When income differences hurt or excite: The nonlinear effect of regional inequality on subjective wellbeing

Combining information from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions and the European Social Survey, we investigate the relationship between subjective well-being and income inequality using regional inequality indicators and individual data. We assume that inequality aversion and perception of social mobility affect the impact of regional inequality on subjective well-being in opposite directions. We find evidence of an inverse U-shaped effect of inequality, where inequality starts to have a positive effect on subjective well-being that becomes negative with a switch point before the average of the Gini index for the entire sample. The rationale for our nonlinear finding is that Hirschman's tunnel effect (and the positive effect of perceived social mobility) prevails for low levels of inequality, while inequality aversion and negative relative income effects are relatively stronger when inequality is higher. Robustness checks on different sample splits are consistent with the hypothesis of the two drivers.     

HOW DO EUROPEANS EVALUATE INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS? AN ASSESSMENT BASED ON HAPPINESS SURVEYS

The purpose of this paper is to measure the evaluation of income inequality by European citizens. Starting from the concept of a social welfare function defined on income distributions the paper estimates the degree and nature of inequality aversion of Europeans. It uses subjective well-being (SWB) as an empirical measure of welfare and estimates how SWB is related to average income and measures of income inequality (from an appropriate class). The estimated relationship is used to determine those inequality measures which qualify as proper representations of people's inequality aversion.     

Inequality aversion and the house money effect

In this paper, we analyse if individual inequality aversion measured with simple experimental games depends on whether the monetary endowment in these games is either a windfall gain (“house money”) or a reward for a certain effort-related performance. We then examine whether the way of preference elicitation affects the explanatory power of inequality aversion in social dilemma situations. Our results indicate that individual inequality aversion measured by the model of Fehr and Schmidt (Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3):817–868, 1999) is not generally robust to the way endowments emerge. The inequality aversion model has only low predictive power for individual behaviour. It performs best when the endowment is house money and relatively small.     

INEQUALITY COMPARISONS IN A MULTI‐PERIOD FRAMEWORK: THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE WELFARE METRICS

This paper considers the use of alternative welfare metrics in evaluations of income inequality in a multi‐period context. Using Norwegian longitudinal income data, it is found, as in many studies, that inequality is lower when each individual's annual average income is used as welfare metric, compared with the use of a single‐period accounting framework. However, this result does not necessarily hold when aversion to income fluctuations is introduced. Furthermore, when actual incomes are replaced by expected incomes (conditional on an initial period), using a model of income dynamics, higher values of inequality over longer periods are typically found, although comparisons depend on inequality and variability aversion parameters. The results are strongly influenced by the observed high degree of systematic regression toward the (geometric) mean, combined with a large extent of individual unexpected effects.     

Do Equity Preferences Matter for Climate Negotiators? An Experimental Investigation

This paper investigates whether climate negotiators have preferences for equity and whether these preferences may help to explain different positions in international climate policy. For this purpose we conducted an online experiment with individuals who had been involved in international climate policy. The experiment consisted of two simple non-strategic games suited to measure individual inequality aversion as captured by the equity preference model of Fehr and Schmidt (Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:817–868, 1999). We find that our participants show an aversion to advantageous inequality to a considerable extent while the aversion to disadvantageous inequality is moderate. Regarding the geographical variety in our sample, we cannot confirm significant differences in the degree of inequality aversion between different regions in the world. Our conclusion is that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national interests than by different equity concerns.     

The relation of risk attitudes and other-regarding preferences: A within-subjects analysis

In this paper we provide experimental evidence on the relation of individual risk attitudes and subjects׳ aversion to favorable inequality. In a within-subjects design we expand Blanco et al.׳s (2011) modified dictator game by the risk-elicitation task of Eckel and Grossman (2002). Our data show strong support for a significant negative correlation between risk tolerance and an aversion to favorable inequality. The results are independent of gender, i.e., women and men show a similar correlation in these traits.     

A utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods

This paper studies utilitarian welfare maximization in a large economy with an excludable public good where individual preferences are private information. If inequality aversion is large, optimal allocations involve the use of admission fees and exclusion to redistribute resources from people who benefit a lot from the public good to people who benefit little. If inequality aversion is close to zero, optimal admission fees are zero. Because of inequality aversion, information rents of people who benefit a lot from the public good receive less weight, so optimal provision levels for the public good are below first-best levels.     

Income inequality,corruption and subjective well-being

ABSTRACT

Based on the data of CGSS2013, we analyse the relationship between income inequality, corruption and subjective well being using an Ordered Probit model. Our results indicate that income inequality and corruption significantly reduces the subjective well-being of our country’s residents. Furthermore, corruption is an important channel for the negative effect of income inequality on subjective well-being, the impact of income inequality on subjective well-being is mainly achieved by the role of corruption. Specifically, the impacts vary according to hukou. Higher degree of income inequality indeed reduces the subjective well-being of urban residents, while it has a positive effect on subjective well-being of rural residents. Corruption has a significant negative impact on the subjective well-being of urban and rural residents. There is heterogeneity in the influence of different income levels in rural areas. The study in this paper shows that anti-corruption and narrowing the income gap are the two major grippers to improve the well-being of the residents.     

Mass Society and Political Conflict: Toward a Reconstruction of Theory

Many recent studies in economics have uncovered the economic and socio-economic factors that are most related to differences among nations in citizens' self-reported levels of well-being (SWB). However, these cross-country studies have generally not taken into account the fact that around the SWB national average, a considerable spread of scores exists within nations. In an extreme case, a country may be in the midst of a major social upheaval, with a large group of dispossessed and disadvantaged individuals, yet this fact is completely hidden by the arithmetical average. Using cross-country data with diverse economic and socio-economic characteristics and the latest available dataset on well-being, we uncover the factors that appear to be the most highly correlated with the inequality of well-being within nations. We find the inequalities in individual incomes and quality of health, and the level of institutional qualities to be most important in explaining the inequalities of well-being.     

Differential mortality and social security

Abstract This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between individuals who differ in their lifespans. We discuss aspects related to the objective function and argue that aversion to multiperiod inequality should be taken into account. Then, we study the properties of the social optimum both with full information and with asymmetric information. We highlight the role of aversion to multiperiod inequality and show that it has substantial consequences on the design of Social Security schemes. In particular, we show that for a low (resp. high) aversion to multiperiod inequality, a negative (resp. positive) implicit tax rate on continued activity is desirable.     

EQUITY-EFFICIENCY PREFERENCES IN Poland AND THE SOVIET UNION: ORDER-REVERSALS UNDER THE ATKINSON INDEX

In this paper, the relation between inequality and welfare index "reversals" is characterized. By the identification of these reversals, upper and lower bounds are established for Atkinson's parameter of inequality aversion. This exercise shows that a level of inequality aversion high enough to show welfare improving over the "egalitarian decline" of 1978–81 in Poland is too high to show improvement over the "elitist growth" of 1981–86 in the Soviet Union. However, even if the lower bound of inequality aversion is assumed, plausible projections on Soviet growth and distribution still show social welfare declining.     

Income Mobility, Inequality and Social Welfare

It is often argued that an observation of rising annual income inequality need not have negative normative implications. The argument is that if there has been a sufficiently large simultaneous increase in mobility, the inequality of income measured over a longer time period can be lower despite the rise in annual inequality. In this paper, it is shown by example that if normative implications are drawn from a standard social welfare function, the set of circumstances put forward in the above argument are not sufficient to guarantee that social welfare will improve. The reason is that even though rising mobility does reduce longer term inequality, it also increases the variability of income profiles over time and the latter has a detrimental social welfare effect. Hence, there are two types of mobility: one which reduces inequality (regression to the mean), but another that increases inequality (relative movements uncorrelated with incomes). Further, if individuals' aversion to income variabiltiy is sufficiently larger than the social welfare judge's aversion to inequality, then an increase in mobility, no matter how large, cannot offset the negative normative effect of rising annual inequality.     

关于经济增长与不平等的综合评价——满意度、熵与社会福利

本文试图探讨关于经济增长与不平等的综合社会福利评价体系.建立社会福利评价体系一般面临两个困难:找出合理的社会福利函数和关于收入的个人效用函数.为此,本文把效用函数和社会福利函数标准化为满意度函数,并证明了,唯一满足齐次性和对称性的社会福利函数是个人满意度的几何平均,不存在常弹性或常相对风险规避的个人满意度函数,常二阶弹性的个人满意度函数意味着效用的收入弹性递减.以地区收入分配为例,计算结果显示我国地区不平等有长期增加趋势,若综合考虑收入增长与不平等,我国的社会福利水平有稍微上升的趋势.     

A consistent multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle

The unidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle demands that a regressive transfer in income—a transfer from worse-off (poor) to better-off (rich)—decreases social welfare. In a multidimensional setting the direct link between income (or any other attribute) and individual well-being is absent. We interpret the social welfare level of a distribution in which each individual has the same bundle as the individual well-being level. We define regressivity on the basis of this individual well-being ranking. In a setting with both transferable and non-transferable attributes, the imposition of the ensuing “consistent” Pigou-Dalton principle forces individual well-being to have a quasi-linear structure in the transferable attributes. Since we allow for transferable and non-transferable attributes, our result provides a normative underpinning for criteria in the distinct literatures of multidimensional inequality measurement (only transferable attributes) and of needs (one transferable and one non-transferable attribute).     

Attitudes to risk and attitudes to uncertainty: experimental evidence

In a series of experiments the interactions among individual attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, the sign of the outcome domain, and the way uncertainty is represented are tested. This is done in a unified framework, eliciting individual values by means of a second price auction. Results confirm the presence of the well-known fourfold pattern of risk attitude (risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses at high probability, and risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses at low probability) and show that this pattern can also be extended to uncertainty. In the valuation of losses the modal pattern is decreasing risk and uncertainty aversion as the probability of loss increases, while increasing risk and uncertainty aversion is observed for gains. Moreover, it is found that the size of reaction to uncertainty does not depend on the outcome domain, and that it persists in the face of an incentive-compatible mechanism to elicit preferences.     

Inequality aversion and separability in social risk evaluation

This paper examines how to satisfy “independence of the utilities of the dead” (Blackorby et al. in Econometrica 63:1303–1320, 1995; Bommier and Zuber in Soc Choice Welf 31:415–434, 2008) in the class of “expected equally distributed equivalent” social orderings (Fleurbaey in J Polit Econ 118:649–680, 2010) and inquires into the possibility to keep some aversion to inequality in this context. It is shown that the social welfare function must either be utilitarian or take a special multiplicative form. The multiplicative form is compatible with any degree of inequality aversion, but only under some constraints on the range of individual utilities.     

Measuring Attitudes Towards Inequality

Individuals' attitudes to inequality aversion are measured using survey data, based on the leaky-bucket experiment, for several groups of students in Australia and Israel. Three forms of social welfare function are estimated. It is found that measures of inequality aversion can be obtained with some precision and that these estimates are substantially lower than the values typically used by those measuring inequality and examining optimal tax structures. Furthermore, a welfare function based on the Gini inequality measure is generally found to give a better fit than forms based on constant relative or constant absolute inequality aversion.
JEL Classification : C 91; D 63     

Local Area Inequality and Worker Well-Being

This paper uses General Social Survey data linked to Census data to investigate the effect of local area income and income inequality on worker well-being. Others have found a robust negative correlation between reference group income and self-reported well-being. However, in many cases the reference group is defined as a large geographic area. This paper adds to the literature in two ways. First, it considers multiple nested geographic reference groups with US data. Second, it explicitly considers income inequality in addition to the level of income. It is found that both income and income inequality are positively associated with well-being at the census tract level, but negatively associated at the county level. Further, the effect of inequality on well-being decreases as income increases at the census tract and county level, while it increases at the state level.     

Inequality aversion and risk aversion

This note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality averse with respect to certainty equivalents, if one is more inequality averse for certainty equivalents than the other, the household preference induced by optimally allocating aggregate bundles according to this social welfare function is more risk averse than the other. We present examples showing that this comparative static can be reversed if absolute inequality aversion is dropped. We show that the utilitarian rule always induces the least risk averse household preference among all social welfare functions (this corresponds to the sum of certainty equivalents).