Agency Costs in Apartment Property Management Contracts

Because fees for property management services are based on gross rental collections rather than on net operating incomes, property managers may not always act in the best interest of property owners. This study is an examination of the agency costs that result from the conflict of interests between owners and managers. A nationwide proprietary sample of 242 apartment properties is analyzed to compare agency costs of four distinct types of ownership structures. Agency costs, measured as operating expenses per square foot, are found to be significantly higher for institutional owners than for noninstitutional owners, but not significantly higher in cases where no competition for property management services exists. We conclude that agency costs of property management contracts are significant and the fee provisions of standard property management contracts should be changed to better align the interests of managers and owners.     

Incentives,Monitoring, and Employee Stock Ownership Plans: New Evidence and Interpretations

This paper reviews the theory and evidence for agency theory‐based explanations for employee stock ownership plans found in the financial participation literature. The UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 is used to test whether share plans substitute for direct monitoring and individual incentives. Contrary to some predictions in the literature, individual incentives are found to be complements of share plans, while other measures of monitoring costs provide mixed results. However, it is found that monitoring costs and a wide range of performance targets explain the conjunction of stock plans and individual incentives. It is suggested that share plans are used to mitigate dysfunctional effects of individual incentives by engendering cooperation and trust, and by broadening the range and time frame of desired performance outcomes.     

Privately Versus Publicly Held Asset Investment Performance

Classic asset pricing is problematic as a method to assess privately held asset investment performance. We propose an alternative approach that involves adjusting the characteristics of assets constituting an index or portfolio to match the asset characteristics of a reference index or portfolio. This approach is applied to commercial real estate, where we create an index of REIT returns to compare to the NCREIF index. To enhance comparability, return indices are adjusted for partial-year financial data, leverage, asset mix and fees. Adjusted results over a 1980–1998 sample period show general convergence between the indices, although an annual return difference of over three percentage points remains in favor of public market asset ownership. Possible causes of the investment performance gap include liquidity and geography as missing risk factor adjustments, an unrepresentative sample period, and the form in which commercial real estate assets are held.     

NAV Premiums & REIT Property Transactions

This study explores the outcome for REIT investment in response to NAV premiums considering (1) the volume of acquisition activity, and (2) relative prices paid for individual assets. Regarding the first, we provide evidence that REIT managers increase real estate investment following positive changes in NAV premiums. Regarding the second, we use a large sample of transactions for retail, office and multifamily property and find that REITs appear to pay significantly higher prices relative to other investors. Transaction prices paid by REIT managers for all three property types are positively and significantly affected by market‐wide NAV premiums.     

REIT and Commercial Real Estate Returns: A Postmortem of the Financial Crisis

In the years surrounding the financial crisis, the share prices of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) were much more volatile than the underlying commercial real estate prices. To better understand this phenomenon we examine the cross‐sectional dispersion of REIT returns during this time period with a particular focus on the influence of their capital structures. By looking at both the debt ratio and the maturity structure of the debt, we separate the pure leverage effect from the effect of financial distress. Consistent with leverage and financial distress costs amplifying the price decline, we find that the share prices of REITs with higher debt‐to‐asset ratios and shorter maturity debt fell more during the 2007 to early‐2009 crisis period. Although REIT prices rebounded with the bounce back in commercial real estate prices, financial distress costs had a permanent effect on REIT values. In particular, we find that REITs with more debt due during the crisis period tended to sell more property and issue more equity in 2009, when prices were depressed.     

Returns and Information Transmission Dynamics in Public and Private Real Estate Markets

This paper examines U.S. public and private commercial real estate returns at the aggregate level and by the four major property types over the 1994–2012 time period. Returns are carefully adjusted for differences between public and private markets in financial leverage, property type focus and management fees. Unconditionally, we find that passive portfolios of unlevered core real estate investment trusts (REITs) outperformed their private market benchmark by 49 basis points (annualized) over the 1994–2012 sample period. Our baseline vector autoregression results suggest that REIT returns do not embed additional commercial real‐estate‐specific information useful in predicting private market returns. These results strongly suggest that equity REIT returns react to fundamental (latent) asset pricing information more quickly than private market returns given their greater liquidity and price revelation. REITs therefore serve as a fundamental information transmission channel to private market returns when asset pricing variables are omitted.     

上市公司股权激励盈余管理及影响因素研究

自股权激励办法施行以来,股权激励作为一种降低代理成本的激励方式,被越来越多的上市公司所采用。然而实证发现,盈余管理会伴随股权激励发生,实行股权激励公司在业绩考核第一年存在显著的盈余管理现象,而业绩考核前一年并不存在。在影响盈余管理的因素上,公司选用考核范围更广的业绩指标能减少管理层进行盈余管理的动机,行权时长的增加会给管理层盈余管理造成一些困难,从而抑制管理层在后阶段盈余管理的行为。     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Industrial Design Effectiveness on Corporate Financial Performance*

Despite the growing recognition of industrial design's value in creating sustainable competitive advantage, few studies have attempted to quantify the contribution that design makes to company financial performance. This article examines the relationship between industrial design and company financial performance in order to assess industrial design's contribution to this performance. Effective industrial design was evaluated by asking a panel of 138 industrial design experts to rank the industrial design effectiveness of publicly traded firms within nine selected manufacturing industries; the ranking process yielded 93 firms. Based on the rankings, firms within each industry were divided into two groups: those judged as exhibiting high design effectiveness versus those judged as low in design effectiveness. Audited financial data reported to the SEC across a seven‐year period from 1995 to 2001 were used to evaluate financial performance. Using traditional financial ratios senior managers consider essential performance measures, those firms with high design effectiveness were hypothesized to have higher returns on sales, returns on assets, and growth rates of sales, net income, and cash flow than firms with low design effectiveness. High design effectiveness firms further were hypothesized to have higher stock market returns. These comprehensive, corporate financial measures incorporate expenditures made on industrial design (industrial designers' salaries, design consultants' fees, computer‐aided industrial design equipment) and expenditures that designers influence through their design choices (material costs, manufacturing equipment). This analysis reveals that firms rated as having “good” design were stronger on all measures except growth rate measures. These results provide strong evidence that good industrial design is related to corporate financial performance and stock market performance even after considering expenditures on industrial design. Further, the patterns of financial performance over the seven‐year horizon suggest that these effects are persistent.     

REIT Stock Market Volatility and Expected Returns

We study the relation between REIT stock volatility and future returns, focusing particularly on the financial crisis period of 2007–2009. There is ongoing debate about whether stock volatility can forecast future returns. Our findings suggest that REIT‐implied volatility is negatively related to contemporaneous stock returns; there is a significant positive relationship between REIT implied volatility and future stock volatility; and there is a significant negative relation between REIT implied volatility and future stock returns. Lastly, we develop trading rules based on REIT implied volatility to test whether these relationships are exploitable. The result suggests a potentially profitable trading strategy.     

REIT Dividend Determinants: Excess Dividends and Capital Markets

The determinants of excess dividend payments above mandatory requirements in real estate investment trusts (REITs) are evaluated. Payment of excess dividends is related to factors associated with reduced agency costs, strong operating performance, the implementation of a stock repurchase plan and an ability to access short-term bank debt. Recognizing that access to external capital is essential for long-term growth, REITs manage dividend policy to allow for capital acquisition in the form of both equity and debt. The acquisition and use of short-term bank debt provides REIT management flexibility in determining dividend policy.     

Market Microstructure and Real Estate Returns

This paper examines the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) market microstruc-ture and its relationship to stock returns. When compared with the general stock market, REIT stocks tend to have a lower level of institutional investor participation and are followed by fewer security analysts. In addition, REIT stocks that have a higher percentage of institutional investors or are followed by more security analysts tend to perform better than other REIT stocks. Our results seem to confirm Jensen's ( 1993 , p. 868) proposition that ownership structure (that is, who owns the firm's securities) affects the value of the firm. Our findings also have implications about the well documented phenomenon that the financial performance of Commingled Real Estate Funds (CREFs) is better than that of REITs.     

Do foreign entrepreneurs benefit their firms as managers?

Research summary: The entrepreneurship literature has extensively studied an individual's decision to found a new venture, but it has little to say about the individual's choice to operate this venture personally or hire an agent. This decision is particularly challenging for foreign entrepreneurs, who, in addition to traditional factors, such as agency costs and personal preferences, need to take into consideration the benefits and liabilities of foreignness. Using novel data on foreign entrepreneurial firms and instrumenting for the owner‐manager choice with a visa policy change, we find that managing foreign entrepreneurs significantly improve firm performance. Our results further suggest that foreign owner‐managers reduce operating costs but have no effect on the firm's productivity and growth. Managerial summary: Immigrants represent a significant part of the population in the United States and Europe and are often more entrepreneurial than local nationals. However, a person starting a firm in a foreign country faces unique challenges. One important choice that a foreign entrepreneur has to make is whether to operate the firm personally or hire a local agent. Foreign entrepreneurs are often believed to be worse managers because they have limited local knowledge and skills. However, our results point to the contrary: We find that managing foreign entrepreneurs significantly improve firm performance by decreasing firms' operating costs. This happens because foreign owner‐managers often have access to unique resources, higher work incentives, and superior management skills acquired at home. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of alliance partner choice: Network distance,managerial incentives,and board monitoring

Research Summary: We ask if managerial opportunism is a significant problem in alliance partner choice and examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining this choice. Using a sample of 313 alliances of U.S. firms from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries from 1992 to 2010, we find that managerial incentives lead to managerial preference for relationally risky distant partners over existing and new close partners. Further, board monitoring encourages managers to pursue existing and distant partners over new close ones, choices aligned with shareholder interests. In addition, we find that board monitoring substitutes for managerial incentives in alliance partner choice. We contribute to the literature on alliance partner choice to identify an important, and hitherto, unexplored perspective. Managerial Summary: This article examines whether managers and shareholders view alliance‐related risks differently, and how the divergent interests between managers and shareholders affect alliance partner choice. We argue that managers’ concern about their loss of employment and compensation from alliance failure impedes the choice of relationally risky alliance partners that may increase shareholder value. We also argue that managerial stock ownership and board monitoring mitigate this managerial propensity. Our findings suggest that stock ownership owned by managers and strong board monitoring are effective governance mechanisms to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Our study offers a novel perspective to understand alliance partner choice by viewing the firm as an entity comprised of fragmented interests.     

Managerial response to constitutional constraints on shareholder power

Research summary: We examine whether top managers engage in misconduct, such as illegal insider trading, illegal stock option backdating, bribery, and financial manipulation, in response to the presence, or absence, of governance provisions that impose constitutional constraints on shareholder power. Within the agency framework, shareholders typically oppose governance provisions that limit their power because those provisions could undermine shareholder influence and increase agency costs. However, when shareholders support provisions that constrain their power, managers could respond positively by refraining from self‐interested behavior in the form of managerial misconduct. We find this to be especially true in industries where these governance provisions are particularly relevant to managers and in scenarios where CEOs do not also serve as board chair. Managerial summary: In recent years, shareholders have become central to organizations and the managers who run them. Shareholders and managers establish a rapport with one another, such that the behavior of one affects the behavior of the other. One of the most consequential decisions shareholders can make pertains to the reach of their influence: They can choose to impose strict governance over firms they own or they can allow for constitutional constraints that limit shareholder power. When they act in the mutual interest of managers by allowing such constraints, we find that managers respond in kind by refraining from bad behavior, such as illegal stock options backdating, insider trading, and financial manipulation. This is especially true in industries and scenarios in which shareholder pressure is most relevant to managers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using Experimental and Neurological Data to Gain a Deeper Understanding of Realization Utility Theory

Starting with the premise that realization utility theory helps explain trading behavior, this study combines a carefully crafted experimental design with functional magnetic resonance imaging technology to offer a more inclusive examination of factors that affect REIT trading behavior beyond whether a REIT is simply trading up or down. We add to the nascent field of neurological real estate by finding that local gains/loss domains are more relevant than are global gain/loss considerations, financial skewness is a significant determinant of trading behavior, and that performance inside the REIT market influences how hard subjects think when performing tasks outside the market.     

Real Estate Mutual Funds: Herding,Momentum Trading and Performance

This study jointly examines herding, momentum trading and performance in real estate mutual funds (REMFs). We do this using trading and performance data for 159 REMFs across the period 1998–2008. In support of the view that Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) stocks are relatively more transparent, we find that stock herding by REMFs is lower in REIT stocks than other stock. Herding behavior in our data reveals a tendency for managers to sell winners, reflective of the “disposition effect.” We find low overall levels of REMF momentum trading, but further evidence of the disposition effect when momentum trading is segregated into buy–sell dimensions. We test the robustness of our analysis using style analysis, and by reference to the level of fund dividend distribution. Our results for this are consistent with our conjecture about the role of transparency in herding, but they provide no new insights in relation to the momentum‐trading dimensions of our analysis. Summarizing what are complex interrelationships, we find that neither herding nor momentum trading are demonstrably superior investment strategies for REMFs.     

When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior

We develop a contingency approach to explain how firm ownership influences the monitoring function of the board—measured as the magnitude of external audit fees contracted by the board—by extending agency theory to incorporate the resource dependence notion that boards have distinct incentives and abilities to monitor management. Analyses of data on Continental European companies reveal that while board independence and audit services are complementary when ownership is dispersed, this is not the case when ownership is concentrated—suggesting that ownership concentration and board composition become substitutes in terms of monitoring management. Additional analysis shows that the relationship between board composition and external audit fees is also contingent upon the type of the controlling shareholder. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incentive Problems and General Partner Compensation in Limited Partnership Real Estate Investments

When a general partner raises capital for a real estate syndication, prospective investors should price-protect against incentives of the general partner to misrepresent project cash flows. In this study, I evaluate the structure of the general partner's compensation and specific project characteristics to determine if compensation structure can mitigate agency costs. Results indicate that front-end compensation is higher for the high reputation general partner and that the compensation structure varies with the degree of management expertise required and the financial risks of the investment.     

Food safety and product liability

This paper focuses on the U.S. product liability system for food poisoning cases and makes six key points. First, current legal incentives to produce safer food are weak, though slightly stronger in outbreak situations and in markets where foodborne illness can be more easily traced to individual firms. Far less than 0.01% of cases are litigated and even fewer are paid compensation. Second, even if potential plaintiffs can overcome the high information and transaction costs necessary to file lawsuits, monetary compensation provides only weak incentives to pursue litigation. Firms paid compensation in 56% of the 294 cases examined in this study and the median compensation was only $2,000 before legal fees. Third, indirect incentives for firms may be important and deserve more research. For example, firms may be influenced by costly settlements and decisions against other firms in the same industry. Fourth, confidential settlements, health insurance, and product liability insurance distort legal incentives to produce safer food. Fifth, the ambiguity about whether microbial contamination is “natural” or an “adulterant” hinders the legal system from effectively dealing with food safety issues. Sixth, a brief comparison of the incentives from U.S. and English legal systems suggests that more research is needed to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and relative impact of each country's legal system on the incentives to produce safer food.