One-Time Cash Flow Announcements and Free Cash-Flow Theory: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends

The leading explanation for the positive price response surrounding tender offer share repurchase and specially designated dividend (SDD) announcements is the information signaling hypothesis. This paper reexamines these announcements to determine if Jensen's free cash-flow theory also has explanatory power. Lang and Litzenberger's (1989) findings suggest an important role for the free cash-flow theory in explaining the market's reaction to dividend changes. In contrast, we find the market's reaction to share repurchases and SDDs is approximately the same for both high-Q and low-Q firms. We thus have an empirical puzzle: If Jensen's free cash-flow theory applies to dividend changes, it is difficult to see why it does not also apply to the analogous events examined here.     

Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis

We show that repurchases have not only became an important form of payout for U.S. corporations, but also that firms finance their share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends. We find that young firms have a higher propensity to pay cash through repurchases than they did in the past and that repurchases have become the preferred form of initiating a cash payout. Although large, established firms have generally not cut their dividends, they also show a higher propensity to pay out cash through repurchases. These findings indicate that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends. Our results also suggest that before 1983, regulatory constraints inhibited firms from aggressively repurchasing shares.     

“自由现金流假说”评析

“自由现金流假说”是公司控制权市场理论的三大核心概念之一，它建立在代理成本研究的基础上，是对代理理论的一大发展。……     

The Effects of Cash,Debt, and Insiders on Open Market Share Repurchases

The findings of the authors' recent study suggest, on balance, that stock repurchases function much like tax‐efficient special dividends, increasing when free cash flow is large and when debt levels are low, but not replacing regularly scheduled dividends. Repurchasing companies experience median event returns of about 2% around the repurchase announcements, with a related mean effect of roughly 3%. Companies with greater free cash flow and less debt are more likely than otherwise comparable companies to repurchase their shares. Furthermore, repurchasing companies that exhibit substandard preannouncement stock price returns and seek to buy back higher percentages of shares tend to elicit more positive stock price reactions. At the same time, the study provides some evidence that corporate managers attempt to use their inside information to profit from buybacks. For example, managing insiders in repurchasing firms decrease their selling activity and increase their buying activity two weeks before repurchase announcements to a greater extent than non‐managing insiders. But perhaps the most remarkable finding from this part of the study is how little insiders as a group seem to profit from their short‐term trading behavior—a finding that suggests that the market appears to anticipate much of this behavior.     

基于自由现金流代理成本假说的投资行为研究

基于自由现金流代理成本假说，本文利用我国上市公司（A股）制造业1998-2003年数据对上市公司投资行为进行实证研究。研究结果表明，（1）经理持股比例越低，代理问题越严重，投资现金流相关性越高。（2）企业融资约束程度越轻，代理问题越严重，投资现金流相关性越高，经理越容易建造“企业帝国”。具体表现为：国家股比例越高，投资现金流相关性越高；净资产税后利润率越高，投资现金流相关性越高；企业规模越大，投资现金流相关性越高。建立有效的公司治理机制可以解决有关代理问题。     

The Long Run Abnormal Performance of UK Acquirers and the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis

Abstract:   Evidence from recent US and UK studies reveals a pattern of poor long run post acquisition performance by acquiring firms. One explanation, due to Jensen (1986) is that acquirers with an excess of free cash flow (FCF) will have a propensity to squander this on wasteful investments, including take‐overs. In this paper, using a dataset of UK take‐overs and proxies for free cash flow similar to those used by Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) , we find no support for the FCF hypothesis and show that this conclusion is robust to the model of long run returns employed. Contrary to the free cash flow hypothesis there is evidence that acquirers with high free cash flow perform better than acquirers with low free cash flow. Although not consistent with the Jensen hypothesis, this evidence is compatible with the emerging UK evidence that shows cash flow‐to‐price measures are associated with market returns.     

Signaling, Free Cash Flow and Nonmonotonic Dividends

Many argue that dividends signal future earnings or dispose of excess cash. Empirical support is inconclusive, potentially because no model combines both rationales. This paper does. Higher quality firms pay dividends to eliminate the free cash-flow problem, while firms that outsiders perceive as lower quality pay dividends to signal future earnings and reduce the free cash-flow problem. In equilibrium, dividends are nonmonotonic with respect to the signal observed by outsiders; the highest quality firms pay smaller dividends than lower perceived quality firms. The model reconciles the existing literature and generates new empirical predictions that are tested and supported.     

A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions

This paper tests (Jensen The American Economic Review, 76, 323–329 1986) free cash flow hypothesis using data on real estate transactions. We find that firms with either higher free cash flow or higher cash reserve pay more fore real estate, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. We also find that the agency costs of free cash flow associated with real estate transactions are more severe when firms have lower Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, we find that among the commonly used corporate governance measures, only equity compensation is effective in mitigating the agency problem of free cash flow.     

自由现金流、现金股利与中国上市公司过度投资

处于经理人控制之下的自由现金流有可能被投入到损害公司价值的非盈利项目上，从而导致过度投资。股利代理成本理论认为，较高的股利支付水平可以迫使经理人“吐出”自由现金流，从而降低企业自由现金流代理成本。但本文实证研究表明，中国上市公司过度投资程度与现金股利支付水平无关。其原因在于，上市公司股利政策受到监管层政策驱动因素的影响，造成股利政策扭曲，并被“异化”为大股东“利益输送”的一种手段。     

论现金流量管理假设

随着市场经济的发展 ,现金流量管理在企业管理中的地位越来越重要。本文分五部分对现金流量管理理论体系的重要组成部分———现金流量管理假设进行了探讨 ,并认为现金流量管理假设体系由管理主体假设、持续经营假设、管理分期假设、时间价值假设、理性管理假设、信息不对称假设、管理有效性假设、现金资源稀缺假设和不确定性假设九个假设组成。     

Free Cash Flow,Issuance Costs,and Stock Prices

We develop a dynamic model of a firm facing agency costs of free cash flow and external financing costs, and derive an explicit solution for the firm's optimal balance sheet dynamics. Financial frictions affect issuance and dividend policies, the value of cash holdings, and the dynamics of stock prices. The model predicts that the marginal value of cash varies negatively with the stock price, and positively with the volatility of the stock price. This yields novel insights on the asymmetric volatility phenomenon, on risk management policies, and on how business cycles and agency costs affect the volatility of stock returns.     

Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?

This paper investigates the governance implications of a firm's capital structure and managerial incentive compensation in controlling the free cash flow agency problem. The results suggest: debt and executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a firm's free cash flow problem; failure to incorporate the substitutability and endogeneity leads to underestimates of the magnitude and economic implication of the disciplinary role of both mechanisms; firm characteristics differ across the prevalence of debt usage versus option usage, suggesting the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of the monitoring devices; and all the above effects are more pronounced in firms that tend to have more severe agency problem.     

Finance methodology of Free Cash Flow

Free Cash Flow (FCF) was adopted in the late 1980s as a financial tool to evaluate the firm and its individual projects. We question the procedure of calculating the FCF where a significant portion of Current Liabilities is offset against Current Assets, thereby creating the hybrid asset Net Working Capital (NWC). Borrowed from accounting methodology, that procedure distorts the FCF size, composition, volatility, and estimated value. Our empirical analysis shows that the nature and extent of those distortions can misinform the firm's stockholders, lenders and borrowers, and investors at large. We propose a revised FCF that would avoid those distortions.     

公司治理结构、市场环境与自由现金流

目前,自由现金流已成为考察上市公司治理质量的重要指标,为此,本文选取A股和香港上市公司的数据对治理结构与自由现金流的关系作了比较研究。实证结果表明,控制股东持股与自由现金流存在正相关关系,A股公司控制股东比H股和香港非中资公司控制股东更倾向于将自由现金流留在公司内部;除香港非中资公司外,其他类型的公司中机构投资者没有发挥对自由现金流代理问题的抑制作用;独立董事在减少自由现金流方面发挥了积极作用,香港非中资公司独立董事在抑制自由现金流的代理问题中发挥的作用大于H股和A股独立董事。     

Free Cash Flow, Golden Parachutes, and the Discipline of Takeover Activity

We conjecture that golden parachutes are initiated when the agency cost of free cash flow is most severe. We examine the relation between golden parachutes and investment levels in firms that have been successfully acquired. Our results support these three conclusions. First, target firms overinvest prior to an acquisition when golden parachutes are present. Second, the acquirers of targets with golden parachutes reduce investment subsequent to the takeover. Third, the reversal in capital investment by the combined firm is correlated with the magnitude of the target's pre-acquisition overinvestment. The latter findings indicate the takeover acts as a disciplining mechanism with the acquirer reversing the target overinvestment subsequent to the acquisition     

自由现金流量与财务运行体系

自由现金流量 (FreeCashFlow)作为一个财务命题的提出和运用虽已有近 2 0年的历史 ,但它在财务理论和实践的功能还没有引起足够的关注。本文通过对自由现金流量概念分析和构成描述 ,梳理它与公司治理下的财务分层管理、财务政策和预算体系之间相互关系 ,展现以自由现金流量为主线构造的现代财务运行体系 ,从而进一步疏通财务管理服务于公司价值最大化目标的具体思路。     

试析自由现金流量的概念及其应用

"自由现金流量"作为一项财务命题,已成为当今理财学界研究与探索的核心问题之一。本文针对目前国外学者提出的种种不同表述的自由现金流量概念,就其共识与差别进行了分析,并在此基础上对自由现金流量命题在理财学中的应用问题加以介绍。     

Earnings Surprises in Analysts' Forecasts,Mandatory Disclosure,and Share Repurchases

This paper examines the impact of forecast errors and the mandatory disclosure of repurchase transactions required by 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations on share repurchases. We define forecast errors as the difference between analysts' forecasted earnings and actual earnings. We argue that firms with positive forecast errors imply greater information asymmetry, which may induce them to signal through share repurchases. We show that both the repurchase target and analysts' forecast revision are positively related to forecast errors. Furthermore, these associations are more pronounced in the low disclosure period (1989–2003) where greater information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is found, while increased transparency in the high disclosure period (2004–2006) leads to more significant improvement in long‐term performances for firms with positive forecast errors. The results are consistent with our expectations that the information asymmetry implied in forecast errors, along with a shock change from the introduction of the 2003 SEC regulation, affect both corporate and analysts' behaviour.