Technology adoption decisions under a mixed regulatory system of tradable permits and air pollution fees for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan

By using a newly proposed tradable permit system built under the current air pollution fee regulation for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan as an example, a mixed-integer non-linear programming model that minimizes the total regulatory costs of firms is applied to investigate how different permit trading ratios and the design of banking might affect firms’ technology adoption decisions and permit trading behavior. By incorporating binary variables in the model to represent firms’ decisions as to whether or not to install new control equipment, the results show that when the unit air pollution fee rate is higher than the firms’ abatement costs, the design of banking causes many firms to install new control equipment that results in an over-reduction of emissions. If no air pollution fee is imposed, the trading ratio plays a more important role than the reservation rate for banking in determining the firms’ emission reduction strategies under a pure permit trading scheme. While the conclusion from this study that uses a non-uniformly mixed pollutant as an example may hold only when certain conditions are met, the framework can be applied to other uniformly mixed pollutants through parameter changes without any limitation. In addition, the modeling technique presented here offers policy-makers a very convenient approach to empirical analysis.      

Alternative intertemporal permit trading regimes with stochastic abatement costs

We examine the social efficiency of alternative intertemporal permit trading regimes. The role of uncertainty and information asymmetry is discussed. For banking to be welfare improving, uncertainty itself does not matter, while information asymmetry does. Three effects of banking are identified: externality effect, information effect, and total permit effect. In the absence of total permit effect, banking is welfare improving if information effect is positive and dominates the externality effect. The relative efficiency of banking regimes with different intertemporal trading ratios is affected by the slope of the benefit and damage functions and the covariance of the shocks.     

Dynamics of pollution control when damage is sensitive to the rate of pollution accumulation

Economic models which take into account the long-term effects of pollution in the environment specify pollution damage as a function of the accumulated stock. Several economists have proposed another formulation where damage is a function of the time derivative of the pollution stock. This paper considers the intertemporal efficiency implications of this formulation. The first specification is qualitative and the objective functional includes both the rate of change and the level of the pollution stock. The second specification is a stylized climate change model with a linear damage function where damage depends only on the rate of increase in global temperature. The analysis reveals that the efficiency properties of optimal pollution control are very sensitive to this change in the damage function. Intertemporal efficiency may require higher emissions compared with the level which is optimal from the myopic point of view. An increase in the rate of discount typically reduces the optimal emission level.     

The U.S. allowance trading system for sulfur dioxide: An update on market experience

In 1990, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that amended the Clean Air Act to create a new program to mitigate the effects of acid deposition in the U.S. through emission reductions of sulfur dioxide (SO₂) and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) at electric utility plants across the country. The SO₂ reductions, totalling a 40% reduction nationally from 1980 levels or a 10 million ton reduction annually, are achieved largely through an emission trading system, the largest program of its kind designed to date. This trading system has the potential to save up to half of the compliance costs associated with more traditional source-by-source emission limit programs.This paper briefly discusses background on the acid rain issue in the United States, and the principal features of the program, including: a permanent cap on utility emissions of SO₂ beginning in 2010, decision to grant up-front allocation of emission credits to reduce individual approvals of trades, the use of continuous emission monitors and automatic penalties to ensure compliance, and integration of the Acid Rain program requirements with other Clean Air Act programs. The paper also discusses the development of the allowance trading market to date, including the types of compliance options chosen and quantity and type of emissions trading being conducted.The U.S. Government right to retain a non-exclusive, royalty free licence in and to any copyright is acknowledged.     

The Welfare Effects of Allowance Banking in Emissions Trading Programs

Permitting allowance banking in emissions trading programs can reduce expected compliance costs by giving capped firms flexibility to adjust the time path of abatement and to hedge against future uncertainty. Recent literature suggests that this compliance cost dividend is significant (Fell and Morgenstern Environ Resour Econ 47:275–297, 2010). Allowance banking may yield an environmental dividend (a) if the growth rate of marginal damages from emissions is less than the discount rate and (b) if emissions are lower in the short run as firms bank permits for use in later periods. A discrete, stochastic dynamic programming model is considered to simulate the two dividends of allowance banking in the context of the most recent Federal United States greenhouse gas cap-and-trade legislation. Simulation results show that under a range of parameter values, the environmental dividend has the same order of magnitude as the compliance cost dividend. Under the central set of parameters, allowance banking increases expected present value of benefits by about $350$ million dollars per year of the program. The environmental dividend, however, is completely eliminated if capped firms can borrow permits from future periods without limit.     

Climate change damage and the trace gas index issue

Efficient policies to control trace gas emissions require estimation of an appropriate exchange rate among these gases; i.e. the relative value of reducing emissions of each gas. A dynamic stock pollutant model is developed that considers damages associated with both non-climatic and climatic effects of the gases, differing atmospheric lifetimes of the gases, the discount rate, and non-linear damages. The index value and shadow value of control are estimated for carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, methane, nitrous oxide and the 4 major chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The value of control for short-lived relative to long-lives gases is lower for low discount rates and quadratic compared with linear damages. The relative value of control for all gases falls relative to carbon dioxide if one considers the direct beneficial effects of carbon dioxide on agriculture. The general approach developed in the paper may have application for other environmental problems where multiple substances pose individual risks but also jointly contribute to a single risk.The views expressed in this document are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture or the United States government.We would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Bruce Larson, Dick Brazee, and Jae Edmonds while taking full responsibility for any remaining errors.     

“More is less”: the tax effects of ignoring flow externalities

Using a model of non-linear, non-monotone decay of the stock pollutant, and starting from the same initial conditions, the paper shows that an optimal tax that corrects for both stock and flow externalities may result in a lower tax, fewer cumulative emissions (less decay in emissions) and higher output at the steady state than a corrective tax that ignores the flow externality. This “more is less” result emphasizes that setting a corrective tax that ignores the flow externality, or imposing a corrective tax at too low a level where there exists only a stock externality, may affect both transitory and steady-state output, tax payments and cumulative emissions. The result has important policy implications for decision makers setting optimal corrective taxes and targeted emission limits whenever stock externalities exist.     

CUTTING CARBON EMISSIONS AT A PROFIT (PART I): OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES

This article identifies and corrects shortcomings in recent modeling studies on the economics of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. The major assessments of the Kyoto Protocol—by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Clinton White House Council of Economic Advisers, the U.S. Department of Energy Interlaboratory Working Group, and the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum—are found to be seriously incomplete. Each study omits one or several of four major cost-reducing policy options, resulting in cost estimates that are far too pessimistic.
In the present study, these shortcomings are overcome through the integrated evaluation of all major cost-cutting policy options within a coherent least-cost framework. Three domestic policies—a national carbon cap and permit trading program, productivity-enhancing market reforms and technology programs, and recycling of permit auction revenues into economically advantageous tax cuts—are combined with international emissions allowance trading.
This analysis shows that an integrated least-cost strategy for mitigating U.S. greenhouse gas emissions would produce an annual net output gain of roughly 0.4% of GDP in 2010 and about 0.9% of GDP in 2020. On a cumulative net present value basis, the United States would gain $250 billion by 2010 and $600 billion by 2020. International flexibility mechanisms (including emissions trading) are of only secondary significance in realizing these productivity, output, and welfare gains.     

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

This paper shows that if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies, as embodied by a reduction in the emission per output ratio, may either improve or jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. A small change in the emission per output ratio can result in a discrete jump in the stable size of a coalition and global welfare evaluated under the stable coalition size. In the case of three countries, the grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. In the case of more than three countries, implementing cleaner technologies may result in a discrete jump, either upward or downward, of the largest stable coalition size and welfare. We examine both, the case of a flow and that of a stock pollutant. In the latter case, we show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that a grand coalition of three countries is destabilized. Measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants are shown to have similar effects on the size of stable coalitions to reductions in the emission per output ratio.     

Emission trading in Europe with an exchange rate

This paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition. It is shown that, generally, this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated, although total abatement costs are always reduced. A routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral, sequential process, subject to an exchange rate. In the example used, results for SO₂ emissions in Europe show that, starting from a uniform reduction, exchange-rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one-to-one trading, without achieving the cost minimum. Sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets at many places. The results are sensitive to: pre-trade emission levels, the transaction costs, the availability of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners.     

Joint Management of Emission Abatement and Technological Innovation for Stock Externalities

We investigate how emission abatement and technological innovation provide different solutions to reduce pollutant emissions. In the case of a stock externality emission abatement leads to a smooth and continuous adjustment of emissions. Conversely, technological innovation has to be interpreted as an option on a less polluted environment and can justify the use of a pollution threshold above which it is optimal to start a research and development programme for a less polluting technology. It is shown that technological innovation interferes with the traditional emission abatement approach. The optimal abatement level is logically lowered once the less polluting technology is available; nevertheless a temporary increase in emissions is optimal during the research and development period. The usual Pigouvian tax system proves to remain an efficient corrective instrument. A numerical application to the Greenhouse effect is provided.     

Dynamic relationship between stock market trading volumes and investor fear gauges movements

This article applies multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (MF-DFA) and multifractal detrended cross-correlation analysis (MF-DCCA) to investigate cross-correlation behaviours between two kinds of stock markets trading volumes and investor fear gauges covering the data of U.S. stock markets from 2 January 2004 to 31 July 2018. The empirical results show that the dynamic relationship between stock markets trading volume fluctuations and different kinds of investor fear gauges are multifractal and find that the dynamic relationship is strongly anti-persistent. Moreover, financial crisis in 2008 has a significant impact on the cross-correlated behaviour, suggesting that stock market trading volume fluctuations and investor fear gauges are more susceptible to each other during the financial crisis period. Through the rolling windows analysis, we also find that the stock markets trading volume fluctuations and different kinds of investor fear gauges are anti-persistent dynamic cross-correlated.     

The Environmental Kuznets Curve and Flow versus Stock Pollution: The Neglect of Future Damages

In this paper we offer a possible explanation for the empirical finding that the pollution-income relationship (PIR) for flow pollutants is an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), i.e. inverted-U shaped, but that the PIR for stock pollutants is monotonically rising. We analyse an overlapping generations model with two pollutants: The flow pollutant causes immediate damages, but the stock pollutant harms the environment only in the future. Hence, a succession of myopic governments lets stock pollution grow with income. In contrast, the flow pollutant follows an EKC whose downturn might be caused by the neglect of future damages and by ever rising stock pollution: Without the stock pollutant the PIR for the flow pollutant can increase monotonically. We also show that the turning point of the EKC for the flow pollutant lies at lower levels of income and of flow pollution if stock pollution is high and harmful. This casts doubts on most empirical EKC studies because they assume that the turning point occurs at the same income level in all countries. However, it is consistent with recent empirical findings that the income level at the turning point of the EKC varies across countries.     

Prices or Quantities Can Dominate Banking and Borrowing*

The possibility of intertemporal banking and borrowing of tradable permits is often viewed as tilting the various policy debates about optimal pollution control instruments towards favoring such time-flexible quantities. This paper shows that this view can be misleading, at least for the simplest dynamic extension of the original “prices versus quantities” information structure. The model of this paper allows firms to know and act upon the realization of uncertain future costs two full periods ahead of the regulators. For any given circumstance, the paper shows that either a fixed price or a fixed quantity is superior in expected welfare to time-flexible banking and borrowing. Furthermore, the standard original formula for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities contains sufficient information to completely characterize the regulatory role of intertemporal banking and borrowing. The logic and implications of these results are analyzed and discussed.     

Alternative standards and instruments for air pollution control in Poland

Like other Central European countries, Poland faces the twin challenges of improving environmental quality while also fostering sustainable economic development. In this study we examine the costs of different standards for air pollution control, and the cost savings from using incentive-based policy instruments in lieu of more rigid command-and-control policies. The comparisons are based on the results of a simulation model of energy use and air pollution control for the Polish economy over 1990–2015. The model simulates least-cost energy supply decisions under different environmental policy assumptions, the corresponding emissions, and the cost of achieving the specified policy objectives. The model results suggest that incentive-based policies will have efficiency gains over command policies that are at least worthy of consideration and may be quite substantial. The size of the gains in practice depends in part on how much flexibility is built into the command approach, e.g., capacity for intrafirm trading as well as alack of technology-specific requirements. To achieve these gains, an increase in the current levels of emissions fees is desirable both to strengthen abatement incentives and to improve the capacity of the Polish government to overcome past environmental damages. However, it seems highly unlikely in practice that fees could be raised to the levels necessary to meet current Polish emissions standards. To make further headway, an evolutionary approach to emissions trading patterned after (and profiting from the experience with) emissions trading in the U.S. seems useful. The program could start out relatively modestly and increase in ambitiousness as the Polish economic transition proceeds.     

Sufficient conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria

This paper reports on conditions on agents' preferences and endowments sufficient to guarantee the existence of sunspot equilibria in a simple overlapping generations model of pure exchange. Sunspot equilibria are those in which uncertainty extrinsic to the economy operates through expectations to yield a fulfilled expectations competitive equilibrium in which the extrinsic randomness has real effects on prices and allocations. The paper also provides necessary and sufficient conditions for these equilibria to have agents trading in a fixed stock of valued fiat money. The condition derived can be interpreted as requiring that intertemporal income effects appropriately dominate substitution effects.     

The dynamics of optimal abatement strategies for multiple pollutants—An illustration in the Greenhouse

We investigate optimal abatement strategies for cumulative and interacting pollutants. We show that different decay rates can cause non-monotonic behavior in the optimal paths of emissions, the aggregate level of pollution, and even the relative optimal price for emissions. This contrasts strikingly with the case of a single pollutant. The results are illustrated by numerical simulations, first for instructive fictitious and second for more realistic parameters mimicking the greenhouse problem. The results add to the skepticism existing about whether the concept of global warming potential is a useful indicator for the optimal relative abatement of different GHGs over time. In fact, we show that a constant index suitable for comparing dynamically different pollutants with respect to their economic harmfulness does not exist.     

Economic growth with environmental damage and technical progress

The papers on economic growth with environmental constraints usually ignore the effect of technical progress, this results in static steady state solutions. This paper examines the problem of optimal economic growth with environmental damage, technical progress taken into account, which produces a steady state solution that corresponds to an equilibrium growth, with non-constant emissions and pollutant stock. As a means of steering the economy along the optimal path, two types of tradeable pollution permits are analyzed. The method of stabilizing the optimal path, leading to a steady state, is suggested.     

Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism

We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.     

Rethinking Deviations From Uncovered Interest Parity: the Role of Covariance Risk and Noise

We examine the ability of the standard intertemporal asset pricing model and a model of noise trading to explain why the forward foreign exchange premium predicts the future currency depreciation with the 'wrong' sign. We find that the intertemporal asset pricing model is unable to predict risk premia with the correct sign to be consistent with the data. The noise-trader model, while highly stylised, receives fragmentary support from empirical research on survey expectations.