An analysis of the reasons for the asymmetries surrounding earnings benchmarks

Several studies report an asymmetry in the distribution of earnings around specified benchmarks. However, doubt has arisen over whether the observed ‘kink’ in the distribution of earnings is solely caused by earnings management. We use a ratio analysis approach to examine a range of specific accruals for evidence of earnings management. We find little evidence that firms immediately above the benchmark have abnormal receivables, inventories or provisions. However, they do increase cash‐from‐customers and reduce inventory. Thus, our results support the recent research that suggests that firms engage in real actions to meet earnings benchmarks.     

Debt,diversification and earnings management

In this article we use panel-estimation techniques to calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) and to produce a better understanding of the nature of the relation between debt and earnings management. Consistent with the transparency hypothesis (which suggests that diversification increases the complexity of firms’ activities and reduces their transparency to outsiders), we find that for less-diversified (more transparent) firms, debt reduces positive discretionary accruals, whereas in relatively more-diversified (less transparent) firms the impact of debt becomes positive. Our paper shows that marginal increases in debt provide the incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, and diversification provides the needed context for this accounting practice to be possible. We have also found that only in the sub-sample of aggressive firms, those that manage discretionary accruals with enough magnitude to increase income, do lenders exert their control. Some firms, however, take advantage of diversification to avoid this control. Our findings are robust to several earnings-management measures and methodologies.     

Audit firm size, public ownership, and firms' discretionary accruals management

In this study, we developed and tested three hypotheses concerning earnings management in Belgium (i.e., a continental European environment). The three hypotheses are about: (1) income smoothing, (2) Bix Six auditors, and (3) public ownership. The study is motivated by the finding by Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam [Contemp. Account. Res. 15 (1998) 1] and Francis, Maydew, & Sparks [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17] that Big Six audit firms act as a constraint on both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. The finding raises questions as to the determinants of earnings management in other institutional settings such as that of Belgium. Accordingly, we study publicly available financial statements of a matched sample of publicly and privately held Belgian firms. Following Francis et al. [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17], DeFond and Subramanyam [J. Account. Econ. 25 (1998) 35], and Becker et al. [Contemp. Account. Res. 15 (1998) 1], we use discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. We find that Belgian companies—both private and public—engage in income smoothing and manage earnings opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of prior-year earnings. The evidence is also supportive of the other two hypotheses, but only when companies have earnings that are above target and have incentives to smooth earnings downwards. The fact that our results on the impact of Big Six auditors and ownership type are different for above and below target firms in Belgium, and differ with findings on U.S. samples, can be explained by the Belgian institutional environment.     

Pricing of innate and discretionary accruals in Australian debt

This paper addresses the conflicting evidence on the role of accruals in debt pricing. We show that the two subcomponents of accruals quality, innate and discretionary accruals, both impact the debt pricing. Higher innate accruals increases cost of debt, consistent with the prior evidence ( Francis et al., 2005 ; Gray et al., 2009 ). However, we also find that higher discretionary accruals reduce the cost of debt. This contrasts with the prior evidence of a positive association between discretionary accruals and cost and debt ( Francis et al., 2005 ), and no association ( Gray et al., 2009 ). We show that noisy measurement of cost of debt reconciles these results.     

Examining the relationship between earning management and market liquidity

The main purpose of this paper is to argue the extent that earnings management lowers liquidity. It should increase information asymmetry and impair trading liquidity. Using a sample of French firms from 2008 to 2011, we find that firms that manage earnings have wider bid-ask spreads. Our results are robust for both of two well-established measures of market liquidity. Therefore, the empirical results indicate that firms that exhibit greater earnings management are associated with lower market liquidity. These findings are in line with adverse selection and shed light on the role corporate governance devices can play in the consideration of shareholder interest’s protection, which leads to improved stock market liquidity levels.     

The association between corporate governance and earnings quality: Further evidence using the GOV-Score

This paper reexamines the relation between corporate governance and quality of earnings using a summary governance measure. Prior research has used many surrogates for corporate governance including size and composition of board of directors, existence and composition of audit committee, and extent of institutional ownership. However, the criticism of the extant research has been that corporate governance comprises many facets and is not uni-dimensional. In this study we fill this void by using the Gov-Score developed by Brown and Caylor [Brown, D., and Caylor, M.L., (2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25, 409-434.] to measure corporate governance. In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period, we find evidence of a significant inverse relationship, namely higher levels of corporate governance are associated with lower absolute discretionary accruals and higher quality of earnings. Furthermore, our results suggest that only firms in the highest category of corporate governance experience significantly improved quality of earnings. Finally, as a test of robustness, we document that corporate governance is negatively associated with small earnings surprises. This implies that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to manage earnings in order to meet or beat analyst forecasts.     

Opaque financial reports, R, and crash risk

We investigate the relation between the transparency of financial statements and the distribution of stock returns. Using earnings management as a measure of opacity, we find that opacity is associated with higher R²s, indicating less revelation of firm-specific information. Moreover, opaque firms are more prone to stock price crashes, consistent with the prediction of the Jin and Myers [2006. R² around the world: new theory and new tests. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 257–292] model. However, these relations seem to have dissipated since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, suggesting that earnings management has decreased or that firms can hide less information in the new regulatory environment.     

Discretionary accruals: signalling or earnings management in Australia?

We investigate the signalling effect of discretionary accruals (DAC). Although we find that discretionary accruals are insignificantly related to contemporaneous stock returns, we uncover that income‐increasing discretionary accruals of GAAP‐complying growth firms are significantly and positively related to contemporaneous stock returns. Furthermore, we find that this positive effect is stronger among firms with better corporate governance mechanisms, such as Board of Directors Independence, Audit Committee Independence and Large Shareholders’ Ownership. In addition to contemporaneous stock returns, we also find similar results with the future increase in dividends. Our findings are consistent with the argument that corporate governance can enhance the signalling effect of reported earnings of GAAP‐complying growth firms.     

Market perceptions of discretionary accruals by debt renegotiating firms during economic downturn

This study addresses how a stock market prices earnings components around a sudden and severe economic downturn. In particular, the study examines the market valuation of discretionary accruals for debt renegotiating Malaysian firms during the Asian financial crisis. Our analysis shows that negative discretionary accruals for debt renegotiating firms are associated with higher market values of equity and are not related to the firms' future earnings. These findings are consistent with investors placing a positive value on the probability that negative accruals increase the likelihood that concessions can be extracted from lenders during renegotiation. In contrast, discretionary accruals for a control sample of non-debt renegotiating firms are not significantly associated with stock prices but are positively associated with future earnings.     

Impact of family dominance on monitoring of earnings management by audit committees: Evidence from Hong Kong

This study examines whether the establishment of audit committees by Hong Kong firms would constrain earnings management, especially in firms with family-dominated corporate boards, a condition unique to Hong Kong. The study uses the methodology of three-stage (3SLS) regression analyses to control for endogeneity among earnings management, voluntarily established audit committee, and corporate board size. The results of regression analyses based on 523 observations for the period of 1999-2000 when the audit committees were first established by Hong Kong firms show that overall audit committees play a significant role in constraining earnings management even in the business environment of higher ownership concentration. The effectiveness of audit committees is, however, significantly reduced when family members are present on corporate boards, especially when family members dominate the corporate board.     

A study of earnings-management motives in the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental accounting models: The Canadian and French cases

The purpose of this paper is to investigate factors that potentially influence earnings-management policy with reference to the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental accounting models. Canada and France, respectively, belong to those different socio-economic environments. Earnings-management practices detected in those countries are expected to be affected by specific socio-economic features of the Anglo-American and the Euro-Continental environments. We explain earnings-management practices by incentives suggested in the literature to reveal which motives are prominent within each environment.We tested our earnings-management motives (EMM) model using appropriate panel-estimation techniques over 1674 Canadian and 1470 French firm-year observations. Our results provide evidence that incentives for earnings management for French firms are specifically linked to contractual debt costs and effective tax rate. However, Canadian firms show specific incentives matched with a dynamic capital market. Issuing equity is a strong motive for earnings management in Canadian firms.     

Accounting-based versus market-based cross-sectional models of CDS spreads

Models of financial distress rely primarily on accounting-based information (e.g. [Altman, E., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23, 589–609; Ohlson, J., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research 19, 109–131]) or market-based information (e.g. [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance 29, 449–470]). In this paper, we provide evidence on the relative performance of these two classes of models. Using a sample of 2860 quarterly CDS spreads we find that a model of distress using accounting metrics performs comparably to market-based structural models of default. Moreover, a model using both sources of information performs better than either of the two models. Overall, our results suggest that both sources of information (accounting- and market-based) are complementary in pricing distress.