ACCOUNTING FOR THE TIMING OF FIRST MARRIAGE*

Among first marriages in the United States, grooms are on average 1.7 years older than their brides. Traditionally, this fact is explained by sex differences in income. We use a general equilibrium, overlapping generations search model economy to show instead that sex differences in fecundity are essential to account for the age gap at first marriage, whereas sex differences in income play a secondary role. Our model economy also accounts for other facts on the timing of first marriages that the literature has overlooked.     

隆回县花瑶民俗风情旅游开发

隆回县花瑶文化神秘、服饰色彩艳丽、民俗风情浓郁、自然山水秀美,具有良好的旅游开发资源基础.文章简要分析了花瑶民俗风情的基本特质和形成的地缘文化背景,较为详尽地描述了花瑶村落、民俗风情、挑花、特产等花瑶民俗风情的主要外显,并指出省域内同类民俗风情旅游产品较多,竞争形势较为严峻.在此基础上,从花瑶民俗风情旅游开发项目设计、资源整合、节会打造、管理机制、资源保护等方面,提出了隆回县花瑶民俗风情旅游开发战略架构.     

基于国籍差异的杭州市入境旅游市场目的地感知形象研究

以往文献针对特定心理或行为变量,如满意度、参与游憩活动等变量,研究民族文化对这些变量影响的强弱程度,而忽视对目的地形象因子感知结构的影响.文章通过日本+韩国、日本、韩国,欧美地区等四个游客样本,检验民族文化对目的地形象因子感知结构差异的影响.结果发现,目的地形象因子存在明显的结构性差异,在因子数目、因子载荷、因子问项构成、形象因子对满意度和未来行为意向的影响等方面,都有不同的表现.最后,对于杭州特性因子,开展差异性营销.     

ON THE EMERGENCE OF TOYBOYS: THE TIMING OF MARRIAGE WITH AGING AND UNCERTAIN CAREERS*

We explore how gender bias in career opportunities affects matching in a marriage market with search frictions and where an individual’s fitness decays with age. We document a “being left on the shelf” effect where young singles, who find the marriage market rapidly thins with age, rush into early partnership. Singles with stronger career opportunities, however, have a greater option value to defer marriage. More equal career opportunities for women (captured by greater schooling and better occupations) potentially explain the recent emergence of toyboy unions, in which the woman is at least 5 years older than her partner.     

UNDERSTANDING MEASURES OF NONMARITAL FERTILITY: THE ROLES OF MARRIAGE AND ACCESS TO HUMAN CAPITAL

This paper proposes an explanation for several decades of rising U.S. nonmarital birth rates and shares, and for cross‐sectional differences in black‐white fertility. Significantly, the explanation does not rely on changes over time or differences across races in individual fertility behavior. It is consistent with the rising nonmarital fertility measures observed in the United States since the mid‐1970s, higher measured fertility for unmarried blacks than whites, and differences across races in the timing of childbearing, despite nearly constant total fertility rates and increasingly similar target family sizes for blacks and whites. The explanation relies on a selection effect associated with changes in the marriage rate and on racial differences in access to human capital investment opportunities. We find strong support for the explanation using U.S. data over the period 1957–2002. Our findings suggest caution in interpreting the results of empirical studies of childbearing that examine marital and nonmarital fertility rates separately, as these studies typically ignore the selection effect of marriage. (JEL J12, J13, I38)     

SINGLE MOMS AND DEADBEAT DADS: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS,MARRIAGE MARKET CONDITIONS,AND PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY

Why do some men father children outside of marriage without providing support? Why do some women have children outside of marriage when they receive little support from fathers? Why is this behavior more common among Blacks than Whites? We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support decisions. We consider the extent to which low earnings, marriage market conditions, and preference heterogeneity explain nonmarital childbearing, deadbeat fatherhood, and racial differences in these outcomes. We find the Black–White earnings gap and preference heterogeneity explain a substantial portion of racial differences, whereas marriage market conditions are less important.     

THE ROLE OF LABOR AND MARRIAGE MARKETS,PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY,AND THE WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE LIFE CYCLE DECISIONS OF BLACK,HISPANIC, AND WHITE WOMEN*

Using data from the NLSY79, we structurally estimate a dynamic model of the life cycle decisions of young women. The women make sequential joint decisions about school attendance, work, marriage, fertility, and welfare participation. We use the model to perform counterfactual simulations designed to shed light on three questions: (1) How much of observed minority–majority differences in behavior can be attributed to differences in labor market opportunities, marriage market opportunities, and preference heterogeneity? (2) How does the welfare system interact with these factors to augment those differences? (3) How can new cohorts that grow up under the new welfare system (Temporary Aid for Needy Families) be expected to behave compared to older cohorts?     

CROSS‐BORDER MARRIAGE COSTS AND MARRIAGE BEHAVIOR: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This article analyzes cross‐border marriages between mainland China and Hong Kong (HK). We examine the effects of a reduction in cross‐border marriage costs following an increase in marriage‐migration quotas and the handover of HK to China. We find that cross‐border marriages mainly involve men from the low tail of the HK attribute distribution. We also find that HK women's position in the marriage market and within households deteriorated following the reduction in cross‐border marriage costs and that their disadvantaged position exerts an incentive effect on their labor market behavior. These outcomes are consistent with our matching model.     

MARRIAGE,MARKETS, AND MONEY: A COASIAN THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION

This article integrates search‐based models of marriage and money. We think about households as organizations, the way Coase thinks about firms, as alternatives to markets that become more attractive when transactions costs increase. In the model, individuals consume market‐ and home‐produced goods, and home production is facilitated by marriage. Market frictions, including taxes, search, and bargaining problems, increase the marriage propensity. The inflation tax encourages marriage because being single is cash intensive. Microdata confirm singles use cash more than married people. We use macrodata over many countries to investigate how marriage responds to inflation, taxation, and other variables.     

COHABITATION,MARRIAGE, AND DIVORCE IN A MODEL OF MATCH QUALITY*

The objective of this research is to further our understanding of how and why individuals enter and leave coresidential relationships. We develop and estimate an economic model of nonmarital cohabitation, marriage, and divorce that is consistent with current data on the formation and dissolution of relationships. Jovanovic's (Journal of Political Economy 87 (1979), 972–90) theoretical matching model is extended to help explain household formation and dissolution behavior. Implications of the model reveal what factors influence the decision to start a relationship, what form this relationship will take, and the relative stability of the various types of unions. The structural parameters of the model are estimated using longitudinal data from a sample of female high school seniors from the United States. New numerical methods are developed to reduce computational costs associated with estimation. The empirical results have interesting interpretations given the structural model. They show that a significant cause of cohabitation is the need to learn about potential partners and to hedge against future bad shocks. The estimated parameters are used to conduct several comparative dynamic experiments. For example, we show that policy experiments changing the cost of divorce have little effect on relationship choices.