Market, Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium

This paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model of an economy with an arbitrary number of industries under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. The market structure of the model economy is expressed by two basic sets of parameters: the degree of competition, and the markup ratio prevailing in each industry. The government is supposed to control the degree of competition through antitrust policy and the markup ratio through entry policy. Using this model, I re-examine the results of traditional competitive equilibrium analysis and explore the effects of competition policies on economic welfare and international trade.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D50, F11, F12, L13, L41.     

ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY*

I characterize the optimal export promoting policy for international markets whose structure is endogenous. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for duopolies, it is always optimal to subsidize exports when entry is endogenous, under both quantity and price competition. With homogenous goods the optimal export subsidy is a fraction 1/ε of the price, where ε is the elasticity of demand (the exact opposite of the optimal export tax in the neoclassical trade theory). Analogously, I show the general optimality of R&D subsidies and of competitive devaluations to promote exports in foreign markets where entry is endogenous.     

Foreign competition and social efficiency of entry

We consider social efficiency of firm-entry in the presence of foreign competition. If the labour markets are competitive, entry is insufficient for the domestic country if the transportation cost is low and the marginal costs of the domestic firms are sufficiently higher than the marginal cost of the foreign firm. In the presence of a domestic labour union, entry is always socially insufficient for the domestic country. Hence, the anti-competitive entry-regulation policy may not be justified in an industry facing foreign competition, and it may depend on the transportation cost, the marginal cost difference between the firms and the domestic labour market structure.     

Competition enhancing regulation and diffusion of innovation: the case of broadband networks

Regulating former telecommunications monopolies has often been legally and technically complex. Among other options, incumbent operators were mandated to share, sell or split their infrastructure thus encouraging market entry. Given the importance of broadband technologies, competitive access has become a policy priority. We use data from 167 broadband markets over a period of 11 years. Firm and intra-platform competition on the incumbent’s legacy network (Digital Subscriber Line) accelerate adoption of broadband, whereas competition over different access technologies does not. The duration of the different regulatory effects shows that simpler network changes have a long-lasting yet delayed effect compared to technically demanding ones.     

Dynamic Gains from International Trade with Imperfect Competition and Market Power

This paper revisits the gains from trade under imperfect competition by explicitly modeling strategic competition and entry. The papers highlights a welfare cost of imperfect competition, due to inefficiently high entry. Through increasing competition, international trade lowers price–cost markups and reduces excessive entry. This adds on a "competitive" channel for gains from trade to the well-known "product diversity" channel from previous literature. Both channels will increase the return to investment and raise the steady-state capital stock. An alternative case is possible, however, where there is inefficiently low entry. In that case, trade tends to be "anticompetitive," raising price–cost markups and encouraging increased entry.     

Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry

The entry process in an industry embodying more or less close substitutes is considered. One examines whether the increase in the number of substitutes induces pure competition when prices are chosen noncooperatively. It is shown that these exists an upper bound on the number of firms which can compete in the market: when this upperbound is reached, any further entry entails the exit of an existing firm. In sprite of this fact, new entries imply the decrease of prices to the competitive ones.     

Entry and fiscal policy effectiveness in a small open economy within a Monetary Union

In this article I develop an imperfectly competitive dynamic general equilibrium model for a small open economy integrated in a monetary union. Here, the type of entry in the non-traded goods’ sector affects fiscal policy effectiveness. Fiscal policy effectiveness is enlarged when aggregate demand stimuli increase intra-industrial competition (case I). This is due to the counter-cyclical mark-up mechanism generated by entry. Such a mechanism is absent in the usual monopolistic competition where entry only has a sharing effect (case II).

Deregulation,innovative entry and structural diversity as a source of stable and rapid economic growth

The importance of free innovative entry (deregulation) for diversity of structure and competition is studied. I demonstrate quantitatively that even with a narrow definition of entry (firms), and given observed entry behavior, successful entrants completely dominate the long-run performance characteristics of the economy. Rapid and stable long-run macro economic growth can only be achieved if innovative competitive entry is vigorous. Free access to markets alone is a necessary condition, with competence a sufficient condition. It is probably wrong to believe that the (ex ante) threat of entry is sufficient for dynamic competition. A growing economy requires a steady showering with optimistic entrants, a few of which turn out ex post to be superior performers. Failing and exiting firms are part of the innovation costs to society for steady and rapid economic growth. The benefits of financial innovations like junk bonds are to reduce barriers to competitive entry to make both successes and failures possible.     

Modelling pharmaceutical price changes in Germany: a function of competition and regulation

In this article, price changes for pharmaceuticals in Germany are modelled as a function of regulation and competition. Changes in the regulatory environment, and in the competitive environment of a product, are taken into account. To follow the hierarchical structure, a four-level random intercept model was constructed. Price changes were allowed to vary randomly between drug classes, between different substances within a drug class, and between different manufacturers of a substance. This study provides evidence that two policy measures – reference pricing and temporary price freezes – succeeded in reducing prices in Germany between January 2004 and June 2006. For off-patent substances – depending on the competition faced by a drug – the effect of competition can be greater than the effect of regulation. The study, therefore, not only demonstrates the importance of competition between and within drug classes, it also provides evidence that generic entry has substantial effects on the prices of branded products.     

Merger policy,entry, and entrepreneurship

We assess the impact of merger policy on entry and entrepreneurship. When faced with uncertainty about its prospects, and foreseeing that it may wish to leave the market should profitability prove poor, a rational entrant considers possible exit routes. Horizontal merger reduces competition post-merger which, all else being equal, lowers welfare; but merger also provides a valuable exit route. By facilitating exit and thus raising the value of entry, more lenient merger policy may stimulate entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. We calculate the optimal merger policy in the form of a low, but positive, profitability threshold below which merger is permitted despite the adverse impact on post-merger competition. This may be viewed as an extension of the “failing firm defence” to include ailing, low profitability firms as well as imminently failing ones. Merger policy is compared with an entry subsidy, and the implications of strategic firm behaviour for the choice of merger policy are also examined.     

Spontaneous economic order

This paper provides attempts to formalize Hayek’s notion of spontaneous order within the framework of an Arrow-Debreu economy. Our study shows that, if a competitive economy is sufficiently fair and free, a spontaneous economic order will emerge in long-run competitive equilibria so that social members spontaneously occupy an unplanned distribution of income. Despite this, the spontaneous order may degenerate in the form of economic crises whenever an equilibrium economy approaches the extreme competition. Remarkably, such a theoretical framework of spontaneous order provides a bridge linking Austrian economics and neoclassical economics, where a truth begins to emerge: “Freedom promotes technological progress”.     

Competition Policy: Some Neglected Issues in the Hilmer Report

The Hilmer Report focuses primarily on the very important issues of legislative and regulatory measures to directly reduce monopolistic structures and conduct. This article argues that competition policy also should embrace measures to reduce transaction costs. Lower transaction costs increase the substitutability of different options and help to extend the competitive market, and particularly to reduce entry barriers for new entrants and for innovations. Contrary to Hilmer, the article argues that economic theory, and particularly the marginal cost concept, can and should have a central role in the assessment of monopolistic behaviour and in the determination of access prices to ‘essential services’ provided by natural monopolies.     

The Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing Policy and Competitive Advantage

The paper investigates the effects on competition of the unilateral most-favoured-customer pricing policy. A model is considered in which a multimarket incumbent firm faces a threat of entry in one of its two markets. It is shown that contemporaneous most-favoured-customer clauses may change competition to the advantage of the incumbent both under strategic substitutes and strategic complements. If the duopolistic market is strong, the most-favoured-customer policy makes the incumbent 'tough' and may be used for entry deterrence purposes.     

The Use of Policies for Competition in the Promotion of Structural Change in Transforming Economies

This article takes as its central theme the idea that competition policy is merely one among many policies which can and should be used to promote competition in an economy. After having considered the importance of competition for any healthy economy, the article examines the inextricable links between competition and transition, in particular marketisation and liberalisation, and discusses in detail the scope for the use of various policies for competition in the transformation process. Within this discussion, particular attention is paid to the importance of the legal and institutional framework, the process of privatisation, macroeconomic stability, ease of entry, supply side policies, the role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and trade policy in contributing to the development of a market economy. The article concludes by noting the extreme care that must be taken not only in the content of such policies but also in their implementation, something which is easily demonstrated by the experience of developed capitalist economies in the West.     

INTERSTATE BANKING AND ANTITRUST LAWS: HISTORY OF PUBLIC POLICIES TO PROMOTE BANKING COMPETITION

Over the past several years, antitrust laws' significance as a public policy to promote competition in banking has diminished. Deregulation has intensified competition so much that it has made antitrust laws nonbinding constraints, even during a merger movement of extraordinary proportions. Deregulation and attenuating antitrust raise a question as to whether a distinctive competitive policy for commercial banks should exist as it has in the past.
Two earlier policies are identified and reviewed in this paper: (1) free banking, which in several forms existed from the 1830s to the early 1930s, and (2) antitrust, which became relevant during the early 1960s. Experience under both policies illuminates the interaction between competition and regulation in banking. Such experience indicates that the effects of current competitive policy must be evaluated within the developing regulatory environment. Partially evaluating current policy within this context suggests that new charter requirements should be reformulated and that large bank mergers should be limited. So long as a distinctive regulatory system exists, a distinctive competitive policy for banks is needed.     

Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable. Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999     

Trade Liberalization and the Degree of Competition in International Duopoly

This paper analyzes how a reduction in trade costs influences the possibility for firms to engage in international cartels, and hence how trade liberalization affects the degree of competition. We consider a particular intra‐industry trade model amended to allow for firms producing differentiated products. Our main finding is that trade liberalization may have an anti‐competitive effect. We find that there is no unique relation between a reduction in trade costs and the degree of competition. When products are differentiated, a lowering of trade costs is pro‐competitive if trade costs are initially high, but anti‐competitive if trade costs initially are low. Hence, trade policy is not necessarily a substitute for competition policy.     

BORK'S PARADOX: STATIC VS. DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Judge Robert Bork holds two opposing attitudes towards perfect competition. It is a highly useful economic model for illustrating allocative efficiency, but it is a defective policy model because it deliberately omits productive efficiency. He reconciles these attitudes by combining perfectly competitive allocative efficiency with dynamically competitive productive efficiency in his analysis.
However, these two kinds of competition do not readily mix. One is a static equilibrium concept, the other a dynamic disequilibrium concept. One assumes perfect knowledge and the absence of change; the other assumes imperfect knowledge, learning, and continual flux. Each kind of competition is built on assumptions which, if true, would preclude the existence of the other.
Bork's policy conclusions require the simultaneous existence of both kinds of competition. If he drops dynamic competition from the analysis, a much more stringent antitrust policy is called for. If he drops static competition, economic theory does not justify even his strictures against mergers and cartels.     

Vox Populi,Vox Dei? Tacit collusion in politics

We study competition between political parties in repeated elections with probabilistic voting. This model entails multiple equilibria, and we focus on cases where political collusion occurs. When parties hold different opinions on some policy, they may take different policy positions that do not coincide with the median voter's preferred policy platform. In contrast, when parties have a mutual understanding on a particular policy, their policy positions may converge (on some dimension) but not to the median voter's preferred policy. That is to say, parties can tacitly collude with one another, despite political competition. Collusion may collapse, for instance, after the entry of a new political party. This model rationalizes patterns in survey data from Sweden, where politicians on different sides of the political spectrum take different positions on economic policy but similar positions on refugee intake—diverging from the average voter's position, but only until the entry of a populist party.     

The impact of product market regulation on productivity through firm churning: Evidence from European countries

Productivity performance in European countries has been a policy concern for several decades. This paper shows that productivity can be enhanced by product market policies which, by increasing competition and efficiency, facilitate higher rates of firms’ entry and exit (i.e. firm churning). Drawing on annual country-sector data for the period 2000–2014 across the EU countries, we find that: (i) competition-enhancing regulation is associated with a higher rate of firm churning; (ii) firm churning, in turn, appears to be positively related to higher total factor productivity at the sector level by facilitating the entry of new competitive firms and the exit of less productive ones. Overall, we conclude that stringent product market regulation can be indirectly associated, via its impact on business dynamism, with the somewhat weak productivity performance in a number of EU countries. Thus, our results point towards substantial productivity gains that could follow from the introduction of further competition-enhancing measures in product markets.