Bargaining Power and Efficiency in Insurance Contracts

Insurance contracts are frequently modelled as principal–agent relationships. The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between differential bargaining power and the efficiency of insurance contracts. The analysis is undertaken in a framework of state-contingent production, which allows us to consider, as separate choices, the level of effort committed by the client and the riskiness of the equilibrium state-contingent production vector. Our central result is that, in the presence of hold-up problems, the exercise of monopoly power by insurers leads clients to undertake socially costly self-protection, leading to suboptimal levels of insurance. Clients can exploit information asymmetries to offset the bargaining power of the insurer, but this process is also socially costly. Hence, competitive markets for insurance will yield a Pareto-superior outcome to the constrained Pareto-optimum reached in markets where insurers have monopoly power. More generally, in a bargaining situation, an increase in the bargaining power of clients will increase social welfare.     

Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs

We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find that REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.

敌意收购

1999年初,故事开始了. 英国的沃达丰,德国的曼内斯曼,美国的AirTouch,这3家大公司在规模上、市值上差不多.     

Modelling Takeover Likelihood

This paper employs a multinomial logit model in an attempt to better understand the motives behind takeovers. The results from the multinomial logit models show that the characteristics of hostile and friendly targets differ significantly and that these differences also vary depending on the time period under investigation. The results give some support to the disciplining role of the hostile takeover. Furthermore, conclusions based on a simple binomial logit model are likely to be misleading and result in incorrect inferences regarding the characteristics of firms subject to takeover.     

欧盟证券强制要约收购规则及启示

本文以2004年5月20日生效的《欧盟要约收购指令》为基础，对欧盟及其各成员国有关强制要约收购的临界点、强制要约收购的价格以及强制要约收购的豁免制度进行了重点分析，对如何完善我国上市公司强制要约收购制度作了探讨。该指令的研究对完善我国证券法律制度具有重要的现实意义。     

Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders

Target firms often face bidders that are not equally well informed,which reduces competition, because bidders with less informationfear the winner’s curse more. We analyze how targets shouldbe sold in this situation. We show that a sequential procedurecan extract the highest possible transaction price. The targetfirst offers an exclusive deal to a better-informed bidder,without considering a less well-informed bidder. If rejected,the target offers either an exclusive deal to the less well-informedbidder, or a modified first-price auction. Deal protection devicescan be used to enhance a target’s commitment to the procedure.(JEL G34, K22, D44)     

Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids

This article examines the impact of a takeover bid on the careers and compensation of chief executives of target firms. We find that acquisition attempts occur more frequently in industries where chief executive officers (CEO) have positive abnormal compensation. Target CEOs are more likely to be replaced when a bid succeeds, than when it fails. CEOs of target firms who lose their jobs generally fail to find another senior executive position in any public corporation within three years after the bid. Consistent with Fama's (1980) notion of “ex post settling up”, postbid compensation changes of managers retained after an acquisition attempt are negatively related to several measures of their prebid abnormal compensation. This result is robust to a variety of specifications and does not seem to be caused by mean reversion or selection bias. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a takeover bid generates additional information that is used by labor markets to discipline managers.     

Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions

Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. We find that a typical target is valued higher by strategic bidders. However, 22.4% of targets in our sample are valued higher by financial bidders. These are mature, poorly performing companies. We also find that (i) valuations of different strategic bidders are more dispersed and (ii) valuations of financial bidders are correlated with aggregate economic conditions. Our results suggest that different targets appeal to different types of bidders, rather than that strategic bidders always value targets more because of synergies.     

上市公司收购与反收购问题探讨

引言 关于上市公司股权之争,有一种观点认为,表面上为股东与股东之间为取得公司的实际控制权而进行的竞争,实际上却为收购方与公司控股股东及董事会、监事会等公司当局方(以下简称当局方)的对抗.此论一听似乎有悖理法:于法于理,公司的董事会为股东大会选举,对全体股东负责,理应代表广大股东的利益,站在公正的立场上行使其职权.怎能厚此薄彼、甚至站在关联股东一方对抗收购方?对此需一分为二.如果是在完善的法人治理结构下,由于激励、监督、制衡机制的作用,自然难以出现此类现象.     

我国收购要约立法及国际比较

目前中国证监会出台的《上市公司收购管理办淑征求意见稿》，是我国对收购要约进行系统规范的专门法规，对以往立法有许多突破和创新，同时也有不足之处。……     

上市公司控制权转移预测研究

本文基于我国的资本市场与制度环境,运用全样本研究思路,运用Logit回归技术,建立预测模型。预测模型能够较好地预测目标公司,并且具有令人满意的稳定度,说明我国上市公司控制权转移具有较好的可预测性,从而在一定程度上反映出我国资本市场效率尚达不到中强式有效状态。     

The Loser's Curse: Accounting for the Transaction Costs of Takeover and the Distortion of Takeover Motives

Studies for major stock markets of share price movements in the period around a takeover show that target company shareholders typically experience large gains in wealth but that acquiring company shareholders do not. The reasons for this asymmetry–and, in particular, for the absence of gains for the shareholders of the companies which initiate the deal–are imperfectly understood. This note suggests one factor contributing to those results. It argues that accounting practice prescribed by the main standard setters is non‐neutral towards ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ bidders with respect to reporting the transaction costs of bidding. It shows how the prescribed accounting treatment of these costs affects performance measures used in salary contracts as well as in the markets for executives and for corporate control. The result is that the managers of bidding companies will have an ‘arti ?cial’ incentive to in ?ate their bid price or to go ahead with a bid which offers no bene ?t to their shareholders. Ironically, the main standard setters seem minded soon to prohibit the only accounting technique which does not distort these incentives.     

上市公司收购的立法和监管——我们为什么不能采取美国模式？

SEC对并购的监管只是美国国家对并购监管总体系里的一小部分，美国有强有力的各州对并购的实质性监管，有较强的民间维权的法律诉讼渠道，还有其他一系列监督和监管渠道。     

Board Share‐Ownership and Takeover Performance

Abstract:   We investigate the relation between takeover performance and board share‐ownership in the acquiring company for a sample of 363 UK takeovers completed in the period 1985–96. In investigating this relationship we pay particular attention to the composition of board shareholdings as well as their size. Thus, in addition to the analysis of total board holdings, we analyse the separate impact of CEO shareholdings and of the pattern of non‐executive and executive holdings within the board. In addition to our detailed examination of board holdings we assess the impact of non‐board holdings. Our analysis controls for a number of non‐shareholding constraints on discretionary director behaviour and for a variety of other influences on takeover outcomes including: the means of payment; acquirer size and market to book value; the relative size of the acquirer and the target; the nature of the bid in terms of hostility and industrial direction; and the pre‐takeover performance of the acquiring company. We assess performance in terms of announcement returns, long run share returns and a portfolio of accounting measures. We find evidence that overall board ownership has a strong positive impact on long run share returns and a weak positive impact on operating performance. However, much stronger effects are found when the overall board measure is split into CEO, executive, and non‐executive directors. We find strong evidence of a positive relation between takeover performance and CEO ownership, which holds for both long run returns and operating performance measures. This finding is robust to controlling for other factors that determine takeover performance and holds in a two stage least squares framework that controls for endogeneity effects. Shareholdings of other executive directors, non‐executive directors, and non‐board holdings are found to have no significant effect on takeover performance.     

Takeover Prediction and Portfolio Performance: A Note

This paper empirically tests whether it is possible to generate abnormal returns from investing in a portfolio of predicted successful takeover targets. Portfolios are formed on the basis of predictions from models similar to those estimated by Palepu (1986). However, unlike Palepu (1986), the portfolios in this paper are formed using a decision rule that results in smaller portfolios with higher average takeover probabilities. This provides a stronger test of whether share prices reflect future takeover probabilities. The results show that while the models have significant explanatory power, the portfolios fail to beat the return on the market over a 12-month holding-period.