Exchange and evolution

This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination, adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general “generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.      

Complexity and the limits to learning

In this paper we look at the manner in which ideas coming from complexity science change our understanding of the cognitive powers of agents that is really necessary to explain the evolution of markets and of firms. The general ideas behind complex systems dynamics and evolution are presented and then two examples are treated in detail. The first in an evolutionary model of a market in which some new product is developed by competing firms and their “task” is to find a strategy in terms of quality and price that will be sustainable. This essentially requires agents/firms to discover mutually compatible strategies, and to create thereby sustainable market niches. The second example considers the internal structure of firms, in terms of their constituent working practices and skills. It demonstrates that it is precisely their ignorance of the consequences of adopting any particular practice that generates diversity in the emergent capabilities of firms, exploring the dimension of potential demand and therefore leading to a successful and sustainable business sector. The work supports the notion that the cognitive abilities that are involved are not about deduction and logic, as a traditional view of rationality might suggest, but are about the development and contraction of interpretive frameworks, which will be different for each player. The paper links these examples to a general recognition of the idea that complex, multi-agent systems evolve through successive “structural attractors”—multi-dimensional dynamical systems—with temporary structural stability. Because real systems contain both the structure and deviations from it, then there is a constant probing of structural stability and the possibility of qualitative change to a new structural attractor. This resembles the ideas in biological evolution related to “punctuated equilibria,” but it also links this to the idea of emergent and evolving networks of interaction, never of course near thermodynamic equilibrium.      

Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs

This paper studies decisions by firms of whether to attempt “behavior-based” price discrimination in markets with switching costs by using a two-period duopoly model. When both firms commit themselves to a pricing policy and consumers are “sophisticated” and have rational expectations, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium with both firms engaging in uniform pricing. Both firms are better off in the uniform pricing equilibrium, compared with the discriminatory equilibrium.      

Solving coordination failure with “all-or-none” group-level incentives

Coordinating activity among members is an important problem faced by organizations. When firms, or units within firms, are stuck in bad equilibria, managers may turn to the temporary use of simple incentives—flat punishments or rewards—in an attempt to transition the firm or unit to a more efficient equilibrium. We investigate the use of incentives in the context of the “minimum-effort,” or “weak-link,” coordination game. We allow groups to reach the inefficient equilibrium and then implement temporary, flat, “all-or-none” incentives to encourage coordination on more efficient equilibria. We vary whether incentives are positive (rewards) or negative (penalties), whether they have substantial or nominal monetary value, and whether they are targeted to a specific outcome (the efficient equilibrium) or untargeted (apply to more than one outcome). Overall, incentives of all kinds are effective at improving coordination while they are in place, but there is little long-term persistent benefit of incentives—once incentives are removed, groups tend to return to the inefficient outcome. We find some differences between different kinds of incentives. Finally, we contrast our results to other recent work demonstrating greater long-term effectiveness of temporary incentives.      

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

Benefit Transfer Equivalence Tests with Non-normal Distributions

Equivalence testing reverses traditional null and alternative hypotheses—welfare estimates are assumed different unless tests demonstrate that the difference is smaller than a specified tolerance limit. Within benefit transfer, researchers have universally used the “two one-sided t-test” (TOST) equivalence test, an approach that is invalid for non-normal welfare distributions. This paper proposes an alternative based on the difference between independent empirical distributions, denoted the “two one-sided convolutions” (TOSC) test. The TOSC permits valid inference for non-normal distributions. Empirical assessments show large divergences between TOST and TOSC p-values when distributions are non-normal—demonstrating the likelihood of erroneous inference under the TOST.     

The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian aspirations

The use of the “principal–agent” model makes an implicit assumption about the existence of an underlying global optimum or “general will.” This assumption is debatable, and Besley does not defend it sufficiently or even seem to realize how strong an assumption it is. Still, it is standard in the literature, and Besley’s book is a very strong contribution to that literature. Its two greatest strengths are its solid microfoundations, and its use of the classical “comparative statics” approach to analyze dynamics.      

Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the “Coase theorem”

This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition.     

Pricing inputs to induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions

We investigate input pricing regimes that induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions by entrants when there is constant returns in the production of the input(s) and simultaneous noncooperative price competition in downstream retail markets. Necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient Make-or-Buy decisions are derived. The necessary condition shows that input prices are relevant for Make-or-Buy decisions except under restrictive and often unverifiable assumptions on the demand structure, and that the least informationally-demanding way to ensure efficient Make-or-Buy decisions is to price inputs at marginal cost provided changes in the entrant’s cost have a “normal” effect on the entrant’s profit. The conditions also show that pricing the incumbent’s input at the entrant’s marginal cost always ensures efficient Make- or-Buy decisions. The extent to which input prices can depart from marginal cost while still inducing efficient Make-or-Buy decisions increases with the efficiency differential between the incumbent and entrant and with the demand displacement ratio.      

Economic Growth and (Re-)Distributive Policies in a Non-cooperative World

Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing (“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively high growth.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.      

The behaviour of producer prices: evidence from French PPI micro data

This paper provides some new empirical findings for how French producers set prices. We used the micro data that composes the producer and business-service price indices from 1994 to 2005. First we address how producer prices are collected. Then we present the main characteristics of how producers change their prices: they are modified infrequently and in small amounts. Also, a behavioural heterogeneity across sectors is observed. Business-service prices change less often than industrial producer prices. The data corroborates both time and state-dependent model predictions. Taylor contracts are not unusual, but a firm’s prices will also react to its economic situation. Nevertheless, the most relevant models, to explain producer price rigidity, are time-dependent.

“The fact that some prices are rigid or sticky, while others are variable, has attracted a good deal of comments from economists in recent years” Tucker (1938)

This study was conducted in the context of the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network. Data were processed under the responsibility of INSEE in the context of an agreement between INSEE and the Banque de France (20B-21B-E301/R05019/2005).     

The Consumer’s Micro-Micro Gasoline Buying Decision

A “micro-micro” consumer problem of gasoline purchases is examined using daily price data. Comparing the optimizing consumer with one who buys gasoline at random, the paper finds optimizers save about 4% of their annual gasoline bill. The paper also provides some evidence about the costs of non-optimal gasoline buying strategies.      

Endogenous structural change and crisis in a multiple time-scales growth model

The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies, and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn “productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path. Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as long term and endogenous outcomes.     

On bubbling dynamics generated by a stochastic model of herd behavior

This paper suggests a class of stochastic collective learning processes exhibiting very irregular behavior. In particular, there are multimodal long run distributions. Some of these modes may vanish as the population size increases. This may be thought of as “bubbles” persistent for a finite range of population sizes but disappearing in the limit. The limit distribution proves to be a discontinuous function of parameters determining the learning process. This gives rise to another type of “bubbles”: limit outcomes corresponding to small perturbations of parameters are different. Since an agent's decision rule involves imitation of the majority choice in a random sample of other members of the population, the resulting collective dynamics exhibit “herding” or “epidemic” features. RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions. Correspondence to: L. Gaio     

From weight watchers to state watchers: Towards a narrative of liberalism

Alan Kahan’s Mind vs. Money: The War between Intellectuals and Capitalism (Transaction Publishers, 2010) treats intellectuals as a class and tells of intellectuals’ yearning to play the role of cleric and aristocrat. Kahan says that intellectuals are necessarily alienated from “capitalism.” In this essay, I discuss Kahan’s erudite and insightful—though sometimes exasperating—work, and I take the opportunity to develop some ideas on the topic, ideas in line with Hayek’s thought.     

Conditional correlations in the returns on oil companies stock prices and their determinants

The identification of the forces that drive stock returns and the dynamics of their associated volatilities is a major concern in empirical economics and finance. This analysis is extremely important for determining optimal hedging strategies. This paper investigates the stock prices’ returns and their financial risk factors for several integrated oil companies, namely Bp (BP), Chevron-Texaco (CVX), Eni (ENI), Exxon-Mobil (XOM), Royal Dutch (RD) and Total-Fina Elf (TFE). We measure the actual co-risk in stock returns and their determinants “within” and “between” the different oil companies, using multivariate cointegration techniques in modelling the conditional mean, as well as multivariate GARCH models for the conditional variances. The distinguishing features of this paper are: (i) focus on the determinants of the market value of each company using the cointegrated VAR/VECM methodology; (ii) specification of the conditional variances of VECM residuals with the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) multivariate GARCH model of Bollerslev [(1990) Review of Economics and Statistics 72:498–505] and the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) multivariate GARCH model of Engle [(2002) Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20:339–350]; (iii) discussion of the performance of optimal hedge ratios calculated with the DCC estimates. The “within” and “between” DCC indicate time-varying interdependence between stock return volatilities and their determinants. Moreover, DCC models are shown to produce more accurate hedging strategies.     

Regulation of the evolution of the architecture of a network by tensors operating on coalitions of actors

Socio-economic networks, neural networks and genetic networks describe collective phenomena through constraints relating actions of several actors, coalitions of these actors and multilinear connectionist operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. We provide a class of control systems governing the evolution of actions, coalitions and multilinear connectionist operators under which the architecture of the network remains viable. The controls are the “viability multipliers” of the “resource space” in which the constraints are defined. They are involved as “tensor products” of the actions of the coalitions and the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through the “cost” of the constraints under the viability multiplier regarded as a price.     

Efficient ecosystem services and naturalness in an ecological/economic model

In an integrated economic/ecological model, the economy benefits from ecosystem services that include: (1) the consumptive use of a harvested species, (2) the non-consumptive use of popular species, and (3) naturalness, i.e., the divergence of the ecosystem’s biodiversity from its natural steady state. The biological component of the model, which is applied to a nine-species Alaskan marine ecosystem, relies on individual optimizing behaviour by plants and animals to establish population dynamics. The biological component is used to define naturalness. By varying harvesting we arrive at different steady-state populations and humans choose from among these steady states. Welfare maximizing levels of the ecosystem services are derived, then it is shown that in the laissez-faire economy overharvesting occurs when the harvesting industry ignores ecosystem services (2) and (3). Lastly, we introduce efficiency restoring taxes and standards that internalize the ecosystem externalities.