WELFARE EFFECTS OF DISTORTIONARY FRINGE BENEFITS TAXATION: THE CASE OF EMPLOYER‐PROVIDED CARS*

In Europe, many employees receive company cars as fringe benefits induced by taxation. We analyze the welfare effects of company car taxation for the Netherlands by estimating to what extent car expenditure and private car travel change when employees receive a company car. Tax treatment of company cars generates an annual welfare loss, ranging from €600 to €780 per company car, mainly due to a shift toward more expensive cars (from €420 to €600), but also due to increased private travel (€180). For the whole of Europe, the annual welfare loss is about €12 billion.     

Optimal taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport: Insights derived from a discrete choice numerical optimization model

We formulated and numerically evaluated a model of car ownership, car use and public transport use for peak and off-peak hours of the day. The model was used to study the optimal tax structure for passenger transport in Belgium, with special emphasis on the optimal tax treatment of diesel versus gasoline cars. We obtained a number of interesting results. First, if the government can set all fixed and variable transport taxes optimally, the higher marginal external cost of diesel use implies that the optimal tax per kilometre for the use of a diesel car is higher than for the use of a gasoline car. Moreover, high congestion implies that the taxes on car use in the peak period are more than twice their current levels. However, the optimal tax on ownership of a diesel car is some 200€ below its current level. Second, if the government uses kilometre taxes that do not differentiate between fuel types, the optimal ownership tax on a diesel car is twice as high as the tax on a gasoline car. Furthermore, if political constraints restrict user taxes to their current levels, we find that optimal ownership taxes on diesel cars double, whereas those on gasoline cars rise by 30%. Finally, subsidies to public transport are found to be optimal as long as variable car taxes are not differentiated between periods.     

Preferences for alternative fuel vehicles of company car drivers

Costs of car ownership for company cars drivers and private car owners are very different. Car use, car choice decisions and preferences for car characteristics may therefore differ substantially between these two markets. In this paper, we present results of a study on the preferences of company car drivers for alternative fuel vehicles and their characteristics, based on data from an online stated choice experiment in the Netherlands. Results show that, assuming current car characteristics, preferences for alternative fuel vehicles, and for electric and fuel cell cars in particular, are substantially lower than those for the conventional technology. Limited driving ranges, long recharge/refuelling times and limited availability of refuelling opportunities, are to a large extent responsible for this. Preferences for alternative fuel vehicles increase considerably with improvements on these aspects, especially for the hybrid and flexifuel car. Under the current company car tax system in the Netherlands, which favours cleaner technologies, these two car types are even preferred to the conventional technology, assuming equal catalogue prices and personal monthly cost contributions. Comparing results with those from a similar choice experiment among private car owners shows that willingness to pay patterns for AFV improvements regarding driving range, recharge and refuelling times, fuel availability and diversity in AFV supply, are considerably different for company car drivers than for private car owners. Company and private car drivers may therefore react (very) differently to future improvements in AFV technology and fuel availability. We finally show that preferences of company car drivers for fuel cell and electric cars depend to a large extent on annual mileage. Market share simulations show that potential early adopters of electric and fuel cell cars can be found among people with a relatively low annual mileage.     

On the marginal excess burden of taxation in an overlapping generations model

We extend marginal excess burden (MEB) analysis in public finance literature to a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous households. This extension allows us to quantitatively assess efficiency ranking and incidence of taxes. Our results indicate a disparity in welfare cost and distributional consequence of different forms of taxation on capital, labor and consumption. According to our MEB ranking, capital income taxation appears to be least efficient as it results in larger marginal excess burdens, compared to labor income tax and consumption tax. The tax incidence analysis shows variation of tax burdens across households, depending on their age, income type and generation. In particular, older households with higher income bear the highest burden of company income tax; meanwhile, future born households bear the highest burden of personal income tax. Hence, our MEB analysis demonstrates a fruitful approach to better understanding efficiency and incidence of tax reforms in one unified framework.     

Efficient black markets?

This paper investigates analytically the welfare effects of black-market activities that firms undertake to evade taxes. The desirability of a black market is linked to the attributes of the goods supplied by black-market firms. The analysis identifies cases where a black market reduces (increases) the distortionary impact of taxation on the allocation of resources across the goods that the government is attempting to tax, leading to a welfare gain (loss).     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

The public and private provision of pure public goods and the distortionary effects of income taxation: a political economy approach

Abstract .  A pure public good is provided by the government and the voluntary contributions of two types of households. The government finances its contribution by means of income taxation. The latter has distortionary effects. A third type of household never makes contributions. We analyse the effects of changes in the income tax rate on (a) the provision of the public good, (b) the private contributions of the households, and (c) changes in the distribution of income and welfare between contributing and non-contributing households. We derive a simple and testable condition under which the lowering of the income tax entails a Pareto improvement.     

Monetary and fiscal policies in a heterogeneous‐agent economy

We study the effects of long‐run inflation and income taxation in an economy where households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. We construct a tractable competitive‐search framework that generates dispersion of prices, income and wealth. We analytically characterize the stationary equilibrium and the policy effects on individual choices. Quantitative analysis finds that monetary and fiscal policies have distinct effects on macro aggregates, such as output, savings and wealth, income and consumption inequalities. There is a hump‐shaped relationship between welfare and the respective policies. Overall, welfare is maximized by a deviation from the Friedman rule, paired with distortionary income taxation.     

Taxation,corruption, and growth

We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.     

The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability

We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional inflations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained fiscal policy and find that strict fiscal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide inflation result in regional inflation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional inflation is less successful since inflation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.     

Optimal income taxation and migration: a world welfare point of view

This paper considers a world in which a distortionary income tax must be employed to raise and redistribute revenue. The optimal taxation of emigrants relative to those left behind is examined under the objective of world social welfare maximization. When tastes for consumption and labor do not depend directly on residence, the optimal tax system induces individuals to reside where the marginal products of their chosen labor supplies are highest. This paper also proves the existence of an optimal tax system under which each individual resides where he pays the greatest tax. This result holds even when tastes are allowed to vary with residence in an interesting way.     

Tax distortions in Sweden and the United States

We calculate the welfare costs of distortionary taxation (including inflation) in models calibrated for the United States and Sweden. The welfare costs are calculated using comparative steady state as well as dynamic analysis, where we take the costs of transition from the distorted to the optimal steady state into account. We also calculate the welfare costs of adding stochastic fluctuations. Our main finding is that the total welfare costs of the distortionary taxes including the distortionary effects of inflation are about five times higher in Sweden than in the United States. Meanwhile, stochastic fluctuations in policy turn out to have a relatively small impact on welfare.     

A classroom game on a negative externality correcting tax: Revenue return,regressivity, and the double dividend

The concept of negative externality is central to the teaching of environmental economics, but corrective taxes are almost always regressive. How exactly might governments return externality-correcting tax revenue to overcome regressivity and not alter marginal incentives? In addition, there is a desire to achieve a double dividend in the use of externality-correcting taxes, that is, to use the revenue to offset existing distortionary taxes, such as those on labor that produce a dead weight loss. In this article, the authors explain a classroom game that was developed for students to understand the theory of externalities, taxation dead weight loss, and regressivity. Then, the problem helps students explore the actual design of a policy that satisfies the double dividend hypothesis and corrects for regressivity.     

Quantifying Optimal Growth Policy

We determine the optimal growth policy within a comprehensive endogenous growth model. The model accounts for important elements of the tax transfer system and for transitional dynamics. It captures the three main growth engines based on standard ingredients in order to understand the quantitative policy and welfare implications of the existing theory. Our calibrated model indicates that the current policy leads to severe underinvestment in both R&D and physical capital, implying that both R&D and capital investment subsidies should be increased substantially. We argue that previous research has overlooked a strong evidence for the welfare significance of the quest for the optimal growth policy by failing to calibrate the distortionary tax system.     

Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds

Discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one-consumer economy, while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution. This paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax, focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high-wage to low-wage workers. In an optimal tax system the MCF will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one. Without optimality the MCF will in general differ between different sources of finance.     

Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child‐Related Cash and In‐Kind Benefits

Abstract. In this paper, we empirically derive the welfare function that guarantees that the current German tax and transfer system for single women is optimal. In particular, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and assess how recent reforms of in‐kind childcare transfers affect the welfare function. Our analysis is based on a discrete model of optimal taxation. We apply this framework using microsimulation and microeconometric techniques. In general, we find that marginal welfare weights are relatively high for non‐working single women. Further, we show that the reform of in‐kind childcare transfers is only optimal if society increases the marginal welfare weights for the working single women.     

Optimal public policy with endogenous mortality

We analyze the welfare‐maximizing policy mix between explicit and implicit taxation, where the probability of survival of the young agents depends upon the share of government expenditure on health, education and infrastructure. We show that increases in the survival probability lead to an increase in the reliance on seigniorage as a welfare maximizing outcome. However, the seigniorage tax base must be large enough for the benevolent planner to use the inflation tax.     

Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curves of the Residential Heating Market: A Microeconomic Approach

In this paper, we develop a microeconomic approach to deduce greenhouse gas abatement cost curves of the residential heating sector. Our research is based on a system dynamics microsimulation of private households’ investment decisions for heating systems to the year 2030. By accounting for household-specific characteristics, we investigate the welfare costs of different abatement policies in terms of the compensating variation and the excess burden. We investigate two policies: (i) a carbon tax and (ii) subsidies on heating system investments. We deduce abatement cost curves for both policies by simulating welfare costs and greenhouse gas emissions to the year 2030. We find that (i) welfare-based abatement costs are generally higher than pure technical equipment costs; (ii) given utility maximizing households a carbon tax is the most welfare-efficient policy and; (iii) if households are not utility maximizing, a subsidy on investments may have lower marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs than a carbon tax.     

Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public Investment in Education

This paper studies the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment in an endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge transmission. Fiscal policy affects growth in two respects: first, work time reacts to variations of prospective tax rates and modifies knowledge formation; second, public spending enhances labour efficiency but also stimulates physical capital through increased savings. It is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on young generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to a pure private system. Non-Ramsey policies that shift the burden on adults are always growth-improving due to crowding-in effects: the welfare of all generations is unambiguously higher with respect to a private system, and there generally exists a continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run growth and welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Fiscal Policy,Economic Integration and Unemployment

In this paper fiscal policy is examined for an open economy characterized by unemployment due to efficiency wages. We allow for capital and firm mobility in a model where the government chooses the level of wage, source-based capital and profit taxation. The taxing choices of governments are analyzed in scenarios which differ with respect to the constraints imposed on the set of available taxes and on the mobility of firms. As a general result, the welfare loss from labor market imperfections increases when tax bases become internationally mobile, which suggests an increasing relevance of domestic labor-market reforms when tax bases become global.