Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency

This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes [1936] and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006]. In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.     

Does Voluntary Disclosure Improve Stock Price Informativeness?

According to theory, comovement in stock prices reflects comovement in the fundamental factors underlying the values of stocks. Recent theory contends that stock price comovement can be driven by information markets or the informational opacity of the firm. To the extent that voluntary disclosure reduces information acquisition cost and enhances firm transparency, we predict that enhanced voluntary disclosure reduces stock price comovement. We provide evidence in support of this prediction using analyst evaluation of firm disclosure policy. Overall, our evidence supports the effectiveness of firm disclosure policy in increasing the amount of firm‐specific information contained in stock returns.     

AUTOMOTIVE RECALLS AND INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY

This study provides an empirical test of the informational efficiency of the stock market by exploring the stock price and volume patterns exhibited by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors around the time of announcement of severe automotive recall campaigns. Because information concerning automotive recalls is released to the public via two distinct methods, which differ only with respect to the number of market participants notified of the recall campaigns, a differential performance analysis of stock returns and trading volume around both events provides evidence of the degree of informational aggregation in the stock market for three closely followed U.S. firms. The results of the study fail to support the definitional notion of informational efficiency with respect to the first public release date of severe recalls, as the vast majority of the stock market's response to recall announcements does not occur until the information is reported to all market participants. Further, tests of differential trading volume around the announcements suggest that some members of the financial community may be trading securities on the basis of the information contained in the first public announcement.     

Changes in the Information Efficiency of Stock Prices: Additional Evidence

Previous research shows, using data from three quarters after the implementation of regulation fair disclosure (Reg FD), that there is an improvement in the informational efficiency of stock prices after Reg FD. We compare the informational efficiency of stock prices in four pre-Reg FD quarters (1999–2000) and 12 post-Reg FD quarters (2002–2005). The improvement in the informational efficiency of stock prices previously reported in the immediate aftermath of Reg FD persists in later periods.     

Ownership structure,corporate governance and analyst following: A study of French listed firms

This study investigates the effects of some characteristics of the French corporate governance model – deemed to foster entrenchment and facilitate private benefits extraction – on the extent of analyst following. The results show that analysts are more likely to follow firms both with high discrepancy level between ownership and control and those controlled through pyramiding. These findings provide empirical support to the argument that minority shareholders value private information on firms with high expropriation likelihood, asking thence for more analyst services. Additional findings show that analysts are reticent to follow firms managed by controlling family members. This is, in part, explained by these firms’ reliance on private communication channels rather than public disclosure, producing a poor informational environment.     

The informational consequences of good and bad mergers

We study the information production dynamics in financial markets in response to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) announcements. We find that acquirers with low levels of pre-announcement stock price informativeness experience a substantial increase in their corresponding post-announcement stock price informativeness in response to positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). We show that this increase is due to the enhanced prospect of deal completion. By contrast, high levels of acquirer pre-announcement stock price informativeness limit traders' incentives to search for, and acquire, new information. We also find that similar dynamics apply to the changes in acquirers' analyst coverage. Emphasizing the important role of information acquisition costs in influencing informed trading, a positive acquirer CAR increases the acquiring firm's post-announcement stock price informativeness in M&As involving public rather than private and subsidiary targets. Overall, we show that M&As have important informational consequences beyond their immediate effects on stock prices.     

Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?

In a capitalist economy, prices serve to equilibrate supply and demand for goods and services, continually changing to reallocate resources to their most efficient uses. However, secondary stock market prices, often viewed as the most “informationally efficient” prices in the economy, have no direct role in the allocation of equity capital since managers have discretion in determining the level of investment. What is the link between stock price informational efficiency and economic efficiency? We present a model of the stock market in which: (i) managers have discretion in making investments and must be given the right incentives; and (ii) stock market traders may have important information that managers do not have about the value of prospective investment opportunities. In equilibrium, information in stock prices will guide investment decisions because managers will be compensated based on informative stock prices in the future. The stock market indirectly guides investment by transferring two kinds of information: information about investment opportunities and information about managers' past decisions. However, because this role is only indirect, the link between price efficiency and economic efficiency is tenuous. We show that stock price efficiency is not sufficient for economic efficiency by showing that the model may have another equilibrium in which prices are strong-form efficient, but investment decisions are suboptimal. We also suggest that stock market efficiency is not necessary for investment efficiency by considering a banking system that can serve as an alternative institution for the efficient allocation of investment resources.     

A comparison of the skewness of stock return distributions at earnings and non-earnings announcement dates

This paper presents evidence that stock return prediction errors are less positively skewed in the time period surrounding accounting earnings report announcements than in a subsequent non- announcement period. Assuming that information available about firms in non-announcement periods depends on discretionary disclosure practices of firms and discretionary search for information by investors, the results suggest that earnings reports cause more extreme ‘bad news’ to be reflected in stock prices relative to discretionary sources of information.     

水信息披露、机构投资者与股价同步性

基于2010-2016年中国A股高水敏感行业的322家上市公司数据,实证检验水信息披露对股价同步性的影响,以及机构投资者的调节效应。研究表明：水信息披露对股价同步性的影响呈倒U型,且在民营企业样本中尤其显著。在国有企业样本中,机构投资者的加入能促使水信息披露更好地融入股价;在民营企业样本中,只有在高水信息披露水平下,机构投资者才能更好地发挥调节作用。     

The impact of replacement cost disclosure on security prices: New Evidence

A number of studies have tested for information content in the ASR 190 disclosure by comparing the conditional and unconditional distribution of abnormal security returns around the time of disclosure. Since no differences were observed, it was concluded that ASR 190 had no information content. The study reported below performs a similar test by estimating the regression function of the conditional distribution of abnormal returns. This test procedure controls for the information content in contemporaneous historical cost disclosure and uses a conditioning variable not considered in earlier tests. It finds statistically significant stock price effects. However, because most of the effects appear to precede the official announcement date by several months, it is unclear whether stock prices were responding to the leakage of the information content of ASR 190 prior to disclosure, to private production of information contained in ASR 190 or to a variable omitted from the study which happens to be correlated with replacement costs.     

Indexing and Stock Price Efficiency

Indexing has experienced substantial growth over the last two decades because it is an effective way of holding a diversified portfolio while minimizing trading costs and taxes. In this article, we focus on one negative externality of indexing: the effect on the efficiency of stock prices. Based on a sample of large and liquid US stocks, we find that greater indexing leads to less efficient stock prices, as indicated by stronger post‐earnings‐announcement drift and greater deviations of stock prices from the random walk. We conjecture that reduced incentives for information acquisition and arbitrage induced by indexing and passive trading are probably the main causes for degradation in price efficiency.     

Effects of Preannouncements on Analyst and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings News

This study examines the effects of earnings preannouncements on financial analyst and stock price reactions to earnings news. Prior experimental research documents that when the signs of a preannouncement surprise and subsequent earnings announcement surprise are consistent (i.e., both either positive or negative), analysts make larger magnitude revisions to their future period earnings forecasts in response to the total earnings news conveyed in the preannouncement and earnings announcement than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. This study extends this research by examining a sample of actual preannouncements from 1993–1997 to determine whether the effects documented in laboratory settings manifest at the aggregate market level in stock prices and consensus analyst forecast revisions. Results indicate that after controlling for the sign of earnings news, sign of earnings, and sign of the earnings announcement surprise, stock prices and analyst forecast revisions respond more strongly when a preannouncement and subsequent earnings announcement elicit the same surprise signs than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. Further analysis indicates that the consistency of the signs of a preannouncement surprise and earnings announcement surprise is not associated with future earnings, suggesting that the magnified reaction of investors and analysts to consistent surprise signs is not a rational reaction to associations observed in market settings.     

Informational Feedback,Adverse Selection,and Optimal Disclosure Policy

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.     

Stock Market Reaction to the Bank Liquidation in Japan: A Case for the Informational Effect Hypothesis

Previous studies investigating the stock market reaction to U.S. bank failures rejected the bank run or domino hypothesis. However, if providing relevant bank information to the public is crucial to preventing bank panics, Japanese banks with limited disclosure are more vulnerable to bank runs than their U.S. counterparts. In this paper, I investigate the stock market reaction to Hyogo Bank's liquidation on August 30, 1995, which was the first bank liquidation in Japan and placed the financial burden on the general public. I find that stock market participants distinguished solvent banks from problematic banks. That is, my results, supporting the informational effect hypothesis, suggest that it is questionable even in Japan for the government to bail out an insolvent bank based on the potential risk of bank runs.     

Risk-Shifting Incentives and Signalling Through Corporate Capital Structure

This paper examines optimal corporate financing arrangements under asymmetric information for different patterns of temporal resolution of uncertainty in the underlying technology. An agency problem, a signalling problem and an agency-signalling problem arise as special cases. The associated informational equilibria and the optimal financing arrangements are characterized and compared. In the agency-signalling equilibrium the private information of corporate insiders at the time of financing is signalled through capital structure choices which deviate optimally from agency-cost minimizing financing arrangements, which in turn induce risk-shifting incentives in the investment policy. In the pure signalling case the equilibrium is characterized by direct contractual precommitments to implement investment policies which are riskier than pareto-optimal levels. Empirical implications for debt covenants and the announcement effect of investment policies and leverage increasing transactions on existing stock and bond prices are explicitly derived.     

投资者关注与市场反应——来自中国证券交易所交易公开信息的自然实验

涨停的股票能否被交易公开信息披露取决于收益率排名中的随机因素,与股票的基本面特征无关。本文利用这一机制设计自然实验检验了投资者关注对股价的影响。实证结果显示交易公开信息披露使股票受到投资者更多的关注,增加了小额资金的净流入,减少了大额资金的净流入和股价的短期收益率,抑制了股价短期波动率,同时降低了股价在长期发生反转的可能性。频繁登上交易公开信息的知名营业部买入的股票受到更多关注,相应的市场反应也更加显著。进一步的研究表明监管性信息披露引发的投资者关注通过降低市场信息不对称抑制了股价反转。     

Interest Rate Surprises and Stock Prices

This paper examines the impact of unexpected changes in the federal funds target on stock prices from 1988 to 2001. Measures of interest rate surprises are constructed from survey data and changes in the 3-month T-bill yield. I find that surprises associated with decreases in the target cause stock prices to rise significantly. Surprises associated with increases in the target increase stock market volatility on the announcement day, with volatility reverting to pre-surprise levels on the day after the announcement. This volatility pattern is only evident since 1994. An implication is that concerns about immediate disclosure causing persistent and heightened stock market volatility might be misplaced.     

Short sales constraints and price adjustments to earnings announcements: Evidence from the Hong Kong market

This study examines how short sales constraints affect the stock price adjustment to the release of public information in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Using a unique feature of this market that allows us to directly investigate the impact of short sales restriction, we find the following. First, non-shortable stocks react more strongly to the publication of negative information than shortable stocks do. Second, non-shortable stocks are overpriced before negative earnings announcements. Hence, part of the strong market reaction of non-shortable stocks on announcement day could be due to the correction of such overpricing. Third, the prices of non-shortable stocks reverse following the announcement of negative information, suggesting that investors overreact to negative information on announcement day. Fourth, it takes longer for the prices of non-shortable stocks to adjust to negative earnings information. On the whole, our results support the research that finds short sales restrictions reduce the efficiency of stock markets.