Origin and concentration

We analyse the effects of different types and concentration of ownership on performance using a large population of firms in the Czech Republic after mass privatization. Specifications based on first‐differences combined with instrumental variables show that the performance effects of different types and concentration of ownership are limited when compared to earlier studies. Often, concentrated ownership has a positive effect, a finding that supports the agency theory. The positive effect of foreign ownership is detected primarily for majority ownership and for ownership by foreign industrial firms. The state as a holder of the golden share has a positive effect on employment and sometimes, also on output and profitability. Overall, our results highlight the benefits of strategic restructuring accompanied by an inflow of new capital and managerial culture.     

The effects of privatization on productive efficiency: evidence from the Baltic republics

By using new and unusual data sets for large samples of firms in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania we find that, since privatization, diverse patterns of enterprise ownership have emerged and ownership configurations are quite dynamic.   To test competing theories on the productivity effects of alternative ownership structures, identical cross sectional production functions specifications are estimated for each country for varying years during 1993 1996. While the effects of private ownership upon productivity are found to vary considerably over time and across countries, productivity effects are always found to be either zero or positive, thus providing partial support for the hypothesis that state ownership is less efficient than private ownership.   Findings are mixed concerning hypotheses on the effects of particular ownership structures. Often (e.g. for Lithuania) estimates indicate that all forms of private ownership have zero productivity effects. However, some estimates for Estonia provide support for the mainstream hypothesis that outside (and especially foreign) ownership is preferred to insider ownership. But in other estimates (again for Estonia) majority ownership by employees is found to deliver better business performance than majority ownership by managers (thus refuting the hypothesis that the preferred form of insider ownership is ownership by managers).     

Family ownership,altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises

Given the continuing uncertainty about whether family firms enjoy lower agency costs, this article hypothesizes that a combination of the effects of family ownership, altruism and self-control is instead at play. To begin with, family ownership can indeed reduce agency costs through better aligning the interests of owners and managers. This is a ‘determining’ effect in that it independently mitigates one source of agency problems. However, altruism combined with self-control problems arising from the highly concentrated ownership often found in family firms can also increase agency costs. This is an ‘embedding’ effect as it is rooted in the personal relationships within the family firm. Using the Business Longitudinal Database compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that for larger SMEs (those with 20–200 employees), the gains in lower agency costs arising from family ownership are almost completely offset by the losses from altruism and the lack of self-control.     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

The restructuring of large firms in the Slovak Republic1

This paper examines case study evidence of large Slovak firms chosen to represent a wide range of initial conditions, privatization techniques and success with restructuring. We document the ownership changes and restructuring actions of firms. We then re-examine several hypotheses about firm restructuring in the light of this new evidence. In particular, we show that the majority of large Slovak firms have successfully restructured in the absence of foreign investors and government-led restructuring programmes. The study also generates some new queries on the effectiveness of different privatization methods in enhancing corporate governance and improving access to skills and capital. We find that privatization to insiders through management-employee buy-outs did not hamper firm restructuring, at least in the initial years after privatization, as the new owners (old managers) invested heavily in new technology, laid off a substantial part of their workforce, sought foreign partnerships, and were prepared to sell controlling stakes to outsiders in return for fresh financial resources. The evidence also suggests that the mass privatization programme in the Slovak Republic did not result in weak corporate governance since it was followed by a rapid consolidation of outsider ownership. This is in contrast to the anecdotal evidence for Georgia, Russia and Ukraine which opted for mass privatization to insiders (managers and employees)     

Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model

We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and one or two firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. The question in this paper is whether a decentralized choice through majority vote would lead to more or less competition. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the viewpoint of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, under concentrated ownership (where owners have a null density), duopoly is always preferred by the majority; while under egalitarian ownership (where firms are equally shared by all the population), the choice of the majority depends on the relative size of workers' and consumers' segments.     

大股东占用资金行为的成因、后果及治理对策

作为转轨经济国家,高度集中的股权结构是我国上市公司的重要特征。集中的股权结构在一定程度上缓解了管理层与外部股东之间的代理问题,但伴随而来的是大股东利用控制权“掏空”上市公司,侵害中小股东利益。2006年以来,我国证券市场刮起了一场“清欠”风暴。在清欠过程中,边清边欠,年中占用,年末偿还等现象说明,一场清欠风暴并没从根本上制止大股东占用资金行为,大股东占用上市公司资金仍是我国公司治理中最为严重的问题之一。     

股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响

在对大股东的性质作出清晰界定的基础上,本文考察了中国上市公司的股权集中度和股权制衡情况及其对公司经营绩效的影响。研究发现:股权集中度和经营绩效之间有着显著的正向线性关系,而且这种关系在不同性质的控股股东中都是存在的。具体来说,在中央直属国有企业和私有产权控股的上市公司中股权集中度所表现的激励程度最高,地方所属国有企业控股的上市公司次之,而国有资产管理机构控股的上市公司最低。同时,过高的股权制衡程度对公司的经营绩效有负面影响。但是,不同性质外部大股东的作用效果有明显差别,而且其在不同性质控股股东控制的上市公司中的表现也不尽一致。     

Foreign-owned firms around the world: A comparative analysis of wages and employment at the micro-level

This paper provides the first microeconomic cross-country analysis of the effects of foreign ownership on wages, employment and worker turnover rates. Using firm-level and linked worker-firm data, we apply a standardised methodology for three developed (Germany, Portugal, UK) and two emerging economies (Brazil, Indonesia). We find that wage effects are larger in developing countries, and that for each country the largest effect on wages comes from workers who move from domestic to foreign firms. Employment growth after foreign takeover is concentrated in high-skill jobs. In contrast to widespread fears, there is no evidence that wage gains come at the expense of greater job insecurity; separation rates actually fall slightly after takeover. We conclude that the positive effect of foreign ownership on wages is not primarily driven by its impact on incumbent wages, but by its impact on the creation of high-wage jobs.     

Organizational transparency and power in firm ownership networks

When public institutions do not support information disclosure and contract enforcement, controlling owners may compensate by setting up ownership networks that facilitate the exchange of resources and alignment of interests. We examine how firms’ controlling owners draw power from ownership networks to provide access to resources for or to expropriate resources from their firms. Horizontal power originates from network centrality and is associated with resource access whereas vertical power originates from principal-principal agency conflicts and is associated with exploitation of minority shareholders. We highlight the impact of horizontal and vertical power through their interaction effects with transparency and disclosure (TD) practices on fixed investments and performance in Russian firms. We find that TD and horizontal power or connectedness are substitutes, while whereas TD and vertical power are complements in their effects on fixed investment and firm performance. Without a strong commitment to TD, powerful owners may thus deprive the firm of productive investments.     

Enterprise performance and ownership: The case of Ukraine

In this paper, we use a unique enterprise level random survey of 150 firms in Ukraine to test hypotheses on the relationship between enterprise performance and ownership in transitional economies. In particular, we explore whether privatisation has yielded improved company performance and whether specific ownership forms (insider, manager, worker, and outsider) have led to differentiated behaviour at the enterprise level. Our analysis also explores the determinants and ramifications of barter, a widespread phenomenon across the former Soviet Union. We refute the hypothesis that private ownership per se is associated with improved performance, and try to isolate any positive performance effects from outsider ownership. However, we do isolate some clear ownership effects, associated with insider ownership. We find barter to be associated with lower profitability, and to be less common in privatised firms.     

股权结构、治理机制与城市银行绩效--来自山东、河南两省的调查证据

银行体系的重要地位和银行危机的频繁发生显示了加强银行公司治理的重要性 ,在我国银行体制改革的背景下 ,研究商业银行公司治理问题具有重要的现实意义。本文利用山东、河南两省 2 8家城市银行的调查样本对我国地方商业银行的股权结构、治理机制及其效果进行了实证分析。结果发现 ,虽然我国地方性银行国有和集中的股权结构特征明显 ,但大股东的国有性质并没有对银行绩效产生影响 ,同时集中型股权结构对银行绩效有明显的积极影响。银行高管人员薪酬有较明显的负激励效果。此外我们还发现 ,外部董事比例和银行规模基本没有对银行绩效产生影响 ,而且山东、河南两省城市银行在公司治理方面也不存在省际间的显著差异。     

How former business owners fare in the labor market? Job assignment and earnings

This study uses detailed longitudinal matched employer–employee data to examine the impact of entrepreneurial experience on job assignments, careers, and wages. The results suggest that there are significant differences in career mobility between former business owners and workers who were always wage employees. Former business owners enter firms at higher job levels and progress faster up the hierarchy than wage employees without entrepreneurial experience. The majority of the former business owners find jobs in small firms. The return to business ownership experience is lower than the return to wage employee experience, thus suggesting that the labor market imposes a penalty for business ownership experience.     

Poverty,competition, democracy,and ownership: A general equilibrium model with vertical preferences

We consider a general equilibrium model where individuals are simultaneously workers, consumers, and shareholders, with two possible market structures: Monopoly and Duopoly, and two extreme ownership structures: egalitarian and concentrated. Considering three standard poverty indicators, the questions are, whether more competition generates more or less poverty for a given ownership structure; and whether a democratic choice between Monopoly and Duopoly leads to the alternative with less poverty. When the ownership is concentrated, we show that Duopoly generates less poverty than Monopoly and the majority votes for the alternative with less poverty. When the ownership is egalitarian, Duopoly may generate more or less poverty and democratic choice alleviates poverty regarding at least one poverty indicator and worsens poverty regarding at least another one, the three poverty indicators never converging. An empirical study on the effect of competition on poverty supports to some extent our theoretical findings.     

Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

In this paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results show that product market competition has a positive and significant impact on performance. Concerning the effect of ownership concentration, we find a U–shaped relationship with performance. Firms with relatively dispersed and relatively concentrated ownership have higher productivity growth than firms with an intermediate level of ownership concentration. This correlation between concentration of ownership and productivity growth is not explained by the type of the controlling shareholder. Finally, product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other rather than to be substitutes. Competition has no significant effect on performance for the firms with ‘poor’ governance; on the contrary, it has a significant positive effect in the case of firms with ‘good’ corporate governance. JEL classification: D24, G32, L1, P2.     

Ownership structure and access to finance in developing countries

Microsurvey data are used to explore the impact of ownership structure and other firm-specific characteristics on firms’ access to finance in 136 developing countries. The analysis uses a consistent and large data set from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ESs). The results show that ownership structure is a significant predictor of firms’ access to finance but with qualifications. Specifically, private and foreign ownership are more robust predictors of firms financing constraints in developing countries, whilst government ownership and large owners appear significant in accordance with the controlling conditions and mostly in low-income countries. The predictive power and direction of firms’ ownership structure is mitigated by both the specific characteristics of firms and the manner in which country-level factors affect the level of economic and financial activity in a country as well as the individual and social behaviour towards financial contracting.     

Divestitures,privatization and corporate performance in emerging markets

We use new firm‐level data to examine the effects of firm divestitures and privatization on corporate performance in a rapidly emerging market economy. Unlike the existing literature, we control for accompanying ownership changes and the fact that divestitures and ownership are potentially endogenous variables. We find that divestitures increase the firm's profitability but do not alter its scale of operations, while the effect of privatization depends on the resulting ownership structure – sometimes improving performance and sometimes bringing about decline. The effects of privatization are thus more nuanced than suggested in earlier studies. Methodologically, our study provides evidence that it is important to control for changes in ownership when analyzing divestitures and to control for endogeneity, selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects of divestitures and privatization.     

The effects of foreign direct investment on domestic firms

This paper uses firm‐level panel data to investigate empirically the effects of foreign direct investment on the productivity performance of domestic firms in three emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. To this end, a unique firm‐level panel dataset is used with detailed information on foreign ownership at the firm level. Two main questions are addressed in the present paper: (1) do foreign firms perform better than their domestic counterparts? (2) do foreign firms generate spillovers to domestic firms? The estimation technique in this paper takes potential endogeneity of ownership, spillovers and other factors into account by estimating a fixed effects model using instrumental variables in the general methods of moment technique for panel data. Only in Poland, do foreign firms perform better than firms without foreign participation. Moreover, for all three countries studied here, I find no evidence of positive spillovers to domestic firms, on average. In contrast, on average, there are negative spillovers to domestic firms in Bulgaria and Romania, while there are no spillovers to domestic firms in Poland. This suggests a negative competition effect that dominates a positive technology effect. JEL classification: D24, F14, O52, P31.     

Is the effect really so large? Firm‐level evidence on the role of FDI in a transition economy1

Foreign subsidiaries usually perform better than domestic enterprises, but selection effects have been acknowledged in the literature. This article contributes by quantitatively evaluating the size of the selection effects and direct effects of FDI entry. We use a large panel of firm‐level data from Poland and match foreign‐owned firms to a control group of non‐foreign‐owned companies and analyse various performance indicators. In terms of efficiency measures, between 50 and 70 percent of the foreign affiliates advantage may be attributed to direct ownership effects. However, in the case of export intensity, the majority of the differential between the domestic companies and foreign subsidiaries is attributable to selection effects: MNEs choose export‐oriented companies and sectors.     

Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms

We examine the effect of ownership structure on firm performance, for firms listed on Vietnamese stock exchanges, using 2744 firm‐year observations over the period from 2007 to 2012. We find a non‐linear relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. State ownership has a convex relationship with firm performance. This paper finds that firm performance increases beyond 28.67 percent level of state ownership. Foreign ownership has a concave relationship with firm performance. We find that firm performance increases with an increase of foreign ownership up to a level of 43 percent and then decreases. Policy makers should encourage foreign ownership and widely dispersed state ownership in firms, which can help improve firm performance.