Greasing the wheels of bank lending: Evidence from private firms in China

Bribery, rather than firm performance, largely determines the extent to which private firms access bank credit in China. Bribery enables an economic outcome whereby firms with better economic performance are awarded larger loans. These firms also pay more in terms of bribes. Although satisfactory firm performance does determine whether firms can access loans, it does so only for loans originated by the big-four banks. For loans originated by smaller banks, performance is not essential for firms to secure loan access. Our evidence sheds light on the surprising finding of earlier studies that Chinese banks use commercial logic in their lending practices despite being endowed with a weak institutional framework.     

Decoupling the distressed banks and their clients,and coupling the distressed firms and their lending banks

This paper simultaneously investigates the responses of stock prices of the related banks and the client firms when one of them is in distress. Two effects are examined. The distressed bank effect, which claims that the stock price of client firms are coupled to that of their related distress banks, and the distressed firm effect, which claims that the related banks are negatively affected when their client firms are in distress. We collect the detailed information of individual transaction loan data to find the relationship between banks and their client firms. Asymmetric responses are reported in this paper. Our results reject the distressed bank effect but, by contrast, cannot reject the distressed firm effect. We propose the fund diversification hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis, and argue the decoupling effect of the distressed bank and their listed firms, owing to the diversified choice of clients' financing channel.     

The impact of foreign bank entry in emerging markets: Evidence from India

This paper uses the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s—analyzing variation in both the timing of the new foreign banks’ entries and in their location—to estimate the effect of foreign bank entry on domestic credit access and firm performance. In contrast to the belief that foreign bank entry should improve credit access for all firms, the estimates indicate that foreign banks financed only a small set of very profitable firms upon entry, and that on average, firms were 8 percentage points less likely to have a loan after a foreign bank entry because of a systematic drop in domestic bank loans. Similar estimates are obtained using the location of pre-existing foreign firms as an instrument for foreign bank locations. Moreover, the observed decline in loans is greater among smaller firms, firms with fewer tangible assets, and firms affiliated with business groups. The drop in credit also appears to adversely affect the performance of smaller firms with greater dependence on external financing. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the exacerbation of information asymmetries upon foreign bank entry.     

The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market

Our paper seeks to examine the direct benefit of bank relationships for a distressed borrower by assessing its influence on the success of firm private debt restructuring. We find that a distressed firm with a stronger bank relationship has a greater probability to successfully restructure its debt through private renegotiation. Accordingly, an analysis of credit rating recovery provides complementary evidence on the factors of successful debt restructuring. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for a debt restructuring to be completed is fully consistent with our documented results. We conclude that in a bank dominated financial system like Taiwan's where firms are heavily bank-dependent, the bank-firm relationship is of crucial importance to the success of financially distressed firms in private debt restructuring.     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market

Direct bank ownership is a common practice in emerging markets. The current paper studies how bank ownership affects firm performance through corporate executive perquisites (perks) in China, a leading emerging economy. In addition to common factors known to influence the level of executive perks, we find a significantly positive link between bank ownership of company shares and executive perquisites. Further analyses suggest that higher level of executive perquisites hurt firm operating efficiency. Specifically, perks are positively associated with interest rate paid by the firms. We find some evidence consistent with the notion that the conflict of interests that banks face as both lenders and shareholders in the emerging markets induces banks to play less effective monitoring if they are concerned with the security of their loans or aim to obtain better arrangement for their loans. Our results reveal a particular mechanism through which bank ownership influences firm decisions and performance.     

Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit Demand

This paper investigates the effects of bank loan availability on the trade credit and credit card demand of small firms, using firm‐level data from the 1995 Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey, conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business. We find that firms increase their demand for trade credit and credit card debt when facing credit constraints imposed by banks. These results provide evidence of a pecking order of debt financing, where firms increase their reliance on potentially expensive sources of funds when bank loans are not available.     

The real effects of bank distress: Evidence from bank bailouts in Germany

How does bank distress impact their customers' probability of default and trade credit availability? We address this question by looking at a unique sample of German firms from 2000 to 2011. We follow their firm-bank relationships through times of distress and crisis, featuring the different transmission of bank distress shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets. We find that a distressed bank bailout, which is subject to restructuring and deleveraging conditions, leads to a bank-induced increase of firms' probabilities of default. Moreover, bailouts tend to reduce trade credit availability and ultimately firms' sales. We further find that the direction and magnitude of the effects depends on firm quality and the relationship orientation of banks.     

Credit Crunch Caused by Bank Failures and Self‐Selection Behavior in Lending Markets

This study investigates how bank failures affect the real economy from the lenders’ perspective. Using experimental settings of unique bank failures in Japan, this paper identifies the credit crunch effect by bank failures. The main findings are the following. First, bank failures decrease the investments of the client firms by approximately 30%. Second, the high investment growth/level firms deal with unhealthy banks. These choices generate a self‐selection bias of 30–80%. Third, there is no evidence that bank‐failure shock is related to the firms’ accessibility to other financial sources.     

Firms as liquidity providers: Evidence from the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Using a supplier–client matched sample, we study the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on between-firm liquidity provision. Consistent with a causal effect of a negative shock to bank credit, we find that firms with high precrisis liquidity levels increased the trade credit extended to other corporations and subsequently experienced better performance as compared with ex ante cash-poor firms. Trade credit taken by constrained firms increased during this period. These findings are consistent with firms providing liquidity insurance to their clients when bank credit is scarce and offer an important precautionary savings motive for accumulating cash reserves.     

Do SMEs Benefit from Unconventional Monetary Policy and How? Microevidence from the Eurozone

We study the impact of the announcement of the European Central Bank's (ECB's) Outright Monetary Transactions Program on small firms’ access to finance using a matched firm‐bank data set from eight Eurozone countries. We find that following the announcement, credit access improved relatively more for firms borrowing from banks with high balance sheet exposures to impaired sovereign debt, with such firms less likely to be refused a loan or to be price rationed. Loan terms also improved as manifested by lengthening of loan maturities. Unconventional monetary policy has a positive impact on firms’ investment and profitability, while its effect on firm innovation is weaker.     

How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how banks resolve firms?? financial distress in Japan. Our results show that distressed firms that have more unsecured bank debt are more likely to restructure debt successfully out of court. Second, private debt restructuring is conducted during the year in which a financially distressed firm would be compelled to report negative net worth because of substantial accounting losses if no debt restructuring plans were implemented. Third, firms that are already in a negative net worth situation are more likely to receive debt forgiveness and/or debt-for-equity swaps. Finally, both the 1-year-lagged total liabilities-to-assets ratio and accounting losses are positively related to the private workout level. These results suggest that banks resolve firms?? financial distress in shareholders?? and creditors?? interests. We argue that, along with bankruptcy laws, the stock exchange rules and the fact that banks are allowed to hold shares in these firms affect the resolution of firms?? financial distress.     

Banks as Tax Planning Intermediaries

We provide the first large‐scale empirical evidence of banks functioning as tax planning intermediaries. We posit that some banks specialize in assisting corporate clients with tax planning. In this role, banks make use of their centrality in financial relationships; access to private information; and ability to structure, execute, and participate in tax planning transactions for clients. We measure bank‐client relationships using loan contracts and measure client tax planning using either the cash effective tax rate or the unrecognized tax benefit balance. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that firms experience meaningful tax reductions when they begin a relationship with a bank whose existing clients engage in above‐median tax planning. The effects of pairing with such tax intermediary banks are concentrated in relationships with larger or longer maturity loans, clients with foreign income or greater credit risk, and when the bank is an industry specialist or has above‐median investment banking activities. Finally, we find that potential clients are more likely to choose tax intermediary banks than nontax intermediary banks, suggesting that tax intermediary banks benefit by attracting new business. Collectively, our results suggest that some banks act as tax planning intermediaries, a role beyond the traditional one of financial intermediary.     

Credit rationing and the relationship between family businesses and banks in Italy

We investigate whether family businesses (FBs) suffer stiffer credit rationing in the post-crisis Italian economy. FBs are, in fact, typically more opaque than other firms, possibly deterring bank lending to them. Moreover, regulatory changes may lead many banks to abandon relationship lending, weakening their ability to evaluate opaque firms. Using detailed firm data, our estimates reach nuanced conclusions. First, credit rationing is not more intense at FBs. However, it systematically intensifies if FBs engage in firm-bank arrangements less able to overcome information asymmetries either coupling with a main bank that uses transactional lending or diluting relationships across various banking partners.     

The Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO Turnovers

This article investigates the governance role of banks exercised through the replacement of underperforming CEOs in borrowing firms. An average level of bank loans outstanding implies a 22% to 47% increase in the forced turnover probability of a borrowing firm’s CEO if a firm’s industry adjusted performance is one standard deviation below average. This increase is much larger, 68% to 92%, when an underperforming firm violates its loan covenants. Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that banks play a key role in the governance of underperforming firms, especially when covenants are violated.     

The effect of banking regulation on cross-border lending

Banking regulations often differ between countries: Some regulators require banks to document their evaluation of firms’ creditworthiness, which determines the banks’ choice of lending technology. In a theoretical model, we study how differences in regulation influence competition between domestic and foreign banks and analyze the effect of regulatory harmonization on cross-border lending. We predict that lending rates are lower and access to credit is easier for firms in a border region if the national regulations differ. Using unique bank- and firm-level data from Germany, we show that firms in a border region have better access to credit if regulation differs.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

The effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry and exit in transition economies

This study investigates the impact of foreign bank penetration on firm entry in Central and Eastern Europe. Acquisition of domestic banks by foreign investors has lowered rates of firm creation, decreased the average size of entrants, and increased firm exit in industries with greater informational opacity, while entry of greenfield foreign banks appears to have spurred firm creation and exit. We modify the view in earlier studies that informational opacity equates with firm size, defining opacity in terms of technological characteristics for a given industry. We find the economic significance of foreign bank entry is larger for opaque industries than industries with large shares of small firms. The study provides evidence of increased credit constraints for start-ups in Central and Eastern Europe which is consistent with the theoretical proposition that the presence of foreign banks exacerbates informational asymmetries.     

On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan

We examine the effects of bank–firm relationships on firm performance in Japan. When access to capital markets is limited, close bank–firm ties increase the availability of capital to borrowing firms, but do not lead to higher profitability or growth. The cost of capital of firms with close bank ties is higher than that of their peers. This indicates that most of the benefits from these relationships are appropriated by the banks. Finally, the slow growth rates of bank clients suggest that banks discourage firms from investing in risky, profitable projects. However, liberalization of financial markets reduces the banks' market power.     

Banking relationships and access to equity capital markets: Evidence from Japan’s main bank system

We study the role of banking relationships in IPO underwriting. When a firm in Japan goes public, it can engage an investment bank that is related through a common main bank, or can select an alternative investment bank. The main bank relationship can be an efficient way for the investment bank to acquire information generated by the main bank, but may give rise to conflicts of interest. We find that main bank relationships give small issuers increased access to equity capital markets, but that issuers of large IPOs often switch to non-related investment banks that are capable of managing large offerings. While investment banks seek to exploit bargaining power with related issuers, issuers respond to expected high issue cost by switching to non-related investment banks. The net result is that total issue costs through related and non-related investment banks are similar. With respect to aftermarket performance and use of proceeds, we find no evidence of conflict of interest or self-dealing for either the main bank or the investment bank.