财政补贴、研发投入与企业价值

企业的价值创造是经济可持续增长的源泉,企业价值的决定因素及其影响机制是企业、学界和政府等多方关注的重点。从企业技术创新视角分析了财政补贴对企业价值的影响。以沪深两市2008-2015年上市公司为样本,实证检验财政补贴、研发投入与企业价值的关系。研究发现,财政补贴对企业价值的影响呈现倒U型,即财政补贴对企业价值影响的边际效应先增加、后减少;研发投入显著提升了企业价值。进一步研究企业价值存在异质性情况下财政补贴的影响,发现相较于企业价值位于1/4分位处和3/4分位处的企业,财政补贴对企业价值位于中位数的企业产生的促进作用最大。     

财税激励、会计稳健性与企业创新投入强度

本文以创业板企业创新投入为切入点,以2009-2017年深市创业板上市企业为研究对象,构建多元线性回归模型利用实证分析法对会计稳健性对企业创新投入的作用与影响机理进行分析,并进一步将财税激励这一国家政策对两者关系的影响加以研究,发现:会计稳健性与企业的创新投入强度呈现出显著负相关;财税激励则能显著提升企业的创新投入强度,并能显著削弱会计稳健性对创新投入强度的抑制作用。     

Multi-region Development and Fiscal Equity

A bstract . If a region has a fixed resource base (say land) then adding labor eventually results in a declining marginal product per worker. If there is a pure Samuelsonian public good in the region, more people permit the spreading of the tax burden for producing the public good at no cost in terms of crowding the good. Thus we have an essential trade-off between the declining marginal productivity of an immigrant to a region and his positive fiscal "value." This trade-off was highlighted by Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski¹ and an optimal population was arrived at for a single region economy. We extend this optimal population argument to a multi-region economy and observe two phenomena.     

Incentives for Discovery

Three more of cur academic advisers, Professors Kirzner, Minford and Tullock, write short notes on'a development'in economics that is contributing to improvement in the human condition.     

北京城市轨道交通现状及快速发展动因分析

改革开放以来,北京城市公共交通尤其是城市轨道交通基础设施和运营管理得到了较快发展,占城市通勤出行的比重越来越高,有效缓解了北京城市化和工业化进程中的城市交通拥堵问题,促进了经济社会和谐发展.文章在总结北京城市轨道交通取得巨大成就基础上,分析了北京城市轨道交通快速发展的动力机制,认为经济发展、科学规划、"奥运效应"、制度创新是提升北京城市轨道交通的最主要的四大推动因素.     

中小企业发展的地方财政政策研究

文章通过分析青海省中小企业在发展中面临的外部问题,提出了加强地方财政政策对中小企业支持力度的相关建议.     

中小企业发展的地方财政政策研究

文章通过分析青海省中小企业在发展中面临的外部问题，提出了加强地方财政政策对中小企业支持力度的相关建议。     

Managerial Incentives for Takeovers

The paper studies managerial incentives in a model where managers choose product market strategies and make takeover decisions. The equilibrium contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under either quantity or price Competition. This result contrasts with previous findings in the literature, and hinges on the fact that when managers are more aggressive, rival firms earn lower profits and thus are willing to sell out at a lower price. However, as a side effect of such a contract, the manager might undertake unprofitable takeovers.     

Externalities and Industrial Development

Using panel data for five capital goods industries, this paper estimates dynamic externalities. In contrast to previous studies, panel data allow separation of externalities from fixed effects and identification of a lag structure. I find strong evidence of Marshall–Arrow–Romer (MAR) (own industry, or localization) externalities. For Jacobs (urbanization) externalities effects are smaller. In terms of lag structure, for MAR externalities the biggest effects are typically from several years ago, but die out after six years. For urbanization phenomena, effects persist to the end of the time horizon of the data–eight or nine years back.     

我国财政政策对产业结构优化的时变效应

研究目标：财政政策对产业结构优化的时变性影响。研究方法：构建带有随机波动率的时变参数因子扩展向量自回归模型,进而通过三维脉冲响应展开时变性分析。研究发现：财政政策对产业结构优化确实产生了时变效应,在经济衰退时期,应该增加财政支出、提高投资性支出占比,结合小幅度减税、提高营业税和消费税占比;在经济平稳时期,应该减少税收、提高营业税占比、降低增值税占比,结合小幅度增加财政支出、提高投资性支出占比、降低一般公共服务支出占比;在经济高涨时期,应该增加财政支出、提高科技支出和投资性支出占比,结合小幅度减税、提高所得税占比、降低营业税占比。研究创新：应用时变参数计量模型研究了财政政策对产业结构优化的时变效应。研究价值：有助于重新认识财政政策与产业结构优化的关系。     

Pollution Regulation and Incentives for Pollution-Control Research

We study the firm's incentives to engage in research for pollution-control technologies and to adopt new technologies that if discovers or that are discovered by other firms. Licensing of discoveries is assumed possible. We also study the regulator's problem in designing optimal environmental regulations that both control pollution and provide incentives for research. Technology adoption standards are part of the optimal regulation. Another finding is that making the adoption standard stricter reduces research.     

Incentives and disincentives for corporate environmental disclosure

The year 2000 saw the launch of AA1000, a standard designed to enable corporate ethical performance to be judged. If such ethical performance is interpreted as social and environmental behaviour our view is that it should lead to more social and environmental disclosure. Yet the willingness to communicate corporate social and environmental performance still seems to be limited. Of the social and environmental disclosures that exist many appear to be rather fragmented and disparate. In this paper we explore the apparent paradox between concern for the environment and the limited amount of corporate environmental disclosure (CED) that takes place. Through an empirical study, the incentives and disincentives for CED are identified. Findings from the study identify a difference between the information requirements of ‘users’ and the willingness of ‘preparers’ to provide. The paper makes some tentative policy suggestions with the intention of bringing the two parties closer together. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

经济增长和产业结构对广西财政收入影响的实证分析

文章通过建立回归模型,分析经济增长和产业结构对广西财政收入的影响。分析得出经济增长和产业结构对广西财政收入有着显著影响,据此提出对策和建议。     

经济增长和产业结构对广西财政收入影响的实证分析

文章通过建立回归模型.分析经济增长和产业结构时广西财政收入的影响.分析得出经济增长和产业结构对广西财政收入有着显著影响,据此提出对策和建议.     

推进产业协同创新发展建议

本文从企业所得税、财务管理、风险投资基金等政策制定形成协同创新宏观环境,利用产业技术创新政产学研协同创新平台建设促进共享支撑和协同服务的平台建设,优化市场需求与协同创新互动创新机制,强化产业协同创新团队管理,以促进产业协同创新的发展。     

Private and Social Incentives for Vertical Contract Disclosure

We follow the framework in Arya and Mittendorf's 2011 Rand Journal of Economics paper but extend their analysis by investigating supplier(s)' equilibrium choices of disclosure or confidentiality regarding their contract terms with the downstream retailers. In the case of a common supplier, we find that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is for the supplier to choose disclosure. This private incentive is opposite to social incentive, which calls for the regulator to choose confidentiality. In the case of dedicated suppliers, however, there are multiple SPNE due to coordination issues between the suppliers. The case which maximizes social surplus – disclosure – can be supported as a SPNE, together with the case of confidentiality, which maximizes supplier profits at the cost of everyone else. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Status Incentives and Performance

Studies in economics and management suggest that people invest effort to achieve pure status, and this investment increases in status incentives. We design field experiments to investigate these two behavioral hypotheses. We define status as the subjects' relative rank in their group based on their performance in a task. We explore two real tasks. In both of the tasks, subjects' earnings are nominal and independent of their performance; so status‐seeking preference should be the sole reason for achieving higher ranks. Our results indicate that inducing higher status incentives may not necessarily improve individual performance and may depend upon the task. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information Management and Incentives

We ask how the incentives of an agent are affected by an information management system that lets the agent receive information about the performance of a colleague before (“transparent firm”) rather than after he provides effort (“nontransparent firm”). Transparency is detrimental for incentives if the performance of the colleague provides information on the relative impact of the agent’s effort on his success probability. The findings imply that firms in which comparisons between employees play a minor role for compensation are transparent. Firms in which they play a major role sometimes choose to be nontransparent despite the flexibility gains transparency provides.