金融契约、决策权配置与管理者激励

突破传统的现金流分析思路,从金融契约和决策权配置视角分析了管理者激励问题,认为外部投资者和经营者之间的决策权配置对经营者行动选择和投资者利益保护产生重要影响。模型分析结果表明,投资者和经营者之间的一般控制权分配并不必然与所有权相匹配,而是受到金融契约缔结过程中双方谈判力大小的影响,经营者最低让渡控制权大小受到投资者期望投资回报、市场监管环境和管理者团队声誉等五个因素影响。     

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System

This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively.     

负债与现金股利共存于激励契约的模型推演

信息传递理论和代理成本理论认为,在激励契约中,负债和现金股利可以相互替代,但是现实中负债与现金股利却共存于激励契约。文章通过模型推演,证明债务支付承诺的“刚性”在控制道德风险方面存在优势,但在传递信息方面存在不足。而现金股利支付承诺则具有较大“弹性”,该弹性能提高信息传递能力,以改善控制逆向选择(隐藏信息)和道德风险(隐藏行动)的效率,从而使负债与现金股利具有互补性,为负债与现金股利共存于公司的激励契约提供了合理的解释。     

Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO₂ abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO₂ of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.     

激励与约束:国有商业银行信贷管理制度分析

对于银行而言,其经营中所面临的道德风险不仅来源于借款企业,更重要、更直接的是其信贷人员的“财德行为”问题。我国国有商业银行传统的信贷管理制度未能对信贷人员的代理行为形成有效的约束,从而导致了大量银行坏帐的产生。现有的信贷管理制度又过度强调了对风险的防范,从而又在很大程度上约束了银行的开拓经营和整修宏观经济的平稳快速发展。本文对此运用契约经济理论分析了我国国有商业银行传统及现有信贷管理制度对信贷人员所做的契约安排及其存在的问题,在此基础上尝试性的提出了一种新的制度改进方案。     

Performance Standards and Incentive Pay in Agency Contracts

When the presence of limited liability restricts a principal from imposing monetary fines on an agent in case of poor performance, the principal might use other kinds of punishment threats to deter the agent from shirking. We show that under the optimal contract in this case, the principal sets a performance standard and punishes the agent if the standard is not met, but rewards the agent on a profit-sharing basis if the standard is significantly exceeded. The optimal choice of performance standards for such contracts is discussed. It is shown that punishment threats, although inefficient, often help the principal to discipline the agent.
JEL classification : D 82     

Merger selection,evidence provision,and the timing of merger control

Merger control impacts the type of merger projects that are submitted, as well as the information provided by the merging parties upon assessment. In this paper, we consider the outcomes in terms of selection of merger types and evidence provision of alternative timings for merger review, pre- or postconsummation of the merger. We show that the selection effect induced by the ex post merger review is welfare-improving due to the deterrence of the most anticompetitive merger projects. In contrast, the welfare impact of evidence provision under ex post assessment is ambiguous. Balancing these two effects makes possible the welfare comparison between the ex ante and the ex post merger policy enforcement.     

双边道德风险条件下科技人员的激励薪酬契约

文章利用现代契约经济学的基本理论,对双边道德风险条件下科技人员的线性激励薪酬契约设计的内在规律进行了分析.分析表明,在理论和实践两方面,线性激励薪酬契约都有广泛存在的合理性.同时,文章根据研究结论并结合中国实际,给出了相应的规范性建议.     

非对称信息下政府对企业节能减排激励机制研究

综合考虑经济增长与节能减排的双重任务,将消费者购买行为、节能减排努力准入标准、政府监督信号考虑在内,构建了政府与企业之间的多任务委托‐代理模型。分别探讨了对称信息和非对称信息下政府如何设计有效的激励机制,鼓励和引导企业积极进行节能减排。结果表明:节能减排努力市场准入标准越高,政府应给与企业越多的固定补贴;政府应根据观测到的企业不同节能减排努力水平设计激励机制;政府监督对促进企业节能减排具有重要作用。     

基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究

针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。     

Two-sided Markets,Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts

We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product differentiation on each side of the market. When platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers, we show that “competitive bottlenecks” arise endogenously. In equilibrium, platforms do not compete directly for sellers, instead choosing to compete indirectly by subsidizing buyers to join. Sellers are left with none of the gains from trade. Despite this, it is sellers who choose to purchase from multiple platforms (multihome). Finally, the role of exclusive contracts to prevent multihoming is explored. We are very grateful to Jose Miguel Abito for research assistance, and to the editor and a referee for helpful comments.     

自发性会计变更、监管契约与契约成本

笔者对我国上市公司自发性会计变更的行为从契约理论的角度进行了分析。对证券市场监管规定和强制性会计政策——两种不同的监管契约对自发性会计变更的不同影响从单向强制性契约成本构成及契约成本最小化方面进行了解释,对证券市场监管契约成本和强制性会计政策契约成本进行了比较研究。     

Weak and Strong Signals

Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz showed that competitive markets can perform very poorly in the presence of informational asymmetry. In this paper I show that if there is a signaling technology which is sufficiently strong (i.e., the marginal cost of signaling declines sufficiently rapidly with quality) the cost of sorting is low and a Nash equilibrium exists. Empirically testable necessary and sufficient conditions for existence are derived. I further show that if Akerlovian participation constraints are added to a signaling model there is a minimum signaling threshold. Finally I argue that these conclusions hold regardless of whether it is the uninformed or informed agents who move first.
JEL classification : D 8     

国有企业高管的晋升激励和薪酬激励——基于高管双重身份的视角

基于国企高管的"政商"双重身份的视角,研究其在晋升和薪酬激励下的行为差异,指出晋升和薪酬的激励目标是不同的。研究发现:国企高管的晋升与业绩不相关,而与非经济指标相关;不同的晋升途径导致高管的行为不同,政治晋升与公司承担的社会责任和非效率投资正相关,非政治晋升与关联方占用正相关;在高管晋升前的任职期间即晋升激励较强时,薪酬与业绩正相关,而与非经济指标不相关;晋升激励非经济目标,而薪酬只激励业绩。     

Philippine Infrastructure and Connectivity: Challenges and Reforms

The Philippines has performed creditably well in the past few years. Ensuring better infrastructure and connectivity is crucial in attaining inclusive growth. This will require substantial investments in infrastructure. Various reforms to address the infrastructure lack were implemented but there is scope for more reforms: improving fiscal space, reforming budgetary processes, improving public‐private partnerships (PPPs) and the regulatory environment, and better policy coordination to address problems of connectivity and infrastructure. The Philippines has to continuously improve the governance framework, ensure stability and predictability of policies and regulations. Better coordination among a diverse set of governmental infrastructure bodies, and also between government and the private sector is needed to address infrastructure bottlenecks.     

独立董事独立性、关联激励与行为均衡

本文通过对委托-代理激励理论和关联博弈激励思想的运用和拓展,主要考察了在独立性、激励和风险分担三重约束下,独立董事激励合约的基本参数特征以及诱使独立董事高水平合作的关联激励机制.     

知识型员工的特征及其激励

知识型员工有追求工作自主、注重贡献、需求多样性和复杂性、对组织忠诚度低和流动性强、追求职业发展等特征。对知识型员工的激励,必须从激励环境、理论模型、激动方式与手段等方面进行系统性、动态性设计,以实现知识型员工和组织共同发展的目标。     

Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

A simple principal-agent model with bilateral asymmetric information and common values is developed. The agent(s) has private information about his characteristics but does not knowhow these affect outcomes. The principal knows how the characteristics translate into outcomes, but does not observe the characteristics. It is shown that equilibrium contracts aresimple in being designednot to reveal the agent's characteristics. When the agent knows howsome of his characteristics affect the outcome, contracts will be differentiated with respect to precisely those characteristics. An application to the use of genetic information is considered.     

竞争、规制与网络型基础产业绩效

竞争与规制是网络型基础产业治理的两种制度安排,并非是相互孤立,而在很多方面是相互补充的.规制具有竞争效应,竞争也具有规制效应,竞争与规制的有机组合有利于竞争活力和规模经济相兼容,从而达到有效竞争的目的.网络型基础产业规制改革的实质就是通过竞争与规制有效发挥作用的制度安排,提高产业绩效,实现社会福利最大化目标.     

交通基础设施门槛、对外开放与制造业生产效率

利用门槛回归模型,分别以铁路和高速公路路网密度作为交通基础设施门槛变量,以贸易开放度、国际投资开放度作为对外开放程度解释变量,证实了交通基础设施在对外开放程度提升制造业生产效率这一运行机制上存在着非线性的调节作用。结果表明：2003—2012年,铁路交通基础设施作为门槛,使得贸易开放度、国际投资开放度分别对制造业生产效率的促进、阻碍作用表现出显著的“倒U”型相关关系;公路交通基础设施作为门槛变量,对外开放程度对制造业生产效率的促进作用表现出了“U”型的关系。