final goods production and research and development (R&D) activities. This arrangement generates changes of the equilibrium capital allocation corresponding to capital endowment, which engenders a regime change from capital based growth with decreasing returns to R&D based perpetual growth. These two growth phases account for the polarization of economies. The model also engenders multiple equilibria on capital allocation—which emerge during the middle stages of capital accumulation—accounting for leapfrogging and the instability of the economic growth of developing countries with medium capital accumulation.     

Information disclosure, banking development and knowledge-driven growth

In this study we develop a knowledge-driven growth model which explicitly models the banking sector as monopolistically competitive. The main mechanism through which financial intermediaries affect the real economy is through the evaluation and provision of liquidity to R&D projects. We distinguish two scenarios. In the regime with information disclosure, banks are able to use the stock of information obtained by the banking industry from evaluating R&D projects. This information externality brings about efficiency improvements, thereby leading to a positive entry of banks, more bank-funded research and in turn positive economic growth. By contrast, in the regime with no information disclosure, it is not profitable for new banks to enter the industry. This implies that no more potential R&D projects can be evaluated and hence financed, thus leading the economy to a zero-growth equilibrium.     

Foreign aid and the quality of economic institutions

Identification of the causal effect that foreign aid has on the quality of institutions in recipient countries has been elusive in the aid effectiveness literature. The main reason is that aid is endogenous with respect to the development of institutions. Our paper examines the impact of foreign aid on economic freedom in the recipient countries at a disaggregated level using an innovative identifying strategy. To do so, we use recently innovated instruments for aid, exploiting the long lags between loan approval and disbursements by official creditors to developing countries. Using plausibly exogenous variations in predicted loan disbursements as instruments for actual aid, we find that foreign aid has a significant positive effect on the quality of economic institutions in recipient countries. The results are robust to alternative specifications and samples. By establishing the existence of a strong link between aid and the quality of economic institutions, we identify the main channel through which aid affects economic growth and development.     

Globalization, rent protection institutions, and going alone in freeing trade

We construct a two-country North-South Product-cycle model of trade with endogenous growth and trade barriers. We remove the scale effects on growth by incorporating rent protection activities by Northern incumbents. We examine the effects of two forms of globalization - an expansion of the relative size of the South and unilateral trade liberalization by either country. We find that the location of rent protection institutions and the sectoral trade structure determine whether or not globalization raises steady-state economic growth. We demonstrate that for accelerating worldwide economic growth, contrary to conventional wisdom, unilateral Northern trade liberalization is preferable to bilateral trade liberalization.     

Growing through chaotic intervals

We consider a growth model proposed by Matsuyama [K. Matsuyama, Growing through cycles, Econometrica 67 (2) (1999) 335-347] in which two sources of economic growth are present: the mechanism of capital accumulation (Solow regime) and the process of technical change and innovations (Romer regime). We will shown that no stable cycle can exist, except for a fixed point and a cycle of period two. The Necessary and Sufficient conditions for regular or chaotic regimes are formulated. The bifurcation structure of the two-dimensional parameter plane is completely explained. It is shown how the border-collision bifurcation leads from the stable fixed point to pure chaotic regime (which consists either in 4-cyclical chaotic intervals, 2-cyclical chaotic intervals or in one chaotic interval).     

Institutions,human capital,and growth: The institutional mechanism

This paper contributes to the debate on the relationship between human capital, institutions, and economic growth. The paper first develops a micro-foundation model linking institutions to human capital. The advantage of our modeling strategy is that the human capital accumulation function is derived from an endogenous process. The theoretical model shows that improvements in the quality of institutions foster human capital accumulation, decrease income inequality and change the historical development path. The paper uses cross-country panel data from 1965 to 2005 to test some of the model's propositions and finds that deep structures or structural institutions – which are very persistent and rooted on the historical development path of an economy – affect long-term economic performance, while political institutions are uncorrelated with productivity and long-term economic growth. The empirical estimates also show that growth of physical and human capital – instead of levels – determines long-run economic growth.     

Growth miracles and failures in a Markov switching classification model of growth

In this paper economic growth is interpreted as a sequence of transitions between distinct growth regimes that countries visit with different frequencies. Countries featuring similar growth dynamics are endogenously grouped into three different clusters. The first cluster comprises successful countries that are characterized by lengthy periods of high or very high growth. Moderately successful countries in the second cluster experience both periods of reasonable growth and periods of stagnation, whereas failing countries in the third cluster suffer from highly volatile growth rates with frequent episodes of crisis. Successful countries are characterized by better initial conditions, policies and institutions compared to the other countries. Neither initial conditions nor institutions distinguish moderately successful from failing countries; what makes them different is policy in the form of investments into infrastructure and human capital, trade liberalization and limited policy volatility.     

Does reform work? An econometric survey of the reform-growth puzzle

There is still an intense controversy about the empirical support for the effects of structural reforms on economic growth. This paper uses data from 46 studies and more than 500 estimates to: (a) document the variation in these estimated effects and (b) identify the main factors that help explain it. We put forward evidence, based on the general-to-specific method, suggesting that the estimated long-run effects of reform on growth are normally distributed, and that accounting for institutions and initial conditions (trade liberalization) are principal factors in decreasing (increasing) the probability of reporting significant and positive effects of reform on growth.     

Innovation and Economic Growth in East Asia: An Overview

East Asia has been one of the most dynamic regions of economic growth and development. The past two decades have seen tremendous economic and technological catching up in the region. Using South Korea as a case to illustrate the process of technology catching up, we find that the process of graduating from imitation to innovation is a nonlinear one, and requires conscious efforts to invest in research and development and other technological capability‐enhancing activities. Successful technology upgrading also calls for policies and institutions that are relevant to technological innovation to evolve and adapt as an economy goes through the different stages of economic and technological development.     

Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent‐seeking

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent‐seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between the size of government and economic growth. We find that with very high (low) discounting, there is a unique low (high) growth equilibrium, regardless of the size of government. For the intermediate range of discounting, there are multiple equilibria and the growth outcome depends on the size of government. With endogenous time discounting, the growth outcome is path dependent and depends on the level of inherited human capital. However, there is only one stable growth regime and the economy endogenously switches to it. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are not extremely high, the stable regime is the one in which there is a high‐growth equilibrium for a smaller size of the government and for larger size, both the high‐growth and the low‐growth equilibrium coexist. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are extremely high, there exists only a unique high‐growth equilibrium irrespective of the size of government. Furthermore, economies with bigger size of the government and/or with poor quality institutions will take longer to endogenously switch to this stable growth regime.     

Is democracy good for growth? — Development at political transition time matters

Is democracy a better political regime for economic prosperity than autocracy? This paper shows that the answer depends on the initial economic development level during the democratic transition when the foundation of institutions was laid. Democracy facilitates growth only in countries that already have adequate development at transition time. These countries are more likely to create and sustain growth-enhancing institutions than others. Without appropriate development, democracy does not improve growth; this applies to about 40% of the third-wave democratized countries. These results are based on a sample of 153 countries in 1960–2010 and robust to various specifications and endogeneity issues.     

Fundamentals of Myanmar's Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective

The serial underperformer of the region, Myanmar's economy is largely without the institutions and qualities necessary to achieve genuine economic growth. This paper explores the fundamentals of Myanmar's economy, from a perspective that emphasizes policy and institutional failure as the principal determinants of the country's present circumstances. The paper explores Myanmar's economy in a multifaceted way, examining concerns over economic growth, public finances, monetary and financial policies, corruption, and international trade. Notwithstanding the change in the form of Myanmar's governing institutions following the elections of November 2010, the paper concludes pessimistically as to the likelihood of meaningful economic reform in the foreseeable future.     

Modelling the nonlinear relationship between CO2 emissions from oil and economic growth

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from oil and GDP, using panel data from 1971 to 2007 of 98 countries. Previous studies have discussed the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, but little attention has been paid to the existence of a nonlinear relationship between these two variables. We argue that there exists a threshold effect between the two variables: different levels of economic growth bear different impacts on oil CO2 emissions. Our empirical results do not support the EKC hypothesis. Additionally, the results of short-term analyses of static and dynamic panel threshold estimations suggest the efficacy of a double-threshold (three-regime) model. In the low economic growth regime, economic growth negatively affects oil CO2 emissions growth; in the medium economic growth regime, however, economic growth positively impacts oil CO2 emissions growth; and in the high economic growth regime, the impact of economic growth is insignificant.     

Is institutional improvement possible?

A substantial literature shows that economic prosperity is dependent on the quality of economic institutions. Countries with low-quality institutions remain poor while countries with high-quality institutions prosper. Improvement in institutional quality brings with it economic growth. Poor countries must improve their economic institutions to escape poverty; so, if a poor country’s institutional structure is unlikely to improve, that suggests dismal prospects for economic growth and an escape from poverty. An examination of institutional quality over 30 years indicates that countries with low-quality institutions have improved their institutional quality, which demonstrates that poor countries are not stuck with low-quality institutions. They can improve their institutions, and consequently, can generate economic growth and escape poverty.     

Political regime type and variation in economic growth rates

Research about the effects of regime type on economic growth rates did not establish any robust differences in average growth rates between democracies and autocracies. Here, it is suggested that we may have asked the wrong question. There still might be a difference in variances. Democracy implies similar constraints on rulers and thereby might lead to quite similar economic performances. Among autocracies, however, constitutional and institutional constraints are likely to be weak and variable. Moreover, personal inclinations of autocrats might matter much more than personality differences between democratic rulers. Data from the 1960–87 period supply some evidence that there is indeed greater variation in growth rates among autocracies than among democracies.     

Globalization and growth in the low income African countries with the extreme bounds analysis

The relationship between globalization and economic growth, especially in the poorer developing countries, is controversial. Previous studies have used single globalization indicators such as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. This paper uses a comprehensive measure of a globalization of Dreher (2006), which is based on measures of globalization of the economic, social and political sectors. Panel data estimates with data of 21 low income African countries show a small but significant positive permanent growth effects. The sensitivity of this growth effect is examined with the extreme bounds analysis (EBA). Contrary to the findings by Levine and Renelt (1992) that cross-country growth relationships are fragile, the effects of globalization and some other determinants of the long run growth rate are found to be robust by EBA.     

The first Great Divergence and the evolution of cross-country income inequality during the last millennium: the role of institutions and culture

Using a millennium of data for 12 countries in the East and in the West, this article tests the extent to which contracting institutions, property right institutions and culture can explain economic development and the Great Divergence. It is tested whether these theories influence growth through science and technology or through human capital or channels that are independent of these two channels. It is found that culture, contracting institutions and property right institutions have all been relevant for growth and development.     

Household Debt,Dynamic Stability,and Change in Demand Creation Patterns

This paper examines dynamic stability and demand creation patterns of an economy in the context of the augmentation of household debt. First, we investigate the dynamic characteristics specific to an economy with household borrowing. Second, we reveal how demand creation and economic growth pattern change with the introduction of households' active borrowing. Our results shows that it is more favorable for the stability of an economy to politically control the interest rate on lending rather than to leave it to be determined by private financial institutions. Our results also indicate that even if the demand regime is wage-led, paradoxically, a rise in wage share may not necessarily stimulate economic growth. On the other hand, profit-led growth is more likely.